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To our heroes, who braved and defeated the most powerful armies in the 
world so we may live free. To Toussaint Louverture, who sought to craft a strong 
state and to Dessalines who was ridiculed as backward by neocolonial elites for 
securing the rights of women and undermining race as a category upon which 
politics should be based in the Haitian Constitution. This work is dedicated to the 
Haitian people, who have struggled against all odds to break the chains of 
oppression, and, who continue to struggle to secure their freedom and dignity 
against those who see freedom and human dignity as a threat to their power. 
HAITI PAP PERI! HAITI WILL NOT PERISH! 
This work is dedicated to my family, my wife Nicole, my daughters Isabella 
Rose and Alexa Marie, and my son Stefan Alexander, who suffered the long 
nights of my absence in their lives so this work could be done… I love you!  
To my father, Dr. Lucien St Louis, who saved Les Cayes from slaughter, 
and his brother, Judge Maxime St Louis, who safeguarded the rights of a 
peasant against an officer and was shot six times in retaliation but still insisted, 
until his death, that the rights of a person could not rest in his/her wealth, status 
and position but according to the law. To Grandfather Solidaire, who faced an 
Army, unafraid because “preserving his integrity and the lives of his neighbors 
were more important than the fear of death.” Your lives reflect the indomitable 
Haitian revolutionary slogan “LIBÈTÈ ou LANMÒ!”- liberty or death. To my 
grandparents Ileide and Joseph St Louis. who dedicated their lives to service, 
  
and Sister Monique St Louis who founded the first indigenous convent as a 
service to the nation and its people.  The struggle to create a Haitian state worthy 
of the valor of its people continues. 
 





I set out to provide a comprehensive political history of the Haitian State 
so that future generations may assess, without polemics, the path forward for a 
nation, that although targeted and maligned its entire existence, has been “the 
city on the Hill”, an inspiration to those seeking freedom, and a source of fear for 
those who deal in oppression and exploitation. That this labor of love has 
achieved completion because of the contributions of so many people is truly 
reflective of the Haitian motto, “L ’Union Fait La Force”. Naming all those who 
have supported me and contributed to this work would require several pages. 
You know who you are. There are, however, a few people, whose invaluable 
service ought to be acknowledged. 
I am blessed with family and friends, R. Michelle Tirado Pierre, Herland 
Walker Pierre, Therese Tirado Heilborn, Maxant and Sonia St Louis, Oksana 
Stowell, who have supported and believe in me. I am grateful to Sagine and 
Philippe Boigris who opened their home to me and supported the research, and 
Anne-Christele Boigris, who told me, “just go home, my mom will take care of 
you”. I am indebted to you. To Ronald Vulcain for his conversations and support, 
Marc-Elie who drove me to all the interviews and appointments, and Dr. Joseph 
Ferdinand who read the document with excitement, encouraging me to keep 
going, “because this is a work that will teach others what I never learned about 
my own country”. Even when dealing with the loss of your wife, you took time out 
to call asking me for the next chapter. To Fr. Mike Cronogue, who encouraged 
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the completion of this work and passed away before seeing it, I miss you. I am 
grateful for being part of a loving family who understood the importance of the 
work. To my mother-in-law and father-in-law, Linda and Roger Pignataro for their 
encouragements and many days of babysitting to give me time to write, and 
especially Linda, for reading the manuscripts even with dry and painful eyes. My 
thanks also to Herbert-Walker Pierre for our countless conversations from 
beginning to end.  
I am particularly grateful to Professors Carlene Edie and John Bracey who 
have taught me how to connect the dots, and to never compromise truth for 
comfort. From my undergraduate senior thesis to my doctoral dissertation, I 
remain committed to your fierce and uncompromising analysis of the Black 
experience and the diaspora.  Professor Edie, thank you for your patience, and 
the time and energy you have invested in me and in this work. Thank you for all 
the mentoring, prodding, intellectual engagements and for walking with me in this 
long and difficult path. I remain convinced that the ancestors placed you in my 
path as a testament that they are still amongst us. They have blessed you with 
the authenticity and ability to carry yourself as a brilliant Caribbean scholar, a 
Black diasporic woman, and in the fierce spirit of the Jamaican maroons without 
forgetting to laugh. I thank you for asking me tough questions without 
discouraging me, for pointing me in the right directions without undermining my 
vision and authenticity. Most importantly, I thank you for your expertise in 
engaging the Caribbean context with laser precision and forcing me to look 
carefully, deeply, and dispassionately and opt not for an easy analysis, but for 
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something valuable and new. You have been an inspiration in my life since my 
undergraduate years, and an epitome of the power of Black Caribbean 
womanhood. Professor Robinson, your encouragement, patience, and 
friendship have been invaluable to me. Your broad intellectual focus and 
knowledge have made you an invaluable support. You have enriched my life with 
personal and intellectual discussions. Your focus on the common man and the 
impact of policies on their lives has been inspiring. Your mentoring and brotherly 
care has allowed me to stay steady in the face of insurmountable work and 
personal difficulty. When the analysis needed reinforcement, you asked subtle 
questions that sent me back to the drawing board excited about clarifying and 
strengthening my argument.  Professor Higginson, most will say that they value 
your brilliant mind, your understanding, and love of history. My family and I 
continue to talk about your love, gentleness, and expressions of care. Your 
cross-regional knowledge and understanding of the history of Africa and its 
diaspora have been inspiring. I appreciate your wisdom and your suggestions 
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 This dissertation posits that the fragility of the Haitian state emerges from 
a key disjuncture from the state crafted by Northern Louverturean elites during 
and after the struggle for independence. Louverturean elites crafted a strong 
state that incorporated and regulated all national cleavages and interests as the 
basis for legitimacy and stability. This state secured their interests while 
regulating their capacity to circumvent the interests of other cleavages. Most 
importantly, it secured the rights of former slaves on whose exploitation other 
cleavages depended. The destruction of the Louverturean state by neocolonial 
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elites and imposition of a neocolonial national state estranged from the majority 
of the population lacked the requisite legitimacy. The shift from the Louverturean 
state to one diametrically opposed to the interests of the majority of its citizens 
disregarded the integrative and protective measures upon which the 
Louverturean state secured its legitimacy.  
Despite multiple attempts to reconstitute the Louverturean state, it was the 
neocolonial national state that was consolidated during the American occupation. 
Following his election in 1957, Francois Duvalier returned to the Louverturean 
state model by incorporating the Black masses and middle class, expanding the 
public sector, protecting the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation, regulating 
commerce, and breaking neocolonial Mulatto stranglehold. Though successful, 
he was constrained by the existing state structure. 
Arguing that the American Occupation consolidated, centralized, and 
enhanced the state’s capacity to support neocolonial elites’ historical exploitative 
schemes, this study suggests that by consolidating the neocolonial national state 
historically deficient in legitimacy and popular support, the Occupation 
accentuated its disconnection from the population and its institutional and 
political deficiencies created the conditions for contemporary instability and state 
failure. 
Contemporary political studies of Haiti offer a linear, unidimensional, and 
incomplete analysis of the Haitian state ignoring Louverturean statecraft. 
Analyzing Haitian political history and state crafting before, during and after the 
American Occupation is necessary to understand its contemporary challenges, 
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and its search for democratic accountability. Such an analysis demands an 
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                                              INTRODUCTION 
Haiti is a relatively large Caribbean nation with a population of 
approximately 10.6 million, located on the Western one-third of Hispaniola, the 
island it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haitians are a mixture of Africans 
(95%), Europeans, Mulattoes (a mixed population of Africans and Europeans), 
with a recent influx of Middle Easterners, Asians, and Latin Americans. Like all 
other Caribbean societies, Haiti is stratified along racial and class lines stemming 
from plantation slavery. Often there has been a close correlation in the society 
between color and class, with whites representing the top of the hierarchy in 
terms of power, status, and wealth, Mulattoes in the middle and blacks at the 
bottom with very high levels of deprivation. The post-emancipation period left the 
color lines, the plantation legacy that privileged whiteness, and near-whiteness 
intact, maintaining the cycle of color and class correlation still pervasive in the 
Caribbean, Latin America and many other former plantation societies. 
Post-revolution Haiti, on the other hand, upended the racial hierarchy that 
persisted in most other post-slavery Caribbean societies, putting blacks at the 
center of power as crafters and leaders of the state. Black leaders crafted a 
defensive and legitimate state with the capacity to protect its black citizens, with 
its legitimacy derived from its ability to balance and regulate the interests of all 
racial groups and class cleavages.  With the negligible European population that 
existed after independence, competition for control of the state emerged between 
Mulattoes and the black revolutionary elites over not just the state, but a 
divergent conception or model of the state necessary for governing.  Mulattoes 
became a proxy for whiteness and the continuity of the colonial system of black 
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exploitation and subservience. This divergent conception of the state and the 
competition between Mulattoes and black elites over the implementation of their 
distinct model has resulted in a political conflict that has been played out over the 
past two centuries. Haitian scholars have often characterized this competition as 
simply the results of racial acrimony and intra-elite conflict, obviating the struggle 
over state crafting and state models in which the competition is rooted.  
Divided and unequal societies, such as those that emerged from colonial 
rule in the Caribbean and Latin America, Africa and Asia, typically experienced 
external domination, disharmony, ethnic conflict, political immobilism and 
sometimes civil wars and the disintegration of the state. Haiti might have been 
expected to follow that pattern after its independence in 1804.  But Haiti had a 
unique place in post-colonial studies as the nation that carried out the first 
successful slave revolt in the western hemisphere.  Despite the inherent divisions 
and conflicts that existed in the colonial slave society of Haiti, after the revolution 
that ended that system Toussaint Louverture managed to conceptualize and put 
in place a stable, legitimate state that served the interests of the black majority 
well, enjoyed their support, and protected the sovereignty of the nation against 
foreign encroachments.  The disintegration of that state, and its replacement by a 
neocolonial state resulted in centuries of successive conflicts and ultimately the 
subjugation of the state to the whims of foreign powers to the detriment of the 
Haitian state and nation.  
 Contemporary studies lament Haiti’s decline since its glorious victory 
against France in 1804, and in the comparative politics literature Haiti has now 
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become synonymous with chronic underdevelopment, kleptocratic rule, political 
instability, and external dependency.  The earthquake that struck Haiti in Januray 
2010 destroyed most of the capital of Port-au-Prince, killed over 300,000 people, 
further immiserized the Haitian population, and destroyed most of Haiti’s state 
institutions.  Many questions emerged before and after that horrific experience. 
For most Haitian policymakers and scholars, the central question facing Haiti 
became: What kind of state should post-earthquake policies support?  For the 
majority classes who had lived their lives outside of the state’s protection since 
the demise of the Louverturean state, the very existence of the state became the 
focus: Where is the state? they inquired, openly decrying its absence and its 
inability to protect their lives. These were certainly crucial questions to which 
meaningful answers are needed.  
          Haiti was indeed at a crossroads in January 2010 and the post-earthquake 
realities offered both Haitians citizens, policymakers, scholars, and members of 
the international community a unique opportunity to address Haiti’s persistent 
instability.  The Haitian state had already collapsed before its structural 
destruction by the 2010 earthquake. As Zanotti suggests, “the weakness of the 
Haitian state was not created by the earthquake” (Zanotti 2010, 756). While most 
commentators characterized Haiti as a “failed state,” there appears to be little 
focus on the causes of that failure. Nevertheless, prescriptions for its 
rehabilitation or rebuilding abound (R. J. Fatton 2010).  
          This dissertation seeks to contribute a state-centered analysis that can 
illuminate the context of state failure in Haiti, and its predisposition to oppose the 
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type of popular redistributive democracy the Haitian masses support.  The 
research question that guides this study is: what is the relationship between state 
formation and democratic accountability in post-colonial states?   Answers to that 
question will be supported by the following arguments: 
       1) Initially crafted by Toussaint Louverture and other Northern revolutionary 
leaders to manage divergent interests within the nation and secure its legitimacy 
by protecting the rights of its newly free citizens, the state, which I refer to as a 
Louverturean state, persisted, stable, responsive and strong. Its legitimacy was 
firmly established on its interdependence with and reliance on the majority of its 
citizens for its defense and its ability to protect their freedom, preserve their 
interests, and prevent their return to slavery. The Louverturean state served both 
as both a constraint on powerful established cleavages to prevent the 
exploitation of its new citizens, and a protector of the interests of those cleavages 
against uprisings and revenge attacks. 
        2) Until its demise and replacement by neocolonial elites whose power it 
was designed to manage and constrain in order to secure the rights of the 
majority of its citizens, the Louverturean state provided a model of governance 
that was both accountable and legitimate – indispensable to all cleavages for 
both constraints and protection. It served as the only national arbiter capable of 
managing the interests of all cleavages without exclusion or favoritism. Its 
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replacement by a new state, a “neocolonial state1” reestablished patterns of 
colonial domination, and class and racial hierarchy by securing the power of 
neocolonial elites to the detriment of the black majority. This shift created a 
national schism that has undermined the prospects for stable governance. 
Consequently, the neocolonial state imposed by neocolonial elites faced a 
population and Northern Louverturean elites determine to oppose its operation 
and consolidation, and curtail its ability to impose a national vision which 
countered their interests (Ardouin 1860, P. Sannon 1905, Leyburn 1966, Barros 
1984, Gros 2012). Until the American occupation, the neocolonial state was the 
site of armed and unarmed contestations and conflicts, weak and illegitimate, 
with only intermittent period of stability under Louverturean nationalist control.  
          3) The American Occupation pacified the armed opposition, disarmed the 
population, eliminated Northern Louverturean elites, re-crafted, centralized and 
consolidated the neocolonial state giving it the capacity to impose its will on the 
nation while securing the power of neocolonial elites. This consolidated 
neocolonial state failed to acquire the requisite legitimacy and state-society 
interdependence of its Louverturean counterpart (Nicholls 1979, Gaillard 1984, 
Laguerre 1993, Schmidt 1995).  The consolidated state that emerged as a result 
of the Occupation was predisposed against the majority of its citizens, and 
unaccountable and impervious to pressures from them (Barros 1984, Betances 
                                                          
1 By neocolonial state, I mean a mean that preserve some of the colonial patterns of domination and 
exploitation by neglecting the interests of the majority of its citizens, barely acknowledging them as full 
citizens deserving of protection. 
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1995, Casimir and Dubois 2010).  The American Occupation provided 
neocolonial elites with a consolidated state to preserve their institutional, 
economic, and political dominance with the coercive capacity to maintain them. 
         4)  The post-occupation state, crafted to support Neocolonial Mulatto 
dominance and preserve commercial interests, became embroiled in racial 
schism, which led to the rise of Francois Duvalier and the consolidation of his 
Duvalierist regime under Noirism, a black nationalist ideology (Castor 1971, 
Nicholls 1979, Dupuy 1989,  B. Plummer 1990, Trouillot 1990). This centralized 
and coercive post-occupation state became the vehicle for Duvalierist power 
within the constraints of the post-occupation neocolonial state. Even the demise 
and popular overthrow of “Duvalierism” in the 1980s, and the ensuing democratic 
transition supported by the majority of the population did not succeed in changing 
its orientation. The military-dominated state, crafted to constrain, if not oppose, 
popular demands, forcefully opposed the democratic movement. At a time when 
it needed to bolster its legitimacy by supporting the popular democratic 
movement to ease the state-nation tension and intra-national conflicts that had 
historically undermined institutional capacity and trust, and democratic 
accountability, its action exacerbated them (Dalvius 1987, Dejan Mars, 1987, M. 
S. Laguerre 1993, R. J. Fatton 2002). This post-occupation state’s historical 
predisposition against popular accountability, forceful resistance to demands for 
democratic accountability, and its failure to control the popular democratic forces, 
resulted in its weakness and ultimate collapse. 
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 Theories of democratization have cohered around the elements required 
for successful transitions to democratic states (Dahl 1971, O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986, Peeler 2009, Howe, Popovski and Notaras 2010). To date, these 
theories have not considered the cumulative effects of negative outcomes from 
an earlier period, which shape the opportunity structure available to historical 
actors at later times (Pierson 2000). On one hand, Haitian leaders bear 
considerable responsibility for failing to advance a coherent, nation-building 
project. On the other hand, their attempts, disagreements, negotiations, 
compromises and battles, have never happened in a “neutral” political context, 
but have rather taken place under conditions and structures accrued historically 
and augmented by profound antagonism from international actors, and 
asymmetrical power among relevant constituents. 
          5)  The demise of the post-occupation neocolonial state creates the space 
for a recalibration of analyses in search of a formula to state crafting and perhaps 
and more importantly, a re-evaluation of the Louverturean state model and its 
relevance to national stability and popular legitimacy. It is an opportunity to 
account for, and challenge the nature of the centralized post-occupation state 
that have led to subsequent failure of democratic governance in Haiti. Such a 
formula can help conceptualize a state that is responsive to all competing claims, 
and strong enough to balance and manage those claims in order to establish 
stable and accountable democratic governance. Louverturean statecraft, to date 
overlooked by Haitian scholars and policy-makers, can provide us with the 
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analytical framework, and national model grounded in popular legitimacy to 
address contemporary crises and democratic instability in Haiti. 
 
 
                RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation is a socio-historical study of the Haitian state and its role in the 
democratization process. Most of the information was gathered through archival 
research. Given that until the death of Dr. Francois Duvalier in 1971, prominent 
Haitian intellectuals who addressed pertinent social and political challenges 
faced by the nation were involved in the state system, their work encompassed 
more than mere intellectual debates; they were policy formulations. One cannot 
understand Haitian state policies outside of the dominant intellectual debates of 
their time. 
Archival Research: I engaged in archival research in the Five College library 
system of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and Mount Holyoke, 
Smith, Amherst and Hampshire Colleges that housed microfiches of historical 
documents dating back to 1797.  Correspondence between the American Council 
in Haiti and Haitian leaders, the American government, and other foreign 
governments, were located in this library system as well as in the libraries of the 
University of Vermont. I also compiled out-of-print manuscripts and documents 
from the French website (http://gallica.bnf.fr) that are not found in the U.S. and 
are no longer in publication. For documents pertinent to the U.S. Occupation 
(1915-1934) and other documents on U.S. government policies towards Haiti, I 
used the archives of the George Washington University and the Library of 
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Congress in Washington D.C.  Archival research in Haiti was limited due to the 
damages caused by the 2010 earthquake.  
Interviews: Field research and interviews were conducted in Haiti from February 
to April 2013, June to August in 2014 and 2015, and in the U.S. from 2013-2015. 
The primary data gathered from the field research complemented secondary 
sources such as books, journal articles, publications from international financial 
institutions, national policy papers, published and unpublished manuscripts, and 
seminar proceedings. Interviewees include some Haitian intellectuals and policy-
makers, including President Aristide, and various former ministers. Looking at the 
policy patterns, political debates, and policy decisions of various state actors, 
political elites, and ethnic factions should provide us with answers pertinent to 
Haiti’s democratic challenges. It also helped to explain the historical legitimacy 
challenge faced by the state.   
Surveys: The dissertation made use of the 2005 World Value Survey questions 
to assess how different segments of the Haitian population feel about institutional 
legitimacy, trust, and confidence in their state and state actors.  The World Value 
Survey is one of the most important research instituions, and since 1980 has 
been running comparative surveys that assess countries across the globe. I 
selected specific questions from their questionnaire (see attaced survey 
questions in the Appendix A) and they are divided into seven categories: 
Population dynamics, Economic Confidence and Effectiveness, Political 
Participation, Institutional Trust, Trust in Law and Order, Trust in State Actors, 
and National Outlook. A series of open-ended questions are included to allow 
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respondents free range in addressing issues they deem to be important and offer 
their own insights. (see attached in Appendix B). The target groups for the survey 
are Haitians living in Haiti as well as abroad, and Haitian-Americans closely 
associated with Haiti and NGO representaives working in Haiti. I had access to 
various listserves that assisted me with survey distributions. I also utilized my 
connections to NGO professionals, and former and current Haitian state 
employees who responded to the survey. The respondents were 18 years and 
older, and their socio-economic backgrounds ranged from working class to elites. 
The target sample size was 500 with 342 respondents; a 68.4% participation 
rate. 
 The surveys were distributed both online and in hardcopies at random in 
different geographical locations in Haiti to ensure that a greater cross-section of 
the population participated. Students from the Haitian State University assisted in 
its distribution while Haitian scholars and consultants supported the effort as 
volunteers and unpaid collegial advisors. 
 
                                              Organization  
Chapter I presents a literature review of the dominant approaches that 
have been used to analyze and understand the modern Haitian state. The 
chapter provides a framework for understanding the emergence of the Haitian 
state within the broader context of postcoloniality in the Caribbean and Africa.   
 11 
 
Chapter II analyzes the historical context of the emergence of the Haitian 
state after the end of slavery and the implementation of the Louverturean state. 
The chapter offers an original analysis of Haitan statecraft during a momentous 
period in Haitian history that has been largely neglected in world history.   
Chapter III analyzes the destruction of the Louverturean state and 
collapse of the revolutionary northern politico-military governance as a result of 
infighting and competition between Mulatto elites and black nationalists. This 
chapter will provide a framework for understanding the role of the American 
occupation in leading to the emergence of a client regime that was funded to 
support both elites and American interests in Haiti.   
Chapter IV explores the argument that the American Occupation 
centralized and consolidated the neocolonial state, reorganizing the military as its 
primary and most powerful institution. The military-centered state under the 
control of neo-colonial elites began a process of entrenched struggle over military 
control between Black nationalist and Mulatto elites.  The role of the military in 
that struggle has to be understood in the context of the American preference for 
a state-controlled military-centered approach to governance not only in Haiti, but 
also in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.  
          Chapter V focuses on the phenomenon of Duvalierism, following the 
election of Francois Duvalier.  Most studies suggest the rise of Francois Duvalier 
to power as a predictable event given the trajectory of Haiti’s authoritarian 
history. Departing from those studies, the chapter suggests a link between the 
Occupation and the exacerbation of historical racial schism that facilitated the 
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rise of the Duvalierist regime. Though symbolically Louverturean, the neocolonial 
framework that was imposed and within which Duvalier evolved, limited his 
capacity to protect the nation against foreign domination. The chapter ends with 
an analysis of the failure of Jean-Claude Duvalier to maintain the stable 
authoritarian state he inherited from his father, resulting in the creation of spaces 
for a democratic movement to emerge.  
Chapter VI examines the democratic transition in Haiti that begun after the 
collapse of Duvalierism in 1984.   The chapter addresses the eclipsing of the 
post-occupation state for an NGO-run state and the need for state crafting to 
develop a strong state to support democratic continuity. It argues that democracy 
requires an effective state, and suggests that the Haitian citizenry have not been 
in support of merely procedural democracy and the pattern of NGO dominance 
but seeks an accountable state anchored in economic redistribution and socio-
economic rights as demanded by the majority. It uses survey results to 
demonstrate that although the Haitian state suffers from a legitimacy and trust 
crisis, it is widely seen as the vehicle that can support stable democratic 
governance, and through which the popular democratic mandate to address 
unsustainable inequality can be pursued.  
In its conclusion, the dissertation raises questions about legitimacy and 
the conditions necessary for democratic governance and democratic 
consolidation in Haiti. It suggests that the Louverturean state model is most 
conducive to securing the legitimacy and popular support necessary for 
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STATE FORMATION: LITERATURE  REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
          Political studies of Haiti are frequently infused with baseless 
mischaracterizations that reflect tendencies of a bygone era, and often defy 
common sense. Recent discussions of Haiti have continued that pattern. When 
faced with the challenge of explaining Haiti’s unstable democratic transition, 
rather than offer substantive analyses of the Haitian state and historical 
dynamics, too many scholars and political pundits are content with simplistic 
cultural assumptions devoid of actual knowledge of Haitian society2. Those 
assumptions range from the “prevalence of African cultural norms and 
institutions,” the “absence of western culture,” to the “lack of cultural inclination 
and leadership commitment and capacity necessary for stable democratic 
politics”3 (Lawless 1992, P. R. Girard 2010, Brooks 2010). Unfortunately, these 
statements reflect a historical bias faced by Haiti. Moreover, they obscure viable 
scholarly analyses currently required. As Trouillot suggests, “the idea that the 
Haitian political quagmire is due to some congenital disease of the Haitian 
mind…make Haiti’s political dilemma immune to rational explanation and 
                                                          
2 A well-known scholar of the Dominican Republic observed in a lecture attended by the author in 1998 
that Haiti’s challenges are due to its clan and tribal conflicts. Given that there are neither clans not tribes 
in Haiti, his statement denotes the kind of misconceptions that saturate most American scholarships on 
Haiti. 
3 In his 2010 opinion piece in the NY Times, David Brooks articulated the most historically persistent 
theme in westerners’ portrayal of Haiti as impeded by voodoo and African culture (Brooks 2010). Most 
Haitian scholars see these pervasive notions as reflecting prevailing biases toward Haitians who dared to 
challenge white supremacy to secure their freedom (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, R. Fatton 2007).  
 15 
 
therefore to solutions that could be both just and practical” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 
121-23). Indeed, these biases contribute little to further understanding of the 
Haitian State, its history and current crisis. They foreclose sensible explanations 
of contemporary challenges, successes, and failures of democratization. These 
characterizations reflect a historical pattern of attacks on Haiti since its 
independence (Lawless 1992). Haitian scholars of all stripes have been 
committed to defend Haiti against its detractors and address these attacks, and 
this dissertation also hopes to contribute to the body of scholarship in that vein. 
     More serious scholarship on the state and Haitian democracy cluster around 
two schools of thought:  (1) the state as an organic set of institutions or regime 
that embodies socio-political arrangements between national actors that 
preceded state formation; (2) the state as an imposed inorganic and dependent 
post-occupation regime that relies on national and international clientelistic 
networks4 to secure the interests of elites and international capital at the expense 
of the nation. After examining the strengths and weaknesses of the major 
arguments of each school, I will offer a new conceptualization of the Haitian state 
- the Louverturean state - as a useful tool for understanding Haiti’s contemporary 
democratic challenges.  
 
                                                          
4 For analysis of clientelist networks in the Caribbean see (Stone 1980) and (C. J. Edie 1989, 1991). 
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Nation-States as Organic Dependent or Semi-Autonomous Regimes: 
In the Weberian and Althusserian sense, the state is defined as a 
territorially bounded entity with an ensemble of repressive and ideological 
apparatuses that allow rulers to exercise a monopoly over the use of force and 
sustain the ideology to maintain their dominance (Althusser 1971, Weber 1978).  
In other words, it is best to describe the state in terms of ‘state system’ or 
‘regime’ – “a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially 
accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a 
given population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general will’ (Jessop 
2007, 9).  
While some scholars argue about the validity of this “general will and 
common interests”, and others differ in their explanations of intra-state and inter-
state dynamics, state emergence, persistence, and failure, they agree on their 
definition and typology of states.  Analyses of the state through the nation-state 
paradigm presuppose the presence of shared national culture within the territory 
of the state and meaningful state-society relations that give the state its 
existential legitimacy and identity – its ‘raisons d’être’. This static view of the state 
as derived from a homogeneous nation and culture structured to maintain 
established power relations obscures the diversity within those nations and 
institutional development from which states can derive independent power. 
Postulating such a static view of the state fails to recognize that state institutions 
or regimes adjust, coerce, expand and contract to maintain the status quo or 
create new ones with or without the acquiescence of the polis and rulers 
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(Althusser 1971, Gramsci 1971). In other words, states, regimes, and institutions 
within states can act independently of both rulers and ruled to preserve their own 
institutional interests and longevity. Thus, the notion that states’ persistence can 
only be understood within the context of existing power relations between rulers 
and ruled, and their ability to be responsive to them and adaptable to needs and 
aspirations without changing the orientation of power is inadequate.  Moreover, 
little consideration is given to postcolonial nations, which lacks the cultural and 
ethnic uniformity, and on which states and regimes are imposed. These states 
and regimes can maintain their subjectivity and stunt their ability to evolve and 
enhance their capacity and autonomy independent from the dictates and control 
of their former colonial masters (A. D. Smith 1983, Ayoob 1995, J. S. Migdal 
2001, Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010)5. While these scholars assert that states 
can be both internally and externally, dependent, interdependent, semi-
autonomous, or autonomous, postcolonial states face great constraints and are 
less autonomous as a consequence of arrangements imposed prior to or at the 
time of their independence by colonial powers (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, 
Gellner 1983, C. J. Edie 1991, Spruyt 2002, Axtmann 2004, Silicon Africa 2016). 
Thus, for scholars of the state, analyses of the state must account for both its 
                                                          
5 A very important contribution worth noting is the new State-nation approach (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 
2010). Although it does not necessarily challenge the nation-state paradigm since nation-states can be 
characterized by independent regimes to manage competition between powerful actors for stable 




national (i.e., societal) and international limitations and the impact of those on 
their autonomy and development, as well as state types.  
          Most early studies of nation-states consider a process of state formation 
that gives apriori legitimacy to the state. In this vein, nation-states emerge by 
virtue of a social contract among the people who wanted to unite, hoping that in 
this way, they would be able to live safely and peacefully. As Charchula notes, 
the state builds its power first of all for the sake of the welfare of its members 
(Charchula 2010, 198-9).  State formation or emergence, therefore, reflects the 
codification and consolidation of a social contract governing norms that existed in 
the nation between rulers and the ruled antecedent to its existence. States thus 
secure their legitimacy by devising regimes capable of sustaining and managing 
these pre-existing historical bargains or social contracts (Gellner 1983, Anderson 
1991).  
            Thus, for these scholars, their emergence from organic arrangements 
and processes and societal practices make them vulnerable to evolutions in 
those arrangements or in the society itself. As those arrangements evolve, 
expand and become more complex, so too does the need for more complex state 
institutions or regimes. State crisis, therefore, is often a consequence of the 
inability of state elites to adapt to evolving contexts and arrangements by 
devising new accountable regimes (Herbst 2000, Riegl 2009). The longevity of 
these states and the success of state elites, therefore, rest in their mutability and 
capacity to build sustainable and adaptable institutions to manage changes and 
evolutions in these pre-existing bargains (Hobbes 1991, XIX.94-100). In sum, 
 19 
 
whether measured by its various ‘Centers of gravity’ as Patrick Carroll suggests, 
or ‘Centers of power’, these states are considered to be as strong as their 
societal bargains and vice-versa, or more precisely as strong as their relations to 
their citizens, and as stable as the arrangements they are tasked to secure 
(Carroll 2009).  
Although scholars contest this notion of an organic dependent state by 
stipulating a more autonomous and disconnected state, this assertion of 
interdependence between society and the state has acquired new life in recent 
debates about democratization and state collapse (Skocpol 1985, Tilly 1990, 
Gros 1996, Ayoob 2001, Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker 2008). While the 
role of social actors in state formation and persistence has been emphasized, 
absent in this thesis has been the external factors that influenced intra and inter-
state relations, state autonomy, and more importantly, the role of state 
institutions themselves in shaping its orientation and state-society relations 
through institutional processes and coercion.  
Furthermore, this early conception of an organic-dependent state with its 
power and legitimacy measured by the degree of adherence to existing social 
arrangements paid insufficient attention to issues of organizational culture and 
institutional mutability (Mann 1984, Carruthers 1994).  Changes in social 
arrangements, power relations, organizational culture or the ability of institutions 
once formed to self-perpetuate, expand, develop new rules, and dictate new and 
different social arrangements are left unaddressed (Mann, 1984; Norlinger, 
1988).  Also absent are considerations for slave-based societies where social 
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contracts, if they existed at all, existed between slaveholders themselves and not 
between slaves and slaveholders. Slaves as properties could be disposed of, 
sold, buried alive, quartered, burned alive, or worked to death and, as such, 
Haitian revolutionary elites could not craft a post-slavery state based on pre-
existing social contracts from which they had fought to free themselves. They did 
not experience the delayed freedom and re-structured subjugation that became 
normative in the Caribbean colonies to avoid widespread revolts (Dookhan, 
1975; Sunshine, 1988).  
More than any of their counterparts, Haitian state crafters had to secure 
the allegiance of former slaves upon whom arbitrary state power could no longer 
be used having fought for and won their freedom. While state persistence 
required institutional adaptation to changes in power relations, and states, once 
they emerge, could evolve both due to changes in social contracts, and 
institutional needs and development, the basis for state crafting, not emergence, 
in the Haitian context, cannot be considered organic and autonomous, but rather 
targeted, purposeful, and interdependent. In this vein, state legitimacy and even 
its survival are based on its ability and that of its elites to maintain these new, 
intentionally crafted, and interdependent social arrangements.   
It is clear that Haiti, as a post-slavery and post-colonial society did not 
have the historical and organic social contract within which the state could 
emerge and maintain popular support and legitimacy. Scholars of the State, and 
specifically scholars of the Haitian state, have to contend with the reality that a 
new social contract had to be intentionally crafted to secure the legitimacy and 
 21 
 
survival of the Haitian state. More importantly, state elites had to be conscious of 
the need to craft a state to that end. That they have not accounted for these 
factors in their analysis reflects a major flaw in the study of the Haitian state. 
Most scholars focus on the continuity of pre-existing social arrangements as the 
basis for an organic emergence of the Haitian state and the source of its 
deficiencies.  Their claim that the Haitian state, since its inception, has 
represented a set of regimes elaborated to maintain old power relations between 
masters and slaves or exploiter and exploited under a new infrastructure, is 
inconsistent with the patterns of relations established by Haitian state crafters 
and requires re-evaluation (Price-Mars 1953, Pierre-Charles 1973, M.-R. Trouillot 
1990, Lundahl 2011). 
 
Nation-States as Imposed Inorganic Dependent Regimes: 
Postcolonial theorists from the dependency school have challenged this 
dependent nation-state narrative centered on cultural and societal uniformity. 
They postulate a level of structural, political and economic dependency imposed 
on postcolonial states, which hinders both their autonomy and development 
(Rodney 1974, Blomstrom and Hette 1984, Ayoob 2001). The thrust of their 
contention is that postcolonial states are not just internally dependent due to pre-
existing socio-cultural dynamics, they are nationally and internationally 
dependent because their colonizers so determined and forcefully maintained that 
dependence (Delince, 1979; Heinl & Heinl, 2005; Global South, 2015; Silicon 
Africa, 2016). Thus, states that emerge from slavery and/or colonialism do not fit 
neatly within this dominant nation-state paradigm since they reflect a different 
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kind of social arrangement. They often begin with a culturally, religiously, and 
racially or ethnically heterogeneous population to manage diminished 
sovereignty, impose regimes of debt and dependency, and deal with internal 
power relations mitigated by the very external forces that lord over the institutions 
that govern the international order. As such, they become part of an international 
system in which they have limited political and economic power or leverage 
(Frank A.-G. , 1966; Roniger, 2004). 
          Contrary to the organic-dependent thesis, Tilly offers a less sanitized and 
more dynamic conflict-dominated analysis of state formation. For Tilly, wars 
make and expand states, and postcolonial states do not experience the level of 
external threat that could facilitate state formation and expansion. Moreover, their 
coercive capacity is designed not for war making and territorial expansion, but for 
internal control (Tilly 1990, 206-7). The postcolonial state in Tilly’s view is not a 
protective state but a coercive one. Vu and Michelena suggest that rather than 
resulting from social contracts, organic-independent nation states emerge in 
“politically competitive environments in which established church and status 
groups rivaled rulers and each other; bargains can occur or be sustained only in 
this environment” (Michelena 1971, Vu 2010, 161). Consequently, states as an 
assortment of regimes or a set of representative institutions emerge when a 
stalemate exists between competing forces; when power differences between 
dominant societal actors become negligible and the possibility of dominating rival 
groups is nil (Waldner, 1999). Accordingly, this leveling of power between 
competing societal forces, even if temporary, creates ideal conditions for states 
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to emerge and sustainable institutions to develop. Needless to note that external 
interference or the role of foreign powers in influencing and fomenting intra-state 
conflicts is left unaddressed. For Waldner, Vu, and Michelena, states are 
therefore relegated to being managers of social arrangements, creating ‘incentive 
structures’, ‘constraining, giving opportunities to social groups’, and ‘undergoing 
processes of institutionalization’, which determine their degree of continuity, 
mutability, and power. For these scholars, states are involved in a “complex 
interplay between state actors, popular groups, and foreign powers” (Kucukozer 
2005, 232-5). States, therefore, can impose conditions for stability, manage intra-
state societal conflicts, as well as set parameters for state-society interactions 
and interactions with foreign powers. Their functionality and autonomy make 
them simultaneously ‘the precipitate of conflicts of interests and power struggles’ 
between dominant societal groups, and the regulator of these groups (M.-R. 
Trouillot 1990, 21). Therefore, according to these scholars, to the extent that 
states have the institutional, coercive, and material capacity to withstand both 
domestic and international pressures, they are autonomous (Skocpol 1985, 
Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988, Carruthers 1994). Many scholars fault this 
nation-state-centered approach for the absence of a more nuanced analysis of 
state-society relations. They also challenge the lack of importance given to the 
role of states in maintaining power relations that benefit some actors to the 
detriment of others, and considerations for ‘individual agency’ and civil-society in 
shaping or influencing state actions (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Blomstrom and 
Hette 1984, C. J. Edie 1989, Jackson 1990, Spruyt 2002). Post-slavery and 
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postcolonial states have not had a high degree of autonomy and power in an 
international system dominated by former slave-holding nations or controlled by 
former colonial powers.  
That post-colonial states have been given qualified access to an 
international system already dominated by the same powers that allowed them 
restricted and qualified political independence, or against whom they fought for 
their independence should not be downplayed for it is an indication of their 
limitations. Consequently, the claim of state autonomy in the international arena 
without first accounting for its power, position, and ability to exert its influence on 
other states sidesteps the constraints faced by post-colonial states, and the roles 
powerful former colonial states play in permanently structuring the power, 
positions, and autonomy of their former colonies. Given that these states 
resulting from anti-colonial independence struggles were crafted to sustain 
national and international social, political, and economic arrangements by their 
former colonizers, any analysis of state autonomy that overlooks this reality and 
their positionality and power can only be considered at best incomplete. 
 
Critics of the Nation-State Paradigm: 
Both organic-dependent and organic-independent schools conceptualize a 
nation-state that is not an anathema to the general will of the population or that is 
dependent, even if relatively so, to the general will or dominant interests within 
their territory (Carruthers 1994, Ayoob 2001, Carroll 2009). They presuppose a 
state that emerges out of a degree of national consensus rather than imposed by 
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either local colonial elites or colonial powers themselves. Critics of the nation-
state paradigm contend that state power or weakness can be explained not just 
by its autonomy from or dependency on societal and foreign actors, but also by 
the availability of national resources and its dependency on other states and 
national elites (Edie C. J., 1991; Ayoob, 2001; Roniger, 2004). While some states 
can emerge from organic processes, their power may well depend on their role in 
the international order.  Others can be imposed for purposes incompatible with 
the needs, norms, and will of their populations, challenging both the organic and 
autonomy claims of nation-state proponents (Rodney 1974, Cardoso and Faletto 
1979, Stone 1980, Vu 2010). Congruently, postcolonial states do not emerge; 
they are crafted and imposed on nations that have little initial influence in 
delineating their functions. Speaking to the realities faced by post-colonial states, 
Migdal and Frank noted that states imposed by neocolonial elites and/or colonial 
powers begin with deficiencies in power, institutional density, and legitimacy (A. 
G. Frank 1970, 1966, J. S. Migdal 1988, 2001, McAllister 2002).  
However, although post-colonial states may be deficient in external and 
internal legitimacy and autonomy they may not necessarily be deficient in power 
or ability to impose their rules, and the will of state elites and foreign powers on 
the population to benefit semi-national and national elites, and foreign interests 
(Skocpol, 1985; Migdal J. S., 1990; Jackson, 1990; Edie C. J., 1991). Some post-
colonial states may have a high degree of legitimacy from inception having 
emerged out of resistance struggles against colonial powers, but may lack the 
capacity to deal with a heterogeneous population or compete against their former 
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colonizers. Moreover, they can hardly be conceptualized as nation-states, given 
the heterogeneity of the populations and, for some, the saliency of their religious, 
cultural and ethnic demarcations or the context in which they were crafted and 
their institutions imposed or inherited. 
Proponents of the nation-state paradigm continue to obscure the fact that 
it is not applicable in all circumstances6, and that postcolonial states demand 
new theoretical formulations (C. J. Edie 1991, McAllister 2002). The primary 
features of these states outside of the nation-state paradigm are that they are 
dominated by foreign interests, are coercive, multiethnic, and do not enjoy 
common cultural and ethnic identities7 or legitimacy, and are challenged by 
salient cultural, religious, and ethnic loyalties often residing across borders. They 
lack a unified sense of nationhood and do not enjoy the bond of a social contract 
that preceded their existence. If a common national identity exists in these states, 
it is because they are forged, imposed, or facilitated by the former colonial power, 
strong supranational institutions or neocolonial elites and is often not inclusive of 
the entire population. Postcolonial Latin American states often leave large 
segments, if not the majority of their indigenous and black populations outside 
the state, barely protected as full citizens, which often lead to direct and indirect 
military challenges against the state.  State stability and/or persistence, therefore, 
                                                          
6 See Charles Tilly’s distinction between nation-states and “national States” (Tilly 1990, 43).  Also, See 
(Talentino 2004, 559).  Most importantly however, the notion of a state-nation crafted to balance 
competing interests between powerful national cleavages seems much more useful than the nation-state 
paradigms that still dominate scholarships on the state. 
7 Stepan, Linz and Yadav’s State-Nation thesis offers some important contribution in this area (Stepan, 
Linz and Yadav 2010). 
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will be to the extent that such states become strong enough to forge and sustain 
a common national identity and allegiance of its differentiated populations by 
crafting their inclusion, imposing its will through coercion, as well as shifting the 
power relations with colonial powers (Ayoob 2001, Talentino 2004, 558).  
 
Toward a New Conceptual Framework: 
Studies of the Haitian state are not without nationalist and neocolonialist 
polemics but all of them have adopted the nation-state paradigm to advance two 
dominant theses. The first portrays the Haitian state as an unresponsive and 
unstable organic manifestation of pre-independence socio-political arrangements 
(Dupuis 1997, P. Girard 2010, Pierre-Etienne 2011, Gros 2012). For this 
perspective, the Haitian state is but a continuitity of colonial exploitative 
arrangements facilitated and governed by neocolonial elites to the ultimate 
benefit of former colonial powers or their foreign replacements.They advocate for 
a Haitian state with the capacity to serve as an arbiter between competing 
national forces and as protector of national interests against foreign 
encroachment without providing a vehicle for acquiring that capacity (L.-J. 
Janvier 1886, R. J. Fatton 2010). Their advocacy and conceptualization of the 
state “as arbiter or paterfamilias prevailed as the dominant folk theory of the state 
in Haiti fitting into a larger perspective within which one can place all 
‘paternalistic’ vision of the state” (Trouillot M.-R. , 1990, p. 20). For them, the 
Haitian state emerges in post-independence Haiti as an unstable arbiter of pre-
independence arrangements that failed to account for the needs and aspirations 
of the majority of its citizens. The state, rather than managing national cleavages 
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and protecting national interests against international actors serves as the 
facilitator of the exploitation of its citizens (Rotberg & Clague, 1971). It overlooks 
both the post-slavery constitution and policies that crafted new regimes and a 
state capable of regulating not past but new socio-political and economic 
arrangements between citizens and national cleavages that safeguarded their 
rights and infringements on their freedom8 (Sannon P. , 1905; Ott T. , 1973).  
Their understanding of the Haitian state as a weak and unresponsive 
nation-state is a misreading, if not a misrepresentation of the state that was 
crafted following the revolution by Northern elites under the leadership of 
Toussaint Louverture. Indeed, the state as crafted by Louverture and Northern 
revolutionary leaders necessitated as a goal the establishment and preservation 
of the rights and freedom of former slaves by redefining and constraining the 
interests and power of powerful cleavages that existed prior to the revolution as a 
source of its legitimacy. The level of threat the Louverturean state faced made 
responsiveness to its citizens and their commitment to its defense requirements 
for its survival and persistence. By conflating Louverturean policies as advanced 
by Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe as perpetuations of French colonial 
policies and control, these scholars mischaracterized, misread, or ignored the 
constitutions promulgated by these revolutionary leaders, the nature of the state 
they crafted as well as the state-society relations it demanded. These scholars 
                                                          




also misjudged their efforts to enlarge and strengthen the state’s capacity to 
support the newly acquired rights of their citizens and ignored the policies that 
afforded those citizens the right to property and self-determination9.  This was a 
departure from the slave system where they had neither the right to property, nor 
the ability to have their personhood, rights, and interests protected, nevermind 
their capacity for wealth accumulation supported.  
Contrary to the assertions of these scholars, and as will be demonstrated 
in subsequent chapters, the original framers crafted policies, and administrative 
and legal regimes to upend the very colonial arrangements, which 
disenfranchised all new citizens of the state, for a new social contract capable of 
securing both the state and its citizens (Ardouin, 1860; Casimir & Dubois, 2010). 
The original Louverturean state was neither unresponsive, nor weak, nor 
unstable. It wielded considerable power to the benefit of all of its citizens, as well 
as managed competing national and international interests. 
The second thesis, advanced by most Haitian scholars concurs with the 
first –namely that the Haitian state was an unresponsive and unstable organic 
manifestation of pre-independence arrangements but postulates that a new state 
emerged and became consolidated during the American occupation (Pierre-
Charles 1973, Nicholls 1979, R. J. Fatton 2002, 2010). These scholars see the 
post-occupation Haitian state as an imposed inorganic and dependent 
                                                          
9 Coincidentally, vestiges of this system still pervade the relationship between agricultural laborers and 
landowners in the North known as “De Motye” or “two halves”. 
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neocolonial nation-state whose institutions and elites rely on international support 
to cultivate and expand a predatory relationship with its citizens. As such, they 
see the Haitian state as a neocolonial regime that mirrors the socio-political and 
economic dynamics of other postcolonial states, but one more estranged from its 
citizenry, more unresponsive to their needs, and less vulnerable to their 
pressures (Nicolas 1927, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Gros 1996, 1997).  
For these scholars, there is continuity between the state that emerged in 
post-independence and post-occupation Haiti. Both lacked legitimacy and 
accountability to the citizenry and were predisposed to exploiting rather than 
securing the rights of citizens. However, although scholars from the first school 
saw a weak state, unable to fully capture and impose its will on the population, 
the second more dominant school suggests that the occupation managed to 
strengthen the state’s capacity to impose its will on the population and secure the 
control and dominance of the elites (Lundahl, 2011). For these scholars, the new 
post-occupation Haitian state was re-structured, and imposed by occupation 
forces precisely to secure the interests of neocolonial elites and international 
capital at the expense of the nation and equipped with a military to support and 
protect these new arrangements and manage new state-society relations 
(Plummer B. G., 1988; 1992; Robinson, 2007). 
          Both schools approach the study of the Haitian State as a linear 
development of an anemic10 nation-state. As will be demonstrated by this study, 
                                                          
10 By an anaemic nation-state, I mean one with low legitimacy, poor state-civil society relations, negligible 
institutional and coercive capacity, the absence of adequate resources to foster national development, 
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they attributed to the Haitian state a degree of colonial institutional continuity and 
pre-independence social arrangements where none existed. The notion of 
Haitian State formation as the linear evolution of a nation-state, and as a weak 
and dependent nation-state, does not provide us with an accurate portrayal of the 
history and trajectory of Haitian state formation and crafting. Without such 
accuracy, we cannot understand the contemporary challenges facing the Haitian 
State, nor facilitate its re-alignment with the nation and address its lack of 
legitimacy. For an accurate understanding of the Haitian State, we must study 
three distinct periods of Haitian state formation and craft, each with its own 
characteristics, challenges, and patterns of state-society relations: The 
Louverturean state, the contested neocolonial national state, and the 
consolidated post-occupation neocolonial clientelist state.  
 
The Louverturean State as a State-nation: 
Faced with racial and cultural heterogeneity, powerful groups with 
divergent interests, and powerful and hostile international actors determined to 
curtail its power and sovereignty, the Louverturean state was crafted and its 
transition prescribed not by colonial powers as most of its post-colonial 
counterparts in the Caribbean and Africa have been. Its framers were victorious 
                                                          
and without the necessary international autonomy needed to project international power and protect its 
international interests (Jackson 1990, Gros 1996). As is obvious here, Gros (Gros 1996) who first 
introduced this definition does not account for the heterogeneity within the state and the divergent and 
destabilizing interests and identities it foster that the state must manage. In such a context, rather than 
an anaemic nation-state, a state-nation is a more appropriate characterization. 
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revolutionary leaders and former slaves jealous of preserving their freedom and 
the nation’s autonomy and fearful of the threat of re-enslavement. The 
Louverturean State did not emerge out of societal dynamics. It was crafted with a 
unique but necessary interdependence between citizens and state elites, and 
between citizens and the state itself out of the need to safeguard their freedom 
and survival against internal and external threats of re-enslavement. The survival 
of the state and its citizens required a priori a strong centralized state capable of 
commanding adherence to its laws and institutions.  Unlike its counterparts that 
were ab initio dominated by elites with prevailing quasi master-slave 
relationships, the Louverturean state’s survival depended on a new state-society 
and politico-social relations independent and antithetical to previous 
arrangements that were based on slavery and subjugation.   
Dominant nation-state theorists have not considered the type of state and 
social contract crafted by Haitian revolutionaries to forestall the threats of 
slaveholding powers from without and those of their allies from within, and 
effectively manage divergent and competing cleavages and interests within the 
nation. The interdependence reflected in state crafting in pre-independence and 
immediate post-independence Haiti between revolutionary elites and former 
slaves, and the state’s ability to manage the competing and divergent interests of 
foreign nations, French colonials, Mulatto elites and former slaves were 
indispensable to securing the freedom of its citizens. Elite state crafters, 
revolutionary leaders, and former slaves alike were dependent on the existence 
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and survival of the state to maintain their newly acquired freedom and secure 
their lives.  
The Louverturean state as it was crafted in post-slavery Haiti required a 
more tightly structured and defended social contract that would commit its 
citizens not only to lend the state legitimacy but also to protect it against internal 
and external threats and assist it in maintaining a balance between salient and 
powerful competing interests groups. Thus, Toussaint’s attempt to arm all 
citizens for national defense was an indication of that interdependence. Crafting 
a culturally heterogeneous former slave society into a cohesive state 
necessitated particular arrangements that set Haitian state crafting and formation 
apart from its counterparts. As some scholars suggest, the existence within a 
society of significant political, cultural, linguistic, and in the case of Haiti, racial, 
economic, and ethnic identities and interests within the national territory capable 
of upsetting its stability, necessitated a state carefully crafted to secure, protect, 
and balance the interests of each group and safeguard and augment the capacity 
and power of the state itself11 (Stepan, Linz, & Yadav, 2010, p. 52). The 
Louverturean State imposed a social contract that bound all citizens to each 
other and itself, centering the state as arbiter and enforcer. 
          General Toussaint Louverture, his constitutional framers, and his state 
crafters could not ignore the need to craft a state tailored to address the pre-
                                                          
11 Rather than a nation-state, the Louverturean State had all the trappings and characteristics of a state-
nation (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 50-2).   
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national, national, and international realities. Their lives and those of the new 
citizenry depended on their ability to craft a state that could meet the internal 
challenges produced by powerful competing interests and identities, as well as a 
global environment dominated by slave-holding powers determined to re-assert 
their control and re-impose slavery. The Louverturean state was crafted to 
secure the rights of its citizens and to be powerful enough to deter national and 
international challenges to its rule. Its ability to manage and balance competing 
claims and maintain stability fostered national prosperity and enhanced its 
legitimacy and capacity. The Louverturean state12, faced ab initio multiple 
dominant groups with divergent identities and interests, and a polarized 
environment – one that requires, a priori, a strong state to allay conflicts and 
maintain stability. It did not emerge from pre-existing bargains between 
competing groups or from pre-independence arrangements but was intentionally 
crafted to meet the pronounced needs for stability, security, conflict reduction, 
and legitimacy (P. Sannon 1905, James 1963, T. Ott 1973). It implemented 
policies that recognized, respected, and protected “multiple but complementary 
socio-cultural identities” and competing ethnic-based interests, and cleavages. 
Louverturean state crafters had to develop institutional mechanisms and policies 
                                                          
12 The Louverturean State had all the characteristics of a State-nation. By State-nation, I mean a state 
where the polis have attachments to more than one cultural tradition within the existing boundaries; 
where the heterogeneity of the nation may involve different cleavages, institutional and cultural 
affiliations, which may or may not preclude identification with a common state.  This is in line with Tilly’s 
national states and Migdal’s State in society concepts (Tilly 1990, J. S. Migdal 2001). According to Stepan, 
Linz, and Yadav, “if a polity has significant and politically salient cultural or linguistic diversity, then its 
leaders need to think about, craft, and normatively legitimate a type of polity with the characteristics of a 
state-nation” (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 52). 
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to accommodate and manage competing and/or conflicting claims without 
discrimination (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 52-3). As such, it was crafted to 
support and secure new social arrangements, and it was on this basis its 
legitimacy rested.  
The Louverturean state itself, as a threat to an international order 
dominated by slave-owning nations, and powerful neocolonial elites within its 
territory who had vested interest in that order, required careful considerations to 
decrease its internal and external vulnerability. Its entry into the international 
system was not structured by powerful states, as its contemporary counterparts 
have been (Ayoob 2001, Rapley 2004, Roniger 2004, Silicon Africa 2016). Its 
forceful entrance into the international order compelled powerful states to 
negotiate with it as equals for concessions even while they collaborated with 
each other to curtail its power and influence. Thus, that Britain and the United 
States constrained the circulation of the Haitian navy to reduce the threat the 
Haitian state posed to the slave-based commercial ventures reflects the 
constraints the Louverturean state faced externally and the impact of that 
constraint on national development and international projection of state power 
(Ardouin, 1860; James, 1963). That the Louverturean state and its leaders 
compelled powerful nations to compete against each other for its market and 
engage in bilateral negotiations and treaty arrangements indicates that it had a 
degree of autonomy and international recognition (R. W. Logan 1941, Leyburn 
1966, T. Ott 1973). The very fact that the American government felt compelled to 
support Louverturean military efforts in the South aimed at consolidating the 
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nation’s control over its territory demonstrates that the Louverturean state, having 
forced its way into the international system had the ability to manage and protect 
its own interests through strategic alliances.   
The fact that Latin American elites sought and acquired its military and 
financial support to secure their own independence is a clear indication of the 
recognized and feared role the state played in international affairs in 
counterbalancing the power of powerful slave-holding nations. Moreover, the 
autonomy of Haiti’s post-slavery state and its ability to serve as the sole arbiter 
between powerful national constituents, and to do so without arbitrarily 
jeopardizing the interests of any, was the source of its legitimacy and survival 
nationally. The Louverturean state experienced some constraints on the 
international sphere and made its presence felt within it while operating with 
autonomy in its national sphere. It was able, because of its internal strength, to 
constrain powerful states, prevent their involvement within its territory, and 
undermine or threaten their supremacy in their own colonies. Its power 
compelled both the United State and Great Britain to negotiate non-interference 
treaties with Toussaint (James, 1963; Logan R. W., 1941). For Louverturean 
state crafters, the Haitian state’s role in securing the rights of former slaves, 
planters, Mulatto elites, stave off the threats of slave-holding powers and 
safeguard its own prosperity, institutional capacity, coercive power, and popular 
legitimacy was central to their project of devising adequate sustaining regimes. 
State formation faced a priori a complex balancing act and a particular need for 
autonomy and the capacity to project its power to compel adherence to the new 
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post-slavery social contract. Even when constrained by an international system 
dominated by slaveholding nations, Louverturean state crafters devised 
strategies that limited those constraints and undercut their influence and impact 
on the nation. 
         The Louverturean model of state crafting is the developmental model for 
contemporary Haiti and offers the solutions necessary to meet the expectations 
and demands of its citizens. It contains the framework to establish a legitimate 
democratic state that is responsive to the needs and interests of all cleavages. 
By overlooking Louverturean statecraft, Haitian scholars undermine their ability to 
offer a comprehensive analysis of the Haitian state, its trajectory, and thus the 
context for national political developments. They also limit their ability to provide 
the nation with solutions capable of addressing its challenges. A historical 
background of the social, political, and economic developments that led to the 






SLAVERY, REVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE HAITIAN STATE 
          This chapter provides the historical context for the emergence of the 
Louverturean state after the end of slavery.  Although various scholars have 
written on this formative period (1791-1843) in Haitian history and political 
development, a study of state formation and Louverturean statecraft has 
remained elusive and in need of investigation13.  The chapter seeks to provide 
original insights into Haitian statecrafting during this momentous formative period 
in the country’s history.  It is widely acknowledged that Toussaint Louverture led 
a revolution that brought slavery to an end in Haiti.  What has not been 
investigated, and would be useful for comparative political enquiry, is that the 
post-colonial state that emerged after slavery under his leadership was a 
constitutionally and institutionally dense state crafted to both constrain and 
preserve the rights and interests of all segments of the population and neutralize 
                                                          
13 For further insight, see the works of Beaubrun Ardouin for a detailed history of the Louverturean period 
as a scholar of that period and political actor albeit tainted by racial polemics. Influenced by the works of 
neocolonial elites such as Ardouin and Madiou, Jean Casimir and Laurent Dubois provide broader 
historical context while advancing the anti-Louverturean polemics that dominate the neocolonial 
historical genre and contemporary studies of Haiti (Nicholls 1974). Moreau de Saint-Mery, Thomas 
Madiou, Alexandre Bonneau, CLR James, and Pauleus Sannon offer important analysis of the societal 
stratifications that gave rise to the revolution, and the persistent competition for power that pitted 
national cleavages against each other and against the state. Although consistent in their analyses, Pauleus 
and James’ work must be read as the treatise of Louverturean supporters. However, while their 
understanding of the political dynamics is clear, their take on state formation and crafting is elusive.  
Antenor Firmin, J.B. G Wallez, Thomas Ott, John Baur, Robert Louis Stein, and David Nicholls’ analyses are 
useful for understanding the trajectory of the state, its early successes, and the political dynamics that 
accounted for its instability. Jean Nicola Leger, Dantes Bellegarde, George Covington, Francois Dalencour, 
Robert Louis Stein, offer detailed accounts of the internal dynamics and historical developments while 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot provides us with a succinct albeit incomplete analysis of the state. 
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all cleavages. This Louverturean state differed significantly from the post-colonial 
state that emerged in many of the newly independent countries in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Rodney 1974, Dookhan 1975, Callaghy, 
Thomas M. and Ravenhill, John 1993, Ayoob 2001, Bogues 2002). Ethnic and 
class conflicts and arbitrary infringement on the rights of citizens characterized 
the political evolution of many of those new post-colonial states. Moreover, they 
were ab inito hemmed into an international system through debt and restricted 
sovereignty through international institutional arrangements, which constrained 
their potential for stability and development. Haiti differed from most of these 
states in its divergent evolution under a Louverturean social contract and its 
economic and political independence from the international system. To what 
does Haiti owe this political and economic independence and divergent 
evolution? How did this divergence inform the development and prosperity of that 
state and its citizens? How did it sustain its legitimacy and power? The chapter 
will elucidate the complex state-society relationships that emerged as a 
significant starting point for understanding Haiti’s post-colonial political and state 
trajectory. 
 
The Colonial System and the Roots of National Conflict and State Formation: 
 
At the eve of the Haitian Revolution, Haiti had within its midst people 
whose identities and interests made them implacable enemies that would at first 
threaten the birth of the Republic, and later characterized the travails of its 
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state14. Conflicts between the Royalists and the Republicans that brought the 
King and Queen of France to the guillotine and resulted in the French Revolution 
and the “terror”, played out in Saint Domingue with equal ferocity. Royalists and 
Republicans, ‘Les Grands Blancs’ and ‘Les Petits Blancs’, all fought over the 
spoils of slavery. ‘Les Blancs’ against Mulattoes and Free Blacks, engaged in a 
fight to the death for rights, privileges, and control over slaves and wealth. 
Mulattoes themselves, divided into 128 categories, each a marker or gradation of 
privileges or deprivations that elicited hatred amongst cousins and brothers, also 
engaged in a struggle against whites over both political and social rights, as well 
as for control over slaves and wealth (Moreau de Saint-Mery 1797-1798, James 
1963, 38). Far below Whites and Mulattoes, the black slaves, despised but 
wanted and fought over by both, because of the wealth and privileges their 
subjugation provided, determined to be free, engaged in fierce resistance against 
all who vie to subjugate, exploit, and dehumanize them ad infinitum. Blacks stood 
firm against their half-brethren, who for status alone, never mind racial and 
economic interests, were willing to claim their limbs and even lives, while 
themselves clamoring for equal rights and social status from whites. Nowhere 
were the social, racial, and ethnic animosity and economic interests so intense 
and clear, and the ruthless greed-induced bloodshed so high. The celebrated 
                                                          
14 For analyses of the conflicts within the society of Saint Domingue, see Ardouin (1843); James (1963); 
Otto (1979); Geggus and Fiering (2009); and Dubois (2004). 
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Caribbean historian C.L.R James wrote, that notwithstanding the infighting 
between whites,  
[T]he advantages of being white were so obvious that 
race prejudice against Negroes permeated the minds of 
the Mulattoes who so bitterly resented the same thing 
from the whites. Black slaves and Mulattoes hated each 
other. Even while in words and, by their success in life, 
in many of their actions, Mulattoes demonstrated the 
falseness of the white claim to inherent superiority, yet 
the man of color who was nearly white despised the man 
of color who was only a quarter white, and so on through 
all the shades. The free blacks, comparatively speaking, 
were not many, and so despised was the black skin that 
even a Mulatto slave felt himself superior to the free 
black man (James 1963, 43). 
 
Added to these dynamics were regional manifestations and population 
demographics that intensified racial competitions. In the North, whites and 
Mulattoes formed alliances against the Black majority who strove for their 
freedom. In the West, where plantations were few, poor whites and Mulattoes 
who were seeking to extend their power and control over blacks allied against the 
few rich white landowners while Southern whites and Mulattoes formed alliances 
to retain control over blacks. Thus, blacks stood alone, cornered on all fronts, 
already the disposable majority, engaged in a war of survival. By the time slavery 
was abolished black generals determined to secure freedom dominated the 
North, collaborated with, and armed maroon colonies in the other regions. The 
West and South, led by Mulatto generals, in alliance with whites were determined 
to maintain their control and interests. Such was the social context within which 
the Haitian state emerged; regionally, ideologically, economically, and racially 
divided, led by regional generals with competing interests and identities. The 
state was thus predetermined to experience, manage, and constrain violent 
internal competition for power, leadership, and wealth (Ardouin 1853). The 
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Haitian state that would emerge thus faced a global slave system opposed to its 
existence, nationalists determined to maintain its independence and protect its 
sovereignty, and neo-colonialists keen on preserving their wealth, orientation 
toward France, and the power they had accumulated through slavery, in support 
of black subjugation but not necessarily slavery. 
Revolutionary nationalist and neocolonialist leaders recognized the 
challenge and feared that lack of cohesion could lead to the reinstitution of 
slavery (Madiou 1847, v1-2, Ardouin 1848, v1-2). They engaged in a state 
crafting project that eventually led to the declaration of independence and 
continued until the American occupation. Even in the midst of internal divisions, 
they seldom disagreed that securing the independence and liberty of post-slavery 
Saint Domingue required crafting a strong and unified state capable of exercising 
sovereignty over its territory and maintaining national cohesion. They 
endeavored to create a state with the capacity to protect itself and its citizens 
against regional secessionist movements, racial separatism, and imposition by 
foreign powers in an international system dominated by slave-owning nations 
who looked askance at the existence of a free Black Republic (James 1963, L. 
Dubois 2004). The revolutionary leaders’ differences lay in their pre-
independence positions, the conception of the state they sought to craft, its 
orientation, and their interests and goals in managing the rights and divergent 
interests of the different identity groups (Nesbitt 2008). For almost one hundred 
years following independence, Mulatto and black leaders would struggle to craft 
a state consistent with their conceptions, goals, and interests. The majority of 
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Northern Black Nationalist leaders attempted to craft a state responsive to the 
majority of its citizens with the capacity and power to secure black liberty. They 
endeavored to maintain a balance between the interests of the nation and those 
of all citizens, while the majority of Mulatto neocolonial leaders sought to craft a 
state to preserve their interests and maintain their dominance. The struggle 
between the two groups over the state and the failure of both groups to 
consolidate their power and control over it led to persistent national instability and 
undermined national development, cohesion and the consolidation of the state 
itself. This failure of both Western and Southern neocolonialists and Northern 
nationalists to consolidate and stabilize the Haitian state ultimately facilitated the 
American invasion of 1915, and the subsequent 19 years of physical occupation 
and 34 years of political and institutional control. 
Northern Haitian revolutionaries were not interested in ‘the inalienable 
rights’ stipulated by the American slave-owners that relegated blacks to 3/5 
human beings, and native Americans to invisibility on reservations, nor were they 
interested in ‘les Droits de l’homme’ claimed by the French Bourgeoisie, that 
ultimately limited those rights to white male citizens (James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973, 
Hunt 1996, Nesbitt 2008). The Philosopher Nick Nesbit notes that Haitian 
Revolutionaries “brought to fruition the unfulfilled promise of the French 
Revolution to found a state in which positive rights applied equally to all citizens, 
without exception” (Nesbitt 2008, 10). They challenged the still prevailing but 
bankrupt notion of freedom centered on leaving the landed and moneyed elites 
unhindered “to enjoy their property, human or otherwise” (Nesbitt 2008, 10). Yet, 
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the paradox between unfettered freedom and institutionalized rights has not often 
proven to be as easily reconcilable as Nesbit suggests. 
Early leaders of the Louverturean state faced ab initio a contradiction; the 
needs for a strong state in an agrarian society that depended on large plantations 
and slavery, and the abolition of slavery and need for the labor of former slaves 
as the basis for state development, expansion, and consolidation. As C.L.R. 
James observes,  
[T]his was almost an insuperable task in a disorganized 
society depending on the labor of men just out of slavery 
and surrounded on every side by the rabid greed and 
violence of French, Spaniards, and British (James 1963, 
155-6).  
 
Faced with a hostile international system where state building and national 
expansion projects were contingent on slavery and black subjugation, they 
understood therefore that freedom in Haiti, a nation of freed slaves, was not 
sustainable without the means to defend it (Charmant 1905, P. H. Sannon 1920-
1933). To defend their freedom, they had to rely on an economic system that 
could provide them with the necessary resources to craft, enhance, and sustain a 
strong state (L. J. Janvier 1886). Black Northern revolutionary leaders saw the 
crafting of a powerful state as the only means to protect not just the nation, but 
also their own personhoods, and later to defend their “race”15 (Cole 1967, Griggs 
and Prator 1968). From independence until the American Occupation, they would 
grapple with this challenge and struggle against those in their midst who sought 
                                                          
15 See letter from King Henry Christophe to Thomas Clarkson in the Clarkson papers, British  
 45 
 
to undermine their revolution, and later following its success, to usurp their 
project of state crafting for their own personal and ethnic gains. The history of 
Haiti then is a history of competition between two “ethnic” factions with different 
interests, ideologies, and different conceptions of the state and its relationship to 
its citizens. Stable governance in Haiti required crafting a state to balance the 
interests of these dominant ethnic factions for the benefit of the nation. This is a 
history of the failure of state crafting. 
 
Pre-Independence: Northern Nationalists, and the Crafting of the Louverturean 
Haitian State: 
There are no disagreements amongst serious scholars that Toussaint 
Louverture is the first Haitian leader to assert the need for Haitian independence 
and the formation of a strong state (Rulx 1945). Few scholars see him, however, 
as the father of the Haitian state. Even fewer discuss his period of dominance 
within the context of Haitian state formation and crafting. Yet, one cannot 
understand the history of the Haitian state without first taking account of its 
beginning. 
 
Property and Production: 
Louverture’ s quest to free his brethren from slavery and establish a state 
dedicated to and capable of protecting against their re-enslavement positions him 
as the undisputed leader of the black revolution in Saint Domingue, and founder 
of the Haitian state. From his alliance with the Spanish Crown to his return in the 
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French ranks, from his defeat of the British to his treaties with them, from his 
unification of the island and consolidation of power to his project of state crafting, 
Toussaint sought to identify the best vehicle to secure black liberty, national 
independence, and the establishment of a strong Haitian state (P. H. Sannon 
1920-1933, Rayford 1941).  
 He saw prosperity as the primary vehicle to crafting a state strong enough 
to support and withstand the internal and external forces, which depended on 
black subjugation for wealth accumulation, and sought the power to curtail black 
rights in order to preserve and maintain their economic gains. For Toussaint, 
economic growth and black liberty were not incompatible. His legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of the state he sought to craft rested on the ability to secure both 
liberty and prosperity, and both depended on maintaining the large plantation 
system, the very structure on which slavery depended. Thus from the beginning, 
Toussaint sought to create a social contract that balanced the needs of the 
emergent state against those of its citizens. 
To achieve his goals, he promulgated the Agrarian Laws to govern the 
plantation system that constrained both laborers and plantation owners and 
reestablished the centrality of Saint Domingue in Western commerce (T. O. Ott 
1973, L. Dubois 2004). Laborers were compelled to work on plantations that 
hitherto had enslaved them, with one fourth of the revenue allocated for their 
compensation, another fourth as taxes to the state, and the remaining half to the 
landowners (Ardouin 1848, Korngold 1965, Lacroix 1880). He established laws 
governing and constraining landowners to respect the rights of people over 
 47 
 
whom months prior they held the power of life and death as slaves16 (P. H. 
Sannon 1920-1933, Madiou 1847, James 1963). “This arrangement” argues 
                                                          
16 Some scholars have argued that Toussaint was not the first to institute these laws. Indeed the 
proclamation of August 21, 1793 by Commissioner Polverel ironically offered Northern slaves who had 
already liberated themselves their freedom if they went back to vacant, destroyed, or their former 
plantations to cultivate them. This proclamation also freed slaves who had already liberated themselves in 
the Eastern part of the Island on the condition that they cultivate vacant land. The French had not yet 
acquired control of the Eastern part of the Island then under the Spanish Crown. The proclamation also 
did two things worth nothing here to explain the distinction and future conflicts between the North and 
the Western and Southern region. It kept slavery intact in the west and the South still controlled by 
Mulattoes and Whites and gave Mulattoes officers, who had fought against the slave uprising, control 
over some of the vacant plantations in the western and Southern region (Ardouin 1853, 235-7). 
Additionally, Polverel’s proclamation applied only to those slaves who had revolted and did not apply to 
northern Black and Mulatto slaves who had not revolted nor did it grant free Mulattoes on the Island 
equal rights with whites for which they had allied with Whites to suppress the slave revolt. Clearly, 
Polverel was in no position to give freedom to men who had already freed themselves or to give them 
lands on the eastern side of the island over which he had no control, but his extension of citizenship to 
them cannot be considered trivial. However, this rather dubious proclamation was important enough to 
raise the ire of the propertied and non-propertied Mulattoes in the North and the South, who wanted an 
unconditional return to the plantation system, equal rights with whites, and the preservation of slavery. 
Consequently, the other French Commissioner, Felicite Leger Sonthonax assaulted by a Mulatto and white 
mob in the North, only survived due to the intervention of Toussaint and his Black generals. Black 
Freedom was thus secured in the North, but remained cursory in the South even after the general 
emancipation (T. O. Ott 1973). This pre-independence regional dynamic and divergence between the 
overwhelming black masses and landowning Mulatto and Black interests would play themselves out 
throughout Haiti’s history. Upon his release, Commissioner Sonthonax in a second proclamation in August 
29, 1793 now freed all the slaves in the North but to maintain the plantation system, appease plantation 
owners, and create order in the colony, stipulated a series of labor regulations that were to govern 
economic relations mirrored Toussaint’s plantation laws. Articles 2, 10, 11, 12, 19 &26. (Ardouin, Etude 
sur L'Histoire D' Haiti 1853, 245-7).  
Art. 11 – The cultivators will contract with their former plantation for one year during which, they will not 
be able to change plantation without permission from the local magistrate. 
Art. 12 - Revenue for each plantation is to be divided in thirds: 1/3 for the plantation owner, 1/3 for 
expenses and the other to be paid to the laborers. 
Art. 33 – Those not associated with a plantation or other work will be arrested and jailed.  
Neither commissioner was able to enforce any of these proclamations. However, Sonthonax managed to 
allay Mulatto anger and earn the support of the powerful black revolutionaries and military officers in the 
North. According to both Ott and Lacerte, Polverel recognized the inadequacy of Sonthonax’s 
proclamation, and Toussaint understood that Sonthonax’ unwillingness to coerce the laborers back to the 
plantation weakened its attempt to reenergize production (T. O. Ott 1973, 130, Lacerte 1978, 451). 
Toussaint, on the other hand had not just the means, but also the willingness to enforce his agrarian rules 
for he saw in its success the means to safeguard liberty (L'ouverture 1803).  
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Lacerte, “required balancing two opposite social interests without doing injury to 
either” (Lacerte 1978, 453). Not all blacks accepted the new agrarian regulations, 
nor did all the Mulatto and white landowners enjoy the curtailment of their power 
over their former slaves, but all had to accept the new basis of the relationship as 
necessary to preserve their interests under the Louverturean state (P. H. Sannon 
1920-1933, Korngold 1965). Toussaint departed from the colonial system by 
binding both former masters and slaves to the state with rights and 
responsibilities that neither could violate at their whims, thereby crafting a 
regulatory role for the state in this new system of employment and taxation. He 
expanded the state’s domain by confiscating abandoned plantations and through 
nationalization, thereby making the state the largest landowner in Saint 
Domingue. By implementing his system of ‘fermage’17, Toussaint increased the 
state’s sources of revenue, resources, and power. According to Cole,  
[T]he system of fermage, which Toussaint instituted, was 
destined to save the economic life of the colony and to 
form the basis of the many codes rurales, which 
succeeded it. The abandoned plantations were taken 
over by the government and let out to rent, usually to 
senior army officers and public officials. The tenants 
were required to distribute one quarter of his gross 
revenue among the workers on the plantation and to 
provide lodging and nursing services. The governments 
undertook to enforce a code of work under which the 
field hands were required to labor for a set number of 
hours each week and were not allowed to quit their 
employment without permission (Cole 1967, 51). 
 
James notes,  
                                                          
17 The fermage was a Land lease program that shared the proceeds equally with the state.  
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[T]he experiment was a great success and plantations 
were farmed out by the government on this new 
principle. Toussaint encouraged his generals and other 
notabilities to adopt this system by which everybody, 
including the state, profited (James 1963, 186, T. O. Ott 
1973).  
 
Through its system of fermage, revenue from taxation on both buyers and sellers 
at the custom houses, as well as its ability to enforce the labor codes and secure 
the rights of laborers, the Louverturean state became the arbiter of interests and 
the preserver of the social contract in Saint Domingue. The new social contract 
protected the rights and equality of all citizens while constraining their ability to 
infringe on each others’. It eliminated the differential racial treatment that 
dominated colonial Saint Domingue and protected its black citizens against re-
enslavement. With a new state-centered social contract backed by a state whose 
power and autonomy rested on the prosperity of its plantation system, the 
Louverturean state became the manager of both conflicts and interests. 
Toussaint protected even those who conspired against the new state in order to 
preserve stability and maintain prosperity (James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973). He 
urged the new citizens to “work together for the prosperity of Saint Domingue by 
the restoration of agriculture, which alone can support a state and assure public 
wellbeing” (James 1963, 205). The Louverturean state maintained its legitimacy 
and the allegiance of its citizens because it had the power to constrain, preserve, 
and protect their interests. More importantly, because of its prosperity, 
institutional and military expansion, it had the capacity and power to compel 
allegiance (Leger 1907). 
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Toussaint’s Agrarian Laws or Rural Codes18 charged his generals, and 
later a special gendarmerie, with the responsibility of enforcing those laws. These 
Agrarian Laws were to provide revenues for the emerging state and its 
revolutionary army, by rebuilding the plantation system, and reinvigorating 
production and commerce, disrupted during six years of war (Ardouin 1848). 
Some scholars like Beaubrun Ardouin and Laurent Dubois have maintained that 
far from seeking independence, Toussaint simply wanted a level of autonomy 
from France (Ardouin 1848, L. Dubois 2004). Indeed, such is the dominant thesis 
in analyzing Toussaint’s actions in St. Domingue. These scholars are either 
unaware or purposefully overlooked Toussaint’s request that the United States 
recognize Saint Domingue’s independence, his independent treaties with both 
the United States and Britain in violation of France’s order, and his eclipsing of 
France’s representation on the island. Toussaint’s Saint Domingue was already 
interacting with America and the British as an independent state, sending Joseph 
Brunel as his representative in America while receiving Edward Stevens as the 
American Consul19. More importantly, Alexander Hamilton’s response to Timothy 
Pickering suggesting the type of government for an independent Saint Domingue 
at the behest of the American consul is a clear indication that American policy-
                                                          
18 See (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, T. O. Ott 1973, 130-134) 
19 “Avoiding the Maelstrom of Saint-Domingue, 1 May–1 June 1801 (Editorial Note),” Founders Online, 
National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-01-02-0181, ver. 2013-08-02). 
Source: The Papers of James Madison, Secretary of State Series, vol. 1, 4 March–31 July 1801, ed. Robert J. 
Brugger, Robert A. Rutland, Robert Rhodes Crout, Jeanne K. Sisson, and Dru Dowdy. Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1986, pp. 127–129. 
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makers at the highest level were aware of Toussaint’s goal to declare the 
independence of Saint Domingue20. So determined was Toussaint to expand the 
state, and so confident was he in the ability of the Louverturean state to manage 
divergent interests that he encouraged French landowners to return to Saint 
Domingue while signing independent treaties with both England and the United 
States, and endeavoring to return the plantations to its former glory (R. W. Logan 
1941, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). At a time when France was at war with both 
America and Great Britain, he disregarded the colonial pact that required French 
commercial monopoly and expanded commerce with France’s enemies. The 
inability of France to impose its will on Saint Domingue because of its wars in 
Europe and the dominance of the British fleet in the Caribbean Sea, allowed 
Toussaint the time and space to sideline the French envoys, remnants of French 
power on the island, and consolidate his control over the territory, governance, 
and policies of Saint Domingue. His goal was to create a militarily and 
commercially powerful independent state, capable of resisting French 
encroachment and the reassertion of French control and slavery. The assertion 
                                                          
20 See Pickering to King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, III, 6.  and "Letters of Toussaint 
Louverture and Edward Stevens, 1798-1800," Franklin J. Jameson, Editor, Amerioan Historical Review. 
1910, XVI, 70. 
This is particularly important because at a time of an undeclared maritime war with France, Hamilton 
advised caution to Toussaint’s ouvertures and the establishment of trades in Saint Domingue, sending 
American representatives to secure relations with Saint Domingue, thus treating it as an independent 
entity and Tousaint as it undisputed leader. The context cannot be ignored, while the fear of Toussaint’s 
revolutionary influence led to containment measures, an independent and militarily strong Saint 
Domingue was needed to undermine French regional power and ability to wage war using black troops. 
Thus, the importance of the response of Alexander Hamilton, former Secretary of the Treasury’s and 




that he was not interested in independence proves false by the realities of the 
existence of Saint Domingue as an independent entity by fiat while Toussaint 
expanded its military capacity and reestablished its commercial linkages with 
France’s rivals. 
As Toussaint noted, “in a well-ordered state, idleness is the source of all 
disorders” and as ‘all work deserves a salary, each salary demands work” ( (L. 
Dubois 2004, 248-9). His goal was not to rebuild the plantation system for its 
sake but to create a work for pay system as opposed to the slave system against 
which he had fought. He sought to organize a stable system of government and 
acquire revenues through taxation and land lease to enhance the capacity of the 
Louverturean state and its institutions and create a well-armed military to defend 
it against France and enemies from within and without (Madiou 1847, James 
1963). Franklin notes that Toussaint “seems to have possessed a very correct 
idea of the true source from whence national wealth was obtained, and he left no 
measures untried that would in the least promote its increase” (Franklin 1828, 
118). Out of the ashes of the six-year war, he succeeded in restoring Saint 
Domingue’s prosperity and importance in international commerce. In less than a 
year under his leadership, exports rose from a mere $700,000 to $3,000,000 and 
doubled from 1800 to 1801 making Saint Domingue the most desirable 
destination for merchants (T. O. Ott 1973, 137). This successful attempt to 
secure Saint Domingue’s role in the international commerce linked the interests 
of key international actors to the autonomy and survival of the Haitian state. By 
all account, Toussaint’s agricultural policies were working, landowners who had 
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deserted their properties returned to work their lands, soldiers rented land to 
cultivate, and international commerce expanded, independent of France (Rayford 
1941, L. Dubois 2004). Lacerte notes, 
[F]rom an economic point of view, the new policy was a 
success. Sugar exports rose from a low of 1,750,387 
pounds in 1795 to a high of 18,535,112 pounds in 1801. 
Coffee exports also increased in the same time period 
from 2,228,270 pounds to 43, 420,270 pounds (Lacerte 
1978, 453). 
  
Independent Saint Domingue under Toussaint’s Leadership re-imposed itself as 
the envy of the New World by being the most prosperous state and an important 
center of commerce21. In the context of securing Saint Domingue’s role in 
international commerce, and the revenue necessary for state defense and 
expansion, his project of crafting a strong state was well underway (Montague 
1940, T. O. Ott 1973). 
 
International Relations and Commerce: 
The assertion of St Domingue’s autonomy was paramount to the 
Louverturean statecraft and claiming its sovereignty from France was already a 
fait accompli. As we demonstrate below, developing a state capable of 
maintaining this sovereignty and defend it was Toussaint’s ultimate goal. 
                                                          
21 Some have erroneously argued that Toussaint never intended to declare independence. I concur with 
(P. Sannon 1905) and (R. W. Logan 1941), that he wanted to first build a strong state before declaring 
independence. The peace treaty of Amiens signed between Britain and France impeded his plan. 
Moreover, his delay in declaring independence suggests that he wanted a strong state to precede such 
declaration, as he understood it would result in armed conflicts. 
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Between 1795 and 1799, Toussaint designed a strategy to assert the autonomy 
of the Louverturean state and prepare its full independence from France. To do 
so, he undermined the oversight of the French commissioners forcing them out of 
Saint Domingue22 (Schoelcher 1882). This strategy of eliminating French power 
of oversight in Saint Domingue made him the leader of Saint Domingue by fiat. 
France’s attempt to reassert its colonial control by sending the new 
commissioner, Theodore Hedouville, failed because of the reliance of the 
population on Louverturean defensive forces (Ardouin 1853). Toussaint’s defeat 
of the invading British forces and his consolidation of state power in the North 
and West accelerated his quest for autonomy. His dominance on the battlefield at 
a time when French forces were at war in Europe and his territorial consolidation 
allowed him to act independently of France and assert the autonomy of Saint 
Domingue. His defeat of the British, along with the French Commissioners’ 
impotence in the face of Toussaint’s army and power compelled the British to 
sign an independent treaty with Toussaint to avoid a military incursion into their 
own territory (Coradin 1987, G. Corvington 2001). It was Toussaint and his 
                                                          
22Once nominated Governor General, Toussaint eliminated French oversight in saint Domingue by naming 
Sonthonax, Representative of Saint Domingue in France. When Sonthonax refused to leave, he compelled 
him by marching his army to the outskirt of le Cap where Sonthonax resided and sent him a letter 
requesting that he travel to France to represent the colony. (See Ardouin, 1853, 564 Vol. 3 for a copy of 
the letter). The latter had to leave but while on a ship to France, sent a letter to Rigaud in the South asking 
him to assert control over his territory. Having been demoted and under arrest from France which 
Toussaint had arranged, he did not have the power to command Rigaud and so acknowledged. Scholars 
have suggested that the letter was a last ditch attempt by Sonthonax to continue the regional animosity 
to maintain divisions that would benefit France. Sonthonax’s letter is found in its entirety in (Ardouin, 
Etudes sur L'Histoire d'Haiti 1848). Rigaud in his simplicity and allegiance to France would indeed refuse to 
accept Toussaint’s Leadership. Toussaint’s action can be understood by France rejection of his demand to 
eliminate the French commissioner position a few months prior (James 1963, 193, T. O. Ott 1973, 91)  
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representatives who presided over the negotiations, while France and its 
representatives were left on the sidelines. Signing a formal reciprocity treaty23 
with General Maitland thus became the Louverturean state’s first international 
assertion of its autonomy.  
The success of Toussaint’s calculated assertion of Saint Domingue’s 
sovereignty, British fear of Louverturean military capacity, and France’s reliance 
on the Louverturean forces to offset British power in the Caribbean facilitated his 
march toward independence (Ardouin 1848, v2-3, Saint Remy 1850). Toussaint’s 
judicious manipulation of British fear that Jamaica, which had already 
experienced maroon uprisings and insurgencies, and the establishment of 
independent maroon communities would quickly fall to attack from his forces 
compelled Britain through general Maitland to negotiate directly with him instead 
of France’s representative and to send an agent to Saint Domingue for further 
protection24 (Leger 1907, 373). Toussaint used that fear to entice the British into 
a treaty, the convention of August 31, 1798 that compelled them to give 
protections to American merchants, their commercial competitor and sought to 
                                                          
23 Reference to the treaty abounds, see EDWARD STEVENS TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL MAITLAND. (Copy.) 
Gonaives, May 23rd. I799. in “Letters of Toussaint Louverture and of Edward Stevens,” 1798-1800, The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Oct., 1910), pp. 64-101. Oxford University Press 
24 Maitland’s letter to Lt. Colonel Grant in June 1799 discussing his treaty with Toussaint required that the 
agent ensure that no expeditions were being prepared and that every negotiation should be directly with 
Toussaint. Moreover, the stipulation in the treaty that French vessels will no longer be welcomed in 
Haitian ports demonstrates Toussaint intention to circumvent France’s power on St. Domingue. It is as 
clear that Britain was hoping to manipulate Toussaint for their own interests, as it was that they 
understood Toussaint’s intention to declare the Island independent. Moreover, an important section of 
treaty was the commitment by Toussaint not to use his forces to invade Jamaica See full letter in (Leger 
1907, 373-82).  
 56 
 
prevent military interference from France by banning French ships from Haitian 
ports25. Banning the former colonial power from participating in the commerce of 
its former colony is indeed an unequivocal assertion of independence. By 
bypassing Hedouville, the French Commissioner, Toussaint crafted an 
independent international policy and a political and economic course distinct from 
France’s economic and political interests26 (Korngold 1965, IX, T. O. Ott 1973, 
106). By so doing, he provided Saint Domingue a level of commercial and 
political independence, securing its role in the international arena. Thus, he 
established the basis of its international sovereignty: recognition through 
commerce, diplomacy, and military strength. Saint Domingue became 
independent by fiat. More importantly, by signing a commercial and military 
treaty, he enhanced his power by consolidating control over and expanding 
existing colonial institutions. The Louverturean state’s control over the 
international relations of Saint Domingue meant securing supremacy over core 
                                                          
25 For stipulations of the convention, see “To George Washington from Timothy Pickering, 11 March 
1799,” Founders Online, National Archives, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-03-
02-0312. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Retirement Series, vol. 3, 16 September 
1798 – 19 April 1799, ed. W. W. Abbot and Edward G. Lengel. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1999, pp. 413–415.] 
According to Ardouin (1853), Logan (1969), and Korngold (1965), fearing war with France and confiscation 
of their merchant ships, the United States needed cover and protection from the British to continue their 
lucrative trade with Saint Domingue. Toussaint treaty and his denial of access to France’s naval vessels 
addressed the American concern. It is clear that the whole affair was to increase commercial competition 
and access to both American and British military resources. 
26 See Dispatches from US Consul Edward Stevens from Cap-Haitien to Secretary of State Timothy 
Pickering, Sept. 30, 1799. In it, Stevens informed Pickering of France’s goal to attack Jamaica. France had 
also long prohibited commerce with other nations in order to maintain monopoly over St. Domingue’s 
lucrative commerce. The treaty eliminated that monopoly. 
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colonial institutions designed to facilitate and implement those relations and 
reorient them outside of France's sphere of influence. 
His treaty provided diplomatic cover for the United States by placing their 
ships under British protection to secure commerce with the Americans. However, 
the most important aspect of this arrangement, British acquiescence to economic 
competition, meant that the latter did not enjoy the kind of leverage in their 
negotiations with Toussaint to demand Commercial monopoly. The treaty thus 
was in Toussaint’s advantage for it allowed him to assert Saint Domingue’s 
autonomy and to force the British and Americans to compete with each other for 
Saint Domingue’s commerce thereby increasing the price of Saint Domingue’s 
goods and state revenues27 (Ardouin 1853, R. W. Logan 1941, Korngold 1965). 
An important aspect of the Louverturean strategy was clearly to avoid 
commercial monopolies by encouraging competition between foreign 
merchants28 and link their economic interests to Saint Domingue’s independence 
(R. W. Logan 1941, Coradin 1987). Toussaint’s diplomatic engagement with 
France’s enemies and competitors gave them an incentive to undermine 
France’s role in Saint Domingue, and limit her ability to reassert control over the 
colony. The Louverturean strategy while exercising territorial control over the 
islands, secured a market for Saint Domingue’s goods, and provided Toussaint 
                                                          
27 The full treaty can be found in the British National Archives in the King papers (King letter to Pickering 
1798). Its translation can be found in (R. W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with 
Haiti 1941, 65-6).  
28 See dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Cap Haitian from 1977 to 1801 
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with sources of arms and ammunitions to resist the anticipated French attack, 
and other nations if necessary (R. W. Logan 1941). Toussaint’s successful 
expansion of commercial relationships and competition, along with his control of 
the circulations of goods, provided revenue to enhance his military capacity, 
which was a key feature of the Louverturean state crafting project29. 
Some scholars have accused Toussaint of being solely concerned about 
his personal power rather than establishing the framework for St. Domingue’s 
independence (Ardouin 1848, G. Corvington 2001, L. Dubois 2004). Others have 
suggested that he sought to be recognized as King by Great Britain, or that he 
intended to ask for British protectorate of Saint Domingue (Madiou 1847, L. 
Dubois 2004, Heinl and Heinl 2005). These assertions are widely disputed by 
both Haitian and Western scholars and are often seen within the context of 
Neocolonial Mulatto propaganda30 (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, R. W. Logan 1941, 
James 1963, Korngold 1965, Nicholls 1974). It is clear that Toussaint used the 
war between France and Britain, and his own military power, to create the 
political space to compel the British to sign independent treaties designed to 
secure the autonomy of Saint Domingue and armaments for his army (Rulx 1945, 
James 1963, Korngold 1965). The military and commercial treaty enabled him to 
build a strong military to protect the emerging state. His strategy also included 
                                                          
29 Letter from Pickering to Adams, May 29, 1799, Knox, Naval Doouments, III, 272. 
30 For an understanding of the attempt by Mulatto scholars to undermine the legacies of Black leadership 
in Haiti, see Nicholls, David’s article “A Work of Combat: Mulatto Historians and the Haitian Past 1847-
1867” in the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Feb 1974. V16. No.1 15-38. 
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British and American recognition of Saint Domingue’s independence when 
declared, the procurement of arms and munitions, along with a reciprocity clause 
that neither Toussaint nor Great Britain would attack each other’s armies and 
colonies. Toussaint’s skillful management of the emerging nation’s interests 
enabled him to protect and expand his military without interference (R. W. Logan 
1941, 65-6). Toussaint’s diplomatic engagement, far from being for personal 
gains, focused on the survival of Saint Domingue as an independent state by 
appealing to and securing British and American commercial interests (R. W. 
Logan 1941, Rulx 1945, T. O. Ott 1973, Coradin 1987).  
Toussaint also circumvented the power of France over St. Domingue with 
respect to French citizens living in Saint Domingue by granting amnesty to 
French citizens who had supported the British military actions against their 
nation. In defiance of the French Commissioner’s mandate to expel these French 
citizens, he enlisted them as officers in his own army (Saint Remy 1850). This led 
Maitland, the British general, to observe, “Hedouville though possessed with 
great nominal powers was in truth possessed of no real authority”. (Maitland 
1798)31. The American General Consul in Saint Domingue, Edward Stevens, 
seconded Maitland’s observations in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State, Timothy 
Pickering: “The agent does nothing at present but what he is desired to do. The 
whole machine of government, both civil and military, is regulated and guided by 
the General-in-chief” (Korngold 1965, x). Like Sonthonax before him, Toussaint 
                                                          
31 Quoted in (T. O. Ott 1973, 106) 
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forced Hedouville to leave Saint Domingue eliminating again any vestiges of 
France control. Hedouville had arrived on March 29, 1798, confident of his power 
and France control of Saint Domingue, outmaneuvered by Toussaint; he left on 
October 22, 1798, 7 months later, convinced of France’s impotence in the face of 
St. Domingue’s autonomy32 (Madiou 1847, T. O. Ott 1973, 108). Toussaint would 
later sign another tripartite treaty with the American and the British to consolidate 
St. Domingue’s autonomy and their recognition of it, even if such recognition was 
by fiat and implicit instead of overt (R. W. Logan 1941, 75-90).  
Toussaint assessed correctly that neither America nor Britain would 
ultimately fully support the independence of Saint Domingue, but would not 
undermine it as long as they had commercial and economic interests in the 
colony’s independence33 (Coradin 1987). Indeed, Alexander Hamilton’s letter to 
Pickering on February 9, 1799, confirmed his suspicion, 
[T]he provision in the law is ample. But in this, my dear 
sir, as in everything else, we must unite caution with 
decision. The United States must not be committed on 
the independence of St. Domingo. No guaranty—no 
formal treaty—nothing that can rise up in judgment. It will 
be enough to let Toussaint be assured verbally, but 
explicitly, that upon his declaration of independence a 
commercial intercourse will be opened, and continue 
while he maintains it, and gives due protection to our 
vessels and property. I incline to think the declaration of 
independence ought to precede.34 (R. W. Logan 1941, 
82, Lodge 1904, VI, 395). 
                                                          
32 Following Sonthonax’s model, Hedouville before leaving for France, issued a proclamation making the 
Southern and Eastern part of the Island independent of Toussaint exacerbating again the regional and 
racial tensions that would become the Achilles’ heels of Haiti. The letter can be found in (Ardouin 1853, 
Vol 3, 511). 
33 Also see “Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti” by (Matthew 1996) 
34 Hamilton was interested in independence in St Domingue but did not want the predisposition of the 
United States to result in escalation with France. He went even as far as to conceptualize the type of 
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system that would be necessary there based on existing conditions and to prevent re-enslavement. The 
following letter to the Secretary of State Timothy Pickering on Feb 21, 1799 demonstrates that point 
clearly: 
My Dear Sir: 
 The multiplicity of my avocations joined to imperfect health has delayed the communication you desired 
respecting St. Domingo. And what is worse, it has prevented my bestowing sufficient thought to offer at 
present anything worth having. 
No regular system of liberty will at present suit St. Domingo. The government, if independent, must be 
military—partaking of the feodal system. 
A hereditary chief would be best, but this I fear is impracticable. 
Let there be then, a single Executive, to hold his place for life. 
The person to succeed on a vacancy to be either the officer next in command in the island at the time of 
the death of the predecessor, or the person who by plurality of voices of the commandants of regiments 
shall be designated within a certain time. In the meantime the principal military officers to administer. 
 All the males within certain ages to be arranged in military corps, and to be compellable to military 
service. This may be connected with the tenure of lands. 
Let the supreme judiciary authority be vested in twelve judges to be chosen for life by the generals or 
chief military officers. 
 Trial by jury in all criminal causes not military to be established. The mode of appointing them must be 
regulated with reference to the general spirit of the establishment. 
 Every law inflicting capital or other corporal punishment, or levying a tax or contribution in any shape, to 
be proposed by the Executive to an assembly composed of the generals and commandants of regiments 
for their sanction or rejection. 
 All other laws to be enacted by the sole authority of the Executive. 
 The powers of war and treaty to be in the Executive. 
 The Executive to be obliged to have three ministers—of finance, war, and foreign affairs—whom he shall 
nominate to the generals for their approbation or rejection. 
 The colonels and generals, when once appointed, to hold their offices during good behavior, removed 
only by conviction of an infamous crime in due course of law or the sentence of a court-martial cashiering 
them. 
 Court-martials for trial of officers and capital offences to be not less than twelve, and well-guarded as to 
mode of appointment. 
 Duties of import and export, taxes on lands and buildings to constitute the chief branches of revenue. 
 These thoughts are very crude, but perhaps they may afford some hints. 
 How is the sending an agent to Toussaint to encourage the independency of St. Domingo, and a minister 
to France to negotiate an accommodation reconcilable to consistency or good faith?  




Having defeated the Spaniards and the British forces in a costly war, the treaties 
he sought provided him with the time and armaments he needed to strengthen 
the Louverturean statecrafting project to maintain St. Domingue’s independence 
through a marriage of the economic interests of foreign powers and military 
deterrence (Coupeau 2008, J. Desquiron 1993). Toussaint understood that both 
British and American support was ephemeral and depended on their commercial 
interests and competition with France, thus his goal was to strengthen his control 
over the entire island and create a military capable of defending the 
independence of St. Domingue when American and British interests wane and 
competition or war with France abetted. His was the epitome of the politics of 
deterrence. Toussaint acted not from a position of weakness nor did he rely on 
international benevolence. He was a realist.  He aimed to maintain the state’s 
autonomy by both economic and military power. Indeed, this was the basis of 
Louverturean state crafting. 
Unlike contemporary Haitian leaders, Toussaint understood the 
international environment within which St. Domingue operated and crafted 
effective policies and strategies accordingly. Neither American nor British leaders 
fully supported an independent black nation, but the effectiveness of the 
Louverturean regime prevented them from openly acting against its existence 
and interests (Coradin 1987). As Pickering wrote, 




[W]e meddle not with the politics of the Island. Toussaint 
will pursue what he deems the interests of himself and 
his countrymen. He will probably declare the island 
independent. It is probable that he wished to assure 
himself of our commerce as the necessary means of 
obtaining it. Neither moral nor political considerations 
could induce us to discourage him; on the contrary, both 
would warrant us in urging him to the declaration. Yet we 
shall not do it (R. W. Logan 1941, 83). 
 
Yet, despite the refusal to formally recognize Haitian independence, Toussaint 
was successful in securing the existence of and support for the Haitian state. 
American and British leaders assessed it preferable to have an independent 
Saint Domingue contained by a naval blockade to prevent it from influencing 
slaves in their territory than to have one controlled by France with the formidable 
military power to pursue the latter’s expansionist ambitions (Lodge 1904). 
Indeed, both Britain and the United States had to consider the advantages of St. 
Domingue as a French colony versus an independent state. Pickering letter to 
Rufus King, the American Ambassador on London in March 12, 1799 made this 
point clear, 
[T]here ought not to be any inducements to withdraw the 
Blacks from the cultivation of the island to navigation; 
and confined to their own Island they will not be 
dangerous neighbors. Nothing is more clear than, if left 
to themselves, that the Blacks of St. Domingue will be 
incomparably less dangerous than if they remain the 
subjects of France; she could then form with them 
military corps of such strength in a future war, as no 
other European or other white force could resist. France 
with an army of those black troops might conquer all the 
British Isles and put in Jeopardy our Southern States. Of 
this the Southern members were convinced, and 
therefore cordially concurred in the policy of the 
independence of St. Domingue, if Toussaint and his 




In essence, Haiti’s neocolonial policy of limited possibilities and containment, as 
formulated by the British and the United States was a harbinger of future policies 
for the postcolonial world. The Louverturean state was in a system of externally 
controlled autonomy and curtailed sovereignty. Its international reach and 
national potential constrained by foreign powers determined to restrict its 
influence, development, and power. 
Despite American hesitancy, Hamilton’s letter to Pickering, and the latter’s 
policy formulation, by May 22, 1799 both the British and America recognized the 
independence by fiat, in the hopes of limiting its power and potential to impact 
their territory and interests by signing a tripartite treaty with Saint Domingue that  
[E]xcluded Rigaud’s South Province from Anglo-
American trade, protected Jamaica and the southern 
United States from attack by the blacks, and guaranteed 
that the British navy would neither interrupt commerce 
nor molest Toussaint’s navy. The treaty was amended in 
June to include opposition against indoctrination of slave 
of both nations (T. O. Ott 1973, 110, Coradin 1987, R. 
W. Logan 1941).  
 
Toussaint had achieved an important objective in his quest for an independent 
state. He not only consolidated his control over land and sea, he also exercised a 
measure of control over the rebellious Southern territory by limiting their 
commerce and cutting their access to the rest of the world using American and 
British naval forces (R. W. Logan 1941, Madiou 1847, v1-2). In a world worried 
about the existence of an independent black nation, Louverture created Saint 
Domingue’s interdependence through a marriage of mutual benefits and 
deterrence (Cole 1967, Rodman 1954). The commercial linkages he cultivated 
and treaties he negotiated with other nations were his vehicles to securing the 
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nascent state35. In Toussaint, Saint Domingue found an able and visionary leader 
who engineered a state capable of protecting its interests, those of its citizens, 
and maintaining its independence. Yet, despite Toussaint’s success in securing 
an independent international role for Saint Domingue, he could not sustain it 
without territorial unity, which remained elusive36. With total control over the 
North and partial control over the West, the Southern and Eastern regions of the 
island had resisted his control with support from France. Toussaint recognized 
that one of the vulnerabilities of the Louverturean state was its lack of territorial 
control and internal sovereignty. Having secured international treaties that 
afforded the Louverturean state a degree of international security and 
sovereignty, Toussaint turned his efforts inward toward territorial security and full 
internal sovereignty (Jackson 1990). 
 
Asserting Territorial Control: 
Despite Toussaint’s success in establishing the autonomy of the 
Louverturean state in international affairs, he contended with regional forces 
opposed to the emergence of a Black-led state and determined to act 
                                                          
35Both the American and British governments needing Toussaint to protect their territories and commerce 
were forced to signed treaties with him as the government of an independent Saint Domingue, thus 
implicitly recognizing its independence. Without an independent Saint Domingue they could secure 
neither their commerce nor territories from France’s expansionary threats. Toussaint the representative 
of the emerging State had skillfully maneuvered its importance to both nations.  See the Letter of 
American First Consul to Haiti Edward Stevens to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. L'ARCAHAYE June 
23rd: 1799 (Review Oct., 1910). 
36 See letter from American First Consul Edwards Stevens to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. Cape 
Francois 3rd May & 24th June 1799. (Review Oct., 1910). 
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independently against it in collusion with foreign powers (Leyburn 1966). 
Toussaint could not secure his nascent state without controlling these forces nor 
could he declare Saint Domingue’s independence without exercising sovereignty 
over its entire territory.  
The basis of sovereignty for any state rests on its ability to exercise control 
over its territory. While Toussaint had established a de facto international 
recognition, territorial control had been elusive (Ardouin 1848, v1-2, G. 
Corvington 2001). The Eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, which was 
controlled historically by the Spanish crown but ceded to France under the Basle 
treaty of 1795, had maintained its autonomy with Spanish dominance under the 
French adviser Philippe-Rose Roume, whom Toussaint had dispatched there 
(Leyburn 1966, T. O. Ott 1973, Schoelcher 1882). To facilitate commerce and 
guard against attacks from competing powers, Saint Domingue was organized 
into regional centers of power. The fertile North, hierarchical, dominated by 
colonial landowners, enjoyed established institutions, the most successful 
agricultural-based commercial enterprises, and had the highest concentration of 
blacks. The South and West, less organized and populated and with a larger 
white and Mulatto population, had a mixed population and social classes. The 
eastern part of the island, formerly a Spanish colony, was culturally different from 
Saint Domingue, sparsely populated, with limited governance structure, and 
poor. Stein notes, “The natural isolation of each of the three French provinces 
encouraged the development of local political and social differences and fostered 
interprovincial rivalries” (Stein 1985, 27). Moreau de Saint-Mery’s description of 
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the population dynamics at the eve of the slave revolution is also instructive: the 
North had 16,000 whites, 9,000 free men of color, and 180,000 slaves, The West 
had 14,000 whites, 12,000 free men of color, and 168,000 slaves, and the South 
had 10,000 whites, 6,500 free men of color, and 114,000 slaves (Moreau de 
Saint-Mery 1797-1798, 115-30)37. This racial and regional diversity coalesced 
into divergent interests and gave way to a realignment and consolidation of white 
and Mulatto interests following the 1791 slave revolution. Whites and Mulattoes 
in the West and South under the leadership of Andre Rigaud formed alliances to 
maintain their dominance and undermined the black struggle for emancipation 
(Ardouin 1848, Rulx 1945, Heinl and Heinl 2005). Mulattoes, who had long 
sought to form alliances, shared power and equal rights with Whites without 
much success found common cause with them in resisting black emancipation to 
maintain their economic interests (Stein 1985). While blacks successfully fought 
against slavery in the North, they had remained subjugated in the South and 
West under a militarized Mulatto and white alliance. The abolition of slavery was 
thus a direct challenge to their economic and racial interests (Ardouin 1848, Rulx 
1945, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004).  
Two years prior to emancipation, Mulatto representatives had sought an 
alliance with whites in the assembly in France. Such a reunion they contended 
would “create a mass of forces that is more effective for containing the slaves”38 
                                                          
37 Also see (Stein 1985, 26-38) 
38 By 1793 in every areas but the North, Mulattoes supplanted the white population by their alliance with 
large white landowners who needed their protection against both white artisans and slaves. This Mulatto 
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(Stein 1985, Hunt 1996, 24). Even after the abolition of slavery in the North on 
August 29, 1793, in Rigaud’s south and west, despite resistance, slavery and 
black’s forceful subservience persisted (Ardouin 1848, v1-3, Rulx 1945, Korngold 
1965). The Mulatto/White alliance to preserve their interests in black servitude 
and power was well cemented by their interdependence. As Ott notes,  
[E]ssentially the Grands Blancs and Mulattoes of the 
west province, masters of the countryside, were fighting 
the Petits Blancs, masters of Port-au-Prince, and the 
slaves. In the South Province, the pattern was much the 
same, except that whites did not split (T. O. Ott 1973, 
55-6). 
 
Mulattoes, having consolidated their dominance in those regions, consequently 
viewed emancipation and black ascendency as a threat to their interests and 
power (James 1963, Parkinson 1978). More importantly, the convergence 
between color and status was such that Mulatto leaders, even those in the North, 
resented black control, but only those in the West and South had the power to 
openly refuse to acquiesce to Toussaint’s leadership (Madiou 1847, Ardouin 
1853, Heinl and Heinl 2005). As The American Consul in Saint Domingue 
observed in his Letter to the American Secretary of State, Toussaint’s drive 
toward territorial consolidation contravened France’s envoys to the island who 
designed to create divisions between Mulattoes and Blacks to curtail his power 
and inhibit his drive towards independence39. The French Commissioners made 
                                                          
dominance is what led to the alliance of Whites in the west with the invading British. It was not an alliance 
against France, but to offset Mulatto power (Ardouin 1853, T. O. Ott 1973, 51-60) 
39 “As soon as Rigaud falls, Roume will be sent off, and from that Moment the Power of the Directory will 
cease in this Colony. I hinted to you, some Time ago, my suspicion that Rigaud was privately supported by 
the french Government, from the cruel Policy of weakening both Mullattoes23 and Negroes, by fomenting 
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sure that the emancipation proclamation never applied to the places under 
Mulatto and white control (Ardouin 1848, T. O. Ott 1973, 71-2). Furthermore, 
Rigaud’s resistance had been encouraged and even given legitimacy by both 
Commissioners Sonthonax and Hedouville who sought to undermine Toussaint’s 
power prior to their removal from the Island by the latter (Madiou 1847, 402-6, 
Ardouin 1848, Ardouin 1853). Hedouville, prior to his departure, expanded 
Rigaud’s territorial control and made him independent of Toussaint. “Toussaint 
sold himself to the British, the immigrants and the Americans,” Hedouville wrote 
to Rigaud, “I relieve you entirely of the authority attributed to him as general in 
Chief, and assign the southern department as I recently expanded” (Ardouin 
1848, v3,511). The French colonial policy of creating racial divisions between 
black and Mulattoes through legal sanction, and exploiting them to maintain their 
dominance, was not far from Hedouville’s mind. “The sole hope of checking 
Toussaint Louverture, even for the moment, lies in sedulously fostering the hate 
between the mulâtres and noirs, and by opposing Rigaud to Toussaint”, he wrote 
(Heinl and Heinl 2005, 76)40. 
                                                          
and keeping up a Contest between them. Every Day confirms me more in this Opinion, and I have now no 
doubt that the Agent is the secret and diabolical Instrument employed by them for this Purpose. He 
certainly is privately in the Interests of Rigaud, and Toussaint seems well acquainted with this Fact. Policy, 
however, induces him to temporize” Stevens to Pickering, June 24th 1799  (Review Oct., 1910, 77). 
40 In an attempt to reduce the power of Toussaint, Hedouville before his departure had promulgated the 
“Law of 4 Brumaire” to expand Rigaud’s territorial control from the South all the way to the outskirt of 
Port-au-Prince thus reducing the West to a few towns. and urged him not to recognize Toussaint’s 
authority (Korngold 1965, 169-71) 
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The coalescing of racial and economic interest with regional rivalries, and 
the inability to overcome colonial-induced racial divisions provided a challenge to 
the Louverturean state crafting project ab initio, one that would persist to date. 
For the Louverturean state to achieve territorial sovereignty, Mulatto power had 
to be checked. The choice was then and has been since, between Mulatto 
consolidation of power for their personal and ethnic gains, and state building to 
preserve the interests of the nation. The Consular dispatch to the Secretary State 
Timothy Pickering by the American Consul Edward Stevens at the eve of what 
would be the most violent racial civil war in Haiti spelled out the dynamics clearly, 
[B]oth wish to reign, but by different means, and with 
different views. Rigaud would deluge the country with 
blood to accomplish this favorite point, and slaughter 
indiscriminately whites, blacks, and even leading chiefs 
of his own color. The acquisition of power is central to 
him and the men in his ranks. Toussaint, on the contrary, 
is desirous of being confirmed in his authority by the 
united efforts of all the inhabitants, whose friend and 
protector he wishes to be considered and, I am 
convinced, were his power uncontrolled he would 
exercise it in protecting commerce, encouraging 
agriculture, and establishing useful regulations for the 
internal government of the colony41 
 
Toussaint “wanted the Mulattoes to be part of the emerging State,” and in his 
search for a unified state, sought to resolve the conflict peacefully, but such was 
                                                          
41 Dispatches from Us Consul Edward Stevens to Timothy Pickering, June 24, 1799 Cap Haitien, Vol. 1. 
It is important to note that the American consul lived in the North and had a rather more intimate 
relationship with Toussaint, and that America had established greater economic relations with the North 
and thus may have sought to protect their interests. Stevens has also been considered a supporter of 
Toussaint’s policies and in some respect, an advisor to him (R. W. Logan 1941). Most historians have 
concluded that indeed Rigaud and his Mulatto followers considered themselves French and acted against 
the interest of the emergent state. Indeed, it is not controversial to suggest that they were against 
independence from France as long as their interests were protected. Despite Toussaint’s overture to 
Rigaud, the latter refused his attempt to form a coalition and instead alerted the French Commissioner of 
Toussaint’s intention to declare independence (Madiou 1847, 464-70, James 1963, Review Oct., 1910). 
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not the disposition of his foes (Ardouin 1853, James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973, Heinl 
and Heinl 2005, 76). Had Rigaud acquiesced to Toussaint’s role as Governor 
General, and submitted to his command as his subordinate military position 
required, had he not been a Francophile, seduced by status and power and 
predisposed to Hedouville’s machinations, war could have been averted. 
However, Personal, territorial, ethnic interests and greed for power proved more 
important than national independence and state building. Following Rigaud’s 
refusal, it became also clear that despite Toussaint inclusion of all races in his 
government and attempts to eliminate racial animosity, his quest to secure the 
state’s territorial sovereignty had also become a struggle between Blacks and 
Mulattoes42. His speech in the cathedral43 of Port-Au-Prince, one of the two 
centers of Mulatto power is important in that vein, 
[‘G]ens de couleur’ who since the beginning of the 
revolution have betrayed the blacks, what are you up to 
today? Everyone knows that you are seeking mastery 
over the colony, that you wish to exterminate the whites 
and enslaved the blacks” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 76, 
Madiou 1847, 487-8). 
 
The civil war that ensued would ultimately determine the fate of the Haitian state 
until the occupation. Contemporary scholar Laurent Dubois, following the racial 
subtext of Southern exceptionalism, and obscuring that Toussaint was Rigaud’s 
superior officer, maintains, that the struggle was not about race but over territorial 
                                                          
42 See Toussaint Louverture’s Letter to the American President John Adams, August 14, 1799 (Review Oct., 
1910, 81) 
43 This cathedral was destroyed in a criminal fire in 1991. 
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autonomy. Louverture’s quest to control all regions and unite the island was met 
by an independent and regionally distinct south44 (L. Dubois 2004, 233-4) 
 
Despite the racial polemics, the conflict between Toussaint and Rigaud, 
between the North and South could have easily been a war for territorial control 
and regional power, had Mulattoes across the country not taken up arms against 
Toussaint and defected to fight in Rigaud’s ranks (Madiou 1847, 467-73, James 
1963, Korngold 1965, T. O. Ott 1973, 112-4). Even prominent Mulatto military 
leaders, who had fought under Toussaint and achieved high ranks, deserted his 
army to aid the South in what they considered a fight for the supremacy of their 
color (Ardouin 1853, James 1963, Korngold 1965). Alexandre Pétion, Jean-
Pierre Boyer, Geffrard, and many other Mulattoes who would later vie for 
leadership of the state, deserted Toussaint and sided with their color and class. 
As Dubois notes, the internecine war was fought with such intensity and hatred, 
unarmed Mulatto soldiers would attack with their teeth, ripping the flesh of their 
black brethren, rather than surrender to them, and “it never entered anyone’s 
mind to take prisoners” (L. Dubois 2004, 235). The ‘Aristocracy of the skin’, which 
until then was confined to regional dynamics and colonial institutions had thus 
become embedded into the project of state crafting. Black generals Jean 
Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe led the fight to quell Mulatto uprisings 
in the North and West, and to assert sovereignty over the South. When Toussaint 
                                                          
44 Similar justifications were made by Beaubrun Ardouin, the Southern Mulatto historian minister and 
ambassador under various Mulatto regimes (Ardouin 1848, t4, 18-26). 
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selected Dessalines to lead the South after the war, his efforts at pacifying the 
region, ensure an end to resistance, and adherence to the Louverturean state, 
were strongly resented by a population who thought themselves too superior to 
be led by blacks (Ardouin 1848, v3). This resentment would later lead to his 
assassination by Mulatto officers disguised as his military guards (Franklin 1828, 
Debbasch 1967). 
The war dealt a blow to this nascent state by limiting its human resources 
and dispersing its energy. Once the civil war was over, despite the amnesty for 
all the combatants, the defeated Mulattoes who were too proud to serve under 
Toussaint and too resentful to pay taxes to the state and the required payments 
to their laborers, never waned in their contempt against the state and its new 
social contract (Waxman 1931)45. Seven hundred well trained officers and their 
families left for Cuba rather than serve their state. Mulatto leaders went to France 
to foment oppositions to Haitian independence and the Louverturean state. They 
would later return with the French to re-establish slavery and control over the 
Island. Officers that could have saved the nation from invasion, and protected the 
                                                          
45 Waxman (1931) and Ott (1973) have provided some important analysis of the disposition of the 
Mulattoes toward the blacks. However, more importantly, primary documents of the French Revolution 
demonstrate that the Mulattoes were not interested in safeguarding black liberty. They sought unification 
and equal rights with whites as preconditions to help maintain slavery at perpetuity (Hunt 1996). CLR 
James(1963) claimed that” never was there so favorable an opportunity for a working arrangement 
between Mulattoes and Blacks as at the very beginning of their history”, but those defeated avaricious 
Mulattoes leaders would support France’s attempt to recapture the old colony and re-establish the old 
slave regime so despised and degraded. Where it not for Napoleon’s intent to disenfranchise them along 
with the blacks compelling them to, temporarily, cast their lots with them, they might have continued 
their support for the re-institution of slavery and the defeat of the new state 
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young state and its citizens allowed racial animosity to prevail over their civism 
and ideals of liberty (Schoelcher 1882, 28-9).  
The very nature of the forces with which he contended contravened 
Toussaint’s state crafting project. While internal forces sought to limit the power 
of the state for their own personal and ethnic interests, external forces supported 
them in order to undermine the formation and potential of that state. His goal of 
creating a strong, unified and independent state was opposed by forces from 
within driven by the ‘aristocracy of skin’ present still in contemporary Haiti, and so 
dominant in postcolonial societies46 (Lacroix 1880, Schoelcher 1882, P. H. 
Sannon 1920-1933, Nemours 1925, Waxman 1931). At a time when the 
embryonic state needed stability and cohesion to protect its development, ethnic 
divisions, and Mulattoes' vanity and economic interests led to civil war 
(Schoelcher 1882). Southern and Western Mulatto leaders objected to a 
government led by the Black Toussaint and its Northern black-dominated 
revolutionary forces. They resisted the regulation of their plantations by a state 
designed to maintain and enforce the interests of its majority population based on 
established rules governing landowners and workers, and a social contract 
securing their freedom47 (Heinl and Heinl 2005).  
                                                          
46 For elaboration of this ‘aristocracy of skin’ see (James 1963) and (Nicholls 1979) 
47 Surely, there have rules governing landowners responsibility towards their slaves but not only were 
they not enforced when it came to obligations that needed to be observed by landowners, they offered 
no real protection to slaves. The Code Noir promulgated by France stipulation right for slaves, freed 
people, and Mulattoes had little relevance. These new laws under this emerging state however were fully 
enforced. According to Ardouin (1843), while it is true that Mulattoes felt entitled to be in charge of the 
state and objected to Toussaint’s willingness to employ competent administrators from all stripes, what 
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The ability of any state to control its territory and maintain order is one of 
its primary sources of legitimacy (Mann 1984, Jackson 1990). By asserting 
control over the national territory and defeat sectarian forces, along with 
extending full control over the eastern side of the Island, Toussaint secured the 
internal sovereignty and autonomy of the state leaving it in a stronger position to 
resist external challenges and secure its international autonomy (Korngold 1965, 
Heinl and Heinl 2005). It is clear however, that Toussaint was not interested in 
crafting a state based on excluding segments of the population. He wanted all 
citizens, whites, Mulattoes, and blacks to be included in the Louverturean project. 
He was not interested in an exclusive ethnic-based state system. He wanted a 
state strong enough to maintain control over its national sphere and deter 
external threat. Ott notes, “Toussaint wanted the Mulattoes to be part of the 
emerging  black state”, but they wanted to be the leader of a state where blacks 
were subservient to them; where the power of the state would be oriented to 
maintain their dominance, not preserve liberty for all48 (T. O. Ott 1973, 128). 
While Ott’s observation about Toussaint’s inclusionary intent is correct, his 
characterization of Toussaint state project as “a black State” reflects the type of 
polemical analyses in which many important scholars have been engaged, which 
                                                          
troubled them most was the state confiscation of property of landowners who deserted the Island. Many 
felt, such properties belong to them as offspring of those proprietors though they were illegitimate and 
not recognized (Nichols 1979; Heinl and Heinl 2005). Also, see Moreau the St. Remy and Thomas Madiou 
who have written extensively on the Mulatto question. Although both St. Remy and Madiou are Mulatto 
sympathizers, their work does to some degree show the cause of Mulatto discontent. 
48 Also see (Coradin 1987), (James 1963), and (Lacroix 1880), and (Madiou 1847). 
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have undermined studies of Haitian state formation (Nicholls 1974, 1979). 
Toussaint sought the formation of a federated state system with institutions that 
upheld its ethno-cultural, linguistics, and regional character. He created a 
multilayered court system with both regional courts and a supreme court to 
address legal challenges and provide impartial avenues for redress. His state 
crafting accounted for regional differences and sought to strengthen institutional 
capacity and eliminate areas of resistance to state rule by providing local and 
regional constituents with independent and impartial institutions capable of 
upholding the laws (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933).  Institutional confidence was 
paramount in Toussaint’s statecraft. Toussaint’s 1801 constitution had already 
assigned the courts its due power to increase institutional confidence and allay 
regional conflicts and national instability. 
Toussaint had advocated for an inclusive effort to protect the citizens of 
Saint Domingue. He saw whites, blacks, and Mulattoes as indispensable in the 
crafting, expansion and security of the new state. His administration, his military, 
his advisors had included members of all castes (Nemours 1925, 67-94, James 
1963, 245). Mulattoes’ refusal to recognize and support the Louverturean state, 
and the defections to Rigaud of prominent as well as ordinary Mulattoes, made 
the vulnerability of the state to racial animus apparent. Already a matter of 
necessity, it became urgent for Toussaint to assert territorial control for the 
survival of the embryonic state and deny foreign powers a bridgehead from 
whence to threaten it and re-enslave its citizens (Lacroix 1880, P. H. Sannon 
1920-1933, Nicholls 1979, Coradin 1987). This multifaceted conflict: between 
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those who chose independence and nation building against regional power and 
dependency, between state-building, national interests and development against 
personal and ethnic consolidation of power, between a nationalist state and 
neocolonial entity, has been the primary obstacle to the process of state 
formation and consolidation in Haiti and the primary source of its instability. 
The war deviated resources from the state-building project, state 
expansion suffered in order to manage an ‘internecine fratricide’ (Schoelcher 
1882). Yet, these impediments did not last. In less than a year, Toussaint 
managed to reassert Saint Domingue’s supremacy in commerce in the New 
World and thus secured resources for the expansion and protection of the 
Louverturean state. 
By the time full control over the island was consolidated, the state was 
weak at best with thousands dead, most of the plantations and cultivation 
destroyed, and many experienced administrators having fled the island (James 
1963, 242, T. O. Ott 1973, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Yet, as James states, Toussaint 
was undeterred by the devastation, “personal industry, social morality, public 
education, religious toleration, free trade, civic pride, racial equality, this ex-slave 
strove according to his lights to lay their foundation in a new state” (James 1963, 
247). For Toussaint, institutions and administration were necessary for proper 
governance. The preservation of liberty, state control over its territory, and 
autonomy in delineating its international relations were predominant concerns he 




National Reorganization: Law and Taxation: 
On the national realm, Toussaint redoubled his efforts at reorganizing the 
state, by dividing the Island into six departments (Ardouin 1853, P. H. Sannon 
1920-1933) . He created ordinary courts of law and two federal courts of appeal, 
one in the French, the other in the Spanish part of the island, and a supreme 
court of appeal in the capital. There were also especial military courts to deal 
quickly with robberies and crimes on the high road. The special military courts 
were important to prevent attacks from active maroon bands (Ardouin 1848, v3). 
The finance of the old regime was complicated and irksome. Toussaint 
demanded first an exact inventory of resources and policies, and then abolished 
the numerous duties and taxes, which were only a source of fraud and abuses. 
He gave the gourde, the local unit of money, a uniform value for the whole island 
(James 1963, 244-5). The Louverturean system of taxation provided the state 
with the necessary revenue to maintain its institutions, while addressing the 
needs of the population. James and Nemours explained,  
All merchandise, and produce imported or exported paid 
a duty of ten percent. All fixed property incurred a similar 
tax. To encourage the poor, he lowered taxes to six 
percent on articles of necessity, and organized a 
Maritime police to secure the ports and protect 
merchants (Nemours 1925, 67-94, L. J. Janvier 1886, 
James 1963, 245).  
 
Agricultural Policies: 
No longer dependent on slave labor, The Louverturean State crafted and 
codified a new agricultural system based on paid labor and large plantations 
(Madiou 1847, Bonneau 1862). Toussaint laid and strengthened the basis for the 
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state and expanded its institutions to maintain a social contract based on the 
liberty of the former slaves and their new rights as paid workers, citizens, and 
soldiers. As James notes, the legitimacy of the Louverturean state was “rooted in 
the preservation of the interests of the laboring poor” and in maintaining balance 
between divergent interest groups within the nation (Nemours 1925, James 
1963, 245-7). The new plantation system and labor laws compelled the new 
landless citizens to work for a fee. These new labor arrangements were the basis 
of the economic and regulatory power of the Louverturean state. Its primary goal 
was the protection of the vulnerable majority, and the state itself was dependent 
on their protection for without their adherence to the state and their willingness to 
take up arms on its behalf, the state was defenseless.  
Some blacks resented their new arrangements and status as workers, 
preferring the ownership of their own land rather than laboring for their old 
masters (Lacerte 1978, 450). Having identified slavery with working on 
plantations, they resisted both the new system and state, seeking new social 
arrangements that did not tie them to the plantation system. Some enlisted as 
soldiers while other lived outside of the state as squatters on open lands or in 
maroon communities in the mountains49. In analyzing the Louverturean 
agricultural policies Trouillot’s observes,  
The major weakness of Louverture’s party and the 
fundamental contradiction of his regime was the 
leadership’s failure to face the fact that the goal of 
unconditional freedom was incompatible with the 
                                                          
49 Others openly revolted against a state they now saw, According to the Ardouin, as the new slave master 
(Ardouin 1848, v2-3). Also see (Lacerte 1978, 453, L. Dubois 2004) 
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maintenance of the plantation system. To the newly 
liberated masses, the work regimen instituted by the 
revolutionary state was no different from the slavery they 
thought they had left behind (Trouillot 1990, 43)50  
 
Trouillot‘s allusion that tensions existed between the necessity and imposition of 
the new State, the responsibility of its new citizens versus the conception of 
freedom by former slaves cannot be dismissed. However, Trouillot obscures an 
important fact - namely that the very freedom enjoyed by the newly liberated 
masses rested on the Louverturean State’s economic arrangements and its 
ability to protect them against re-enslavement and thus necessitated the 
formation of a new model of citizenship and a social contract between these new 
citizens and the state, not just their presence as liberated people. Indeed, most of 
the population opted to support the system that secured the prosperity of the 
Louverturean state and enhanced its capacity to protect their freedom (Franklin 
1828, Saint Remy 1850). Moreover, the Louverturean state was as determined to 
pursue whites, Mulattoes, and Black landowners for violating the new labor 
covenant, as it was determined to pursue workers for refusing to work, and 
participate in some form to enhance the capacity of the state to protect their 
freedom (L. J. Janvier 1886, Korngold 1965). This arrangement, argues Lacerte, 
                                                          
50 Trouillot statement, however avoids posing the fundamental question? Would the Haitian state have 
been able to resist the Napoleonic forces had Toussaint not implemented his policies? Would he have 
been able to secure the treaties with the British that temporarily safeguarded the Island from attacks and 
allowed him time to strengthen the state? Were the interests of the new black citizens ultimately better 
served by the new regulations? What other viable options did Toussaint have which he did not explore? 
Perhaps contemporary assessment of Toussaint ought to ponder these questions. Nevertheless, we know 
this, regardless of whether Black workers agreed to these arrangements, the revenues, and shared 
expectation, would have been better than the alternative. Moreover, that there was only one major 
armed protest incited by the his nephew speaks to the support for these new arrangements. 
 81 
 
“required balancing two opposite social interests without doing injury to either” 
(Lacerte 1978, 453). The Agrarian laws required landowners to pay a fourth of 
the production as compensation to the workers, and another fourth as taxes to 
the state and compelled the worker to sign a contract for three years that would 
require staying with one landowner and the need for state’s permission to nullify 
the contract (Ardouin 1848, v2). For Toussaint, the protection against re-
enslavement necessitated a forceful and capable state, and the plantation 
system provided the only viable revenue source for that state. In a hostile 
environment permeated by powerful nations determine to re-impose slavery, 
internal forces who regarded emancipation as an affront to their racial ideology 
and economic interests, and a vulnerable majority fresh out of slavery, the 
Louverturean state was at the center to balance internal and external interests 
and secure the rights of the majority.  
Toussaint seems to have understood that in postcolonial states, the ability 
of the state to manage divergent interests, establish, and sustain a social 
contract binding all interests were the precursor to national stability (Stepan, Linz 
and Yadav 2010). He crafted a state powerful enough and in control of enough 
resources to make it costly for all who would seek to undermine its rule. The 
Louverturean state was not based on the exclusion of some groups and 
interests, for such a state would be too prone to instability, institutional 
weakness, and failure (Gros 1996). Unlike most contemporary neocolonial 
states, resource extraction did not end up in the pockets of state and political 
elites, but served to strengthen the state’s capacity, and enhance its ability to 
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protect the nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, James 1963, G. Corvington 2001). 
The protection of the right of all citizens regardless of interests, social position, 
ethnicity, or color was the Louverturean State’s primary focus.  
In less than six years, Toussaint succeeded in crafting a state powerful 
enough to exercise sovereignty over its territory and deter other nations from 
infringements, economically strong enough to entice other nations to compete 
over for its market, and feared enough to elicit treaties of non-intervention from 
Britain and the United States (R. W. Logan 1941, Coradin 1987). Toussaint had 
asserted territorial control, squashed regionalism and separatism, re-established 
prosperity, international commerce, and secure relations with other nations. By 
the end of 1799, he increased his military capacity by having 10 well-armed large 
military ships built in the United States, and could put 100,000 well-equipped 
men on the battlefield51. The Louverturean state had the power to prevent 
internal challenges and guard against external threats. He had created a 
standing army capable of defending the nation and securing the state’s and its 
agents’ monopoly over the use of force on its territory (Korngold 1965, ix). Yet, 
despite its successes, the Louverturean state remained a state on the defensive, 
                                                          
51 Some scholars put the number of Toussaint’s troops to 55,000 but despite the debate about his forces, 
most agreed that his success in arming the entire population and his ability to put them on the march to 
protect their freedom made his military capacity almost too dynamic to limit to 100,000 troops. In 
comparison to other militaries, Korngold wrote, “the largest military George Washington ever 
commanded had not exceeded 20, 000,”… and “A British army of 20,000 well-trained and excellently 
equipped soldiers had been decisively defeated by Toussaint Louverture” (Korngold 1965, IX). It is not far-
fetched to conclude that Toussaint’s army was formidable enough to elicit apprehension and induce the 
British and Americans to seek treaties to protect their territories from encroachments. These 
apprehensions were made explicit in the tripartite treaty. 
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the target of forces both from within and without, and, at the eve of its territorial 
consolidation, without a constitutional framework for stable governance.  
Governance and National Cohesion: 
Having addressed the internal and external sovereignty of the 
Louverturean state, Toussaint endeavored to provide it with a constitutional 
framework to preserve stability, national coherence and equal regional 
representations. A constitutional commission of elected officials from each region 
was summoned to draft “a constitution for the island of Saint Domingue, 
according to its interests which are different from those of France” (L. J. Janvier 
1886, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 87). Each region was afforded two elected 
representatives to craft the legal framework of the nascent Haitian state (Ardouin 
1853, L. J. Janvier 1886, 2, Korngold 1965, T. O. Ott 1973, 118-9). Toussaint 
could have chosen a few men he trusted to draft the constitution and excluded 
the South where Mulatto leaders harbored animosity towards him and resented 
black leadership. Instead, he provided an inclusive framework for the state to 
ensure the representation of all ethnic, economic, and regional interests. He 
wanted a legitimate state, one dedicated to the welfare of all its citizens that 
could command their allegiance.  
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In presenting the Constitution to the population, Bernard Borgella52, the 
White mayor of Port-au-Prince and Chair of the constitutional committee made 
clear that they were engaged in formulating the legal basis for an independent 
state (L. Dubois 2004, 246). More importantly, he recognized that the state was 
destined to manage divergent group interests and claims. Indeed, convene by 
Toussaint, the Haitian framers crafted a state to address the national challenge 
with which French colonialism had saddled Saint Domingue. Borgella made it 
clear the objective of the new constitution, “We sought to address the needs of 
the different regions and create a legal system that expands to the entire Island,” 
he notes, 
[W]e saw the necessity to secure workers for the 
reestablishment of commerce, manufactures; the need 
to cement the union between the former Spanish East 
and the rest; the need to establish a clear and uniform 
system for the administration of finance and correct the 
irregularities; to provide safety and rights to property 
owners and workers. And finally, the need to consolidate 
and stabilize the internal peace; to enhance prosperity; 
to make known to all citizens their rights and 
responsibilities; and eliminate all the animosity and 
apprehension by presenting a system of law through 
which all interests can be linked (L. J. Janvier 1886, 5-
6)53. 
 
The Louverturean Constitution provided the basis for a social contract for the 
new state: equality, freedom, the rights to payment for work performed, and the 
                                                          
52 Bernard Borgella was a proponent of independence. The fact that Toussaint named him chair of the 
constitutional commission should not be seen as a mere coincidence. It was for many a clear indication of 
his intention to declare independence from France (L. J. Janvier 1886). 




rights to due process and the protection of property and personal security (L. 
Dubois 2004, 247-9). With Toussaint as the Governor, the framers enhanced the 
regulatory role of the state by centralizing the taxation and judicial system giving 
it ultimate control over state revenues and the rule of law (Madiou 1847, 
Nemours 1925, 67-94, James 1963). Theirs was the early formulation of a 
presidential system. To separate the army from the everyday protection of the 
citizens, a 55-man police force was established in each parish to enforce the 
laws and maintain security (Lacroix 1880, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 85-7). Deviating 
from the colonial administration that reserved all state employment to whites, he 
ensured that competent administrators managed the institutions of the state 
regardless of race, “hiring even his staunchest enemies if they had abilities that 
could be of service to the new state institutions54” (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, 
James 1963, 245). In less than six years, Toussaint had made considerable 
gains in his project of state crafting. As Heinl and Heinl observe,  
[H]e established tariffs, levied taxes, suppressed 
smuggling, stabilized the currency, organized a budget 
(33 million Francs for 1801), created administrative 
subdivisions, set up courts, opened schools, built roads, 
reopened the theater at Cap Français, restored the 
Gregorian calendar, and returned the clergy to their 
ancient places and offices (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 87) 
 
Indeed, few could dispute the fact that by 1800, the Louverturean state was 
militarily and economically strong, institutionally independent, and nationally 
                                                          
54 James Franklin, no friend of Black emancipation nor of Toussaint, commented, ”He [Toussaint] never 
allowed any prejudices against white persons to influence him” (Franklin 1828, 129) 
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coherent, enjoying the allegiance of the majority of its citizens55. In Toussaint’s 
constitution, religious freedom, equal rights for women and children born out of 
wedlock were the law (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). 
The fact that Toussaint was about to declare Saint Domingue independent 
was not up for debates then nor should it be now. Indeed, both the U.S. and 
Britain expected the declaration. They were formulating policies while torn 
between fear and greed for profit: Profit- because both could benefit from an 
independent Saint Domingue; fear because of the challenge an independent 
black state posed to them as slave owning nations (R. W. Logan 1941). Louis 
Joseph Janvier, the Haitian historian and diplomat, is right to argue, “Toussaint, 
after having ably conceived and prepared was about to execute, in 1801 and 
1802, his plan of independence,” and had it not been for a changing international 
environment he would have succeeded (L. J. Janvier 1886, 25, P. H. Sannon 
1920-1933) . Toussaint’s goal was not just to declare independence, but also be 
able to stay independent by the power of the Louverturean state, and the 
determination of its citizens to defend their right to live free with a government of 
their choosing. He had dedicated the resources of the state to arm and train the 
                                                          
55 The Louverturean state reflected a truism which Toussaint himself expressed in referring to France’s 
possible adverse reaction to the new constitution, “our liberty is no longer in her hands: it is our own. We 
will defend it or perish (James 1963, 281, Korngold 1965, 239). When Napoleon wrote in anger to him, 
“The constitution you have written while containing some good things is contrary to the dignity and 
sovereignty of the French people, of which St. Domingue is but a part” Toussaint made his intent clear; St. 
Domingue, colony which is an integral part of the French Republic your letter states, seeks its 
independence. Why would it not do it? The United State did the same. I will never betray the cause I have 
started” (Schoelcher 1882). 
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newly emancipated citizens in order to protect both the state and their own 
freedom56 (Ardouin 1848, L. J. Janvier 1886, Korngold 1965).  
 
The Demise of Toussaint’s International Coalition: 
No sooner had Toussaint succeeded in securing the state that the 
international system he relied on began to unravel.  The U.S. resolved its conflict 
with France, and Great Britain signed the treaty of Amiens securing peace with 
Napoleon57 (R. W. Logan 1941). The weakness of the Louverturean international 
relations strategy was apparent as both nations assisted France in its quest to 
reestablish control and slavery on the island (Coradin 1987). The fear of a black 
nation overwhelmed their economic interests. Moreover, the 700 Mulatto officers 
who had opposed the Louverturean state and chose to leave the island rather 
than serve under black leadership returned with the Napoleonic expedition 
(Ardouin 1848). “Virtually all the Mulatto officers exiled after the war in the 
South”, observe Heinl and Heinl (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 111). The national unity 
did not last, victim of racial schism and Mulatto resistance to the inclusive 
                                                          
56 According to the Haitian Historian Pauleus Sannon, Toussaint had brought and distributed “30 thousand 
rifles, 175 thousand barrels of gun powder, and a large quantity of sabers, pistols and cavalry 
equipments” (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, t3, 3). Korngold suggests that he distributed more than 100 
thousand rifles to the population, stating as he did that only “these can secure your liberty” (Korngold 
1965, 237)   
57 The fear of France’s wrath for supporting St. Domingue’s independence, concerns about the influence 
of an independent black nation on their enslaved populations, and the challenge it could pose to their 
slave-based economic system compelled every western nations to support Bonaparte’s expedition to 
regain control over the island and re-institute slavery (R. W. Logan 1941, 85-90). 
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Louverturean state, but Toussaint’s subsequent treacherous arrest and 
deportation did not result in the destruction of the Louverturean state. The 
interdependence between the nation and state he had fostered, and his belief 
and confidence in the willingness of black citizens to protect their freedom and 
their state proved prophetic (Schoelcher 1882, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, 
Korngold 1965). The ambitious Toussaint had crafted a state dedicated to the 
liberty of its citizens and tried to ready it for independence. Although he died in a 
cold dungeon in France before he succeeded in declaring the country fully 
independent, his state crafting project did not die with him. It took another two 
years, along with more than 100,000 deaths, 60,000 of them French soldiers, for 
the Haitian revolutionaries to formally declare independence and reassert their 
control over the Louverturean state, which Toussaint had so skillfully crafted (P. 
H. Sannon 1920-1933). The declaration of independence by his second in 
command Jean Jacques Dessalines in 1804 and the creation of an independent 
Haiti finalized the march toward a responsive state. 
 
Jean-Jacques Dessalines: the War of Independence, and the Continuity of the 
Louverturean State Crafting Project: 
While the west and South most defiant to the Louverturean state, 
collaborated with the French invading forces, the generals, whose career started 
in the North, the center of the Louverturean project, initially resisted, feigned 
adherence, then declared all out war. Indeed, like the average citizen, they had 
much to lose in the re-institution of slavery. However, they had violated the 
Louverturean military strategy (Rulx 1945). Rather than engage the French in a 
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guerrilla war, vanity and pride led them to face the Expeditionary Forces in direct 
combat (Korngold 1965, L. Dubois 2004). They exposed their soldiers to 
unnecessary dangers and lost many to the better armed French forces, but the 
French, aided by Rigaud’s Mulatto corps, also suffered immense casualties and 
were out fought in various battles that registered to date in the annals of Haitian 
History (Madiou 1847, t2, 128-35, J. Desquiron 1993). The Louverturean forces 
had fought the French into a stalemate. Only the Maroon bands, which Toussaint 
had left outside the state’s control, followed the Louverturean military strategy. 
Christophe, in observing the tactics of the insurgents, admitted the failure of the 
generals to follow Toussaint’s military strategy to resist the expedition in his 
conversation with the French general Pamphile de Lacroix. “If instead of fighting 
we had fled before you, and alarmed the Negroes of the country, you would 
never have succeeded over us. Toussaint ceased not to say what no one would 
believe – ‘we have arms in our hands – pride alone makes us use them’; and 
now these new insurgents have arisen up to follow that very system…”58 (Griggs 
and Prator 1968, 30). Whereas the Louverturean military leaders temporarily 
joined the invasion forces feigning adherence, the grassroots guerilla defensive 
structure Toussaint had armed and organized, who would later be called Cacos, 
waged guerilla warfare. The “indigenous forces attacked at night, and 
disappeared before resistance could be organized” with Louverturean generals in 
                                                          
58 Also see (Lacroix 1880)for a direct account of the conversation. 
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seemingly in fruitless pursuit, collaborating and binding their times for all out war. 
Even with the disengagement of the organized army from these attacks, the 
French were having difficulty combating these Louverturean forces involved in 
what Desquiron calls “la petite guerre du peuple” (J. Desquiron 1993, 32). This 
model of highly organized grassroots defense of the state would persist until the 
American occupation in 1915. It is this model the Americans would set out to 
destroy and these Northern guerilla groups, which the marines referred to as 
bandits that would offer sustained resistance to the occupation. The Marines saw 
waging war against them as necessary to the subjugation of the Haitian people 
and their state. 
The French understood little of the nature of the Louverturean state, and 
blinded by racial arrogance, Napoleon dismissed the thought that blacks could 
defeat whites on the battlefield59 (Ardouin 1848, t2). With unspeakable violence 
against blacks and Mulattoes, murdering 800 at a time by drowning, The French 
army overplayed their hands (Madiou 1847, v2, Ardouin 1848, v4/5, James 
1963). The indiscriminate killings, the arrest and deportation of Rigaud, and 
witnessing their brethren massacred or eaten alive by dogs for the pleasure of 
French audiences, led Mulattoes, who came with the expedition to destroy the 
Louverturean state, to doubt France’s intentions of allowing them equal rights 
                                                          
59 How quickly did he forget the more than 20,000 British soldiers who were been soundly defeated by 
them three years prior? Warned by The French Colonel Vincent, a good friend of General Christophe and 
advisor to Toussaint who had lived on the Island that the army of St. Domingue was a formidable force, 
they paid little attention to his advice and exiled him to Elba (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 31). 
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with whites60 (Waxman 1931, 290). Had the French only targeted blacks, it is 
conceivable that Mulattoes would have remained their allies against the 
Louverturean forces and undermined the prospects of a fully independent state. 
While Mulatto support of the Expeditionary Forces vacillated, Northern black 
generals, weary of their treachery, prepared to reassert control over the 
Louverturean state by organizing and arming the resistance under the guise of 
pursuing them (James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). Despite their increasingly common 
plight, Mulatto support for the French continued, their disposition against blacks 
persisted. It took the reinstitution of slavery in Guadeloupe, Trinidad, and 
Martinique, and the reintroduction of laws circumventing Mulatto rights to 
disabuse the latter of their pretentions (Madiou 1847, Korngold 1965). As Janvier 
notes,  
[W]hen they realized that slavery was being re-
established, that they would be deported, killed, 
enslaved or place back in the humiliating conditions they 
lived prior to 1789, they made common cause with 
blacks and fought against the French with whom they 
had sought to subjugate the blacks (L. J. Janvier 1886, 
230-1). 
 
For the first time since the revolution started in 1791, Mulattoes, whose economic 
interests, prejudices, and vanity had made them party to an expedition that came 
to subjugate blacks, found common cause with and bound their interests to those 
                                                          




of the black citizens61 (Waxman 1931, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). The 
alliance was not an act of repentance, or an acknowledgment of their wrongs 
toward blacks, but one of survival, argues Waxman. The “Mulattoes, always as a 
class, the bitterest enemies of the negroes, were so completely convinced by 
events in Guadeloupe and Martinique that white interests could no longer be 
theirs that they began to join the rebellion” (Waxman 1931, 290). The Mulattoes’ 
willingness to form an alliance with blacks thus was not a recognition of the futility 
of their racial vanity, nor was it to protect the Louverturean state, but rather 
because without blacks they could not protect their interest and freedom. It was 
an alliance of convenience doomed to failure.  
The election of Dessalines, Toussaint’s second-in-command, as general-
in-Chief after the black/Mulatto alliance unified former enemies under the 
Louverturean banner. In less than two years, the attempt to destroy the 
Louverturean project had failed; France had lost more than sixty thousand of its 
best soldiers; and blacks regained control of their state, declaring the 
independence Toussaint had so skillfully prepared, this time with a seemingly 
unified voice formally christening their newly independent nation of Haiti 
(Bellegarde 1938). Black and Mulatto cohesion, a goal unsuccessfully pursued 
                                                          
61 According to Mulatto sympathizers Heinl and Heinl, “The atrocities of Rochambeau, the noirs’ fear of 
re-enslavement, and the despair of hommes de Couleur again stripped of their rights – all these 
accomplished what no ruler or regime in Haiti ever again achieved. For the first and last time in the 
history of the country, Haitians of all colors spontaneously united in a single cause… It was Dessalines 
himself, who in the final analysis unified his countrymen" (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 105).  
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by Toussaint, had provided the Louverturean state with the most promising 
possibilities. 
The project of state crafting continued, not started, as most historians 
suggest, with the declaration of independence and the election of Dessalines 
(Madiou 1847, L. J. Janvier 1886, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). Toussaint firmly 
anchored the framework of the nation: its policies, its laws, and its institutions. 
Congruent with the Louverturean constitution of 1801, Dessalines was 
unanimously elected general in chief for life62 by military and regional leaders, 
and the constitution and polices Toussaint had skillfully crafted formed the basis 
for this now fully independent state of Haiti. However, having inherited the 
Louverturean state, Dessalines was left to resolve the racial schism that had 
undermine it, reassert territorial sovereignty over the Eastern part of the island, 
re-establish commerce and relations with other nations, and determine the role of 
whites in the new nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Rulx 1945, Nicholls 1979).   
                                                          
62 Following the usual racialized analysis, Mulatto historian Laurent Dubois barely masked criticism when 
he wrote in 2004, “Dessalines, like Louverture named himself governor for life”. Unless we assume he is 
not knowledgeable about Haitian History, we have to conclude that Dubois was involved in purposeful 
revisionism by ignoring the fact that all the current leaders of the revolution and regional representatives 
elected Dessalines unanimously in congruence with the 1801 constitution (L. Dubois 2004, 300). He also 
omits the fact that Mulatto leaders like Pétion and Boyer though they rejected the Louverturean 
constitution, kept the President-for-life in their own ‘republican constitution’. Dessalines coronation as 
emperor of the independent Louverturean state was the only major constitutional change but it was a 
change in title only as he refused to create a hereditary monarchy and followed the same constitutional 
requirements for naming a successor established by the 1801 constitution. The concern for almost all 
Haitian leaders since Toussaint was to secure institutional continuity and a clear direction for a nation 
dominated by violent competition for power. They struggled between establishing a monarchy or a 
presidency and most, even the most republican amongst them pursued a “presidency for life”. Scholars 
often overlook the fact that Duvalier’s “presidency for life” was not an aberration but rather reflected the 




The Racial Question in Haiti at Independence: 
The Haitian historian Thomas Madiou argues that on the very night of the 
declaration of independence, on January 1, 1804, discussions about the French 
presence on the island were already underway (Madiou 1847, v3, 107). The 
Louverturean state under Toussaint’s leadership had encouraged and supported 
white presence and participation in state affairs. The constitutional framers, even 
while recognizing the threat divergent racial and ethnic interests posed to the 
Louverturean state,63 included non-discrimination articles, and secured the rights 
of every citizen (James 1963). Leaders debated the roles of white colonials who 
had supported the expedition, participated in their atrocities, and questioned their 
allegiance. While some blacks and Mulattoes spoke of taking vengeance on the 
white population who had supported the re-establishment of slavery, and 
excesses of the French forces, the two former generals of the Louverturean state 
under Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe, remained committed to his 
constitutional framework (Madiou 1847, Leyburn 1966). However, the presence 
of French forces on the Eastern part of the island and the failure to dislodge them 
raised concerns about their collusion with France for another invasion (J. 
                                                          
63 These whites who benefited from Toussaint’s regime were the first to rise up in support of the French 
and clamored for the reestablishment of slavery. They were amongst those who feted as the French 
murdered, drowned, poisoned, suffocated, and set dogs on blacks and Mulattoes tied to posts to be 
devoured alive (Ardouin 1848, Nemours 1925, Cole 1967, L. Dubois 2004). That feelings of the population, 
soldiers, and generals ran high was no surprise, neither was the need to decide how to deal with a 
population that proved a threat to the liberty of the citizens. 
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Desquiron 1993, Coupeau 2008, 37). “Indiscreet comments by some colons still 
in the colony reported to the authorities angered the population. They were 
already complaining about Dessalines’ moderation and predisposition toward the 
whites,”64 notes Madiou (Madiou 1847, v3, 113).  
Post-independence Haitians, “feared that whites in the colony were 
actively conspiring to prepare a new attack aimed at bringing slavery back to the 
island” (L. Dubois 2004, 300). Indeed, French spies were already flooding the 
Island to foment dissent and ethnic conflicts, some using false papers; and the 
arrest, prosecution, and execution of some French citizens using false Dutch 
papers confirmed the fears (Rulx 1945, 133-4, Coradin 1987, 46-7). Concern of 
France’s return, resentments for the massacres committed by colonial forces, 
and the foolhardiness of some of the remaining French population in challenging 
the new order incited the population to take matters into their own hands (Cresse 
1824, 72-80). Four months after the declaration of independence, all the French 
citizens were killed or asked to leave the Island (Ardouin 1848, L. Dubois 2004). 
The only French who remained on the island were those who had fought against 
the expedition, had skills that could assist in the rehabilitation of the state, or had 
a history of actively supporting the revolution (Leyburn 1966, J. Desquiron 1993, 
L. Dubois 2004). Although Dessalines and the revolutionary leaders did not 
initially order the massacre, once it began, they allowed their military forces to 
                                                          
64 For a full expose of the French population actions following the declaration of independence, see 
(Cresse 1824). A witness of the incidents, Cresse makes clear the temerity of the French population and 
the causes for the elimination of the French population on the Island. 
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participate, hoping to deter future designs on their nation. “Whatever maybe the 
judgments of my contemporaries and posterity upon this required measure, as 
long as I save my country,” Dessalines stated65 (Madiou 1847, v3, 119). While 
Toussaint had relied on the power of the state to constrain hostile forces within 
the nation, leaders of post-independence Haiti had use expulsion and 
extermination to resolve the colonial question, and fear as a deterrent to 
challenges by hostile forces. 
However, fear and resentment were not the only driving force behind the 
elimination of French colonials however. It is clear that many, especially in the 
South and West, had much to gain in removing the colons (Madiou 1847, v3, L. 
J. Janvier 1886, James 1963, Klooster 2009). Klooster suggests that many, 
predominantly Southern and Western Mulattoes, incited the elimination of the 
white population against the wishes of Dessalines and Christophe. She argues, 
“self-enrichment must also count as a cause of the elimination of the remaining 
                                                          
65 Ott argues that Dessalines invited whites back to the island and “even apologized for the killing of 
innocent whites by the rampaging blacks” and brought a large number of planters back (T. O. Ott 1973, 
190). He sought to continue the policies of Toussaint but in the end, he could not contain the forces that 
had experienced such horrors at the hands of the French. Leyburn rejects that premise, arguing, “It may 
have been a desire for revenge or he may have wished to warn France against any future attempts to 
regain possession of the country” (Leyburn 1966, 33). Madiou, suggests Toussaint had secretly assembled 
all the black officers at the time of Leclerc’s expedition informing them, “the time to exterminate the 
whites had arrived, that they were at the last phase of the revolution, and would never be free and happy 
until all the whites were massacred” (Madiou 1847, v2, 117). His assertion seems the most doubtful. 
Nevertheless, neither Ott nor Leyburn’s suggestions may be far from the truth, but as for deciphering 
Dessalines’ intent, no scholar has such capacity. It is clear however that he did not stop the killing and in 
some instances directed some of his troops to participate. It is also clear that he did not hate whites as 
Mulatto propagandists suggest; he extended citizenships to whites through naturalization, and his family 
doctor was white. The mass killing of French colonials began in the South, undertaken by the Mulatto 
population suggest Klooster and Leger (Leger 1907, Klooster 2009).The Conflict over plantations formerly 
owned by whites confiscated throughout the West and South by Mulatto planters and some military 
officers that two years later led to the assassination of Dessalines partially supports this thesis.   
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French amongst whom were owners of large plantation” in the areas where 
Mulattoes had the most power (Klooster 2009, 111). The pervasive assertion that 
Dessalines ordered the killing of all the whites, and that no whites could own 
property on the island, maintained by many scholars and detractors, should 
perhaps be revisited and constitutes part of the negative propaganda 
perpetuated against Haiti (Lawless 1992). Indeed, any whites, except French, 
could become citizens and thus landowners (L. Dubois 2004). Besides non-
French merchants living in Haiti, immediately following independence, 
Dessalines extended Haitian citizenship to the remaining white populations that 
consisted of formerly French citizens who had supported emancipation, Poles 
who had defected to the revolutionaries, and Germans who emigrated earlier to 
the country (Rulx 1945, v1, 130-2).  
The Black and Mulatto Question: 
To address the black/Mulatto animosity that had plagued Saint Domingue 
prior to independence, Dessalines expanded the Louverturean constitution by 
stipulating, perhaps naively, that all Haitian citizens were black, hoping to 
eliminate the color distinctions and rivalries that had impeded national cohesion 
(Nicholls 1979, Klooster 2009). Janvier argues,  
[D]essalines really wanted that there be no color 
distinction between Haitians. On many occasions, he 
repeated that blacks should marry Mulattoes and 
Mulattoes’ blacks to create an intimate union between 
members of the national family. To demonstrate the 
sincerity of his intentions, he offered his daughter 
Célimène, a black of pure blood in marriage to Pétion, the 




He forbade any talk of color or racial distinctions by people in his administration, 
trying to subdue the tensions that had resulted in civil war between Rigaud and 
Toussaint. However, the provision of a common classification to support a unified 
and coherent national identity could not change the hearts of many who saw 
themselves racially and culturally superior to their black compatriots and entitled 
to replace the French as their masters66. Despite Dessalines’ efforts to eliminate 
the aristocracy of the skin, a Mulatto party re-emerged, rejected his leadership 
and policies as uncivilized, and plotted for his demise (Ardouin 1848, v6, 69-87). 
Trouillot observes,  
[I]t seems likely that the Mulattoes’ greater familiarity 
with western customs and values led them to judge the 
manners of the former slave who was leading them as 
unbecoming to a chief of state. Some clearly viewed 
Dessalines’ social policies as “uncivilized.” Ironically, 
many such policies, including freedom of religion, equal 
rights for children born out of wedlock, and marriage and 
divorce laws favorable to women, have since become 
hallmark of “civilization.” But when they were formulated 
by Dessalines and his trusted Jacobinist legislators… 
such views were anathema to those who thought they 
had a natural monopoly on civilized behavior (M.-R. 
Trouillot 1990, 46)67 
 
Larcerte suggests that in addition to their refusal to accept Dessalines’ leadership 
because of his color, as old elites, Mulattoes also resented the emergence of this 
                                                          
66 James Franklin, a British merchant and Mulatto supporter who at the time advocated against the total 
abolition of slavery in the British Islands because he felt blacks incapable argues it was Dessalines 
tyrannical rule not racial prejudice that led to the failure of Mulatto/black alliance. However, the Haitian 
historian Thomas Madiou, a staunch Haitian nationalist respected for his impartiality, who served in both 
neocolonial Mulatto and black nationalist governments, and most Haitian scholars, even those who 
supports the Mulatto narrative, concede that racial and “cultural” pride, and Dessalines’ land titles 
verification were the cause of the failure (Franklin 1828). 
67 What is clear is that besides some minor changes, the constitution promulgated by Dessalines was 
essentially a reproduction of the 1801 Louverturean constitution. 
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new group of black elites represented by Dessalines with whom they competed 
and to whom they felt they were playing second fiddle (Lacerte 1978, 454-5). 
Dessalines met Mulattoes’ plots and anger with an unflinching determination to 
continue the Louverturean project impeded by the expedition and the arrest and 
murder of Toussaint in France. Agricultural production, relations with foreign 
powers, the protection of the state, the need for commerce and revenue: 
Dessalines’ tasks could not be delayed by Mulatto avariciousness.   
 
Agrarian Policies and Commerce: 
Much as Toussaint did after the war of emancipation, Dessalines sought 
to jump start the state, its institutions and laws neglected during the war. 
Moreover, expecting a return of the French and with an army of 50,000 not 
including militias, and a navy of 3,000 men, Dessalines needed both revenue for 
defense and expansion of the state (Madiou 1847, v3, 110).  
Dessalines reorganized the plantation system, adopted the Louverturean 
agrarian policies to increase production and revenue. He re-established 
commercial policies and increased taxes on imports and exports with greater 
oversight over the ports to limit theft of state revenue (J. Desquiron 1993, v1). To 
protect local industries and commerce, he restricted the importation of products 
produced nationally such as salt, and secured a role for Haitian merchants by 
giving them monopoly over retails and limiting foreign transactions to wholesale 
product purchased through Haitian merchants (De Pradines 1851-1865, v1, 32-3, 
L. J. Janvier 1886, 43-79). He rejected British protectorate offers and asserted 
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Haitian sovereignty by threatening to ban British merchants from Haitian ports, 
but kept commercial relations, which had started since he took control over the 
revolution in 1803. To expand commercial competition, he began commercial 
relations with Holland, Dutch, and the Danes. “The continual presence of these 
nations in Haitian ports”, according to former ambassador Jean Coradin, “is proof 
commerce in the nation grew, and they had an interest in preserving their 
commercial linkages with Haiti as Haiti had in maintaining a market for their 
goods” (Coradin 1987, 30-34). 
The Louverturean state whose development suffered during the expedition 
was again afoot. In less than two years, the independent Haitian state was on the 
move. British offer of protection in exchange for occupation of Mole St. Nicholas 
was rejected by a confident state able to defend itself and unwilling to cede its 
territory to any foreign power. Dessalines implemented the Louverturean 
strategies that protected the state and enhance its capacity, and re-established 
the administrative and judicial institutions to manage the affairs of the citizenry. In 
continuation of the Louverturean state project, state policies regarding religious 
plurality, marriage, the need to have a trade, and the management of ports were 
all again implemented (Franklin 1828). As an indication of the continuity of the 
Louverturean foreign policy and political strategy, Dessalines even kept 
Toussaint’s international representative, Joseph Brunel, at his post in the United 
States (R. W. Logan 1941).  
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Expanding the State’s Domain under Dessalines: 
Dessalines’ insistence on following the Louverturean policy of 
nationalizing vacant properties to expand the State’s domain ran counter to 
Mulatto interests. The day of the declaration of independence, he decreed, “all 
lands owned by France in colonial days, belonged to Haiti” and established a 
‘Directory of State Properties’ to manage land titles and ownership led by the 
able Joseph Balthazar Inginac (Rulx 1945, v1, 6, Leyburn 1966, 38). Aware of 
the land grab that followed the departure of the French planters in the South and 
West following independence, he voided “all sales and donations” of lands during 
the war. The most controversial policy, however, was his second decree 
demanding the verification of property titles (Franklin 1828, Nicholls 1979). 
According to Lacerte, “the Director of State Properties carried out an effective 
investigation of these titles and confiscated 562 plantations in the west” that were 
acquired illegally (Lacerte 1978, 456). Given that the Louverturean state had 
secured land titles, and state control over vacant properties in the North under 
Toussaint, this measure impacted mainly the West and South, bastion of Mulatto 
power, where French Colons had held their properties until the final war of 
independence. News of Inginac’s work in the west and the prospect of its 
implementation in the south caused the first open fissure in the black/Mulatto 
alliance. Southern Mulattoes who, according to Leyburn and Rulx, had “managed 
by hook or crook to secure tenuous claims to vacant properties,” resisted the 
state's title verification of their suspiciously acquired estates (Leyburn 1966, 38, 
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Rulx 1945, 7). Bellegarde also supported Leyburn and Rulx' thesis that the rising 
hostility towards Dessalines was not solely due to Mulattoes’ sense of superiority. 
[A]s Long as Dessalines closed his eyes to the disorder, 
no one paid attention to his faults. As soon as he 
threatens, according to his expression, to “break the 
bones of the thieves” and the embezzlers, complaints 
began to be raised against him (Bellegarde 1938, 92).  
 
The Louverturean project of prioritizing state power and national interests 
over those of individuals gave rise to Mulatto acrimony (Madiou 1847, Lacerte 
1978, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, J. Desquiron 1993). Citing their French paternity as 
the source for their claims on the estates, though they were not legally the heirs 
of those they now claimed, Mulattoes resisted Dessalines’ titles verification law 
as an encroachment on their rights (James 1963, Nicholls 1979). This reality was 
not lost to the latter, who observed, 
[B]efore the war, the Mulattoes, children of the whites 
received no inheritances from their fathers; why is it, 
since we chased the colons, they are claiming the 
estates of their white fathers who not long ago denied 
their existence? Will blacks, with their fathers in Africa 
not have anything then? Where are the properties of the 
thousands of colons who left the island? Mulattoes are 
not just content embezzling the resources of the state, 
they conspire… Be careful! Blacks and Mulattoes, we 
have all fought against the whites; the resources we 
have acquired by spilling our blood, belong to all of us; I 
intend to ensure that they are distributed with equity 
(Madiou 1847, v3, 247-8)68.  
 
In a little over a year after independence, “by confiscation of vacant and falsely 
claimed estates, Dessalines had created a vast public domain,” notes Leyburn 
                                                          
68 See (L.-J. Janvier 1886, 44-5, Nicholls 1979, 38). 
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(Leyburn 1966, 39). Two third of the national domain was acquired by the 
Louverturean state under Dessalines (Lacerte 1978). “Dessalines behaved 
badly”, suggests Klooster, it was bad policy “to review the legal titles to estates 
confiscated in the last stage of the revolution,” yet, it was a legal requirement of 
the Louverturean state (Klooster 2009, 112). Using the institutions of the state to 
enforce property rights, and eliminate graft brought the tension between national 
and Mulatto interests to the forefront. Dessalines’ attempt to secure and exercise 
control over state resources, necessary for its expansion and security, angered 
neocolonial Mulatto elites who saw those resources as the source of their 
personal enrichment. Worst even was his willingness to ensure that not only 
state properties illegally confiscated but also resources acquired from them were 
reimbursed to the state. Closing his eyes to the fleecing of the state would not 
only have weakened the state in a time where the state was in need of 
resources, it would have also made a mockery of the institutions so much blood 
had been spilled to safeguard.  
The Haitian scholar and former member of the diplomatic corps, Louis 
Joseph Janvier asserts,  
[W]hen Dessalines ordered Inginac to scrupulously 
examined property titles and reject those that were 
acquired illegally, and he was attempting to exert state 
control over those estates and properties that were to be 
distributed to all… He sought to create the truest 
independence of the peasantry by making them 
landowners (L. J. Janvier 1886, 43-7).  
 
Acquiring the properties abandoned by French colons and reasserting control 
over those owned by the state prior to independence was the precursor to the 
implementation of his land distribution program, Janvier contends (L. J. Janvier 
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1886). The Mulatto historian, politician, and diplomat Beaubrun Ardouin 
maintains that Dessalines’ land confiscation policy was not to expand the state’s 
domain or distribute to the black majority but to accumulate his own wealth 
(Ardouin 1848, v3). For Nicholls, ”whether Dessalines intended to divide the land 
into small properties and distribute them to the people, or whether he meant to 
extend state ownership with blacks enjoying equality with Mulattoes, is not 
entirely clear” (Nicholls 1979, 38). What is clear is that the South and West, much 
as they did against Toussaint, took up arms to safeguard their interests at the 
expense of the state. By challenging Dessalines’ attempt to provide institutional 
oversight over legal transaction and implement laws designed to enhance the 
power of the Louverturean state, Mulattoes placed their interests above the 
welfare of the nation. The old racial animus re-emerged, and conflicts between 
men sworn to defend the nation grew  (Madiou 1847, v3, Bellegarde 1938).  
The assassination of Dessalines in October 17, 1806, who in less than two 
years after the declaration of independence had regenerated the Louverturean 
state, resulting from the misalignment of national and Mulatto interests, shaped 
the political history of the Haitian state. His murder, notes Coradin, “ruptured the 
alliance that made 1804 possible. It was realized because of the refusal of 
neocolonial, mostly Mulatto elites in the South and West, to be dispossessed of 
properties they acquired illicitly” (Coradin 1987, 48). The Haitian State suffered 
its second major setback, one that would shape the national struggle for power 
and state consolidation until the American Occupation. While it may be true, the 
struggle for which Dessalines found his death was as so much about racial 
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prejudice as it was about economic interests, the most important aspect of that 
struggle was to determine the type state necessary to preserve the rights and 
interests of the black majority (Nicholls 1979). The death of Dessalines 
accelerated the struggle between Mulatto leaders and those of the Louverturean 
state. By choosing caste over nation, and sacrificing the interests of the majority 
to preserve their individual quest for wealth, neocolonial Mulatto elites carved a 






THE STRUGGLE FOR A NATIONAL STATE AND ELITE FAILURE: THE DECLINE of 
NORTHERN COHESION, THE RE-EMERGENCE OF NEOCOLONIAL ELITES, AND 
THE RISE OF AMERICAN COERCION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 
              Chapter III analyzes the struggle between revolutionary Northern black 
nationalists and southern and western-based neocolonial Mulatto elites to 
implement competing models of statecrafting. Departing from the dominant 
literature of the period, the chapter contends that the infighting between Haitian 
elites did not simply revolve around “color”---black elites fighting light-skinned 
Mulatto elites over resources. An alternative explanantion offered in this chapter 
is that the struggle for power was centered on the type of state under which Haiti 
would be governed and the interests that state would represent.  After the death 
of Dessalines, and for decades thereafter, there was a protracted struggle 
between black and Mulatto elites, as the latter challenged the Louverturean state 
crafting strategy that secured the economic and political rights of the black 
majority and tied the destiny and legitimacy of the nation to the welfare of its 
citizens. Successive Mulatto leaders sought to replace the Louverturean state 
form with a neocolonial Haitian state that restricted the rights and freedoms of the 
black majority, and consolidated Mulatto hegemony. To that end, Mulatto elites 
formed alliances with external patrons whose subsidies helped to reorient the 
Haitian state toward a political economy that became vulnerable to American 




A Divided Haiti: Pétion and Christophe: 
Three years after its independence, Haiti was divided; the state of Haiti, which 
later became the kingdom of Haiti led by Christophe in the North, and the 
Republic of Haiti by Pétion in the South and West. As the historian and former 
Haitian ambassador Jean Coradin observes, a “political chessboard” persisted 
whereby the cleavages were clearly established. Neither of the protagonists 
attempted to stop the process of division in which the country would be engaged” 
(Coradin 1987, 50-1)69.  
 
This division lasted thirteen years and reflected the fundamental divergence 
between a nationalist state; secure, prosperous, and legitimate based on the 
Louverturean model in the North, and an unstable and weak minority-led 
neocolonial state in the South and West that depended on interest manipulations, 
and bargaining away the power and resources of the state to maintain its 
dominance70. 
 
The death of Dessalines represented a major break in the constitutional 
history of the Haitian state and its territorial integrity. Neocolonial Mulatto elites, a 
minority within the nation, sought to control the lever of political power by 
circumventing the constitution and creating a new political map that gave the 
                                                          
69 Translation mine. 
70 A short-lived secessionist movement by Rigaud in the South is often referred to as a third republic, but 
internal disjuncture merely demonstrated the instability of the Mulatto state. 
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south and west political dominance (Saint-Remy 1854-7). The first move by 
neocolonial Mulatto elites was to abrogate the national map of 24 parishes in the 
South and West and 35 in the North; each constitutionally required to elect one 
deputy per parish. Mulattoes, under Pétion’s leadership, instead created fifteen 
new parishes overnight in the South and West in violation of the constitution, 
giving these regions, thus themselves, majority in both the assembly and senate 
(Griggs and Prator 1968, 39-41). Thirty-nine deputies were elected in the South 
and West instead of twenty-four, and seventy-four deputies present instead of 
the constitutionally mandated fifty-nine (L. J. Janvier 1886, Cole 1967, 155). The 
constitution was hurriedly amended, and the threat posed by Pétion‘s Mulatto 
forces, camped in the capital, which had only recently murdered Dessalines, 
silenced outright protestations. In spite of the threat, 24 senators protested the 
usurpation in a letter to Christophe, the constitutional successor of Dessalines (L. 
J. Janvier 1886). Given the protest letter, it is unquestionable that many feared 
for their lives.  
The ensuing election of Christophe was of little consequence. He was a 
president without power, the first attempt of what Haitian historians have aptly 
coined “la politique de doublure” – the politics of under-study. Mulattoes would 
wield power with a black figurehead as president in order to maintain their 
legitimacy in the face of the black majority (Saint-Remy 1857, Bellegarde 1938). 
Christophe’s refusal to accept this unconstitutional act and serve as a Mulatto 
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puppet was predictable given his adherence to rules and ethics, which his 
government would later demonstrate71.  
 
Pétion and Neocolonial Mulatto Statecrafting: 
Pétion‘s engineered constitution had all the trappings of a neocolonial 
bourgeois democracy. It was indeed a Republican constitution inspired by its 
American counterparts but with little interest in national development and state 
expansion. Within the context of a minority ethnic group ruling a majority 
population and relying on them for their wealth and livelihood, Pétion‘s republic 
operated much like an American southern plantocracy, and to boot, initially 
retained the Louverturean agricultural and land policies which maintained 
laborers on the plantations with little to give them in return (Bellegarde 1938, 
Trouillot 1990). Pétion’s regime consisted of Mulatto landholders governing a 
black majority without rights enjoyed little legitimacy (Nicholls 1979). Such a 
dynamic proved unsustainable, making the need to craft a strategy to sustain 
their power and dominance not only important but also necessary. 
From the start, Pétion’s regime faced challenges from within. Pétion and 
his neocolonial state had to contend with a lack of legitimacy and devised 
                                                          
71 Laurent Dubois’s suggestion that lust for unlimited power led Christophe to object to the new 
constitution and the process that brought it to light, contradicts facts and the historical records, 
documented by those intimately involved in the affair. More importantly, it reflect the neocolonial 




strategies to secure the allegiance of the population (Saint-Remy 1854-7). His 
first policy was to secure elite support. To achieve this goal, he divested the state 
of its domain and revenue by giving lands and estates back to Southern and 
Western landowners of his caste, and reimbursing them for lost production from 
those estates confiscated by Dessalines, which they had acquired illegally (J. G. 
Leyburn 1966). Heinl and Heinl notes,  
[A]s further sweeteners for the elite, Pétion at the same 
time repealed the 25 percent share on every crop 
instituted since Toussaint and proclaimed a crop-subsidy 
policy whereby in years of low prices the government 
would buy up surplus sugar and coffee” (Heinl and Heinl 
2005, 130-1).  
 
To increase Mulatto access to social mobility, Pétion also reduced the 
minimum amount of land holding permitted from 50 acres to 30 acres. His repeal 
of the landownership clause of the Louverturean state, instituted to maintain the 
large plantation system and secure the prosperity of the state, was later further 
reduced to 15 acres (Moral 1961, 129-31).  
          Pétion’s  land policies weakened and impoverished the state to line the 
pockets of his caste, and secure an allegiance and legitimacy he had not earned. 
Having eliminated state revenue sources, the state faced deficits, which he 
remedied by issuing money redeemable through claims against state lands. The 
fleecing of the state by the Southern and Western neocolonial elites facilitated by 
Pétion’s neocolonial Regime led, Bonnet, one of the more scrupulous Mulatto 
Southerners to observe in disgust, 
In a country where corruption has hold of every branch 
of government; where everyone seeks to live off the 
public treasury…, venality and misrepresentation end up 
as accepted norms. Every reform that tries to shut off 
graft by those who profit from this state of affairs stirs up 




Pétion’s regime employed both Inginac, Dessalines’ former director of state 
properties, and Bonnet, nationalist Mulattoes known for their integrity, who had 
given so much energy to combat corruption, grow the state’s coffers, and 
enhance its power and holdings. Inginac and Bonnet were later forced to leave 
the country for their protest against the rampant graft and corruption of the 
neocolonial regime (Inginac 1843, Rulx 1945, 8-12)72. With little legitimacy, and a 
weak state that neglected the majority interests, Pétion’s permissive policies 
toward the elites were not even sufficient to quell dissent within their ranks. 
Faced with opposition to his rule, within a year the veneer of republicanism 
crumbled. Pétion governed by decree and ignored the senate. He later 
disbanded it at gunpoint and created a 5-member senate down from 24, which 
re-elected him for another 4 years and later nominated him as president for life 
(L. J. Janvier 1886, 90, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 131).  
Resistance to Pétion’s regime also emerged from the black majority. The 
Maroon bands in the west and South organized by Toussaint that fought against 
Rigaud during the civil war and against the French/Mulatto alliance during the 
French Expedition also challenged the new Regime. Quiet under Dessalines, 
they rose against the neocolonial Mulatto state that until then had shown little 
                                                          
72 It is clear that although motivated by the prevailing racial hierarchy that had been consolidated during 
slavery, neocolonial elites acted to preserve their interests. There were many Mulatto elites who 
supported the Louverturean state rather than their group interests Inginac and Bonnet represented those 




concerns for their welfare and interests73 (Saint-Remy 1854-7). With Maroons 
forcefully challenging the Mulatto state, empty state coffers depleted by policies 
and largesse to his caste, and unpaid black soldiers refusing to defend the state, 
in which they had few benefits, Pétion engaged in a final divestment of state land 
to purchase their allegiance74. He distributed fifteen acres to every soldier with 
more acreage given to officers and sold over 70,658.07 additional acres of state 
lands acquired under Toussaint and Dessalines75. To address peasants’ 
discontent and quell Maroon revolts, he eliminated the Louverturean agrarian 
code that required laborers to contract with a large plantation76.  
                                                          
73 This would become a permanent feature of Haitian politics, with maroon bands, which became more 
organized expressing their grievances by challenging state power. The Cacos in the North and Piquets, 
these groups would become the vehicle through which control of the state and state power itself would 
be contested. 
74 Pétion is widely seen as the cause for the decline of the economy of the Haitian state. Some have 
argued that his policy was also an attempt to cause military defection in the North and undermine the 
prosperous Northern regime of his rival, Christophe (Ardouin 1853, v3&4, Nicholls 1979). It is true that 
these policies caused some defection in Christophe’s rank. According to Desquiron, Pétion’s land 
distribution policies led the Mulatto population to move from the North to the South in search of lands. 
The population shift and mulatrization of the South further aggravated racial character of and animus 
between the two regions. The defections posed no actual threat to stability for Christophe, having 
expanded his military by importing blacks to serve as soldiers in his army. Pétion’s cancellation of the rural 
codes did on the other hand result in some peasant defection from the North, a dynamic that Christophe 
tried to address by policing the border (Cole 1967). 
75 His land distribution decree in 18 December 1809 was clearly designed to garner the support of the 
black-dominated military. The military land grants were as follow:  
Colonels - 75 acres; Bataillon Chiefs -  45acres; Captains to second lieutenants – 30 acres; non-
commissioned officers and soldiers 15 acres (Nau and Telhomme 1930, 249-50). 
76 It is clear that until the black population rose up against the regime, Pétion’s policies and land 
distributions only benefited his caste. It is important to note that following only Mass challenges to his 




Saint-Mery and De Pradines argue that Pétion believe that citizens’ 
ownership of property would create greater allegiance to the state and a greater 
willingness to defend it77 (De Pradines 1851-1865, v2, 243-6, Saint-Remy 1857, 
v2, 164-5). Others have argued that he fulfilled Dessalines’ goal of redistributing 
lands to those who had shed their blood for the defense of liberty (L. J. Janvier 
1886, Rulx 1945). While one can debate the finer points of these assertions, it 
may suffice to observe that the policies directed at the military and the black 
majority came at a time when the Mulatto state faced a rising popular insurgency, 
and lack of support and legitimacy from the black majority.  
The ultimate attempt to buy allegiance from the soldiers, and bolster 
popular support, drove the final nail in the coffin of the state. The policies of 
neocolonial elites lacking popular support and legitimacy had permanently 
undermined the economic structure that had formed the basis of prosperity for 
the Louverturean state (Saint-Remy 1857, v5,160-67). It deprived landowners of 
workers for their plantations, undercut the large plantations system, and shifted 
cultivation to small landowners, and sharecroppers. This shift became one of the 
primary features of the neocolonial Mulatto state; enabling Mulatto landholders to 
move to the cities and live off the sharecropping proceeds as intermediaries 
between peasants and foreign merchants (Jeune 1826, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). 
The cost of the lack of legitimacy of the neocolonial Mulatto state was its 
                                                          
77 Both Trouillot and Nicholls maintained that Pétion sold more than 100,000 acres of state land most of 
which benefited high-ranking Mulatto officers and administrators (Nicholls 1979, Trouillot 1990). 
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permanent weakness and reliance on clientelistic networks and the exploitation 
of its black peasantry. Pétion felt it necessary to secure the survival of his regime 
by bankrupting the state, and divesting it of resources in order to maintain the 
allegiance of its citizens. 
 
Pétion and International Recognition: 
Pétion sought to secure foreign allies in hopes of creating friendly 
neighboring states. He supported Simon Bolivar’s war against Spain in Latin 
America with men and munitions, mirroring Dessalines’ support for Francisco de 
Miranda in 1804 (Coradin 1987). He pursued the Louverturean strategy of 
gaining recognition through commerce with Britain but due to the weakness of 
the neocolonial state, and unlike Louverturean state, allowed the British to dictate 
the terms. The most important feature of Pétion’s foreign policy, however, was 
his willingness to negotiate with France and offer payment for the recognition of 
Haiti’s independence78 (Bellegarde 1938). As the following excerpt from an 
official French Royal report explains, he was much more willing to negotiate with 
France than was his counterpart in the North. 
In 1816, ostensibly: official agents were sent to Saint-
Domingue to deal directly with the two leaders who 
                                                          
78 Nicholls suggests that it is inconclusive that Mulatto leaders in the South and West, or Pétion himself 
were willing to buy recognition from France. It seems more likely, he maintains, “Pétion’s private and 
secret view was that some kind of French protection or Suzerainty would be desirable or at least 
acceptable” but was unable to pursue it openly (Nicholls 1979, 49). Beaubrun Ardouin, the Mulatto 
Ideologue, beneficiary of many posts under Mulatto regimes and architect of “la Politique de Doublure” 
rejects outright the suggestion of such predisposition or the assertion that the leaders in the North and 
Christophe were more uncompromising with France78 (Ardouin 1853, v8).  
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shared authority on the Island. The negotiators, without 
succeeding completely with Pétion, achieved a result 
more satisfying from him, for they succeeded in 
establishing commercial relations between France and 
the Southern party of the Island under borrowed colors, 
et reported from Pétion, the proposition of an indemnity 
to pay to the ‘anciens colon’, and commercial 
preferences, if France consented to recognize the 
Haitian republic. Since the end of 1816, period of the 
return of the agents to France, to Pétion’s death at the 
end of March 1818, it was never again a question of 
negotiations79 (G. Paul 1836, 3). 
 
The weakness of the Mulatto neocolonial regime, and his predisposition 
toward France led Pétion to compromise the very legitimacy of the revolution. As 
former plantation and slave owners, neocolonial elites were torn between their 
historical socio-economic interests that made them allied to white colons, and the 
legitimacy of the emancipatory revolution80 (Vastey 1814). Some of his 
                                                          
79 « En 1816, d'une manière ostensible : des agents officiels furent envoyés à Saint-Domingue pour' traiter 
directement avec les deux chefs qui se partageaient l’autorité ; les négociateurs échouèrent auprès du roi 
Christophe, et, sans réussir complètement auprès de Pétion, ils obtinrent cependant un résultat plus 
satisfaisant de ce côté, car ils parvinrent à établir des relations commerciales entre la France et la partie 
du sud de l'île sous des pavillons empruntés, et rapportèrent, de la part de Pétion, la proposition d'une 
indemnité à payer aux anciens Colons, et d'avantages commerciaux, si la France consentait à reconnaître 
la république Haïtienne. Depuis la fin de 1816, époque du retour des commissaires en France, jusqu'à la 
mort de Pétion, survenue à l'a fin de mars 1818, il ne fut plus question de négociations » (G. Paul 1836, 3). 
This report was published by the Royal library of France for the Department of Commerce in 1836. 
80However, given the offer made by the King of France, Louis XVIII, it seems that he too was aware of the 
neocolonial elites’ conflict of interet and their anti-black proclevities when he proposed them the  
following a decade after the revolution in exchange for recognition: 
1. To Pétion, Borgella and others (as long as their color approach them to the white race), 
assimilation to the whites, and advantages honorific as well as fortune 
2. To the rest of their caste currently alive, full political rights with whites, with some exceptions 
that could lead to less 
3. To all who are more or less closer to white than the pure Mulatto, limited political rights 
4.  To the free men who are fully black more limited rights  
5. To be returned to their old masters all blacks who are working on the land and return as many as 
possible those who have moved away from the plantations 
6. Purge the island of all the blacks that cannot be admitted amongst the free who would be 
dangerous with the others on the plantations 
7. Curtail the creation of more free blacks (Ardouin 1848, V8, 25-6, 30, Coradin 1987, 81) 
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contemporaries suggested that Pétion’s offer to pay an indemnity reflected this 
conflict of interests and undermined the notion that the nation was justified in 
declaring its independence, while others argue that his primary concern was to 
secure France’s Recognition, upon which relations with other nations depended 
(Vastey 1816, Vastey 1819, Delorme 1873, Coradin 1987). Whether scholars 
attribute his proposition to France to his search for international recognition or to 
a willingness to preserve Mulatto interests at the expense of the nation may be 
conjecture. What is unequivocal is that the weakness of the Mulatto state, 
Pétion’s upending of the Louverturean state crafting project, and Christophe’s 
adherence to it dictated their reaction to France and reflected both historical 
reality and an ideological disposition (Madiou 1847, Leger 1907, Bellegarde 
1938). While Pétion dinned and entertained the French envoy, Christophe 
arrested and jailed his for daring to suggest the recognition of French sovereignty 
and having on his person papers advocating for the reinstitution of the old regime 
(Cole 1967).  
The rejection of the Louverturean state model by Pétion, and 
consequently, the social contract that secured the protection and allegiance of 
the black majority undermined the capacity and prosperity of the state, 
                                                          
 
Nicholls’ suggestions that these distinctions, maintained by force for over two hundred years, which 
the king sought to reinstitute, did not create cleavages with core interests that influenced their 




weakening legitimacy and support to his regime. Having neglected the black 
majority, Pétion could not rely on them to defend the neocolonial state against 
foreign encroachments despite its clientelist schemes. Thus, as it was with 
Rigaud, argues Nichols, the neocolonial elites “believed that the best way for 
their caste to survive was to submit to France” (Nicholls 1979, 51). Lacking in 
legitimacy, and without the support of the majority, the regime felt compelled to 
not only seek foreign support, but to engage in an ill-conceived negotiation With 
France offering to pay with resources it lacked for a freedom its citizens rightfully 
acquired.  
Ardouin and Saint-Mery argue that Pétion’s state model provided a degree 
of peace and individual rights in the south and west. For the two scholars, the 
decline of commerce and the weakness of the neocolonial Mulatto state were 
more the result of national adjustment than policy. The happiness of the 
population, they contend, more so than its commerce is a better marker of its 
success, ignoring the discontent and armed resistance of the black population on 
the state (Ardouin 1848, V4, Saint-Remy 1857). Nevertheless, even Leyburn, the 
passionate Mulatto apologist, concluded, 
Pétion saw prosperity slowly wane, cultivation decline, 
profits give way to deficits… The fact remains that his 
country was rich when he came to power and poor when 
he died, united in 1806, and divided in 1818. Candor 
compels his admirers to admit that many of the 
calamities of the social and economic history of Haiti can 
be traced back to Pétion’s administration (J. G. Leyburn 
1966, 53 & 62). 
 
Pétion’s death from yellow fever in 1818 did not end the Mulatto state crafting 
experiment. His successor, President Jean-Pierre Boyer expanded the reach of 
the neocolonial state. Two years after the death of Pétion following the death of 
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Christophe, the Northern Louverturean state was disbanded and the Island 
forcefully united. The neocolonial Mulatto state became the national model.  
 
Christophe and the Survival of the Louverturean State: 
As a black officer under Toussaint since the start of the revolution, he 
understood the cost of freedom and had supported Toussaint plan to create a 
state capable of defending it. Christophe had the interests of the Louverturean 
state and nation in mind, and saw in its strength the very foundation for the 
preservation of his own individual freedom and the nation’s citizens. Despite the 
political constraints and the urgency of organizing the country’s defense to 
protect its independence, his regime and political acts, in essence, prove more 
republican and legitimate. Janvier notes, 
[H]is 1807 constitution was more appropriate to Haiti’s 
political needs for a country, to the leadership of which, 
all citizens thought necessary to place a military officer 
capable of defending its independence (L. J. Janvier 
1886, 82) 
 
More importantly, the new constitution of the Northern State reasserted the 1801 
Louverturean constitution by eliminating the post-revolutionary foreign ownership 
clause81 passed by Dessalines, offering full protection to foreign merchants, 
                                                          
81 Vastey argues that while it was fine to exclude French from property ownership, it was unfair to exclude 
other nationals, as well as unhelpful to the national development and commerce. This is particularly 
important given baron de Vastey’s role as council to the king, and state ideologue (Vastey 1817, 207). . 
Ironically, restrictions on foreign land ownership were reestablished in 1819 at the suggestion of the 
British Abolition, and Christophe’s Ambassador at large Thomas Clarkson in a letter to King Henry dated 
June 28, 1819. For a full copy of the letter and the King’s response, see (Griggs and Prator 1968, 146, 167). 
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allowing foreign ownership of property in the city, and encouraging foreign 
economic involvement and investments (Franklin 1828, 200-1, Ardouin 1853, 
V7,14, Nicholls 1979, 52)82. As the Louverturean ideologue, Demesvar Delorme 
remarked, the goal was to create a prosperous state for “prosperity is power”, 
and the Louverturean state needed a prosperous state and foreign merchants to 
find adequate resources to buy armaments for its defense (Delorme 1873, 138). 
As Toussaint and Dessalines before him, Christophe’s regime was based on 
economic and military power backed by a social contract between the state, its 
elites, and the masses.  
As Toussaint and Dessalines did before him, Christophe raised taxes on 
imports, enacted laws that restricted the importation of certain products such as 
white sugar to protect the national sugar industries and expand consumption of 
national goods (Gazette 1808, Vastey 1817). The state blocked the foreign 
imports of foodstuff to ensure national self-sufficiency and required all planters to 
produce food for national consumption in addition to increasing production for 
exports. Baron de Vastey, the Secretary of State and state ideologue, was 
unequivocal about Christophe’s intent when he wrote, “A nation must be able to 
supply herself with everything she principally needs. “If she depends on foreign 
markets for subsistence, she has no more her independence in her hand” 
(Vastey 1817, 53-4). To further the quest for self-sufficiency, the Northern regime 
                                                          
82 James Franklin, a British merchant was particularly interested in the growth of commerce in the North. 
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built weaving mills that were so successful it became unnecessary to export 
cotton, as it was needed for national production (Vandercook 1928, 135). 
Christophe's fidelity to the Louverturean project of securing the nation, and 
crafting a strong state through commerce, self-sufficiency, and military power, 
made his regime the center of commerce, development, and security, and one of 
the most successful in Haitian history (Cole 1967). Whereas, under Pétion graft 
was the norm, which led him to comment, “All men are thieves”; the Northern 
regime was known for its safety and the integrity of its citizens (Leyburn 1966, 
Cole 1967, Griggs and Prator 1968).  
The British merchant, James Franklin, no supporter of black leadership,  
observed, Christophe’s “regulations unquestionably display sound views of policy 
which ought to have ensured the welfare of the country, together with the security 
and happiness of its people” (Franklin 1828, 210). Others also noted the success 
of the Louverturean project under Christophe.  
The state coffers were filled to overflowing – the annual 
revenue amounting to three and a half million dollars, the 
nobility and landowners became wealthy, and want and 
hunger disappeared” (Griggs and Prator 1968, 55).  
 
Dutch, Americans, English, Danes, and Swiss merchants competed for access in 
this most lucrative market in Northern ports. Properties of British merchants in 
Cap-Haitian alone were valued at over one million dollars (Cole 1967, 
189).Franklin’s observation of the Louverturean Northern state is most telling: 
“agriculture was smiling, the produce of the soil increasing considerably, [and] 
commerce was making rapid progress, and bidding fair to become equally 
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advantageous to the state.” The state generated revenue “sufficiently ample for 
all the exigencies of government” (Franklin 1828, 219). 
          Unlike Pétion’s regime, whose entire administrative and military leadership 
was composed of Mulattoes, among Christophe’s most important administrators 
and military officers were Mulattoes, blacks, and whites committed to the 
Louverturean state model. British, Dutch, Scots, Americans, Spaniards were also 
involved in the Northern regime. Christophe was interested in the development of 
his compatriots and the state and spared no resources to that end (Rodman 
1954). British officers headed his navy and trained Northern sailors in marine 
craft (Cole 1967, 162-73). He hired agricultural experts from England, and bought 
tools from foreign companies to improve cultivation. German architect assisted in 
the development of his infrastructure. He sought the help of teachers from 
England and Philadelphia, requested teachers from the British foreign school, 
and opened five national public schools using the Lancastrian83 method to 
accelerate the education of his population (Griggs and Prator 1968).  
          Christophe encouraged the creation of private schools, and founded 
academies for professional training (Vandercook 1928, 150, Rodman 1954, 17, 
J. Desquiron 1993, 40). He understood that a population that was denied the 
right to an education could not effectively sustain the independence and 
prosperity of the Louverturean state without remedy. He also understood the 
                                                          
83 According to Desquiron, the Lancastrian method meant that teachers taught in the morning, and the 
most advanced students transmitted their knowledge in the afternoon to other students. This process he 
notes accelerates the alphabetization rate (J. Desquiron 1993, 40-1). 
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false claim of superiority upon which white supremacy rested. Cole is right to 
assert, “The project closest to his heart was the education of his people. He saw 
clearly that learning was the only sure safeguard of their continuing freedom” 
(Cole 1967, 229). Thus, Christophe expanded the Louverturean project to 
safeguarding the independence of the nation through prosperity, commerce, and 
a strong state backed by not only an armed, but also an educated and 
enlightened citizenry84. Out of a population of 240,000, notes the Diplomat, 
senator, and historian Edner Brutus, 72,000 were already alphabetized in the 
North  (Brutus 1948, 51-7). The Louverturean educational policy was so thorough 
that it regulated absences and required every boy ten years or older, in addition 
to their education, to learn a trade (Vandercook 1928, 151). His was not a 
plantocracy or a neocolonial state based on exploitation, extraction of resources 
from the masses for external gain and personal enrichments, he was crafting a 
nation of actors not idlers where every citizen would contribute to its 
development. Whereas education was reserved for the neocolonial elites in 
Pétion’s regime, it was compulsory and free in the North (Vandercook 1928, 
150). In the Louverturean state, schools flourished, a printing press was 
established, monuments, palaces, schools, even a theater was built, and 
fortresses were erected at the ready to defend the nation against encroachments 
by foreign powers (Griggs and Prator 1968, 55).  
                                                          
84 After learning of Christophe’s educational policies, Pétion did follow suit by creating a Lycée to 
Christophe’s seven public and professional schools. Moreover, the school as it were was in Port-Au-Prince 




Agricultural and Commercial Policies: 
Christophe’s Northern regime continued the Louverturean agrarian 
policies, but expanded and protected the rights of agricultural workers with 
required breaks for breakfast, lunch, a two-hour mid-day rest, time for dinner. He 
established a five-day work week, with Saturdays and Sundays off to allow 
workers the time to tend to their own fields and pursue their personal economic 
and social interests and address the causes of worker discontent experience 
under Toussaint. Moreover, to secure compliance by landowners and workers, 
he replaced Toussaint’s 52 police inspectors with 70 especially trained police 
officers stationed in each of the thirty-five provinces (Griggs and Prator 1968, 50, 
Heinl and Heinl 2005, 136).  
Christophe continued the Louverturean project of state expansion by 
expanding the state’s domain started by Dessalines, increasing worker’s 
protection, and bolstering the state’s regulatory and institutional capacity. He 
distributed and sold lands indiscriminately to Mulattoes, whites, and blacks (J. G. 
Leyburn 1966, Cole 1967). These land policies were designed to increase state 
revenue and provide resources for reconstruction and state expansion. Unlike 
Pétion, Christophe’s land grants and sales were not to secure allegiance but 
were predicated on a required annual production yield by the grantee or buyer, 
creating an incentive for increased production, and state revenue and capacity 
(Nicholls 1979, 54). These policies increased both production and commerce, 
and through taxation, the revenue needed to expand the state institutions, and 
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improved its military capacity and training. He also continued the Louverturean 
state-centered policy of leasing state lands to government and military officials 
who had a stake in increased production, commerce, and state revenues. One of 
the most important additions to the Louverturean project was the institution of a 
successful monetary policy and a currency – the Gourde - to manage internal 
commerce85 (Vandercook 1928, 108-9).  
 
International Relations in the Louverturean State: 
In no area was the determination of Northern Louverturean leaders to 
preserve the sovereignty of the state, the integrity of the nation, and manage its 
international affairs more uncompromising. Christophe had fully adopted the 
Louverturean international relations’ model of enticing nations through 
commerce, and linking state autonomy to their commercial interests. Such a 
model was predicated on ensuring a level of agricultural production to sustain the 
commercial needs of multiple nations (Rayford 1941). The fear of another French 
invasion made the recognition of independence the primary focus of all Haitian 
leaders. Whereas Toussaint was able to couch his project of state crafting, and 
drive toward independence behind the rhetoric of allegiance to France, the formal 
declaration of independence gave no cover or protection to the new nation, 
                                                          
85 In an attempt to emulate Christophe, Pétion created a tin currency, ridiculed by his citizens as Serpent-
a-monaie - snake money, for its lack of value (Leger 1907, J. G. Leyburn 1966). 
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making international recognition of Haitian sovereignty the single most important 
goal.  
Despite the animosity between Mulattoes and blacks, specifically between 
Christophe and Pétion, Nicholls argues, both Haitian leaders were equally 
committed to preserving Haitian independence. “The public and official policy of 
both Pétion and Christophe was that national independence must be defended at 
all costs,” he wrote (Nicholls 1979, 49). They had differing view, however, on the 
type of recognition to pursue. Pétion was content with a protectorate status 
whereas leaders of the Louverturean state wanted unequivocal and unconditional 
recognition by other nations86 (Cole 1967, 179-81).  
The success of the Louverturean state under Christophe gave it relevance 
and leverage in international commerce. Yet, France’s power and the dominance 
of the slave-based economic system were such that despite their commercial 
interests, other nations dared not recognize Haitian independence (Wallez 1826, 
Coradin 1987). Christophe’s commercial relations with the British were good, and 
despite the act of the American Congress banning commerce with Haiti between 
1806 and 1809, American merchants proved useful in securing Haitian autonomy 
and implicitly its independence, but not enough for overt recognition as was the 
case with Toussaint (Rayford 1941, Nicholls 1979). Other neutral nations also 
                                                          
86 Had the black and neocolonial Mulatto elites maintain their unity; their common goal would have been 
facilitated by the national expansion, and consolidation of the Louverturean state. Their failure to do so 
meant that only the Northern state had the capacity and was fully committed to securing its 
independence whereas the neocolonial Mulatto state could not. 
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flocked to Northern ports to benefit from the commercial advantages Christophe’s 
kingdom offered87 (Cole 1967).  
The Northern State enjoyed an implicit recognition of its independence, 
and nations engaged with its representatives on that basis (Vastey 1816, 
Vandercook 1928). Christophe asserted the nation’s sovereignty by arresting 
foreign merchants who violated its laws, confiscating ships and their cargo for 
infringing on the Nation’ sovereignty, protected its national waters by a well-
organized naval fleet, and compelled the British and the Americans to recognize 
and respect its laws88 (Cole 1967, 182-90). He had found in the abolitionists 
Wilberforce and Clarkson supporters to his cause, willing to serve as agents in 
England and Russia, and thus expanded the state’s representation and outreach 
to other nations89 (Griggs and Prator 1968, 126, 140-6).  
The eagerness of the neocolonial Mulatto state leaders to negotiate with 
France reflected an emotional and cultural dependence on a country that still 
considered them second-class citizens. On the other hand, the Louverturean 
state’s categorical refusal to deal with France without a piori recognition of the 
nation’s independence was a clear indication of their independence and 
                                                          
87 Due to the lack of production in the South, nations were less interested in doing business in its ports. 
Pétion’s government had to lower taxes to entice nations, Allowed French ships to frequent its ports, and 
even sought British protectorate in 1810 fearing attack from both Christophe from the North and Rigaud 
in the South who had returned from France and taken control over the South (Cole 1967, 176-80). 
88 See the Von Kapp Brunce Affair (R. W. Logan 1941, 188). Also, see Consular dispatches, Cap-Haitien, 
lettre de Monseigneur de Compte de Limonade Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. 24 Avril 1818. 
Communique from William Taylor to Monroe 20 May 1818. 
89 For copies of the correspondence between Christophe, Clarkson, and Wilberforce and between the 
abolitionists and representative of the Northern state, see (Griggs and Prator 1968, 103-280).  
 127 
 
determination not to enter negotiation with France from a position of 
subordination (Vastey 1814, Pre zeau 1815, L'an 12 de L'independence, 4-5). 
Contrary to its counterpart, France had no emotional or cultural hold on the 
Louverturean state.  
Scholars have long mused on the predisposition of the two regimes, 
suggesting the precariousness, flaws, and lack of legitimacy of the neocolonial 
Mulatto state as the cause for their willingness to entertain negotiations with 
France, and offer to pay a ‘reasonable indemnity’ for recognition90 (Wallez 1826, 
Leger 1907, 163, Nicholls 1979, 51). When France approached the two states 
again in 1816, in another attempt to reassert its sovereignty over the Island, the 
Louverturean state led by Christophe again took the lead in setting the conditions 
for negotiations from a position of strength, 
[W]e will not negotiate with the French government 
unless it is on the same level: sovereign with sovereign, 
nation with nation! No negotiations will take place with 
this nation without being firmly based in the recognition 
of the independence of the kingdom of Haiti in matters of 
government and commerce. The French flag will not be 
admitted in any of our ports, nor will any French citizen 
                                                          
90 Negotiations with the French agent Dauxion Lavaysse would have continued under Pétion had 
Christophe not published the information he gathered from Medina, forcing him to break off negotiation 
(Leger 1907, Griggs and Prator 1968, 59). Scholars, partial to Pétion have often pointed out his public 
pronouncement after he broke off negotiations with Lavaysse. What they conveniently ignored is the fact 
that negotiations were stopped only because of pressure from Christophe’s publication of the materials 
he confiscated from Medina. More importantly, they overlook the fact that it was Pétion who wrote, 
without prompting, to the French envoy, “I propose to your excellency to establish the bases of an agreed 
indemnity which we shall solemnly engage to pay, accompanied by any just guarantee that may be 
required of us”, weakening the Haitian position (Wallez 1826, 169, Nicholls 1979, 51). Baron de Vastey, 
the Northern ideologue and member of Christophe’s leadership council rejected the notion of paying for 
the recognition of Haitian independence in a scathing manifesto (Vastey 1817, 53-4, 1814).  
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until France unequivocally recognize the independence 
of Haiti91 (Ardouin 1848, V8, 252,5, Leger 1907, 164-5). 
 
Having been previously embarrassed by Christophe’s publication, Pétion 
followed suit this time, linking the recognition of Haitian independence as 
precondition for negotiations. Neither would live to see full recognition of Haiti but 
the implementation of Pétion’s indemnity proposal would have a lasting impact 
on the nation by indebting it, establishing its dependence, consolidating its 
neocolonial status, and depriving it of much needed resources for development92 
(Nicholls 1979, 50).  
 
Christophe: Unintended Consequences of the Louverturean State: 
While hierarchy and status dominated the neocolonial state, a sense of 
equality pervaded the North (Harvey 1827, 120-1). Comparing the North to the 
South, Nicholls notes, 
[I]n the kingdom, there was a considerable spirit of 
equality in spite of the elaborate façade of aristocratic 
hierarchy, while in the republic, a careful reading of the 
constitution as well as an examination of the practice, 
would reveal that, despite talk about the sovereignty of 
                                                          
91 The original letter from King Henry to Thomas Clarkson’s his British advisor can be found in (Griggs and 
Prator 1968, 276-80). 
92 As I have pointed out before, his offer of indemnity had unfortunately been made. It is on that offer 
that future negotiations will be based. The Haitian Diplomat Jean Coradin wrote, “in not limiting the 
negotiations to a single proposition: unconditional recognition and in proposing an indemnity that was 
not even demanded, Pétion seemed to have gone beyond French designs, without contemplating the 
consequences that would result from such an act (Coradin 1987, 77). While the assertion that the 
indemnity was an offer by Petion is at best revisionist, it is clear that the weakness of his government 
compelled him to accept it while Christophe rejected it outright. A rather interesting fact is that the 
indemnity paid for the confiscation of the properties of former colons, the very properties Western and 
Southern elites embezzled, and resisted Dessalines’ attempts to reintegrate in the state’s domain. The 
neocolonial Mulatto state paid restitutions for stolen properties in the possession of its elites.  
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the people, real power was in the hands of a small self-
perpetuating elite (Nicholls 1979, 59).  
 
However, this spirit of equality and the legitimacy of the regime did not eliminate 
internal dissent. Samuel Huntington’s contention that economic development 
brings internal pressure for political change seems relevant in analyzing the rise 
of dissent in the North (Huntington 1965). The success of the Louverturean state 
created frictions between its elites. Moreover, contrary to the exclusionary 
practices in the neocolonial Mulatto state, the rise of blacks in positions of power 
created resentments from many Northern Mulattoes who had always maintained 
a sense of superiority and entitlement to leadership and power. Yvan Debbasch 
argues that some Mulattoes under Christophe were not pleased that they were 
placed on equal footing with blacks and collaborated with the rival neocolonial 
state, seeking the overthrow of the successful Northern Louverturean state 
(Debbasch 1967, 254).  
          The re-emergence of old racial dynamism and a failed Mulatto uprising led 
to a wave of Mulatto migration from the North to the South. This mulatrization of 
the South furthered the North/South racial antagonism, and Northern Mulatto 
collaboration with the neocolonial Mulatto state created instability and an internal 
insurgency movement (Cole 1967, J. Desquiron 1993, 41). Despite appeals by 
Baron de Vastey, and Chevalier Pre Zeau, Mulattoes and ideologues of the 
Northern regime, for Mulattoes to bind their interests to those of the Louverturean 
state and its citizens, Mulatto rebellions, plots, and collusion with Pétion’s 
neocolonial regime and later his successor Boyer were constant (Pre zeau 1815, 
L'an 12 de L'independence, 6, 17, Vastey 1819, Nicholls 1979, 56). Following 
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Christophe’s stroke, the power that held sway over the varied interests in his 
kingdom waned. His resulting paralysis allowed those within his regime that only 
fear and state power held in check, to foment rebellions to undermine the very 
regime dedicated to serve them and the nation (Cole 1967). Mulatto uprisings 
and defections grew, creating a level of instability, and elite ambitions resulted in 
internal divisions that ultimately led to the overthrow of the regime, and the death 
of Christophe (Vandercook 1928, 162-5, Cole 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 138-
9). One could argue that Christophe’s failure to find a balance between the 
interests of neocolonial elites within his regime and those of the state and the 
masses, his insistence on pushing his people too quickly to expand the state and 
create a nation worthy of international praise, and his failure to recognize and 
address Mulattoes’ divergent interests, led to internal schisms and destruction of 
the Louverturean state upon his death. However, not much could have been 
done by Christophe besides sacrificing the state and its citizens. It was 
neocolonial elites who sought the destruction of the Louverturean state and 
subjugation of the black majority to preserve their economic, caste, and political 
interests.  The cost of their success continues to be felt after almost 200 years. 
Those who overthrew him hoping to benefit from the power and gain 
control of the state he had so skillfully crafted regretted the act that not only gave 
control of the northern state to the Southern Neocolonials regime, but 
undermined the Louverturean state crafting project leading to the decline of the 
nation (Cole 1967, Griggs and Prator 1968). The English merchant and author 
James Franklin, who was no friends of Haiti and black freedom, captured the 
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result of the fall of the Louverturean state best when he wrote, “Had Christophe 
lived, he would have raised his country in affluence and in civilization, but his 
death has sunk the former, and retarded the latter” (Franklin 1828, 231) 
 
Boyer: The Ascendency of the Neocolonial Mulatto State in a United Haiti:  
The ascendency of Jean-Pierre Boyer as President of the Mulatto state in 
181893, followed by the death of Christophe, led to the forceful unification of the 
nation and the nationalization of the Mulatto state project (Cresse 1824, Rodman 
1954). The reassertion of control over the Spanish part of the Island in 1822 
would further entrust the Mulatto state with full control over the destiny of the 
Island. For the first time since the death of Toussaint, Haiti had reasserted 
sovereignty over its national territory by formally reuniting the island of 
Hispaniola. However, far from leading to the enhancement of the nation, Boyer’s 
25-year leadership remains one of the most damaging in the story of the nation 
resulting in both national neglect and international indebtedness rendering the 
nation forever subservient and dependent as a neocolonial state.   
The expansion of state control over the entire island ran counter to the 
interest of Spain, the United States, and Britain whose policies had been to limit 
the power and potential of the Haitian state, and curtail its influence (Lodge 1904, 
R. W. Logan 1941). It is this policy, which prevented Toussaint from formally 
                                                          
93 Boyer’s ascension to power was not without controversy. It took the intervention of the presidential 
guard to compel the senate to elect him as president of the republic (Heinl and Heinl 2005).  
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declaring independence in 1801, supported the separation of the country into two 
states, and now isolated it after its successful territorial re-unification. Rather than 
influencing the recognition of independence, the reunification served as further 
rationale for denying it94. This became clear to Boyer and other Haitian leaders 
when Britain and the United States recognized the independence of Mexico and 
other newly independent Latin American states, and when even the Latin 
American states assisted by Haiti in their struggle for independence refused to 
recognize Haiti as an independent state (Leger 1907, 175). Worse was the 
refusal of the United States to treat Haiti as a nation, and the exception made in 
the Monroe Doctrine, which restricted its application and protection to Haiti while 
expanding it to all the newly independent Latin American states (R. W. Logan 
1941, 186, Weeks 2008). Faced with an international environment increasingly 
hostile, the realization that Haiti could no longer rely on British commercial 
interests as a safeguard against France, Boyer re-engaged France in the 
negotiations began under Pétion (Cole 1967). For the first time since 
independence in 1804, the Haitian state, in its neocolonial formulation, was 
vulnerable.  
                                                          
94 Haitian leaders were also aware that Britain, while banning slavery, had extended France’s right to buy 
slaves for five years with the goal of eliminating all Haitians and replacing the population with slaves. 
Many of those leaders, who had long believed that Britain would be the first to recognize the 
independence of their nation, were disillusioned. Christophe, while seeking recognition without 
compromise, pursued the Louverturean model of creating a state strong enough to deter attacks. Like 
Toussaint, he had challenged the British naval blockade imposed on Haiti since 1797, and tried to build its 
own naval fleet. 
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Thus, the national ascendency of the neocolonial Mulatto state project, 
even with territorial expansion, did not succeed in enhancing state power and 
national prosperity but became a vehicle for elite enrichment at the detriment of 
the nation. Worse, it increased the enemies and vulnerability of the state by 
angering the new Latin American states and reducing the commercial linkages 
that existed between Haiti and other nations by not following adequate policies to 
enhance national production (P. Sannon 1905, J. G. Leyburn 1966). Victim of the 
neocolonial Mulatto state project, the Haitian nation, found itself without recourse; 
its prosperity and commerce weaker, its military, one the most feared in the 
Western Hemisphere, disorganized and disengaged, and unable to sustain its 
autonomy without external protection and international recognition (Wallez 1826, 
P. Sannon 1905). This emerging neocolonial state was not even in a position to 
negotiate without preconditions (P. Sannon 1905, 19).  
Its leaders had already undermined the legitimacy of Haitian 
independence by proposing an indemnity. Boyer furthered this process by 
sending representatives to continue the negotiations on the same terms95. This 
weakness of the Haitian state empowered France to decree, unilaterally, the 
conditional independence of Haiti on 17 March 1825. With an armada of fourteen 
warships, France entered Haitian waters compelling the Haitian government to 
agree to the imposed conditions for recognition:  150,000 francs as indemnity, 
                                                          
95 According to the French ministry of finances, the government of Jean-Pierre Boyer, represented by 
Baron de Machau entered in negotiations with France to renew its commitment to pay an indemnity for 




and the reduction in half of tariffs and taxes for French merchants in Haitian 
ports96 (Wallez 1826, Esmangart 1833, G. Paul 1836, Coradin 1987). Not only 
did France compelled Haiti to pay an exorbitant price for recognition, the 
imposition also reduced the state revenue needed to pay it by giving France 
dominance over Haitian commerce as the most favored nation, and by reducing 
their taxes by half (P. Sannon 1905, Leger 1907, Rulx 1945). No other nations in 
the American continent suffered such infringement on its right to self-
determination.  
In less than five years after the fall of the Louverturean state, neocolonial 
elites had managed to weaken the nation and alienate the very black population 
on whose shoulders the protection and prosperity of the nation rested. This 
national affront, made possible by the predominance of Mulatto caste interests 
over those of the nation, remains one of the lasting wounds of the neocolonial 
Mulatto state project (L. J. Janvier 1886).  
The power of the Louverturean state rested on commerce, military power, 
and the balance of elite interests, state interests, and the interests of the majority. 
With the ascendency of the neocolonial Mulatto state, such balance had 
disappeared and with it the economic and military power of the state. This loss of 
power enabled France to impose conditions on the young Haitian nation and 
compel its representatives to sign an agreement, which wounded its national 
conscience and pride and destroyed its economic independence.  
                                                          
96 For a full account of the indemnity, see the French Commercial Journal Le Constitutionnel, 1919, p3 
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Although Boyer continues to be faulted for buying an independence that was 
already in the nation’s possession, the recognition by France upon which all 
other recognitions depended resulted in the recognition of Haiti a year later by 
Britain, Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark (Leger 1907, 182). The Mulatto 
regime had ended the limbo status and isolation of the Haitian state in 
international Affairs at a cost that consolidated its neocolonial position and 
established its dependency status. This is perhaps the only area besides 
unification where the Mulatto regime succeeded, tying the new republic to the 
metropole through resource expropriation. Had the neocolonial Mulatto elite not 
incurred the indemnity, perhaps history would have judged them less harshly. 
However, by placing a prosperous and debt-free nation in debt to France, and 
borrowing from French banks to service that debt, they structured the nation into 
permanent subservience, the Mulatto elite dealt Haiti a fatal blow97.  
 
Boyer and Neocolonial Mulatto Hegemony: 
Boyer further accelerated the racial stratification of the nation, as “more of 
the people enjoyed less and less with the aristocratic Mulatto caste” (Rodman 
1954, 19). His 25-year presidency consolidated Mulatto control over the state 
and resulted in the disenfranchisement of the black nation. The public schools 
                                                          
97 See Emprunt D’Haïti – Rapport a Monsieur le Président du Conseil des Ministres du Roi de France – 
Paris, le 15 Décembre 1830 et 29 Janvier 1831 signe par le général Lemoine, Président de la Commission 
et Filleau, Felines, Santerre et G. Paul Commissaires. Imprimerie de Setier. 
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established under the Louverturean regime of Christophe in the North that 
alphabetized over 72,000 citizens were closed, or turned into barracks for 
southern soldiers; the efforts to improve the population were indefinitely 
suspended (Leger 1907, Cole 1967). No government did more to exclude blacks 
from state positions and eliminate the possibility of them ever attaining those 
positions by systematically eliminating their access to education than Boyer’s.  
James Franklin, the merchant and British representative in Port-au-Prince at the 
time observed, 
[I]t is the prevailing sentiment of the people of color, that 
blacks should be kept in their present state of ignorance, 
and so long as the government be composed of people 
of the former class, the latter will remain in their present 
condition (Franklin 1828, 399). 
 
The neocolonial Mulatto state project intensified under Boyer, sought not just 
Mulatto domination of the state, and the preservation of Mulatto interests, but the 
complete and indefinite exclusion of the black population from the levers of 
power (Heinl and Heinl 2005). Destroying existing schools and systematically 
eliminating their access to education was one of the strategies used to facilitate 
that endeavor (P. Sannon 1905, Rodman 1954, 18-20). In less than a year after 
the demise of the Louverturean state, the neocolonial Mulatto state “was already 
buttressing its elite status by denying literacy and education to the black masses 
of the North, and the Artibonite and, in general to peasant and cultivators 
everywhere” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 154).  
          Besides the educational policies that delayed the advancement of the 
Black population, the neglect of the state institutions in the North that were the 
source of stability and development was a major strategy to weaken the 
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prospects for the re-emergence of the Louverturean project. The disregard for 
the laws, agriculture, and commerce, the source of so much wealth and 
international competition in that region, constituted a systematic subordination of 
national interests to facilitate Mulatto domination and the supremacy of the 
neocolonial state (Charmant 1905, Cole 1967). The crafters of the neocolonial 
Mulatto state at the height of their power, with the opportunity to lead a united 
nation, and provide Haitian citizens with the leadership necessary to consolidate 
a prosperous nation, chose their caste over the national welfare. They engaged 
in racial separatism and exclusion instead of fostering a national identity and a 
unified nation dedicated to the welfare of its citizens. 
To consolidate its power, the Boyer regime engaged in a systematic 
dismantling of black leadership, substituting competent northern black leaders for 
inexperienced southern and western Mulattoes, and murdering prominent 
northern elites and high-ranking army officer, while exiling others to southern 
towns under Mulatto control (Wallez 1826, 337-343). In less than a decade, 
Mulattoes had succeeded in pushing blacks out of leadership positions, and 
eliminating the prospects of their children ever developing the capacity to 
challenge their hold on state power. In his usual apologist sentiment, and 
ignoring the success of the North under black leadership, Leyburn argues that it 
was a lack of educated blacks and not Boyer’s intention to create a Mulatto-
dominated state. Despite his inclination, he was forced to admit, “during Boyer’s 
time class distinctions became fixed, in large part although not wholly, on the 
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basis of color” (J. G. Leyburn 1966). Haitian scholar Alcius Charmant offers us a 
clearer assessment of the consolidation of Mulatto power under Boyer, 
[I]n systematically excluding blacks from participation in 
important state functions of the nation, in denying their 
children access to education, in pushing his egotism to 
the point of closing professional and primary schools, as 
well as the academies that Christophe had opened in his 
kingdom, president Boyer thought he found the solution 
that would render his aristocratic power indestructible, 
and permit the men of his caste to become the only 
masters of the territory (Charmant 1905, 211). 
 
Thus, by placing their personal and caste interests above those of the nation, 
neocolonial Mulatto elites, managed to undermine the viability and autonomy of 
the Haitian state, structure its dependence on foreign powers and banks, and 
create the conditions for national bankruptcy, and decline (Franklin 1828, L. J. 
Janvier 1886, Rodman 1954). The nation previously economically independent 
became the first victim of the neocolonial system. Had neocolonial elites tied their 
interests to those of the nation, had they not felt themselves an extension of their 
former masters thus entitled to crafting and controlling a state designed to protect 
their interests, the Louverturean state crafting project would have endured and 
secured the prosperity of the Haitian state and its citizens. The presence of a 
state established against the interests of the nation became the symptom of the 
Haitian national maladies (Trouillot 1990).  
 
Boyer and the Orientation of the Neocolonial State: 
Despite its Mulatto orientation, the Boyer regime was the target of young 
Mulatto aristocrats who wanted a change from the old guard who dominated 
state positions (Leger 1907). The exiled of black military officers, the exclusion of 
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Black nationalist elites in state affairs, and the extension of that exclusion to the 
masses through the rural codes also angered black elites and military leaders (P. 
Sannon 1905). From 1826 until the fall of Boyer’s regime in 1843, the military 
implicitly refused to enforce the code, and even though the regime capitulated, 
military uprisings and plots against it intensified.  
Rather than provide a rallying point for the government, the earthquake of 
May 7, 1842 became a symbol of its ineptitude, and the source of vociferous 
contestations. The intra-elite struggle that developed within the neocolonial 
Mulatto regime festered, and when it resulted in open conflict lead by young 
southern Mulatto leaders, and the black military refused to intervene, the die was 
cast. Boyer and other prominent leaders of his regime went into exile in 1843 
leaving the nation dependent and destitute, scarred by an aristocracy of the skin 
that had been institutionalized as state policy, and constrained by a catastrophic 
debt that robbed it of resources needed for its development. In summing up the 
impact of Boyer and the neocolonial Mulatto state, Leyburn wrote, 
From great estates to tiny plots; from carefully tilled 
fields to small gardens in a wilderness; from financial 
prosperity to debt; from directed enterprise to slot; from 
an attitude of hopeful determination to one of tolerance 
for things as they are – these are the striking contrasts of 
the two periods and the two state models (J. G. Leyburn 
1966, 86). 
 
Historian Thomas Madiou puts it simply: for 25 years under Boyer, “the nation 
barely existed. The nation did not even stay stationary, she did not progress, she 
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regressed…”98 (Madiou 1847, v5,468-9). His fall also resulted in the secession of 
the East, encouraged as it were by France, Britain and the United States, and 
Boyer’s Mulatto supporters in the East - every effort to reunite the island again 
would fail (Leger 1907, 199-201, R. W. Logan 1968). If color prejudice grew more 
acrimonious thanks to polemics between Mulatto and Louverturean ideologist 
under Pétion and Christophe, Boyer did little to calm them and, by all account, 
intensified and institutionalize them. In his analysis of the Boyerist regime, 
Janvier notes, 
Boyer could have pacified the racial acrimony by 
preaching Dessalines’ ideas on the matter. He did the 
contrary. With his rural code of 1826, he aggravated the 
situation. Blacks made up nine tenth of the population: 
he threw them in the countryside. Although reduced to 
serfs on Mulatto plantations, Blacks were not idiots. 
They took note there were none of them in his 
administration, none in the highest ranks in the military, 
in the senate, nor in the lower house, not even in the 
liberal careers from which Boyer kept them with devilish 
skills (L. J. Janvier 1886, 231-2). 
 
Indeed, presiding over a unified island, Boyer had an opportunity to inspire the 
nation and craft a state to account for the interests of all its citizens and lead a 
cohesive nation. Instead, he continued to consolidate a neocolonial state crafted 
to preserve Mulatto interests and predisposed against the majority of its citizens.  
 
                                                          
98 Also see (J. Desquiron 1993, 50) 
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Boyer, Land Reforms, and Commerce: 
By the time Boyer took over control of the neocolonial Mulatto state, little 
remained of the state’s domain, and commerce had declined, leaving the state 
bankrupt (Bonnet 1864, J. G. Leyburn 1966). The unification of the nation 
following the death of Christophe (Franklin 1828, Cole 1967). Unification with the 
North provided Boyer with a well-managed public domain, and successful 
agricultural and commercial enterprises and afforded himthe opportunity to 
reverse the state’s economic decline, shift its fortune and direction, and, more 
importantly, create an inclusive representative government. Instead, he 
confiscated the northern treasury, squandered the wealth, neglected the 
commerce and agriculture that enriched the Louverturean regime, and rather 
than expand the progress accomplished by the North to the rest of the nation, 
destroyed and undermined every Northern institutions (Leyburn 1966). Heinl and 
Heinl, no friends of Haiti’s Louverturean leaders, note,  
[I]t took three years for Boyer and the men in Port-Au-
Prince to run through the surplus inherited from Henry: in 
1823, the republic’s treasury was empty” (Heinl and 
Heinl 2005, 154).  
 
More than eleven millions in gold confiscated from the Louverturean 
regime vanished, regulatory institutions were disbanded, and landholders were 
forcefully removed from their properties, seniorwere military officers, were 
transferred leaving the north with neither order nor resources (Esmangart 1833)..  
Reunification with the sparsely populated Spanish East also offered no 
advantages to the state. Rather than expand the state’s domain, Boyer 
distributed land to members of his caste and at the insistence of Mulatto 
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landholders, reintroduced the rural codes of 1826, which, unlike those of the 
Louverturean state that allow for social mobility, educational opportunities, 
independent contracts and greater rights for workers, aimed to create a 
permanent black serfdom (Ardouin 1848, v8). Under Boyer’s rural codes, 
Workers could not send their kids to school without approval from Mulatto state 
officials, establish a shop or sell their produce, build a home away from the 
plantation, and once classify as a cultivator only government officials could 
change that classification (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 66-70). Unlike the Louverturean 
codes, cultivators could not form cooperative enterprises, or pool their resources 
to buy and work on their own plantations; they could not sell their produce 
cultivated on their own land and therefore acquire revenue to change their social 
conditions and that of their children. Unlike the Louverturean regimes that were 
willing to lease lands to workers as long as they maintained a level of production, 
the neocolonial Mulatto state blocked all avenues of upward mobility to the black 
population (L. J. Janvier 1886, P. Sannon 1905, 23-6). The rural code 
implemented by the neocolonial Mulatto state, notes the Haitian scholar Dantes 
Bellegarde, “profoundly angered the old soldiers of the revolutionary army who 
became cultivators: had they not only spilled their blood to transform slavery into 
permanent servitude?” (Bellegarde 1938, 108). The scholar Leyburn, a Mulatto 
supporter, puts it bluntly,  
[E]very individual who was not a public functionary, and 
who had no private means or a profession – in plain 
English, every Haitian except the aristocrat, the official, 
the artisan, and the soldier – was bound to the land, with 
no right to separate himself from it except in case of 




Whereas the Louverturean regime required parents to send their children 
to school and for fourteen year olds to learn a craft, thereby providing a way out 
of the plantation system, the Mulatto state eliminated the prospects of upward 
mobility for the black majority, confining them to permanent serfdom on Mulatto-
owned plantations (Bonneau 1862, P. Sannon 1905, 25). The black-dominated 
military refused to enforce the rural codes, and the masses ignored it in the North 
while resisting its enforcement by Mulatto military leaders in the south and west. 
The Spanish east already with a different work habits refused to cooperate. The 
maroon revolts that challenged the neocolonial state under Pétion because of its 
neglect and anti-black policies, re-emerged under the leadership of Jean 
Jacques Accau (Madiou 1847, Leger 1907). Leyburn adeptly observes, 
The enforcement of the rural code failed primarily 
because the army was controlled by Negroes, whom the 
president dared not drive too hard; while only the army 
could have enforced faithful performance by the black 
laborers (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 80). 
 
 The emerging neocolonial state lacked the legitimacy, institutional capacity, and 
the allegiance of the military to enforce the oppressive codes. The fear of popular 
resistance also limited its ability to enforce them even in the South and west 
where Mulatto military power was strongest (Madiou 1847, v4, Ardouin 1848, v8). 
The personal urgings of Boyer himself to local military leaders and his 
Machiavellian maneuvers to transfer local troops and their senior officers to new 
areas and station non-local troops and officers to enforce the rural codes caused 
further frictions and popular resistance (Boyer 1824, J. E. Baur 1974, Nicholls 
1979). Prominent Louverturean military generals who refused to enforce the laws 
were targets of assassination, and others who took up arms against the 
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neocolonial state were either executed or exiled to other parts of the country 
(Rodman 1954, J. E. Baur 1974). Moreover, the Black majority retreated to their 
own small plots, free from the excesses of a neocolonial Mulatto state whose 
policies, though unenforceable, were intentionally detrimental to their interests 
and those of their children. This retreat of the workforce from the neocolonial 
state and their uprisings to challenge its impositions, expanded the pattern of 
economic decline of the south to the rest of the nation. Under Boyer notes 
Rodman, 
Coffee grew wild, and the organized cultivation of 
sugarcane, cacao, and cotton for export had ceased 
altogether. The French buildings, factories, and irrigation 
works that had survived the revolution and been rebuilt 
under Dessalines and Christophe fell into disrepair… 
The Mulatto attempt to rule Haiti on behalf of an elite 
caste, while making economically disastrous efforts to 
appease a predominantly Negro population, had failed 
(Rodman 1954, 20). 
 
However, the failure of the Mulatto regime was not so much due to the attempts 
of its leaders to craft policies that appeased its black population, as Rodman 
suggests, but rather their attempt to restrict the black population to Mulatto-
owned plantations, and exclude them as full citizens from their state crafting 
project. Their state lacked popular support and thus was doomed to being 
anemic and unstable.   
Post-Boyer Transition: 
The fall of Boyer was orchestrated by young Mulatto aristocrats he had 
brought to power who resented the dominance of the old guard, resistance from 
the military dominated by black officers, and a peasant-led insurgency movement 
challenging their disenfranchisement and their quasi servitude status at the hand 
 145 
 
of Mulatto landowners99 (L. J. Janvier 1886, 226). However, Boyer’s fall did not 
mean the fall of the neocolonial Mulatto state but placed the black-dominated 
military, which rose against his rule, at the center of the struggle for power (L. J. 
Janvier 1886). Mulatto representatives sought to eliminate black control of the 
military by arbitrarily promoting members of their caste to high military ranks, and 
by introducing universal suffrage, before only reserved to those with military 
service (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 89). This attempt to refashion the military and place 
it under Mulatto control to lessen the re-emerging power and influence of 
Northern black military leaders and heroes of the revolution, was met with 
contempt.  
With a black-dominated military restive, young neocolonial aristocrats, 
confident for having successfully overthrown Boyer and the old guard, tried to 
retain control of the state. It took two cannons to decide Boyer’s successor and 
four years for the black army to reassert itself. Rodman notes, after this affront on 
their institution, the only one in which black still maintained some power, “the 
negro army had finally resolved to lessen the power of the Mulatto government” 
                                                          
99Due to historical Mulatto dominance, Southern blacks were the most disenfranchised and had less 
access to property. The confiscation of colonial lands by southern Mulattoes, which Dessalines had tried 
to reverse for a fairer distribution, and for which he was killed was further expanded under Pétion and 
Boyer (Marcelin 1896, J. G. Leyburn 1966). Boyer’s 25-year rule consolidated Mulatto landownership by 
dispossessing blacks and legally binding them to large plantations. Thus, Boyer had faced a sustained 
popular insurgency led by former southern maroons and revolutionary soldiers known as the ‘Piquets’ 
because of the tradition wooden lances they carried as weapons for lack of guns. Unlike in the North, 
Toussaint had not succeeded in arming blacks in the south, which resulted in their inability to conquer the 
state for force. They could only resist it and their landowning elites. Dominated by Mulatto landowning 
elites who wanted a docile black majority to tie to their lands, southern blacks along with poor Mulattoes 
had waged a sustained insurgency movement and aided Toussaint in the war against Rigaud. (L. J. Janvier 
1886, 223-227, Bouzon 1894). 
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(Rodman 1954, 20). To continue their hold on power, Mulatto leaders sought to 
craft a system that would enable them to retain power and control of the 
neocolonial state, with blacks in the presidency. Four generals, heroes of the 
revolution, succeeded each other in power in less than four years, all 
octogenarians and the target of Mulatto political manipulations in their attempt to 
maintain power with a black figurehead. “La Politique de Doublure” or “the 
Politics of understudy”, as Nicholls and Dorsainvil argue, took center stage 
(Dorsainvil 1894, Nicholls 1979).  
The Southern Mulatto General, Riviere Herard, elected on December 30, 
1843, lasted a year before being toppled by a mass uprising from the South, 
revolutionary leaders in the North, and elite discontent, as the black army 
watched on, unwilling to fight fellow blacks to preserve Mulatto hegemony (Leger 
1907, 188-91). As Leyman notes, “not gifted with administrative ability, Herard 
blundered first by imprisoning one of the most popular southern negro leaders in 
the country, thereby turning much of the population of the South against him”100 
(J. G. Leyburn 1966, 90). A more important factor, however, is ignored by 
Leyburn. Namely, having helped to overthrow Boyer in return for land retribution, 
Herard’s government sought to continue the Boyerist agenda and reneged on 
                                                          
100 Louis Felicite Salomon Jeune, a Louverturean supporter from one of the few Black Southern elites had 
caused the ire of Mulattoes by celebrating a mass in honor of Dessalines and advocating for an end to 
Mulatto control. His father, nominated by Toussaint in 1799 to administer the South following the war 
with Rigaud, and his older brother, murdered by Boyer for objecting to the policy of black 
disenfranchisement, Louis Félicité Salomon Jeune’s arrest by the Mulatto general, turned president, 
Riviere Herard, led to a frontal attack by the black population in the South on the state, and the 
overthrow of the Mulatto general. This first attempt of Mulattoes to use the military to their advantage in 
the transition had failed (Nicholls 1979, 77-8, Delince 1979, v8, 60-8). 
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land redistribution promised to the Southern peasants (Dorsainvil 1894, 
Bellegarde 1938). As the former Haitian Ambassador, minister and nationalist 
scholar J. N. leger notes, although their revendication “was the result of grave 
abuses; it indicated the ideals of the Haitian peasantry to remain proprietors of 
the land, and fight against their exploitation” (Leger 1907, 192-3). The Northern 
black General, and former official in Christophe’s Kingdom, Philippe Guerrier, 
succeeded Herard on May 3, 1844.  
Guerrier, a product of the Louverturean state project, pacified, without 
bloodshed, the Southern insurgency by the black masses against Herard by 
supporting their demands for land redistribution. He founded two Lycées: one in 
the North, the other in the South, reorganized state institutions, re-instituted the 
state council, and started a land distribution program to meet the demand of 
dispossessed southern blacks (Leger 1907, 193-4). He attempted to consolidate 
black control over the state by moving the capital from Port-au-Prince to the 
North, away from the Mulatto center of power and influence, and congruent with 
other Louverturean leaders, strongly defended Haitian sovereignty in 
international Affairs (Nicholls 1979, 79). Recognized for his courage and common 
sense, and despised by Mulattoes for his attempt to curtail their power, he died a 
year later on April 15, 1845. His rule, however short, demonstrates the 
Louverturean tendency to prioritize the welfare of the nation by safeguarding the 
interests of all national constituents with a strong state as arbiter. His successor, 
Christophe’s brother-in-law, General Louis Pierrot, sought to pursue the same 
policy without alarming Mulatto leaders, but his refusal to live in Port-au-Prince 
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and acquiesce to Mulatto power led to a Mulatto orchestrated military coup, 
which resulted in his resignation on March 24, 1846 (L. J. Janvier 1886).  
The last black General, Riche, fully controlled by the neocolonial elites, 
died less than a year later, on February 27, 1847, leaving Mulattoes without a 
malleable black candidate to continue their politics of understudy. In control of 
state institutions, lacking legitimacy, without military power to support their 
dominance, and able to undermine the military or subvert its quest to re-assert 
black control over the state, argued Desquiron, Mulatto elites assessed, “since it 
is necessary to have a black as president, we will choose one who is ignorant 
and docile we can manipulate” (J. Desquiron 1993, 52).  
Their nomination of General Faustin Soulouque in March 1847, seemed at 
last to be the answer to the Mulatto search for a figurehead (Dorsainvil 1894, 
212). Soulouque was a former member of the presidential guard under both 
Pétion and Boyer, and was promoted general and the head of the presidential 
guard by the deposed President Pierrot. The choice was not designed to uplift 
the nation, but rather to enable Mulattoes to maintain their power while providing 
the masses with a symbolic black president. Indeed, with an all-Mulatto cabinet 
running his government and little decisions left to him, his first few months as 
president appear to be an ideal manifestation of “the government of understudy”. 
Yet, despite Soulouque’s willingness to work with the neocolonial elites, little 
respect was paid to the dignity of this old black general with a deisre to do his 
best to administer the affairs of state, notes Leger (Leger 1907, 197-8). Worse, 
having nominated him because of his perceived malleability, many within the 
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Mulatto aristocracy were still dissatisfied, argues Janvier, “unwilling to accept 
even the presence of a black president. For them, personal interests superseded 
those of a nation already mutilated and troubled” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 233).  
When Soulouque asserted his leadership and demonstrated his 
independence from the neocolonial elites, he was attacked, and ridiculed at 
home and abroad by Mulattoes opposed to his regime, impacting the prestige of 
a nation already under attack by those that resented its existence (Stinchcombe 
1994). He was also the object of insubordination from neocolonial Mulatto elites 
in his government who felt entitled to the leadership of the nation having ruled 
exclusively for 37 years (Dhormoys 1859, Bouzon 1894, Bellegarde 1938). In 
addition to Mulatto intransigence, disturbances throughout the country, the 
arrogance of foreign agents encouraged by the elites, and the national threat 
posed by the secession of the East demanded the attention of this nationalist 
general.  
 
A veteran military officer devoted to his nation, he resolved to address its 
challenges by first reconstituting a cabinet composing of both blacks and 
Mulattoes, something not seen since the demise of the Louverturean state. 
Facing a persistent insurgency, ongoing guerilla war with the east, Mulatto 
malcontents, and a weakened nation, Soulouque sought to rectify the precarious 
condition in which thirty-seven years of Mulatto hegemony, and exclusion of the 
majority of the population had left the nation (Leger 1907, 197-200, MacLeod 
1970, 39).  
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Within a few months in office, to offset Mulatto power and influence in 
Port-Au-Prince, and having witnessed their manipulation of the military to remove 
leaders they could not control, he created a paramilitary guard, the Zinglins101, 
consisting of entirely new recruits (Bouzon 1894, 13). The creation of the Zinglins 
was to undermine the ability of the Mulatto elite to use segment of the military in 
the South to maintain their dominance. He further consolidated the power of his 
regime in Port-Au-Prince against Mulatto encroachment by naming his colleague, 
General Jean Louis Bellegarde as military governor of the city, and Colonel 
Dessalines, the son of the late revolutionary leader, as chief of police (Heinl and 
Heinl 2005, 144). These changes enabled him to suppress the Mulatto coup 
d’état in Port-Au- Prince that came one year after taking office in April 16, 1848.  
In an attempt to re-orient the neocolonial state toward the Louverturean 
model, he appointed a racially diverse cabinet, silenced the armed Mulatto 
opposition to his regime, and sent prominent members of their caste overseas to 
represent the nation rather than leave them in the country to foment rebellion and 
instability in their quest for power (Marcelin 1896, Leger 1907, 198). By 
suppressing the Mulatto armed rebellion against his government, Soulouque, 
argues MacLeod, “effectively destroyed any threat of an elite uprising for a 
decade” (MacLeod 1970, 41). Others, however, were more generous in their 
                                                          
101 Janvier argues that the Zinglins were created to control peasant insurgencies. However, the fact that 
they were not present in the North and were concentrated in the capital and Cayes, the two primary 
Mulatto strongholds where most of the Mulatto military officers resided is crucial in understanding the 
counterbalancing role they were created to play. This strategy of creating paramilitary organizations to 
offset Mulatto power would be adopted a little over one hundred year later by Dr. Francois Duvalier to 
offset the post-occupation military, tame Mulatto power, and assert control over the neocolonial state.  
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assessment, suggesting that he permanently broke the political and military 
power of the neocolonial Mulatto elite (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 93). 
Soulouque sought to emulate Christophe’s kingdom by re-instituting the 
royal model. His coronation as Emperor represented the attempt by Soulouque 
and high-ranking Northern military officers to eliminate, once and for all, the 
power of regional Mulatto legislators and regional military factions, concentrate 
power in the hands of their commander, and uplift the prestige of the nation. As 
leger notes, “the superior officers estimated that only absolute power 
concentrated in the hands of their chief would stop national discords” (Leger 
1907, 199). The military itself organized the national petition to crown Soulouque 
Emperor in order to create the condition for national cohesion (Bouzon 1894). It 
was a genuine, albeit misguided belief that the concentration of power would 
eliminate long established racial and regional discords, address the 
marginalization felt by blacks under the power and policies of the Mulatto state, 
and allow the country to speak with a unified voice with its international 
detractors.  
Congruent with Louverturean policies, Soulouque pursued a vigorous 
defense of Haitian internal and external sovereignty. He pacified armed 
revolutions in the South spurred by Mulattoes, as well as the peasant insurgency 
that challenged state power, and subdue the factionalism within the military. 
Simply put, “Peasants and urbanites understood that armed manifestations of 
discontent would no longer be tolerated; everything remained calm and the 
country had a few years of quiet” (Leger 1907, 198). He also sought to reassert 
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control over the East whose secession was supported by the three major foreign 
powers and the anti-nationalist Mulatto clique102, and strengthened the black 
military, neglected under Boyer (Madiou 1847, v5, Bouzon 1894, Dorsainvil 1894, 
210-218, Marcelin 1897, 8-12). For the first time since its independence, Haiti 
established ambassadorships and full recognition in France and England, 
previously denied to the nation (Bouzon 1894).  
Soulouque also refused to pay the indemnity to France, which he 
considered an affront to Haitian sovereignty (Marcelin 1897). When the French 
Admiral Duquesne threatened to bombard the capital, he fiercely responded that 
“he would meet force with force”, the French capitulated (Coradin 1987, v2, Heinl 
and Heinl 2005, 194). In this vein, he adopted an international political strategy 
that mirrored those of the Louverturean state. He sought to regularize relations 
with the Vatican under pope Pius IX without ceding the right of Haitians to name 
their clergy. More importantly, Soulouque maintained a vigorous and successful 
diplomatic front against France, Britain, and the United States defending Haiti’s 
rights to address the secession of the Dominican Republic as an internal matter, 
                                                          
102 It is important to note here that Mulatto resistance to Soulouque led them to act against Haitian 
interests by allying themselves with the eastern secessionist movement. Rather than defend Haitian 
liberty by preserving its territorial integrity, Mulatto military leaders who were stationed in the East 
facilitated the uprising against the state (Bouzon 1894, Leger 1907). It was Beaubrun Ardouin, the most 
prominent Mulatto elite, Member of Parliament, and ambassador to France who suggested Britain and 
France act together to secure the independence of the Dominican Republic. Indeed, it was this policy that, 
together with the United States, they pursued; recognizing the independence of the Dominican Republic 
while denying recognition to Haiti. Unable to control the state, Mulatto leaders who reign supreme under 
Boyer, aided in the dismemberment of the nation (Nicholls 1979, 82). The letter from the Haitian 
Ambassador Beaubrun Ardouin to the British Consul Ussher is instructive in this respect. Ardouin to 
Ussher, 17 Sept. 1849, Pro, FO 35/36. 
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staying firm despite various threats by those nations103 (R. W. Logan 1941, 237-
76). MacLeod notes, “Soulouque ruled Haiti during the difficult period of the high 
tide of ‘manifest destiny,’ and kept the new republic intact almost to the 
presidency of Lincoln (Bouzon 1894, MacLeod 1970, 47).  
Scholars like Leyburn, and Ardouin, whose brother, Celigny Ardouin, was 
executed by Soulouque for his participation in the 1848 coup d’état have been 
quick to malign the emperor. These scholars have gone to great length to 
mischaracterize his regime and those of Dessalines and Christophe as 
“barbarous” and “backward”, betraying their sentiments toward black rule, and 
the polemics of race and identity that has dominated Haitian historiography 
(Ardouin 1848, v6, Leger 1907, Nicholls 1974). Although one cannot deny that 
there was violence associated with those regimes, one cannot cherry pick which 
violence to condemn, nor ignore their context and causes. The difference 
between the violence of the Soulouque regime and that of the neocolonial 
Mulatto state under Boyer can best be understood by analyzing its purpose. For 
the first time, state violence was directed against Boyerist neocolonial elites to 
limit their power and control over the state and provide the space for good 
governance rather than secure Mulatto supremacy and black exclusion.  
Soulouque ‘s regime at its worst represented a backlash to the exclusive 
policies of the neocolonial Mulatto state, and as such, was marked by a degree 
                                                          
103 See Congressional Globe, 28th Congress. 1st session., 164  for documents supporting the collusion of 
Spain, France and the United States to support the Eastern secession and prevent Haiti from re-asserting 
control over its territory. Also quoted in (Padgett 1940, 269)  
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of violence present in any major transition and struggle for power. Neocolonial 
Mulato elites, refusing to concede to the decline of their power, reacted violently, 
and were met with equal violence from new state actors determined to end their 
supremacy and preserve the integrity of the state (Dhormoys 1859, Delorme 
1873, Bouzon 1894, Leger 1907). The roots of the recurring violence that marks 
Haitian regime politics can be traced to the stalled statecraft of the early-to-mid 
nineteenth century. 
Soulouque seemed mostly concerned with securing a strong and unified 
state accessible to all and exclusively devoted to neither black nor Mulatto elites. 
Moreover, the criticism of Soulouque’s coronation is at best misdirected, for the 
differences between a presidency for life with the right to name your successor, 
and a kingdom, appear to be of little consequence except for the prestige of titles 
awarded to administrators of the kingdom (MacLeod 1970, 43-4). Even the 
prestige, according to MacLeod, seems less important when one realizes that 
administrators under the presidency earned a lot more than the Dukes and 
Barons of the Kingdom104. More importantly, almost all Haitian leaders attempted 
to create a level of permanency and continuity of their regime in order to curtail 
racial and regional factionalism to maintain national cohesion and protect the 
nation against its external enemies. Unfortunately, ethnic and elite factionalism 
                                                          
104 The Haitian scholar Justin Bouzon argues that the empire enjoyed popular support because of the 
symbol of independence it conveyed. Seeing their new leaders in the same titles and positions as other 
European leaders was a source of pride (Bouzon 1894). Writers Paul Dormoys and Hubert Cole also 
support this thesis (Dhormoys 1859, Cole 1967). 
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was too dominant to allow the need for continuity shared by all leaders to create 
the condition for the emergence of a national coalition. 
 
Education and Access: 
Less than two years following his election, Soulouque reversed Boyer’s 
educational policies by expanding educational access, establishing primary 
schools in every province, and requiring entry to 7-year olds (Brutus 1948, J. 
Desquiron 1993, v1, 56). The expansion of schools to the provinces eliminated 
the concentration of schools that was designed to cater to neocolonial elites, and 
made it unnecessary for the masses to move from the countryside or to have to 
acquire resources to send their children to schools in the cities (Bouzon 1894, J. 
Desquiron 1993, v1). Soulouque brought the schools to the masses and thus 
broke Mulatto elites’ monopoly on education. To meet the need for secondary 
education, and limit Mulatto dominance in this area, he hired French teachers to 
supplement Haitian educators. By the time he left office after ruling the country 
for twelve years, notes Desquiron, there were 175 primary schools with a total of 
13,000 students and two public Lycées educating 200 students (J. Desquiron 
1993, 56).  
While the educational gains were meager compared to the Louverturean 
state under Christophe, for the first time the black masses in the South had 
access to education, and Northern schools closed by Boyer were open again and 
supported by the state. Like Christophe, he endeavored to provide the black 
majority with the vehicle to upward mobility. To the black elites, he opened 
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access to state employment denied by neocolonial Mulatto elites, consolidated 
their positions within national institutions, thus providing them with resources to 
enhance their education and break the Mulatto monopoly over knowledge and 
national institutions105 (L. J. Janvier 1886, 264-6, Dorsainvil 1894, Charmant 
1905). 
For the first time since Christophe, both black and neocolonial elites were 
involved in the leadership of the state. While Soulouque tried to limit Mulatto 
power, he could not implement the social contract of the Louverturean state that 
created interdependence between state and nation. He was operating within an 
entrenched neocolonial state structure to limit its external orientation and 
exclusion of the black majority. He offered few advantages beside schools, 
access to state positions, shared power and national pride to the black majority. 
Seeking cohesion and endeavoring a strong state to counter external challenges, 
he forcefully put down Southern black peasants’ resistance against the state 
(Bouzon 1894). His goal was neither to re-introduce Louverturean statecraft nor 
assert black control over the state, but to eliminate Mulatto dominance of the 
state, and perhaps less ambitiously, given his inclusion of Mulattoes in his 
government, to facilitate equal access by reducing Mulatto power and enabling 
black elites to share control over state institutions106 (Leger 1907).  
                                                          
105 According to Janvier, one of the mistakes of the members of Soulouque’s nobles was their failure to 
send their children to acquire higher education abroad. This, he suggests, led to the decapitation of the 
regime and post facto attacks against it that had no defenders (L. J. Janvier 1886, 268-9). 
106 Although virulently anti-Soulouque, Dhormoys’s book is important in that it reflects the tendency of 
European authors and Mulatto elite to misrepresent Soulouque as a thoughtless Tyrant instead of a 
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Unlike Boyer who excluded Blacks from positions of power, Soulouque did 
not exclude Mulattoes from high positions. His objective was not to dominate 
Mulattoes, he merely wanted to ensure an equitable distribution of positions, 
power, and access between black nationalists and neocolonial elites and secure 
a respectable place for Haiti in the world.  
 
It is thus in this context: the search for solution to Haiti’s challenges in the 
post-Boyer era, that Soulouque’s rule can be judged. Indeed, his detractors have 
unsuspectingly provided us with the motivation of Soulouque and his regime. “He 
was an authentique,” argues Heinl and Heinl sarcastically, “a man of his time 
who believed the nation belonged to all equally, and not just to some, and took 
his role as the head of state seriously,” implying that Soulouque was out of touch, 
and his conviction - misguided (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 196). Indeed, in one of 
their few lucid moments, Heinl and Heinl offer a reliable analysis, but not 
surprisingly, they fault Soulouque for believing in an accountable state and 
inclusive citizenship. Soulouque’s regime, as has been the case for all regimes 
that have sought a balance of interests, which has meant balancing the interests 
of the elites with those of the populace, is still portrayed as the most “backward”, 
“uncivilized” and “violent”. Nevertheless, “because of the tranquility he 
established”, argues Leger, “agriculture flourished again, and prosperous days 
re-emerged” (Leger 1907, 199). For a man who could neither read nor write, 
                                                          
leader who sought to end Mulatto dominance of the nation and create a more inclusive and responsive 
state. See (Dhormoys 1859) 
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elected by neocolonial Mulatto leaders because they thought him manipulatable, 
he, Soulouque, accomplished for the Haitian nation a degree of respect and 
prosperity in less than twelve years, something thirty seven years of “learned” 
Mulatto rule were unable to achieve. “He was the first black ruler of the whole 
nation of any consequence”, argues MacLeod, and although his rule marked the 
definite eclipsing of the Louverturean statecraft, it gave rise to the emergence of 
a black nationalist party that would challenge Mulatto power, and, if not fight for 
the elimination, at least, for the direction and control of the neocolonial state 
(MacLeod 1970, 47).  
Soulouque did not succeed in protecting the interests of the black majority, 
nor did he attempt to fully implement the Louverturean model by centering the 
state’s legitimacy on the protection of, and legitimacy from the black majority. He 
gave access to the state to a marginalized black elite, and middle class officers, 
without re-orienting the neocolonial state. His was an elite-centered politics that 
rejected the notion of Mulatto supremacy and the total subordination of the 
neocolonial state to Mulatto interests. He did not enjoy the support of Northern 
elites who erroneously interpreted his rise as fulfilling the Mulatto agenda and 
resented its orientation toward southern black elites with whom he was most 
acquainted.  
Although his challenge of Mulatto supremacy earned a level of support 
from the North later, he inherited the constraints rooted in the “Mulatto state,” and 
as such were limited in terms of ultimate power (Leger 1907). Therefore, the 
Soulouque regime did not constitute a reemergence of the Louverturean state, as 
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Ardouin and Leyburn incorrectly suggest, but rather maintained a slightly 
modified, continuation of the neocolonial Mulatto state as the state over which 
competition for power would take place (Ardouin 1853, v6, J. G. Leyburn 1966, 
92). His struggle against Mulatto dominance was not to craft a new direction for 
the state, but an intra-elite struggle over control of the state itself. At its best, the 
state had to employ a mélange of coercion and enticements to maintain mass 
support. The elites of this now established neocolonial state, both blacks and 
Mulattoes, were outward oriented, and dependent on the support of foreign 
merchants to compete for control over the state (Trouillot 1990).  
Nevertheless, if, as some have argued, the rise of Soulouque in 1848 
marked the first successful attempt by black elites to wrest power from Mulattoes 
and gain control of the national neocolonial state, the demise of his regime in 
1859 represented their failure to consolidate that power, and an opportunity for 
both elites to find a way forward together. The dominant thesis that he was 
consumed by a lust for power and contributed little in the twelve years he led his 
nation seems at odds with a more factual analysis of his regime. MacLeod points 
out,  
[T]here is a prima facie case against the generally 
accepted version of the history of the Soulouque era and 
even cursory examination of the record reveals some 
possible new interpretations (MacLeod 1970, 37).  
 
Most scholars, even those who reject the existence of a neocolonial Mulatto 
state, conclude that his regime shifted the orientation of the state and perhaps 
more specifically, transformed it from a state designed to protect Mulatto power 
and serve Mulatto interests to one firmly oriented toward a more inclusive but 
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elite-centered politics. Soulouque’s government shattered the power of the 
Mulatto elite, gave black elites access to the state, and, for better or worse, 
created the conditions that made it impossible for any elites to dominate the 
nation, and disenfranchise the black majority unchallenged (Bouzon 1894, Leger 
1907, Bellegarde 1938). By placing blacks and Mulattoes on equal footing within 
the state, his regime created the possibility for an elite coalition to emerge to 
move the nation toward stability and prosperity, and for a while under his 
successor, this seemed a likely path. 
A distinguished military officer and former Duke under Soulouque, 
Geffrard’s overthrow of Soulouque government appeared more a result of his 
dissatisfaction with the latter’s military incapacity to put an end to the 
secessionist movement in the East, failure to assert control over the military. His 
discontent was accentuated by Soulouque’s execution of fellow high-ranking 
military officers on accusation of dereliction of duty than outright opposition to his 
regime. A career military officer since the age of fifteen, the defeat of the military, 
coupled with Soulouque’s treatment of its officer corps, was surely disturbing to 
General Fabre Geffrard. Thus, it is not coincidental that the military, itself 
discontent, offered no serious opposition to Geffrard’s armed revolt against the 
emperor (Michel 1932, J. C. Baur 1954).  
General Fabre Geffrard was not an enemy of the regime. He had been 
well acquainted, nay, embedded in the previous regime, having been elevated as 
a duke in Soulouque’s imperial court. His government, argues Janvier, “was but a 
continuation of the empire, without the emperor, the nobility, and the international 
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strength” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 270). By all account, Geffrard embodied a national 
aspiration to continue the move from the internecine struggles, and instability that 
had bewitched Haiti (D'Alaux 1856, E. F. Dubois 1862, Michel 1932). He was not 
from the elites, nor was he from the masses. He had served under both regimes, 
and had assisted in the overthrow of both. He also had the confidence of the 
military, the only major institution capable of exercising its will (Michel 1932). 
He pursued the negotiations with the Vatican started under Soulouque, 
expanded Soulouque’s school of arts and crafts, and reorganized the school of 
medicine (Leger 1907, 205). Geffrard completed and expanded the primary and 
secondary schools started under Soulouque, established the schools of law, 
music, and drawing, and invited French priest to teach in the national schools. To 
“ensure the formation of competent professors,” he sent young Haitians to 
Europe to complete their education on state scholarships devoid of the ethnic 
favoritism of yesteryears (Leger 1907, 205-6, J. Desquiron 1993, 57).  
Under Geffrard’s leadership, a foundry was opened, new modes of 
transportation, new industries doted the national territory (G. Corvington 2001, 
v3, 154-5). More daring was his reorganization of the army: the reduction of its 
forces from 30,000 to 15,000, the retiring of many military officers, and the 
introduction of French military trainers on Haitian soil to train his presidential 
guards, a decision that alarmed nationalists who objected to French military 
presence on the Island. Adam sums up Geffrard’s success thus, “some very 
important economic, political, social and technical transformations took place 
under Geffrard: urbanization, industrialization, and the penetration of foreigners 
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in furthering the commerce capitalist” opened new doors for the nation (Adam 
1982, 73).  
Despite the economic and educational success of the regime and the 
recognition of Haitian independence by the Americans, Geffrard’s diplomatic 
relations lacked vigor. Moreover, his overtures to whites through the decree of 
Oct 18, 1860, his land distribution to light skinned African-Americans while 
ignoring peasant demands for lands, and the perception that neocolonial Mulatto 
elites were reasserting themselves under his regime, alarmed segments of the 
nation, and led to armed conflict, and the emergence of a vocal black opposition 
(L. J. Janvier 1886, 295-7). Geffrard was keenly aware of the geopolitical 
environment and sought to entice entrepreneurial foreigners, including African-
Americans to immigrate to Haiti and assist in its development. His government 
did not pursue the exclusionary politics of Pétion and Boyer. It gave access to 
blacks and Mulattoes alike, and sought through foreign overture to encourage 
commerce, investments, and innovations. However, elites’ reaction to perception 
of increasing encroachment, competition, and displacement by foreigners, and 
the disbanding of half of the army led to unrelenting military challenges to his 
regime from former officers and peasants encouraged by northern black elites.  
Geffrad’s tactics were heavy fisted. He resorted to executions and forced 
exile of important members of the Black Nationalist elites to quell dissent, which 
increased their hostility and challenges to his regime (Clement 1860). As the 
perception of a “Mulatto government” supported by foreigners increased 
resistance to his government, so did Geffrard’s reliance on coercion (Leger 
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1907). The Soulouque Empire had reduced the political power of the Mulatto but 
as Nicholls notes, “Mulatto control of the national sector of the economy left them 
in a permanently strong position and enabled them to reassert their political 
power under Geffrard” (Nicholls 1979, 107). The re-emergence of Mulatto power 
within the regime, facilitated by their monopoly of commerce fueled an already 
conflict ridden environment an angered a black elite armed with both pen and 
swords (Delorme 1873, J. Desquiron 1993).   
No less than fourteen-armed uprisings occurred, and amongst the various 
leaders of anti-Geffrard forces were the Northern Louverturean ideologue and 
nationalist scholar Demesvar Delorme and Southern nationalist ideologue and 
former Soulouque’s minister of Finance, Lysius Felicite Salmon Jeune. The black 
elite party had taken shape, this time defying historical regional separatist 
tendencies. Despite countless executions and military assistance from foreign 
forces, the population succeeded in overthrowing Geffrard under the leadership 
of Sylvain Salnave (L. J. Janvier 1886, 296-7).  
A political unknown in a nation dominated by popular military race-
conscious leaders, and acrimonious ethnic and regional politics, the populist 
Mulatto Salnave fit in neither camp and lasted only two years in office. Having 
challenged military leaders and black elites in the North and South, and not 
beholden to neocolonial Mulattoes Salnave fell victim to a coalition of Southern 
and Northern black military elites supported by Mulatto elites (Bellegarde 1938, J. 
Desquiron 1993). His capture and execution by the military, ended a rather brief 
popular presidency controlled by neither black nationalists nor neocolonial 
 164 
 
Mulatto elites but supported by the masses. His execution marked the first 
coalition of Mulatto and black elites to prevent a populist leader from 
consolidating control over the neocolonial state in which their interests now 
rested. The ascendency and popular support of the Mulatto Salnave 
demonstrated that the Haitian masses were more concerned about their freedom 
and interests, and a leaders’ politics than ethnicity or color. They were not 
against a Mulatto president, but against any president, black nationalists or 
neocolonial Mulatto elites, who failed to protect their interests107.This too would 
prove to be a common theme in Haitian politics. 
 
Elite competition and the Struggle for Control of the Neocolonial State: 
From Salnave until the American Occupation, competition between 
northern and southern black elites over control of the neocolonial state with the 
old neocolonial Mulatto elite benefitting economically, but caught in the middle 
with neither political nor military power and willing to give financial backing to the 
aspirant most likely to protect its interests, reflected the nature of national politics. 
Haiti became dominated by coups and countercoups. As Michel Rolph Trouillot 
observes,   
[T]he bayonet, not the senate, put presidents in power, 
the bayonet also ousted them. The lesson of the post 
Salnave period then, is that the armed forces – the 
regular army as well as forces raised by military 
landlords – played a key role in shaping the crisis and in 
defusing it (Trouillot 1990, 94).  
                                                          
107 It is a historical fact however, that they were more inclined to support a nationalist than they were 




Adding to this dynamic was the regional character of the military, he continues, 
where the army’s “main regional divisions acted as semiautonomous bodies, at 
least insofar as their allegiance to the local commanders was stronger than their 
sworn obedience to the chief of state” (Trouillot 1990, 94). For every overthrow of 
government, every coup d’états, Haiti and the Neocolonial state lost competent 
men to exile or executions. Therefore, the state, no matter its advances under 
previous regimes, had to restart over with new constitutions, new institutions and 
without institutional memory, continuity, or a technocratic bureaucracy. The state, 
like its presidents, represented a series of ephemeral representations with the 
only permanent feature being its neocolonial orientation. The only permanent 
element of their rule was the permanency of elite interests. Indeed, it is a strain to 
characterize these past regimes as purveyours of “states” in the manner scholars 
typically discuss. 
Of the 15 presidents who succeeded Salnave, few served a full term, most 
were overthrown by military factions, and some were executed as acts of 
revenge. The nationalist Mulatto, General Nissage Saget, served his term but 
only due to support garnered from military leaders in the North, and the 
arrangement to turn the power over to the Southern Black General Michel 
Domingue in 1874. He did so despite attempts by neocolonial Mulattoes to 
convince him to remain in office for he was not interested in presiding over a 
state to preserve Mulatto interests. Michel Domingue, with his nephew, the Black 
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nationalist ideologue Septimus Rameau108, served two years of his eight-year 
term, barely escaping with his life (Bellegarde 1938).  
He was overthrown by neocolonial elites, who murdered Rameau, the 
Southern Black nationalist Ideologue, in the process (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 235-
6). Having acquired some prominence under Geffrard, Mulatto elites, had with 
the overthrow of Domingue in 1876 regained control of the state, and brought 
with them their ideological wing, the liberal party, headed by the grandson of 
Boyer, Boyer-Bazelais (Marcelin 1896, J. Desquiron 1993). Neocolonial Mulatto 
elites, with the Liberal party as their ideological arm led by Boyer-Bazelais, and 
Boisron-Canal as president, returned to their old Boyerist tricks, but this time, 
there was a black political, military, and intellectual force with which to contend 
(Bellegarde 1938). Eighteen uprisings were orchestrated by the end of his first 
three years in office by a populace refusing to relive the Mulatto experience, and 
a liberal party determined to reinstate those exclusionary practices. These 
unrelenting attacks led Boisron-Canal to ally himself with the Black Nationalist 
party and thus undermined the rise and power of the exclusionary neocolonial 
Mulatto party (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 73).  
However, his refusal to marginalize Blacks became reason for the liberal 
party’s call to arms against his regime and thus a leader of their own caste. One 
observer notes, “[t]he government was attacked because it refused, in its 
                                                          
108 founder of the nationalist party, served as vice-president, the first in Haitian history. 
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impartiality, to favor a party who wanted to take power and oppress the rest of 
the citizens” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 408). They murdered government ministers, 
soldiers and citizens, and burned the capital, the center of their own power, only 
their defeat and exile ended the bloodshed. They had attempted to regain power 
by force and lost; it was the liberal party and Mulatto oligarchy’s last act.   
 
By opposing the seeming reasonable Boisron-Canal, they had created the 
condition for the re-emergence of the black elites and the military, which had 
remained quiet since the fall of Domingue. Neocolonial elites found themselves, 
as in the period from 1843 -1847, targets of reprisals in what some incorrectly 
described as a race war, but given that the primary targets were Mulatto office 
holders who supported the liberal exclusionary party, it can only be properly 
categorized as a violent struggle for state control as all such struggles often are 
(Heinl and Heinl 2005, 245). Indeed, it may even be said that the removal of the 
supporters of the oligarchs from state institutions was even mandated by 
parliament109 as a requirement for a peaceful nation. The directives seems clear: 
“It is incumbent upon you, citizens of the departments, to stop with your wisdom, 
and firm and resolute attitude an impious civil war, started to satisfy the private 
interests of a few,” they urged (L. J. Janvier 1886, 409). Boisron-Canal, rather 
than lead a state devoted to Mulatto interests, and engage in an internecine war, 
                                                          
109 See Bulletin Des lois et Actes D’Haiti, No. 10, 1879 
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left office not long after, a year prior to the end of his term leaving the state to 
black nationalists (Leger 1907, 233). 
The return of Lysius Salomon Jeune, the Minister of Finance under 
Soulouque, and staunch Black Nationalist ideologue and adherent of 
Louverturean statecraft, and his election as president for seven years was a 
prosperous and tranquil period, punctuated by the invasion of the neocolonial 
oligarchic forces who had been in exile in Jamaica. Under Salomon, the First 
National Bank was created, agricultural production grew, access to primary and 
secondary schools expanded, and universities opened. Land was distributed to 
the peasantry who had long demanded it as an affirmation of their independence. 
The presidential palace, blown up under Salnave, was rebuilt. Haiti became 
member of the international postal service, industries were created, a railroad 
established, a military school - the first since Christophe - was created. The 
Haitian dollar became equivalent to the US dollar; this was a major transition for 
a nation historically plagued with instability and a weak economy (L. J. Janvier 
1886, Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938).  
Salomon’s government, however, was not without opposition. Mulatto 
oligarchs categorically opposed it and northern Louverturean elites with 
parentage in Christophe’s nobles were fully not supportive of Salomon’s regime 
due to its regional southern roots110. Mulattoes led by the Liberal party leader and 
                                                          
110 Salomon faced hostility from the North from the very start. Nord Alexis, son of Baron Nord, a noble 
under Christophe, the son-in-law of former president Louis Pierrot, Christophe’s brother in-law who had 
been jailed twice by Salomon, Cincinnatus Leconte, and Florvil Hyppolite all generals, connected to the old 
Louverturean state opposed Salomon and took up arms once he was re-elected for another seven years 
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grandson of Jean-Pierre Boyer, Boyer Bazelais, mounted a full-scale invasion, 
which ensnared the nation in a civil war that in the end they lost with costs both 
to themselves and the nation, argues the historian Frederic Marcelin (Marcelin 
1896). The former American diplomat Heinl, commenting on the defeat of the 
Mulatto party, and the national cost of the civil war between black nationalists 
and the neocolonial Mulatto oligarchs, put it thus,  
[I]n a perverse way, Bazelais had won. By clawing the 
country apart, by forcing the government to spend 
millions for arms and defense, by killing commerce, by 
polarizing society and the races, the insurrection inflicted 
wounds on Salomon and his program – and on Haiti – 
that could never be healed (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 261). 
 
The resources that could have been focused on Haiti’s development were 
wasted in the hands of arm dealers. Some of the most educated citizens of the 
nation that could have devoted their energy to enhancing the common good, and 
expanding the capacity of institutions of the state, allowed caste interests, and 
racial pride to dominate their sentiments. The great historian Dantes Bellegarde, 
in assessing the opposition to Salomon, lamented, 
[I]n the opposing factions were men remarkable for their 
education, experienced in conducting Haiti’s 
international affairs with integrity. Never before could 
Haiti have presented so fine a showing… By 
cooperating, these men could have assured the 
prosperity and dignity of their country111. 
 
                                                          
(Leger 1907).  Also, for a detailed expose of the Mulatto armed opposition to Salomon, see (Heinl and 
Heinl 2005, 251-261) 
111 Qted in (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 254) – (Bellegarde 1938) 
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His re-election for another seven years led to regional conflict between members 
of the Louverturean and Southern black elites resulting in his resignation and 
voluntary exile (Nicholls 1979, 110). 
The overthrow of Salomon led to the election of the southern Black 
Nationalist ideologue Francois Denis Legitime in 1888. Within a year, he was 
overthrown by Northern generals for the sake of getting one of their own in the 
presidency, and opposing a Southern black elite whom they considered, if not a 
member of the class, at least too cozy with the Mulatto oligarchs (Edouard 1890, 
27-9). Regionalism and elite competition had again reared their heads, with the 
North determined to assert control over the neocolonial state. There was no 
opposing ideologies, no state model or race to wrangle over. This was a struggle 
for power and control of the neocolonial state.  Dorsainvil puts it thus, “three men 
from the South had just succeeded each other in the presidency: the North, this 
time wanted one of its sons” (Dorsainvil 1894, 268, J. Desquiron 1993, 77).  
It was the first time since the tumultuous transition from the exclusionary 
state led by Boyer and the short presidencies of Guerrier, Pierrot and Riche that 
the North had asserted control over the neocolonial national state. The adherents 
to the Louverturean state model, and descendants of Christophe’s nobility, 
supported by the Nationalist movement, had finally managed to gain control over 
the neocolonial state. With the neocolonial Mulatto faction having been soundly 
defeated by Salomon, and the last hope of the oligarchs dispatched into exile, 
the election of General Florvil Hyppolite faced little internal conflicts, and 
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provided the nation with its first chance since Boyer to serve the people 
unimpeded.  
Guerrier had little time to serve as he died less than a year in office. 
Pierrot had tried unsuccessfully to move the capital to the North, overthrown by 
the Mulatto Oligarchs, and Riche, in his late eighties, died less than a year in 
office. Thus no northern elites came close to state power before this time. The 
North had a chance with the popular Mulatto Salnave, but black and Mulatto 
elites rejected him.  
Until Hyppolite, no Northern representative had consolidated enough 
power to lead the whole nation since the assassination of Dessalines in 1806, 
and the reorganization of representative body, and none had manage to lead the 
neocolonial state since the failed attempt by Pierrot. 
The Hyppolite regime continued Salomon’s policies of national 
development and a vigorous international defense, defeating the American 
attempt in 1890 to gain control of Haitian territory (Douglass 1891, Dorsainvil 
1894, G. Corvington 2001, v4). The North overthrow of Salomon was simply a 
question regional nationalist competition, not because of ideology, policy, or 
political disagreements. Congruent with Louverturean practice of securing 
national sovereignty and expanding state capacity and services, Hyppolite’s 
regime compelled the French to change their citizenship practices in Haiti, 
secured a non-interference policy with the Dominican Republic, and established 
ambassadorships in various nations before hostile or indifferent to Haiti. As the 
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historian and former ambassador Leger notes, “President Hyppolite had good 
relations with all the foreign powers” (Leger 1907, 245).  
Under this Northern leader, the ports were rebuilt, an iron market was built 
in both the capital and Cap Haitian, for the first time a waterworks project 
delivered clean water to homes in various cities, and telegraphs lines linked cities 
and provinces. Bridges allowed for uninhibited transportation, new government 
buildings and customhouses were built, stimulated by his new ministry of public 
works (Dorsainvil 1894, 272-4, R. W. Logan 1968, Nicholls 1979, Heinl and Heinl 
2005, 289-90). Even an electric plant began operation (Leger 1907, 246). 
Telephone service was introduced in all the main national centers, The Senate 
and Deputies were housed in a new building, and new attentions were given to 
roads. For the first time Haiti had an ice-plant (Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938). 
Dorsainvil notes, “No government signed more contracts… Without a doubt, they 
represented the determination of the president to ensure the progress of Haiti” 
(Dorsainvil 1894, 273).  
His regime was the implantation of the Louverturean model constrained by 
a neocolonial structure and orientation. The strong regulatory developmental 
state we have come to understand and studied in Asia and other regions could 
not have been better represented under Hyppolite. However, unlike South Korea 
and Taiwan, countries that benefited during the Cold War era from east-west 
competition for influence, and thereby were financially well supported by western 
powers through investments and foreign aid.  South Korea and Taiwan also had  
a homogeneous population, whereas Haiti was not homogeneous, and had 
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cleavages with strikingly divergent interests; but more importantly, it was on its 
own, already indebted and undermined. Hyppolite continued Salomon’s march 
toward state expansion, the centralization of power, and national development. 
Institutional coherence and continuity, and the temporary defeat of the 
neocolonial Mulatto elite forces, masked by a thin veneer of liberalism allowed 
the nation a modicum of stability that facilitated a level of development. 
        Hyppolite’s as well as Salomon’s regime have been characterized as violent 
for their refusal to allow factionalism and neocolonial elites to undermine their 
national development projects. Their determination to give the state monopoly 
over the use of force and subdue destabilizing forces, and the re-emergence of 
armed Mulatto insurrections under the guise of the “liberalist party” did indeed 
result in violent confrontations (Nicholls 1979, Gaillard 1993). Often ignored are 
the very causes that led them to resort to state military power to maintain stability 
and prevent regional and ethnic-based forces from upending their state projects 
for personal or ethnic gains.  
The parallel between Christophe’s drive to develop his nation, and 
Salomon and Hyppolite’s government has been drawn by many, and not without 
merit. His death of a stroke ended his term in 1896112. The election of Tiresias 
                                                          
112 Legitime, an elite black Southern nationalist, was one of the most respected Haitian intellectuals and 
had never served in the army. More importantly, he was a member of the Southern elite with little 
popular support except in Port-Au-Prince. Face with opposition from General Florvil Hyppolite, also a 
Black Nationalist but supporter of Salomon, and the son of one of Soulouque’s ministers, and the former 
minister of war of Salnave’s populous government “puts him squarely in the Soulouque-Salnave-Salomon 
anti-oligarchic line” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 278). Other opposition figures included, Gen. Nord Alexis 
descendent of Northern nobility and son-in-law of former Pierrot, and Northern General Cincinatus 
Leconte also a descendent of Northern nobility. Desquiron wrote with regret, in overthrowing Legitime, 
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Auguste Antoine Simon-Sam, Hyppolite’s Secretary of War, seven days after his 
death prolonged Northern supremacy over the neocolonial state and the project 
of state building. Under the presidency of Simon-Sam, the project of national 
development and state expansion continued, a new modern national court was 
built, the national college was rebuilt, the railroad linking the capital to the 
Northeast started by Hyppolite was completed, and the Tramway service 
reestablished in Port-Au-Prince. Railroad transportation began in the North to 
connect the various Northern provinces.  
In the midst of all the development projects, state leaders acknowledged 
the contributions of blacks in the formation of the state, which had not been 
acknowledged since the establishment of the Pétion and Boyer’s neocolonial 
state. The emperor and liberator of the nation, Jean Jacques Dessalines was 
recognized by the state with a marble statue erected in its honor in the capital 
(Dorsainvil 1894, Leger 1907, 249, Bellegarde 1938). The end of his term over, 
President Simon-Sam left office on May 15, 1902, leaving it to the assembly to 
elect the next president113. The efforts of Salomon, Hyppolite, and Simon-Sam 
constitute a twenty-one year focus on Haitian state development, and the most 
                                                          
“We miss the occasion to create a civil government for Legitime was general in name only. He had the 
reputation of being a thoughtful man, and an excellent administrator” (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 77). 
113 Many historians have accused Tiresia Simon-Sam of enriching himself by orchestrating kickbacks while 
signing contracts to expand the state and of mismanaging state funds. There may well be truth in their 
accusations. (Bellegarde 1938, 141-2, G. Corvington 2001, v4, 59-61)It is important to note though, that 
no governments prior to Hyppolite and Simon-Sam engage in such ambitious development projects and in 
an environment where Haiti was entirely dependent on international Banking, one can only imagine the 
challenges. Suffice it to say, for the first time, Haitian leaders from all quarters seemed to have oriented 
their energy not to undermining the state or each other but for the benefit to the nation and state. 
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unified and longest nation-building period of the nation. These leaders attempted 
to refocus and re-orient the state toward the nation by implementing the 
Louverturean model to build stronger more responsive state-society relations. 
The die, however, was already cast, as the neocolonial Mulatto elites had 
established the state economic dependence and indebtedness to France, and on 
foreign merchants for loans. 
 
Anthenor Firmin, Nord Alexis and the Re-Emergence Neocolonial Elites’ Power 
and the Politics of Understudy:  
 
The departure of Simon-Sam left open a political void with the North still 
dominant but divided, and America, Germany, and France competing for 
influence, became more determined to interfere in Haitian internal Affairs. The 
Germans dominated Haitian commerce, and had threatened to bombard the 
capital to compel the Haitian government to pay the claims of its citizens, a 
common practice by western powers in the region. America, interested in 
implementing its Monroe Doctrine on Haiti, engaging in a period of Gunboat 
diplomacy, and seeking to acquire control over Haitian territory to establish a 
military base, also threatened Haiti with its navy, while France, dominant in 
Haitian Affairs since the indemnity, was competing to keep its economic 
stranglehold and imposition of most favorite nation status114.  
                                                          
114 The Monroe Doctrine prior to the late 1800s excluded Haiti driven by American racial politics. Now an 
emerging world power, the need to control Latin America and the Caribbean and prevent German 
expansion Change American foreign policy toward Haiti (R. W. Logan 1941).  
See the following communication for the change in American policy towards Haiti: Consular dispatches xvi 
on 17 Oct. 1888, No. 915, Haiti, Instructions, III, Sherman to Powell, 11 Jan. 1898, no. 97 
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No one would deny that Dr. Antenor Firmin, staunch nationalist and a 
prolific intellectual, was a Francophile, and his collaboration with France to 
resolve the conflict with the United States over the base, and France’s support 
for Hyppolite’s government after the German threat had further endeared France 
to the Haiti’s economic and political elites (Bellegarde 1938, R. W. Logan 1941, 
109-14, G. Corvington 2001, v4). Both the U.S. and Germany were apprehensive 
about the election of Antenor Firmin, the Finance Minister under Salomon who 
opened the First National Bank in collaboration with France at a time when 
American Bankers and German merchants had asserted control over most of 
Latin America’s banking. Firmin had served in both the Hyppolite and Simon-
Sam regimes as Finance Minister and as the celebrated interior minister who 
successfully defended Haitian sovereignty against American encroachment. The 
opposition of German merchants to Firmin as President was, if not justified, at 
least understood. Firmin had, as a minister under the previous governments, 
reduced German monopoly on Haitian commerce, and sought France’s financial 
assistance instead of Germany’s to secure the economic independence of the 
Haitian state. More importantly, he had broadened commercial and economic 
competition to the displeasure of the dominant German merchants, and created a 
national bank to decrease national dependence on German lending institutions, 
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long-term allies of the neocolonial Mulatto elites115(Rotberg and Clague 1971, 
111-2). 
 
Firmin’s skillful defeat of America’s land grab attempt116, and his preference for 
French rather than American banking at a time of American expansion and 
financial dominance of the Western Hemisphere did not make him a darling of 
American Diplomats (Coradin 1987, v3, 120-7). Trouillot suggests, 
The tension between the German merchants, who were 
tied to the local elites, and the U.S. diplomats, who were 
willing to fall back on military intervention, reflected 
larger international games but profoundly affected 
Haitian political life (Trouillot 1990, 99).  
 
German and American interests, though divergent, were not compatible 
with Haitian national interest and the stability of the Haitian state, which the 
election of Firmin would have facilitated. Although both nations were on a 
collision course, it is not altogether very surprising that both nations collaborated 
to undermine the election of Firmin; they shared a common short-term interest. 
The Germans and their neocolonial allies had much to lose in the election of 
Firmin, and the Haitian state and people - much to gain.  
Few were against Firmin, according to Desquiron, “The idol of young 
Haitians who admire this great intellectual, this masterful diplomat who 
                                                          
115 The Haitian position against the German was also a matter of national Pride. The Germans had acted 
against national sensibilities and Haitian nationalist intended to decrease their influence in the country as 
a consequence (Coradin 1987, v3, 200-26) 
116 Under the threat of American naval power, Firmin had outmaneuvered the American delegates, to the 
acclamation of his compatriots, forcing them to leave Haitian waters without any concessions. See Logan 
and Coradin for a detailed discussion of the incident (Coradin 1987, v3, 133-46, R. W. Logan 1941). 
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maintained the United States at bay, the financer who, twice, restored the 
budgetary equilibrium of the nation.” Moreover, [f]or qualifications, one could not 
find better: experienced administrator, he held the entire government’s portfolio 
for a month under Hyppolite. His reputation of integrity and his popularity was 
such that though the previous president did not like him, he dared not dismiss 
him” (J. Desquiron 1993, 84). The Firminist mystique had blurred all lines, 
continuing the process of creating a national identity, and national conscience 
capable of focusing Haitians and the state toward a common goal. It was 
something long desired; a new age of Haitian national consciousness was 
emerging, one that would be delayed by foreign opposition. 
Neocolonial Mulatto elites also assessed that the election of Firmin would 
mean the continuation of nationalist control and consolidation of the state and its 
orientation toward national accountability and development. They therefore opted 
to support the eighty-seven year old Northern General Nord Alexis as a means to 
re-assert their control and interests against the popular will. Although not 
surprising, their decision to undermine Dr. Firmin election in order to implement 
their politics of understudy through the malleable Octogenarian confirmed their 
position vis-à-vis the nation. Both the U.S .and Germany intervened in the 
political process providing weapons to Firmin’s opponents to protect their 
interests117 (Dorsainvil 1894, 275-80, Bellegarde 1938, 140-6, Trouillot 1990).  
                                                          
117 The roles of the German merchants have been dissected by scholars with respect to their gunrunning 
to Aid Nord Alexis and their attack on the Haitian navy, which supported Firmin. The case of “Crete a 
Pierrot”, and the Haitian Admiral  Killick who blew himself and the ship up rather than letting it be taken 
by the German navy remains salient in Haitian nationalist discourse. Few scholars have analyzed with 
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American and German support of Nord Alexis circumvented the will of the 
population, and Haiti missed another opportunity to maintain continuity in state 
affairs and the momentum towards national development and institutional 
expansion that had started under Salomon. The connection between American 
and German support for Alexis, the cancellation of the national Bank’s charter 
instituted by Firmin as a Minister of Finance under Hyppolite, and the increased 
dependence of the Haitian state on German financiers during his time in office, a 
reversal of Firminist policies of creating a politically and economically 
independent state. Finding a strong economy and the Haitian dollar equivalent to 
the US dollar at the beginning of his presidency, he left the nation with an 
exchange rate of $170 Haitian to one U.S Dollar, with Germans bankers the 
primary beneficiaries of the Bankruptcy and weakening of the state (Heinl and 
Heinl 2005, 310). By bringing Nord Alexis to power, neocolonial elites gave the 
country their “black” president and acquire the power to reassert control over the 
neocolonial state and re-orient it toward their interests and those of their foreign 
allies. 
                                                          
depth the role of the American consulate in undermining Firmin’s presidency. Some have noted in 
passing, that “the U.S. Secret Service in New York had intercepted Firmin’s arms and war chest  - 2,000 
rifles, 100,000 cartridges, and $400,000” ; an act that left Firminist forces empty handed to face General 
Nord’s military (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 306). But even without discussing the implications of that seizure or 
the interests involved, one would have to argue that by refusing asylum to supporters of Firmin who had 
taken refuge in the American consulate in the City of Saint Marc, and turning them over to the forces of 
General Nord Alexis to be shot, the American made their intentions and support for Nord quite clear 
(Bellegarde 1938, 140-6, R. W. Logan 1968, 115, J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 85-7). Further studies would help 




The previous regimes having enjoyed the support of the population, and 
earned a degree of legitimacy by their national predisposition, experienced a 
level stability unprecedented in Haitian history, which consequently facilitated 
state expansion and national development. Violence between state and non-
state actors, as well as attacks on the state, had decreased. The government of 
Nord Alexis reintroduced a level of instability and national acrimony that had 
been absent in Haiti for over two decades. Alexis’ regime, depending entirely on 
force and violence to maintain stability and power, made martyrs across caste 
and color of elites and commoners alike – all those who supported the previous 
nationalist regimes or who  sought the election of Firmin in search of a more 
responsive and accountable state were targets. Every sector of Haitian society 
became victim of a president they neither supported nor thought to be the most 
capable. The peasantry, long silent, led by the Southern Piquets and the 
Northern Cacos returned on the political scene, challenging the state, and by 
extension all cities under the control of its supporters (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 
Heinl and Heinl 2005).  
American military involvement in neighboring nations had not reached 
Haiti but its political machinations and those of foreign governments had created 
the Haitian governance crisis to block the path of national development its 
nationalist leaders had undertaken. The American expansionist project placed 
them in direct competition with Germany, and propelled them to become more 
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involved in Haitian affairs118. As Logan observes, “the establishment, during the 
administration of Nord Alexis, of a custom receivership in the Dominican 
Republic should have served as a warning”, and by preventing the ascendency 
of the nationally respected, Antenor Firmin to the presidency, neocolonial elites 
and the Alexis’ “administration deferred hopes for political stability, and economic 
viability” (R. W. Logan 1968, 114).  
In undermining Firmin, neocolonial oligarchs ensured Haiti would miss an 
opportunity for national cohesion and a chance to address national challenges 
with a unified voice. The defeat of Firmin and election of Nord Alexis also 
undermined a process of national unification and the elections of governments 
that enjoyed the popular support and legitimacy of the whole nation rather than a 
specific region and elites. It halted the monopoly of governments interested in 
securing viable state-society relations through national development and their 
commitment to using the talents of all citizens, regardless of race, to serve the 
nation (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 90). The regional manifestations of the armed 
                                                          
118 There was a clear interest in Haiti and the territories of Mole St Nicolas and La Tortue as well as Haitian 
finance and banking. The following consular Dispatches makes clear the international competition for 
Haiti: 
Hayti, Despatches, XVII, Langston to Frelinghuysen, Dec. 3, 1884, No. 691, confidential. 
France, Instructions, XXI, Frelinghuysen to Morton, Feb. 28, 1885, No. 698 
Hayti, Instructions, II, Frelingheysen to Langston, March 19, 1885, No. 336 
For Firmin’s negotiations that prevented American takeover of Mole St. Nicolas, see (Leger 1907, R. W. 
Logan 1941, 446-51).  Also see Hayti, Despatches, XXV, Douglass to Blaine, April 21, 1891, No. 155 
What would come to dominate American interests in Haiti turned out to be no longer territorial interests, 
but the consolidation of American power through banking and the control of financial institutions, and 
sources of state revenues (R. W. Logan 1941, 1968, Coradin 1987, v3). 
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forces returned, and the South rose to overthrow a government that lacked the 
legitimacy to govern unlike his most recent predecessors (Bellegarde 1938, 140-
8).  
Alexis’ presidency represented a reassertion of the old guard against the 
emerging highly educated technocratic class. He eliminated the Northern Black 
Nationalist coherence that had undermined and sidelined the neocolonial 
oligarchs for more than two decades, and by so doing, relegated control of the 
state to neocolonial elites. His overthrow led by Gen. Antoine Simon allowed the 
South to reassert its control over the state, and continued neocolonial Mulatto 
ascendency to control the state and dictate its orientation.  
They found in Antoine Simon a force against Northern nationalist power 
and influence under his government, they furthered the consolidation of their 
power and involvement in the management of the nation in the pursuit of their 
personal and caste interests. However, the election119 of the Antoine Simon did 
not eliminate the acrimony. Indeed, whereas under Gen. Alexis, violence 
revolved around state control and state power, under Simon’s government 
violence took a more regional character and ultimately led to open military 
conflicts with Northern generals and the nationalist Cacos (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 
330-332). Simon’s military excursion in Northern territories to reduce the most 
                                                          
119 Many Haitian scholars would object to the characterization of election, the manner of coming to power 
in those times. However, unlike many other nations in Latin America, no Haitian presidents took office 
without first being elected by the Senate as required by the constitution. While it may be said that those 
elections took place under duress with military forces camping in the capital, and that the senate’s action 
is better classified as a certification than an election, it cannot be denied that a level of respect existed for 
state institutions. No man, no matter the size of its army became president without the Senate approval. 
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concentrated and coherent group of nationalists increased regional tensions 
resulting in a northern backlash and greater coherence between Northern elites.  
Northern leaders, the Zamor brothers, the Peraltes, General Vilbrun 
Guillaume Sam, cousin of the former president Tiresia Simon-Sam, rallied to 
support Cincinatus Leconte, the German-educated northern nationalist and 
former Minister of Public Works under Tiresia Simon-Sam to oppose the regime. 
Antoine Simon served three out of a 7-year term of his presidency, overthrown by 
Northern nationalist forces led by General Jean-Jacques Dessalines Michel 
Cincinnatus Leconte, the great-grandson of the Emperor Jean Jacques 
Dessalines (Dalencour 1935, Bellegarde 1938).  
The struggle between neocolonial elites and black nationalists had re-
emerged with neocolonial elites enjoying more power gained and consolidated 
under the two previous regimes. With the election of Leconte on August 14, 
1911, the North had regained their supremacy and control of the state. No 
national forces would be strong enough to resist Northern dominance until the 
American invasion and occupation. Leconte’s presidency was not without 
international implications for a nation over which foreign powers competed.  
The previous neocolonial government, in recreating the National Bank 
disbanded by Nord Alexis, had allowed France and the United States to acquire 
full control over the finance of the state, sidelining German interests and 
deepening the nation’s dependency and vulnerability to foreign pressure. 
Leconte’s studies in Germany, his past employment at the German embassy in 
the North, and the alleged financial support garnered from German merchants in 
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his military campaign against the Antoine Simon’s regime, made him a presumed 
ally to Germany thus a threat to British, French, and American interests120 (Heinl 
and Heinl 2005, 332). The fear seems misplaced, however, as he went on to 
secure Haiti’s interests and re-start the modernization program arrested since 
Nord Alexis (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 91).  
In less than a year, Leconte’s determination to preserve Haitian 
sovereignty from an ever-threatening and encroaching United States, and protect 
the territorial and financial integrity of the nation became a primary feature of his 
regime. The creating of the Banque Nationale de la Republique D’haiti under the 
previous regime with 50% of its share under American control and the rest under 
French control with a 5% German share meant that the Banque was Haitian in 
name only121 (H. Schmidt 1971, 39). More importantly, under the Franco-
                                                          
120 The French Indemnity and the various loans taken by Mulatto governments France to finance it not 
only made Haiti an indebted nation but also dependent on French financial institutions from 1826 until 
the American occupation. The emergence of German merchants in the 1880s at the height of Haitian state 
expansion and development, reduce that dependence, by providing state leaders with different sources of 
funding rather than just one thus making Germany notes Historian Hans Schmidt, increasingly important 
in Haitian commerce and finance (Gaillard 1993, 150-1, 335-339). By 1907, “Germans dominated Haitian 
commerce and shipping ad had obtained a number of concessions” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 21). Fear of 
German dominance in Latin America and the Caribbean had made Germany the primary competitor of 
American power in the region and the only nation capable of challenging the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, 
German military power, its commercial interests and financing of regional Northern forces, and the 
existence of a German population since the revolutionary war of 1804 gave Germany a foothold 
incomparable to other nations (H. Schmidt 1971, 34). The awareness of American racism in Haiti given the 
Plessy vs. Fergusson Supreme Court case in 1896, a case where the complainants were people if Haitian 
descent in Louisiana, did not aid Haitian perception of American racial policies (Laguerre 1998, 1, 67-8).  
121 Millspaugh, the American Imposed Financial advisor to Haiti following the occupation noted, “the 
support given by the State Department to American interests in Haiti, especially to the national City bank, 
appeared at the time to give color and motive to our entire Haitian policy (A. Millspaugh 1971, 26). He 
committed an error however in suggesting that American Banking interests were 20% rather than 50% (A. 
Millspaugh 1971, 22). In fact, it was American foreign policy to undermine what America rightly saw as 
German monopoly of Haitian commerce thus a threat to their domination of the Western Hemisphere. 
Controlling Haiti was indeed a primary focus of American foreign policy in the Hemisphere and the vehicle 
to that control became the New York City bank (R. W. Logan 1941, H. Schmidt 1971). Under the 
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American Banking arrangements, the Haitian government finances and decision-
making became dependent on foreign powers. As Millspaugh, the American 
financial advisor imposed on Haiti during the occupation notes, 
[T]he bank was the sole treasury of the government: it 
received all government funds intact until the end of the 
fiscal year, and it was in no way legally obligated to 
make advances. Nevertheless, under agreements 
entered into annually, it had advanced from month to 
month amounts required for ordinary governmental 
expenses… (A. Millspaugh 1971, 23). 
 
The Bank had therefore the power to undermine governmental stability by 
starving it of cash necessary to pay its employees and if militarily threatened, to 
defend itself. It is this dependence, this loss of autonomy of the state, and the 
nation to Franco-American banking interests that Leconte sought to undermine 
and curtail by relying on German merchants rather than the Bank.  
Leconte’s skills in limiting the power of the Franco-American Bank made 
him a respected and competent leader, good for Haiti, but despised by those with 
banking interests in Haiti, and their merchants (R. Gaillard 1984, Blancpain 
1999). The most important economic accomplishment of the Leconte’s regime 
was the reduction of the BNRH stranglehold on the nation, providing the 
government with a fiscal year surplus of $800,000, and the ‘Convention 
                                                          
Presidency of Cincinatus Leconte, which American saw as a German ally, the secretary of state himself, 
Philander C Knox, escorted by two military attaches visited Haiti to convey American concerns to the 
president (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 93, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 334). Haiti was the only country with 
substantive German economic interests, having eliminated, or reduced foreign interest in all the other 
independent Latin America and Caribbean states, American policy-makers turned against the only Nation, 
which had resisted it. Given the economic nature of the American expansion, following the Panama Canal 
project it is not surprising then that American Banks was an important if the most important vehicle of its 
foreign policy.  
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Budgetaire’ that compelled the bank to agree to a monthly disbursement to the 
government (A. Millspaugh 1971, 17-8, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 337).  
Leconte appointed competent Haitians to the Courts, paved streets, 
established a sewer system, re-organized the primary school system, Built a 
military headquarter, the first in the nation, and sought to modernize the military 
in order to address its regional character (Bellegarde 1938, 140, G. Corvington 
2001, v4,216-7). His assassination a year into his presidency, on August 8, 1912, 
due to a palace explosion abruptly ended what most Haitian scholars and his 
contemporaries termed a remarkable beginning. It also raised questions and 
suspicions about the possible involvement of foreign agents in pursuing their 
interests by more nefarious means to remove a president they found unpalatable 
for placating their agenda. 
 
The Decline of Northern Coherence and Rise of American Coercion and Dollar 
Diplomacy: 
 
From 1912 to 1915, Haiti saw five presidents and experienced a level of 
instability that crippled the nation. Elected right after the death of Leconte, the 
Northerner Tancrede Auguste continued the projects started by his predecessor, 
but died less than a year later. The consequence of Firmin’s failure to gain the 
presidency was the eclipsing of a national figure capable of uniting the nation. 
Cincinatus Leconte and Tancrede Auguste were the next best chances for a 
national candidate, but their short presidencies eliminated that prospect. With 
Leconte and Auguste ended the North’s cohesion and power and Haiti’s 
opportunity of having a respected nationalist leader with roots in the 
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Louverturean project and the commitment to national development that paralleled 
earlier leaders. After them, no single figure arose to provide Haiti with a viable 
national option. Moreover, whereas Northern forces previously remained 
dominant by acting with regional coherence, their dominance now was no longer 
a result of regional unity, but because members of its nationalist elites could 
effectively manipulate different segments of Cacos forces to impose their 
presidency on their own region and the nation. The disunion in the North thus 
provided an opening for neocolonial elites to reassert their power and craft a new 
political course for the state but this too would not last. 
The legal expert Michel Oreste followed on May 4, 1913. The first Mulatto 
westerner since 1843, and a reformist, Michel Oreste had the support of both 
neocolonial political and intellectual elites. The election of Oreste supplanted the 
preponderance of Northern military power in determining the presidency was 
seen as an attempt by western elites to shift the nature of the presidency and 
circumvent northern military dominance of national politics122. Emphasizing the 
civilian character of the presidency was already a trend under the two previous 
                                                          
122 Jean Desquiron disputes the claim that the election of Oreste was an attempt by western and southern 
elites to regain control of the state but rather an increased longing of a cross-section of the population for 
civilian leadership. “It seems”, he notes, “they are tired of military governments and that the moderate 
management of Leconte and Auguste made good impressions” (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 92). However, the 
countervailing argument is that Oreste was a Bazelaisist or from the liberal party which opposed the 
dominance of the North and the control of the state by blacks. Regardless of one’s position on the matter, 
it is fair to note that the firminist period had created a convergence of people of different political ilk 
seeking a more responsive and effective state led by competent civilians and technocrats. Perhaps 
Oreste’s Bazelaisist orientation had been overstated but it was nevertheless a rallying point for Black 
nationalists across the nation (R. Gaillard 1993, 12-23, 146, G. Corvington 2001, v3). For reference to 
Michel Oreste’s Bazalaisist orientation, see (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 340). 
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regimes. Both the Leconte and Oreste presidencies had emphasized the 
technocratic and civilian character of their regimes and distanced themselves 
from military-laden governance structures123.   
However, whereas Leconte, a military general and direct descendent of 
Dessalines, had the support of the Northern military and political elites and could 
prevent challenges to his regime as long as he did not capitulate to American 
pressure, Oreste lacked that support because of his regional and neocolonial 
affiliations.  
His regime faced the same economic pressures than Leconte’s from an 
ever-encroaching United States who wanted control over Haiti’s customhouses, 
the nation’s primary sources of revenue, as they had acquired in the Dominican 
Republic, Nicaragua, and Cuba. American and French control of the Banking 
system narrowed the options of Haitian governments and made the nation even 
more dependent on transaction in its custom houses. Relinquishing control of 
these custom houses was the last stage of ensuring American economic 
supremacy, the imposition of its economic agenda, and Haiti’s total dependence. 
Oreste’s unwillingness to allow American banking interests veto power over the 
                                                          
123 One cannot discount the military reaction to Oreste’s government. Both Leconte and Auguste were 
members of the military whereas Oreste was not, both were allied to regional Caco forces and supported 
them financially, whereas as Oreste cut the financial support. His attempt to reform the military also 
reduced their support for him and increase resentment for an institution not accustom to civilian 
oversight. Michel Oreste “Disdained military titles of which his predecessors were so fond. He inaugurated 
the civil presidential regime in Haiti. His inclination to disregard the influence and even the authority of 
military leaders from the North, who, since Leconte, considered themselves indispensable, better yet, 
central to the power of the government, angered the latter (G. Corvington 2001, v4, 255-6, Heinl and 
Heinl 2005, 340).  
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Haitian state deprived his government of needed financial resources to defend 
itself or provide subsidies to segments of the Northern military. His inability to 
deal with Northern political elites’ concern of neocolonial Mulatto supremacy, and 
most specifically, its inability to pay off Caco leaders Oreste Zamor, and Davilmar 
Theodore due to economic constraint imposed by the United States, led to his 
overthrow  nine months later (Bellegarde 1938).  
The overthrow of Michel Oreste’s civilian regime by a segment of the now 
competing Northern forces thus cannot be analyzed solely through the lens of 
civilian-military tensions or neocolonial-nationalist competitions. It must be 
viewed within the broader context of a failed American strategy to coerce the 
government into making decisions that would give them access to the nation’s 
primary sources of revenue and lack of cohesion of Northern Nationalist forces. 
The fall of Oreste also brought to light another fissure in the North: the cohesive 
military front North military and political elites had for so long depended on had 
devolved into sectorial military competition, available for the highest bidder to 
those seeking control of the neocolonial state. Northern nationalist elites were no 
longer the only one competing for control over the presidency. Regional Cacos 
military leaders who before supported Northern elites were now involved in 
directly competing for the presidency. Elites of all stripes therefore became 
victims of the adventurism of regional Cacos groups who vie for the spoils of the 
neocolonial state.  
By withholding its funds, American policy-makers anticipated the need to 
remain in power over years of Northern dominance to be strong enough to 
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supersede Oreste’s commitment to safeguarding the nation’s sovereignty by 
maintaining control over its ports and customhouses. The American strategy 
based on their assessment of neocolonial elites’ quest to reassert their power, 
failed. By refusing American dictum, Michel Oreste had also decided that it was 
best to lose power to another citizen rather than cede Haitian sovereignty to a 
foreign power, and worse, one whose history of black mistreatment was well 
known.  
Internal opposition to Michel Oreste was not due to intra-elite competition 
or competition between nationalist and liberalists, but was the result of direct 
competition between regional Caco forces (Charmant 1905). For the first time, 
Northern elites had lost control of their shock troops. Caco factions were no 
longer subservient to northern nationalist elites but sought, for themselves, 
control of the neocolonial state and the presidency. This was a turning point in 
Haitian politics; all elites now fell prey to a military-driven politics they had 
practiced in their competition for state control.  
Although one can conclude that the overthrow of Michel Oreste and 
election of Oreste Zamor on February 10, 1914 resulted from misguided elite 
competition for the leadership of the neocolonial state, it was also, at least partly, 
if not primarily, due to American use of its banking interests to enfeeble the 
government and undermine its ability to defend itself against internal armed 
threats by reducing its access to capital. This policy of starving governments of 
funds to influence their decision-making became the primary tool of United 
States’ foreign policy in Haiti.  
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The refusal of Haitian head of states to cede their nation’s sovereignty 
despite the financial noose, led American policy makers to seek more coercive 
tactics, thus American war ships’ presence in Haitian waters increased and 
remained permanent from 1913 until the invasion in 1915 (A. Millspaugh 1971, 
25). American Gunboat diplomacy had reached Haiti. The most significant event 
was not the fall of Michel Oreste, but the landing of U.S. marines under the 
pretext of protecting its citizens and their interests during the transitional period 
following the departure of Michel Oreste. It was by all account a dry run, and set 
a precedent for things to come, notes Haitian scholar Dantes Bellegarde 
(Bellegarde 1938). The presence of American boots on Haitian soil made three 
points clear: first, the United States was no longer shy about landing forces on 
Haitian territory, second, American interests was such that military involvement 
would no longer be avoided, and third, Haitian elites in Port-Au-Prince did not 
object to the American military presence and colluded with them as a vehicle to 
offset Northern political and military dominance intimidated by the presence of 
competing regional Cacos groups in the capital.  
The Cacos regime of Oreste Zamor that preceded Michel Oreste faced 
immediate economic pressure from the United States and opted to challenge 
America’s coercive Dollar Diplomacy (H. Schmidt 1971, A. Millspaugh 1971, 24). 
Unwilling to succumb to American financial coercion, Zamor transferred the 
treasury service to local merchants, rather than the American bank, reduced the 
dependency of the government on monthly disbursements, then aided by the 
nationalist-dominated chamber of deputies, issued a bill enabling the government 
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to produce paper money. Zamor’s attempt to circumvent American financial 
coercion failed when the American State Department blocked the shipment of 
paper money from New York. His refusal to agree to American control over 
Customhouses, and his loans from German Merchants, all but signaled American 
hostility toward his regime (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 343-7).  
Starved of cash from the American controlled bank; unable to pay his 
soldiers and support his regime, Zamor became the first overt victim of American 
“Dollar Diplomacy” enabling its regional Caco competitor Davilmar Theodore to 
overthrow him less than a year later on October 29, 1914. His presidency 
acquiesced by the Senate on November 7, 1914, Theodore also maintained the 
same disposition as the two previous governments, refusing the American offer 
to assist his regime in exchange for control over its customhouses. The passing 
of another bill permitting the issuing paper money on Dec. 24, 1914, and using 
local merchants for loans to offset the bank’s supremacy, was the carbon copy of 
the government he had overthrown (Bellegarde 1938, A. Millspaugh 1971).  
With the Zamor regime, refusing to cede control of the nation’s 
customhouses, and enjoying the support of the population, the American 
government’s pattern of creating a financial crisis to compel governments hostile 
to foreign control to acquiesce to its demands became its primary strategy 
(Bellegarde 1938, 243-5). To do this, the U.S. State Department, as it had with 
previous uncoorperative Northern governments, requested that the bank stopped 
dispensing the monthly funds needed by the Zamorist regime to cover its 
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expenses124. Facing internal challenges, the withholding of the monthly 
disbursement, Peter Fuller, the American minister in Port-au-Prince at the time 
confirmed his government’s intentions by observing,  
[T]his [financial strangulation] most likely would bring the 
government to a condition where it could not operate … 
It is just this condition that the bank desires, for it is the 
belief of the bank that the government, when confronted 
by such a crisis, would be forced to ask for assistance of 
the United States in adjusting its financial tangle and that 
American supervision of the customs would result125 (A. 
Millspaugh 1971, 27). 
 
Despite these concessions, and various attempts by Zamor’s minister of the 
Interior Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, and his minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Borno to 
negotiate with the American government, their unwillingness to cede control of 
Haitian territory was interpreted as a failure by an American government with its 
sight on Haiti’s customhouses and its territory (R. W. Logan 1968, 120-122). 
Unable to convince Zamor to cede control of the nation’s customhouses, the 
American State department dispatched a marine expedition a month after his 
election to illegally remove the nation’s gold reserve from the Bank worth five 
hundred thousand dollars, and transfer it to the National City bank of New York 
(J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 94).  
The days of Haitian independence appeared numbered. American 
banking interests, having acquired control of Haitian finances as a vehicle of US 
foreign policy, now had a stranglehold on the Haitian state and governmental 
                                                          
124 For more detail, see Despatches from U.S. Counsul in Port-au-Prince on June 2, 1914 and July 2, 1914. 
125 See Despatches from the American Minister to Port-Au-Prince, July 2, 1914 
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decisions. It was a stranglehold that went beyond mere control of national 
finances. It was outright theft of the national treasure to eliminate the last 
vestiges of Haitian indepenence. To paraphrase Montague, the neocolonial 
Haitian state was not only at the mercy of the National City Bank of New York but 
was also losing a high percentage of its resources to foreign misappropriation 
and crookedness over which it had no control to prevent. From 1911 till the 
invasion, a percentage of every Loan acquired by the state never made it to its 
coffers. Of the $674k loan issues in 1911, 81%;  $609k in 1913, 78.8%; $712k in 
1914, only 60% was netted by the state; and in 1914 out of $525k from City Bank 
56% reached Haitian coffers (Montague 1940, 2002-3).  
Despite the hypocritical historical and contemporary accusations of Haitian 
mismanagement levied by American diplomats and scholars, theft, blackmail, 
and coercion characterized America’s new relationship with Haiti, and has 
persisted. Northern Nationalist resistance remained the only obstacle to 
American regional supremacy. Having had its way with Nicaragua, Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and the Dominican Republic, and being the hegemon in the region, 
America was unwilling to accept the refusal of the ephemeral governments of a 
nation it saw as weak if not illegitimate (H. Schmidt 1971).  
Further, so weak was the Haitian state that even the recognition of the 
governments was preconditioned on its relegation of national sovereignty and 
interests to American control126. Elite infighting and absorption in their incessant 
                                                          
126 Foreign Relations 1914, 355, 361-369 – Indeed, the government of Davilma Theodore never succeeded 
in achieving full recognition because of its refusal to agree to American terms and cede control over the 
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competition for power, Haitian leaders squandered the nation’s leverage and 
independence, and left it little room to maneuver away from American dollar 
diplomatic grasp. Their failures had made the Haitian state an easy target of 
foreign manipulations, vulnerable to their intimidations. Faced with Northern 
nationalists’ refusal to cede Haitian sovereignty to American banking interests, 
Dollar diplomacy would ultimately gave way to American Gunboat diplomacy. As 
historian J. Fred Rippy notes,  
[T]he United States had endeavored to attain its 
objectives by diplomacy – straightforward or devious – 
but when diplomacy or financial coercion failed or 
patience, sometimes too meager, was exhausted, force 
and the menace of force occasionally were employed as 
instruments of national policy (quoted in Montague 1940, 
v). 
 
The American Dollar Diplomacy had succeeded as far as it had reduced 
the reliance of the Haitian state on moneylenders and hamstringed Haitian 
governments to American-controlled financial institutions127. More importantly, by 
reducing the influence of other nations, it created a re-orientation of the sphere of 
                                                          
country’s sovereignty. In turns, The US government withheld Haitian state revenues controlled by its bank 
to force a concession. As Logan and Millspaugh stipulate, the weakness and fall of Theodore’s government 
was directly related to the lack of state funds. Historian Rayford Logan offers some important insights into 
the negotiations between Theodore’s government and the United States (R. W. Logan 1968, 28-30, A. 
Millspaugh 1971).  
127 Heinl and Heinl argue that Haitians were already facing financial problems prior to the restrictions. 
Millspaugh went further to suggest that Haitians were defaulting on their loans prior to the American 
occupation. These are gross mischaracterizations. According to Schmidt, “despite the precarious character 
of Haitian finances and the frequent revolution, Haiti continued to meet external obligations up to the 
time of American intervention… Indeed, Haiti’s record of debt payment was exemplary compared to that 
of other Latin American countries: in 1915 Ecuador was $2 million in arrears, Mexico was $15 million in 
Arrears, and Honduras was more than $100 million in Arrears (H. Schmidt 1971, 43). It is under the 
occupation with American financial advisors that Haiti became unable to pay its debts. The Haitian 
government went to extraordinary degree to maintain the service of its foreign debt. For more on the 
fidelity of the Haitian government to pay its debts, see Senatorial Report No. 794, p7-9. 
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influence making it impossible for Haitian governments to survive without 
American support. The confiscation of Haiti’s treasury not only destroyed the 
confidence of local moneylenders dominated by Germans, it undermined the 
ability of the Haitian government to service their loans, procure new ones, and 
offset the United States’ financial stranglehold. The American strategy as 
stipulated by the American ambassador to Haiti made clear that the goal was to 
starve the Haitian government out of much needed funds to compel them to 
bargain their sovereignty.  “Haitian head of states will oppose United States’ 
demands as long as they have access to one dollar”, he states. “However, when 
they run out of their resources, they will yield. Such is the secret of the 
embarkation of the gold”, and the aggressive economic maneuvers orchestrated 
by the American government (Anglade 1977, v2, 25)128.  
Although the goal was to deepen the Haitian economic crisis and 
undermine political legitimacy, the American foreign policy strategy often rightly 
revealed US policymakers’ genuine concerns about German power and 
encroachment in the Caribbean in the post-Panama Canal and World War I era. 
As Heinl and Heinl correctly assert,  
[T]he synchronous opening in 1914 of World War I and 
of the Panama Cana heightened U.S. concerns over the 
West Indies as well as American Sensitivity toward What 
Germany evidently saw as its special position in Haiti. As 
the war went on, this sensitivity changed to suspicion. It 
was against this backdrop that the United States sought 
Haitian assent to customs receivership (Heinl and Heinl 
2005, 358).  
 
                                                          
128 Qted in (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 95) 
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Secretary of State Lansing made the concerns even starker, there was “good 
reason to believe that Germany was ready to go to great lengths to secure the 
exclusive customs control of Haiti, and also to secure a coaling station at Mole 
St. Nicholas,” he wrote on May 4, 1922129. Indeed, Haiti featured highly in the 
geopolitical concerns of the United States, and the failure of all segments of the 
Haitian leadership to use that concern to advance Haitian interests due to their 
infightings remains a major reflection of their ineptitude and shortsightedness.  
Contrary to historian Philippe Girard’s evidence-light assertion that there 
were no American interests to protect, and that American involvement in Haiti 
was simply a case of “benevolent imperialism”, most scholars concur on the 
geopolitical importance of Haiti to the United States. The methodical approach of 
the American drive to control Haiti’s primary sources of revenue and tie the 
nation into its economic system to eliminate German influence, and secure its 
regional dominance had little to do with benevolence but much to do with 
imperialism (B. G. Plummer 1988, Blancpain 1999, P. Girard 2010, 81). It is 
indeed quite reasonable to suggest that American failure to convince Haitians 
leaders to assent to their demands, ultimately led to more forceful measures (H. 
Schmidt 1971, B. G. Plummer 1988, Renda 2001). In the end, American national 
interests could not be indefinitely postponed in the hopes of successful 
diplomacy with Haitian governments that had become, by most accounts, grossly 
dysfunctional. 
                                                          
129 Senate Report No. 794, 332-34 
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The inability of Theodore’s regime to prevent national resources and 
financial decision-making from being susceptible to American banking veto 
demonstrated the increasing impotence of the Haitian neocolonial state and its 
governments to protect Haitian sovereignty and control its internal affairs and 
international obligations. This was the turning point and the end of the regime of 
the well-liked, popular, but inept president130. It was also a turning point for a 
nation politically and economically bankrupted by its elites.   
 
Prelude to the Invasion: National Crisis, the Failure of National Elites, and the 
Rise of American Dominance: 
Once again, political competition and the failure of nationalist and 
neocolonial elites to find common ground, and to gain popular legitimacy, 
eliminated the prospect of national development, and ultimately, the chance to 
formulate a coherent national response to American intrusion. Haitian elites’ 
disunion wilted away the strong Louverturean state. Haiti’s inability to respond to 
this affront was due to the failure of Haitian leaders to craft a strong and 
accountable state. Additionally, and perhaps more destabilizing was the violent 
competition between northern elites and regional Cacos leaders because of the 
Firminist defeat. The unabated militarized conflicts resulting from competition in 
                                                          
130 Haitian Historian George Corvington in his analysis of Theodore’s regime notes, “During his short 
presidency, ‘Fre da’ –Brother Da- as he was affectionately called could only be considered as a good old 
man, an old man without initiative… The fire he unintentionally lighted in the heart of the people would 
grow dimmer, because of the excesses of the troops from the North that accompanied him, and that he 
was unable to control (G. Corvington 2001, v4, 296). Also quoted in (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 94)  
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the North had undermined the northern state crafting project, and weakened the 
military and the North as the center of nationalist resistance against foreign 
encroachment, leaving the nation defenseless and vulnerable.  
Iterations of failed “neocolonial states” had made Haiti vulnerable by 
directing its resources away from state expansion and national development and 
diluting its bond with the majority of its population. Having disenfranchised the 
population by crafting a state to support elite interests rather than those of the 
nation and its citizens, neocolonial elites had to rely on foreign powers to regain 
their dominance. Moreover, nationalist elites, shortsighted as they were, in not 
supporting Firmin and resisting Neocolonial elites’ and foreign nations’ 
manipulation of Nord Alexis, could no longer rely on the population to defend or 
support their cause. 
Despite the fact that the American affront to Haitian sovereignty was 
partly, if not wholly, encouraged by neocolonial elites and facilitated by the intra-
elite struggle in the North, it nonetheless angered Northern elites who blamed 
their counterpart in Port-Au-Prince and their influence on Davilmar Theodore, the 
old Cacos chief turned president, for the affront. The march of an elite-led 
Northern military force commanded by Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, former minister 
and cousin of former President Tiresias Simon Sam, meant the end of the Zamor 
regime but also accentuated the intra-nationalist struggle and military 
factionalism amongst Northern elites for state control.  
The fall of Theodore and the election of Sam on February 1915 was 
marked by resistance. Almost all sectors of Haitian society: neocolonial elites in 
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Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and Les Cayes, the primary centers of neocolonial elite 
power standing against Northern control plotted with foreigners; from the North, a 
faction of the black nationalist elites led by former minister of the interior and 
finance, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, a staunch Firminist, and unapologetic Northern 
nationalist, sought a return to nationalist leadership, while American military 
threats hung over the nation.  
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam lasted only five months in office, victim of both a 
changing international environment, the determination of neocolonial elites intent 
on taking advantage of Northern factionalism to upend Northern political control 
and military dominance, lack of cohesion between Northern nationalist elites, and 
the imbecility of his military chief for carrying out his order to murder defenseless 
people in their jail cells if his regime was threatened (Nicholls 1979, R. Gaillard 
1984, Heinl and Heinl 2005, Pierre-Etienne 2010). By murdering Sam in revenge, 
the Neocolonial elites demonstrated their own failure to put the interests of the 
nation before their own. They had an opportunity to secure an alliance with 
faction of the Northern nationalist elite but lacked the foresight; it was a zero-sum 
game.  
The chaos of the years that culminated the end of Sam’s Presidency 
reflected a political stalemate. It culminated with a factionalized nationalist 
Northern elite unable to form a coherent military and political front to maintain 
control over the Neocolonial state, and a neocolonial Mulatto elite, with no 
military power and scant political legitimacy to exert control and influence over 
the state it had crafted, siding with foreign powers (Nicholls 1979, Dupuy 1989, 
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Pierre-Etienne 2010). The nation under foreign threats, and neither Mulatto nor 
black elites capable of sustaining their power without a coalition, provided a 
unique opportunity for a lasting solution and political stability. It was an 
opportunity created by dynamics not unlike the pre-independence period but this 
time, the U.S. offered a better bargain than France, and neocolonial elites opted 
for an external alliance, one that would forever seal the destiny of the nation and 
eliminate its last chance toward securing a modicum of independence and 
national sovereignty.  
A subsequent American occupation further retarded the development of a 
functional Haitian state. The U.S. consolidated the neocolonial state by allowing 
Mulatto elites to achieve supremacy and by eliminating northern military power 
and secured the subservience of the Haitian state and its people. Haitian scholar 
and political party leader Pierre-Etienne wrote, 
The military intervention and American occupation of 
Haiti in 1915 occurred in the context of the total collapse 
of the state. In this context, of state absence, the 
occupiers found themselves obligated to entirely 
reconstruct the repressive and administrative 
apparatuses of a new state” (Pierre-Etienne 2010, 234).  
 
However, the state had not collapsed as Pierre-Etienne, a candidate for the 
Presidency in 2010, argued. The neocolonial project underfoot since the advent 





THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION, ELITE COLLUSION, AND CLIENTELISM IN 
HAITI 
 
           Chapter IV analyzes the impact of the American Occupation on the 
reorientation of the Haitian state.  Under American occupation, American Marines 
created, supported, and funded a client regime to give legitimacy and rubber-
stamped American demands and policies. With the Haitian state under American 
control and its government at their service, for the first time since its 
independence, clientelism and external dependency took root in Haiti. A distinct 
form of clientelist regime emerged, disconnected from popular support and 
legitimacy, one that relied on foreign military force and neocolonial elite cohesion 
as the basis for its sustainability.  Clientelism evolved in Haiti with neocolonial 
elites in collusion with foreign forces and in opposition to popular aspirations to 
secure particular rather than national interests.   Although most scholars concur 
that, the occupation centralized the state and left Haitian elites with the coercive 
infrastructure to maintain their dominance, few discuss the impact on the Haitian 
state itself, its lack of legitimacy and popular support, and its orientation away 
from the masses toward neocolonial control and political and economic 
dependency. Also left wholly unexplored is the nature of the state left behind and 
the regimes that controlled it.  
        This chapter argues that the 19-year occupation waged war on nationalist 
elites, systematically destroyed their military and political infrastructure, an 
objective long sought after by their neocolonial rivals. More importantly, the 
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occupation imposed a client regime on the nation in opposition to popular 
aspirations; one lacking in legitimacy and dependent on coercion and external 
military support for its survival.  To facilitate the persistence and dominance of 
the client regime, the occupation reorganized and consolidated the historically 
contested neocolonial state and created an uncontested and centralized military 
to protect foreign and neocolonial elites’ interests. Far from eliminating the 
dominant military paradigm that dominated elite competition as some scholars 
suggest, the occupation merely consolidated the power of neocolonial elites 
placing them at the helm of a militarized state and reinforced the historical 
schism between the two groups centered around color (H. Johnson 1920, Balch 
1927, P. H. Douglas 1927, D. B. Cooper 1963, A. Millspaugh 1971).  
          The Occupation handed neocolonial forces control of the direction of the 
nation with a new military responsive to foreign powers and dedicated to 
preserving their interests rather than those of the nation (Buell 1929, J. H. 
McCrocklin 1934, Montague 1940, H. Schmidt 1971, Dupuy 1997). It cemented 
the colorist politics of exploitation and exclusion supported by neocolonial elites 
and their foreign allies that was so staunchly resisted by nationalists (Nicolas 
1927, Bellegarde Smith 1982). By creating a neocolonial regime dependent on 
foreign support for its political and economic dominance instead of one based on 
political legitimacy and responsiveness to popular aspirations, the occupation 
created the seed of instability that continues to plague Haiti.  The persistence of 
neocolonial control of the state along racial lines became central to the 
 204 
 
contestation against the occupation and post-occupation political development 
(Price-Mars 1928/1983, Spector 1985, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Blancpain 1999).  
     In the end, it is this colorist clientelist regime and its determination to maintain 
control of the state through military means that gave rise to the Negritude 
movement, the political and cultural recriminations and ultimately to Noirism or 
the Haitian Black power ideology resulting in the election of one of its leaders, Dr. 
Francois Duvalier in 1957. The American Occupation thus created the context 
and conditions for the political, economic and institutional instability that has 
plagued Haiti by consolidating the neocolonial state, and imposing and 
supporting client regimes that undermined the need for governing elites to 
develop a level of popular legitimacy that could have strengthened state-society 
relations and the possibility for stable democratic governance. It created a state 
weak on legitimacy and dependent on coercion. 
As was demonstrated in earlier chapters, since Jefferson, the U.S. had 
been hostile to the Haitian Republic, blocking its recognition, and enforcing its 
isolation (R. W. Logan 1941, Y. L. Auguste 1979, B. Plummer 1990, Matthewson 
2003). Except for Mexico and the Louisiana Purchase, the U.S. had enough 
territory and people to conquer within its own boundary. They came to external 
imperialism late but lost no time from the mid-1820 to 1915 to directly impose 
their will on neighboring nations, except Haiti. Franco-American relations and 
American national racial politics had made them hesitant to meddle with the 
recalcitrant Black Republic (L. Manigat 1967, R. W. Logan 1968, Weeks 2008). 
The U.S. had sought since before Haitian independence to keep Haiti at bay, 
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both for fear of its influence and because of its own treatment of its Black 
American population (Lawless 1992, Rothenberg 2007). The Monroe Doctrine 
and its corollaries, and the Platt Amendment as tools of American expansionist 
policies had caused every independent nation in the Western Hemisphere and 
European powers to acquiesce to American supremacy. However, fiercely 
jealous of its independence, Haiti had stubbornly managed to keep this powerful 
neighbor at bay and the nation away from its influence. By the mid-1890s, the 
American gaze had turned toward Haiti. Despite this apparent historical 
reluctance to fully engage with this republic, according to scholar Mary Renda, 
American forces made multiple attempts to influence or intimidate Haiti in the 
later part of the nineteenth century (Renda 2001). The 1880s saw a marked 
determination to gain direct access and influence in Haitian affairs. The 
dominance of American commercial and banking interests in shaping American 
national interests and foreign policy, the prevalence of German merchants and 
banking interests in Haitian commerce, and American concerns about Germany’s 
interest in establishing a coaling in Haitian territory at the start of WWI made Haiti 
a central element in American foreign policy (R. W. Logan 1941, Healy 1976, 
Heinl and Heinl 2005). That they succeeded or that Haiti finally succumbed to US 
hegemony can be ascribed to the failure of Haitian elites, and the fact that, not 
unlike the pre-independence years of the Haitian Republic, American foreign 
policy and economic interests superseded their racial apprehension (R. W. 




The Disembarkation of the Marines: 
The landing of the marines and American occupation was neither 
accidental nor a result of political turmoil, as is often suggested by most scholars 
(Montague 1940, Healy 1976, E. L. Beach 2002, Langley 2002, L. Dubois 2011). 
American had devised to establish control over the black republic and had been 
waiting for the opportune time to execute their plan (R. W. Logan 1941, Castor 
1978, B. G. Plummer 1988, 1990). The former minister, ambassador and scholar, 
Antenor Firmin, having successfully resisted various American attempts to usurp 
Haitian sovereignty, and recognizing the impending danger to Haitian 
independence, advocated for national cohesion to prevent American interference 
in Haitian internal affairs. He argued that instability, not interest in Haitian 
territory, which he had so skillfully defended, would facilitate American 
encroachment (Firmin 1905)131. Some Haitian patriots also wrote alarmingly 
about the danger represented by American action in neighboring Dominican 
Republic, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico while others foresaw an 
impending American invasion and decried the expressions of support for 
                                                          
131 While Firmin was correct on the territorial question in 1905, the dynamics had changed considerably 
by 1910 fear of German influence and economic interests became the driving force in American foreign 
policy towards Latin American and the Caribbean. In Haiti, specifically, American policy-makers had used 
their acquisition of banking interests through collusion with France as a lever of influence and control 
over successive governments. Moreover, by 1904 the United States government asserted the right to 
intervene and exercise police power in the region (Weeks 2008, 68-85). Impositions on Venezuela, 
Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, the arbitrary control of Cuban and Dominican customhouses, primary 
sources of state revenues, and unrelenting pressure on various Haitian governments to cede control of 
their finances all fit neatly into a pattern of foreign policy driven by economic and regional hegemonic 
interests. All this, justify, as it were, by their own Taft  (Government n.d.), and Roosevelt’s Monroe 
Corollary (Review Oct., 1910, Weeks 2008) 
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American intervention amongst neocolonial elites (Edouard 1890, 46, Laventure 
1893, 19-25, Frederic 1902, 15, Charmant 1905). Their fears were not unfounded 
as the Secretary of State Elihu Root at the time confirmed to Albert Shaw, the 
American council in Haiti, 
[O]f course, they have some pretty good reason for 
doubting the advantages of too close an association 
between the United States and a black man’s 
government. I have been watching every move in Haiti 
for several years very closely in the hope that a situation 
would arise in which we could be of material help to 
them and in which we could give that help in such a way 
as to establish the right kind of relations… For any 
positive step, I think we must wait for the psychological 
moment (qted in Montague 1940:192)132.  
 
Montague, in defending United States’ action in Haiti, argues that the State 
Department was more interested in transferring the foreign debts of countries in 
the western hemisphere from Europe to New York to secure their financial 
dominance than invading their territories. While true, the presence of American 
forces in various nations suggests that the refusal to comply to cede economic 
control voluntarily, as should be expected, led to military impositions and the loss 
of economic and territorial sovereignty. Even those who allowed control of their 
Custom Houses could not allay military occupation, as was the case in the 
Dominican Republic (R. W. Logan 1968, G. Black 1988, Langley 2002, 133-41). 
Moreover, the imposition of financial control placed an American chokehold on 
these nations in “America’s Backyard” subject to the Monroe Doctrine, 
eliminating their last vestiges of autonomy, and the last sphere of European 
                                                          
132 Elihu Root to Albert Shaw, Dec., 1908 – also see Phillip C Jessup, Elihu Root, I 554-5 
 208 
 
influence in the Hemisphere. This was well understood and resisted in the region 
(Montague 1940, Healy 1976, 1988, Langley 2002, Weeks 2008). The goal was 
not simply financial control but fashioning the right kind of states, regimes, and 
institutions to support that control and make that transfer of economic dominance 
from Europe to the United States permanent.  America was involved in a project 
of regional economic dominance and control of Custom Houses, the primary 
sources of revenue for these nations was central to this project. To maintain that 
dominance, uncooperative governments and corresponding national political 
environments were forcefully re-oriented (Healy 1976, G. Black 1988)133.   
As mentioned above, American policy of coercing Haitian governments to 
cede control of their primary sources of revenue by limiting access to resources 
was constant and was the source of political instability. Succeeding governments 
failed due the financial constraints imposed by the American government 
because of their refusal to acquiesce to American Demands (Kelsey 1922, R. W. 
Logan 1941, Y. L. Auguste 1979, G. Black 1988, B. G. Plummer 1988). However, 
what is often not discussed is the damage American interference did in 
weakening Haitian governance structures and intra-state and intra-elites power 
relations. The Americans well understood that their economic constraints and 
impositions on Haitian governments by controlling the banking system were the 
                                                          
133 American economic imposition had already occurred in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Honduras, 




source of these ephemeral governments and instability, having observed the fall 
of three governments as a consequence of their policies and strategies. What 
they hoped for were leaders who cared more about holding on to power than 
preserving the nation’s sovereignty.  
The American strategy failed because Northern nationalist politicians 
preferred to forego power rather than cede the nation’s sovereignty to American 
control. It was precisely American policy-makers’ failure to understand the 
Louverturean influence on Northern self-determination that led to the invasion 
and an all-out military attack on the North. Thus, the American argument that the 
intervention was to eliminate the instability is at best a disingenuous 
mischaracterization. The American government colluded with the City Bank of 
New York in efforts to force successive Haitian governments to yield to American 
demands as the American minister to Haiti, Madison R. Smith made clear in his 
letter to the Secretary of State on June 9, 1914,  
[T]he suspension of the budgetary convention signed 
between Haiti and the National City Bank of New York 
would most likely bring the government to a condition 
where it could not operate. It is just this condition that the 
bank desires, for it is the belief of the bank that the 
government, when confronted by such crisis, would be 
forced to ask for assistance of the United States in 
adjusting its financial tangle, and that American 
supervision of the customs would result. In the event the 
bank refuses in July or august to renew the convention 
budgetaire, it is not unlikely that the government of Haiti 
will soon thereafter indicate its willingness to negotiate 
with the United States in an effort to find some way out 
of its financial difficulties134. 
                                                          
134 Minister Smith to the Secretary of state – American Legation – June 9, 1914 – file 838.51/340 – No. 88 
Madison R. Smith. It is important to note here that based on the American minister’s letter, someone on 
the Haitian president’s cabinet was assisting the American minister by relaying information and quite 




It is this partially manufactured instability, which would serve as the excuse for 
invasion – partially manufactured because of the factionalism in the ranks of 
Northern nationalists, which made them vulnerable to external pressures and the 
perfidy of neocolonial elites in prioritizing power over nation.  
The fact that the U.S. was partly responsible for undermining Haitian 
governmental stability and creating for the first time since 1843 rapid successions 
of governments has to be central to understanding pre-invasion Haiti. The active 
and dogged resistance by Haitian northern political actors, despite American 
success in gaining control over Haiti’s debt and banking system135, their refusal 
to succumb to American pressure and voluntarily cede control over the nation 
meant that an American military invasion remained the only option for American 
policy-makers. Thus, predictably, since economic coercion and ‘dollar diplomacy’ 
failed to produce the intended results in Haiti, American gunboats diplomacy took 
the lead, substituting dollars with bullets as was advocated by President Taft 
(Montague 1940, 200-4, Renda 2001, 30-1). Mary Renda notes,  
[A]s US capitalists made important inroads in Haiti, 
instances of gunboat diplomacy would become more 
and more frequent, by 1910, the United States had 
achieved a position of dominance over other great 
powers in Haitians Affairs, by 1913, President Wilson 
                                                          
135 It is true that Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was faced with Elite resistance from the start and opted to 
incarcerate a large number of prominent individuals (Healy 1976, 36-7). Guided by his foreign minister, 
Louis Borno who was already committed to American intervention, it is argued that Sam had succumbed 
to American economic pressure and was about to acquiesce to custom control until his overthrow 
forestalled the advancing Cacos troops of the former minister, and staunch nationalist, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo 
(McCrocklin 1934). The Americans well understood that Dr. Bobo would not cede control of any aspect of 
Haitian sovereignty, having so written and having rejected earlier American advances as the main 
negotiator under the former president Davilma Theodore (Wriston 1929, 512-3). 
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and his advisors were searching for a way to translate 
that dominance into definitive control. The American 
government attempted to secure control at various 
points during 1914 and 1915, culminating in the decision 
to land marines and sailors on July 28, 1915 (Renda 
2001, 30).  
 
The following message from the invading Admiral Caperton to the navy supports 
Renda’s assertion of Haiti economic and strategic importance for the United 
States. “During my operations on the Island of Haiti,” he notes, 
I have tried to understand and apply the politics of my 
government toward this nation. Given its economic and 
commercial importance for the United States, and 
considering its strategic importance for the navy, in an 
area threatened by foreign powers”136 (Gaillard 1973, 
35)  
 
American policy makers were implementing the Monroe Doctrine across Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Haiti was the last holdout. Furthermore, they feared 
German Design on the strategic Mole St. Nicholas, for a Submarine base, which 
would compete with American military dominance of the region137 (R. W. Logan 
1968, 123-5). However, despite American dominance of Haitian banking 
systems, and the constant threats and pressure on national leaders,  the refusal 
of Northern nationalist leaders, adherents to the Louverturean creed, to give in to 
American demands and cede control of the nation’s sources of revenue 
remained the only obstacle to their fiscal domination of the region and of the 
Haitian state. 
                                                          
136 Us Senate Report, No. 794, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration 
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1922), vol. I, p.294 
137 Us Senate Report, No. 794, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration 
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1922), p.313. 
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Therefore, “that the American occupation occurred is no surprise, what is 
surprising,” asserts Rothberg and Clague “is that they waited until 1915” (R. W. 
Logan 1941, Rotberg and Clague 1971, 109). Indeed, the plan for invasion was 
drawn since November 1914 and American policy-makers had been waiting for 
the most opportune moment when nationalists could offer the least resistance138 
(H. Schmidt 1971, 64-71). That moment came at a critical time in Haitian political 
history; one that saw an emerging alliance between segments of the neocolonial 
elites and Northern nationalists led by Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, the former Minister of 
the Interior of the Davilmar regime. It was perhaps the advent of another Firminist 
moment where the potential for elite coalition and more stable governance was 
the most promising. The young, outward looking, better educated modernist 
sector of both nationalist and neocolonialist elites found common cause in their 
search for a more responsive government and modern state system; one that 
could have provided a unique opportunity for national stability. It was their 
challenge to the oligarchical leadership of their parents. Dr. Bobo, as did Dr. 
Firmin before him, represented this segment of the highly educated bourgeois 
technocrats nationalists who rejected the competition between neocolonial and 
nationalist elites. They rightly saw this competition as a hindrance to national 
development and their search for a more responsive state and accountable 
leadership.  
                                                          
138 “War Portfolio No. 1, reference No. 5-d: Republic of Haiti,” Nov. 9, 1914; NA, RG45, WA-7, Box 636. 
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This alliance was the result of the usurpation of power and control of the 
neocolonial state by a Northern military adventurer, the son of a former president, 
Vilbrum Guillaume Sam who had accentuated the schism amongst Northern 
elites by seizing power for self-aggrandizement (Bellegarde 1953, 245-6). His 
ability to usurp power was the culmination of Northern elites’ disunion and served 
to galvanize them behind the unifying leadership of Dr. Rosalvo Bobo. Supported 
by neocolonial modernist allies in the capital, and the Northern elites and its 
military infrastructure, Dr. Bobo marched toward the capital to unseat a 
government that lacked both the support and ability to govern (R. Gaillard 1973, 
33-6, Blancpain 1999). Sam’s jailing and subsequent murder of 168 
neocolonialist and nationalist elites’ supporters of Dr. Bobo in the capital and 
consequently, the revenge killing of the northern president and members of his 
cabinet by the very oligarchs whom had opposed their sons’ support of Dr. Bobo 
were aberrations in Haitian political history (Gaillard 1973, Heinl and Heinl 2005). 
Despite being a military general and the son of a former president, Sam had 
lacked both the necessary Northern Nationalists support to lead the state, and, 
more importantly, the popular legitimacy to defend military challenges to his rule 
(Castor 1971, R. Gaillard 1973, 83-97, E. L. Beach 2002).    
Elites fissures in the North, neocolonial intergenerational disconnect in the 
West, American economic coercion and American military forces patrolling Haiti’s 
waters in wait, Haiti’s neocolonial oligarchs morning their sons, saw an 
opportunity to permanently rid themselves of Northern Dominance.  To this end, 
they facilitated the landing of occupation forces, advised their policies and 
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strategies, aided in the disarmament and disbanding of military regiments in the 
city, and collaborated with them to forestall the advancing northern military 
forces, led by the Nationalist Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, (Bellegarde 1929, II,5, R. 
Gaillard 1973, 83-8, Nicholls 1979).  
Neocolonial collusion with the invasion and Occupation is often discounted 
and has yet to be fully investigated. Too many Haitian scholars and apologists 
still maintain that neocolonial elites were not complicit in the invasion and only 
collaborated with a fait accompli, or better yet, attempted to limit the impact of the 
invasion on the sovereignty of the nation by negotiating and collaborating with 
occupation forces (Renda 2001, Heinl and Heinl 2005, L. Dubois 2011). 
However, Congressional records, diplomatic correspondences, and navy 
archives offer substantive evidence of not only their collusion during, but also, 
perhaps more damning, demonstrate that such collusion preceded the 
occupation. Thus, that neocolonial Mulatto elites conspired is not in question, 
what is to be determined is to what extent they facilitated foreign invasion and 
domination of the state, and the impact it has had on the nation and its people. 
This chapter advances that the rationale for conspiring is in the history of 
competition between nationalist and neocolonial elite groups. Theirs was an 
attempt to undermine Northern Nationalists’ Dominance and acquire control of a 
state they had crafted but had lacked the power to control. This lack of power is 
the source of their collusion with foreign powers, and ultimately the establishment 
of a client regime under their leadership.  
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For the first time in Haitian history, a client regime controlled by foreign 
powers took roots with the capacity to sustain itself. Even prior to the election of 
Guillaume-Sam as President, neocolonial elites worked with foreign powers to try 
to facilitate their ascension to state control notes Healy (Healy 1976). Such 
assertion is supported by the proposal of prominent senators, led by the head of 
the senate, for American intervention as testified by Admiral Caperton,   
[T]he proposal of ten senators that Caperton prevents 
the entry of Guillaume Sam into the capital and let the 
senatorial group arrange a “free election” to choose a 
new president. This man would presumably be 
guaranteed in office by the United States, along the lines 
already followed in Santo Domingo (Healy 1976, 37)139. 
 
Admiral Caperton states that neocolonial elites had long before the invasion, 
approached him seeking American support, tutelage, and protection in his report 
to the navy, “Better class Haitians keep aloof of politics, desire American 
intervention to stabilize the government but do not openly promote such ideas for 
fear of execution by Politicians”140. Neocolonial elites already foresaw their role 
as leaders of a client regime. Given the power of Northern military forces, 
neocolonial elites understood that in order to acquire and maintain control over 
the nation, foreign backing was necessary and thus consequently while some 
advocated for it in their newspapers, others covertly proposed it (Nicholls 1979, 
J. Desquiron 1993, Renda 2001, 11).  Viewed in this context, clientelism began in 
                                                          
139 Caperton testimony at the Senate Inquiry Hearings, p293.  The leader of the Senate, Sudre 
Dartiguenave, would later become the central figure of the American occupation ( (Gaillard 1973). 




Haiti at the urging and with the support of neocolonial elites who had created a 
level of dependency by indebting Haiti to France with the indemnity in 1825. 
 
Occupation and Clientelism in Haiti: 
Although Caribbean clientelism and dependency theorists assume a 
degree of popular legitimacy for regime survival, for neocolonial elites in Haiti, the 
absence of popular legitimacy meant that state control was dependent on a 
foreign clientelist model that rendered their governance impervious to internal 
mass pressures and independent of popular legitimacy. Absent the political 
dependence and reliance on legitimacy from the masses, and under political and 
military protection of an occupying force neocolonial client regimes left the 
population with little effective institutional tools to safeguard their interests 
besides armed opposition, which could only be offered by the North (C. J. Edie 
1984, Dupuy 1989, Blancpain 1999). Having identified the nationalist elites and 
their military infrastructure as a threat to their dominance and their clientelist 
model, both occupation forces and neocolonial elites sought their destruction as 
a precondition for their usurpation of power (R. W. Logan 1961, R. W. Logan 
1968, 126-29, H. Schmidt 1971). Admiral Caperton’s admission that neocolonial 
leaders sought the creation of a regime under U.S. protection reflects the lack of 
power and legitimacy of neocolonial elites. Thus, Nicholls is correct to assert, 
[M]any members of the elite welcomed the American 
occupation and … saw in the occupation a chance to re-
establish the political hegemony of Mulatto elite, which 
had been gradually eroded in the preceding decades. 
Other elite Haitians, while secretly collaborating with and 
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advising the Americans, refused to commit themselves 
publicly to the occupation (Nicholls 1979, 146). 
 
Neocolonial elites’ collaboration with the Occupation is not only central but 
becomes crucial for American imposition. Even if we take the observation of 
Edward Latimer Beach, the biographer of Admiral Caperton with some 
skepticism, his rendition of the situation is consistent with various scholars, 
consular correspondences, and Congressional documents.  Beach notes,  
[A]dmiral Caperton asked for and received the 
cooperation of law-abiding Haitians, and though he 
immediately assumed complete military and civil control, 
this was with the willing consent of the vast majority of 
those in Port-au-Prince. In all of his acts, he received the 
immediate cooperation and help of the best elements of 
Haitian Society. Amongst these, there were no evidence 
of sullenness (E. L. Beach 1915, 3)141. 
 
It is unequivocal that neocolonial elites initially advocated for, facilitated and 
sustained the occupation. According to the American Charge D’ Affaires Davis 
Beale, “the better elements of the natives in Haiti are in favor of American 
intervention…” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 383). Even Montague, a historian at the 
Virginia Military Institute despite contradicting the officers involved directly with 
those elites by suggesting that the motivation of the neocolonial elites was less 
clear than portrayed by American representatives and other scholars, offered a 
damning assessment, 
[T]he motives of individuals were confusingly mixed; 
each persuaded himself that his course was in the public 
service, while his selfish interest was very plain to his 
critics. Few could have been utterly cynical, but also few 
showed themselves ready to make personal sacrifices 
                                                          
141 Given American racial policies, the segregation within the American military, and the realities of 
American occupation, it is clear that, from the start, Caperton had found a group in Port-Au-Prince willing 
and eager to cooperate; one he could accept with more ease. 
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for the sake of their convictions. undoubtedly the attitude 
of many were determined by considerations of private 
fortune rather than of the public good, for that was 
inevitable in a class which knew no source of livelihood 
save the treasury. As the event was to prove, some were 
ready to imperil Haitian independence in order to gain a 
political advantage over their fellow citizens (Montague 
1940, 212-13).  
 
Neocolonial elites, whose interests rested in State control, rightly saw 
collaboration with occupation forces as a propitious vehicle to assert their 
individual and caste power and interests and offset decades of northern political 
and military dominance. Consequently, they collaborated with the Occupation 
forces both overtly and covertly much as they did during the revolutionary war 
with France (Trouillot 1990, 128-30).  
 
Dartiguenave vs. Dr. Bobo:  
As the Minister of the Interior and Education in the regime of Davilmar 
Theodore, Dr. Bobo had objected to American pressure and attempts of 
members of the cabinet to cede control of the nations’ sovereignty (Gaillard 
1973, 17-20). Like previous governments, Davilmar’s government was faced with 
an ultimatum; formal recognition by the American government depended on 
Haitian capitulation to American demands. The American Secretary of State not 
only demanded the creation of a committee that would be required to sign over 
Haitian Sovereignty to which, according to the American Minister, the Haitian 
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Foreign minister had already agreed to the terms142.  American pressure and 
neocolonial collusion appeared to have succeeded in cornering the Theodore’s 
government, leaving Dr. Bobo the sole cabinet member to object to American 
demands and blocking the capitulation of the regime143 (R. Gaillard 1973, Healy 
1976). Consequently, leaked information about the negotiations undertaken by 
Joseph Justin, the Foreign minister, and disclosure of the treaty the American 
sought to impose for recognition to the Senate, led Justin to be interpelled by the 
Senate dominated by nationalist delegates. The feelings of the foreign minister 
during the senate hearings revealed the very dysfunction of neocolonialist elites, 
and the covert negotiations in which he was engaged with the American 
government.  “For some time”, Foreign Minister Justin stated, to the 
consternation of the senate, “they say that the country cannot administer itself, 
that our civil struggles have impoverished it, that our finances are disorganized. 
They say, also, that we are in need of a master” (Gaillard 1973, 20-21). The 
nationalist-dominated senate, outraged by the nature of American demands and 
the lack of transparency of the foreign minister, forced his resignation144 
                                                          
142 A series of telegrams correspondences between the State department, the American representative in 
Haiti, and the Haitian government makes clear the American strategy resisted by Dr. Bobo.  Minister 
Blanchard  to the Secretary of State, File No. 838.00/1028; secretary of State to Minister Blanchard, 
Washington, Nov. 24, 1914, File No. 838.00/1039; Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State, Nov. 25, 
1914 – File No. 838.002/31 
143 Blanchard to Bryan, April 6, 1915. File No. 838.00/1150; New York Times, July 29, 1915, p4 
144 It is worth nothing that because of racial dynamics in the United States, Haitian foreign ministers were 
usually neocolonial elites and the rare Mulatto nationalists, like Leger and Hannibal Price. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that there may have been collusion between the American embassy and the Haitian foreign 
minister, Joseph Justin, which Dr. Bobo and Nationalist Senators recognized and sought to undermine. 
Unfortunately, Justin would be replaced by Louis Borno, would serve as foreign minister under the first 
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(Montague 1940, 206, R. Gaillard 1973, 18-24). The emergence of Dr. Bobo as 
the defender of the Nation was added to his reputation as a preeminent scholar 
and doctor of medicine. In his letter to the State Department, Blanchard, the 
American minister in Haiti lamented the impact of the leaked documents on the 
negotiations to the Secretary of State and the emergence of Dr. Bobo as the new 
chief negotiator for the Theodore’s government, 
[T]he Minister of Foreign Affairs was interpelled by the 
Senate as to the foreign policy of the Government and 
notably regarding recognition, appointment of 
commission and custom control. Senate Rose in a body, 
denounced Minister for Foreign Affairs, accused him of 
endeavoring to sell the country to the United States and 
concerted attempts were made to serve him blows. In 
the course of Foreign Minister’s interpellation in the 
Senate …, the interpellator, on the refusal of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to give any information as to the 
negotiations at that time, which he considered 
premature, produced and read a draft of our convention 
for the customs control as well as the counter-project, 
which contemplated financial control and had appeared 
to me as possibly acceptable. This was the cause of the 
manifestation against the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
resulting in his resignation145.  
 
Although the role of Dr. Bobo in leaking the documents has never been 
discussed, his intervention in the senate during this debacle made clear that he 
was fully involved in the matter and aware of the views of the senate. 
Outnumbered on the cabinet due to his opposition, he needed the intervention of 
the senate to assert control over the negotiations. Having succeeded, he spoke 
with confidence of the government’s position; “the government would bury itself 
                                                          
occupation government and later as president to assist in its persistence and in the consolidation of 
neocolonial dominance. 
145 File no. 838.00 / 1063 & File No. 838.00/1044 - Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State. Port-au-
Prince, Dec, 4, 9 a.m. and 12, 1914, 11pm ;  
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in the fold of the national flag, rather than consent to the slightest injury to Haitian 
Autonomy” (Gaillard 1973, 21). Consequently, Bobo’s centrality in the 
government and popularity in the nation increased, but so too did the ire of the 
American representative. “Dr. Bobo has gained much popularity by posing 
himself as an ardent patriot with the mission of protecting Haiti from the American 
aggression,”146 he noted,  
[H]aving succeeded in relieving the foreign minister of 
his duties, Dr. Bobo, forcefully defended Haitian 
sovereignty by rejecting American demands. Rather than 
succumb to American pressure to cede control over the 
nation sovereignty, he provided a comprehensive 
counterproposal that sought an economic partnership 
instead of subservience147 (Montague 1940, 205, Turnier 
1955, 259) 
                                                          
146 National Archives, Washington. DC, 838.00/1183 also quoted in (Gaillard 1973, 18) 
147 See telegram from Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State – American Legation, Port-Au-Prince, 
December 12, 1914, 11pm – File no. 828.00/1063 
Haitian Government’s counter project to the State Department’s proposed convention 
Provides for the appointment of three commissioners to the United States to Negotiate as to: 
1. Appointment of three American and Three Haitians engineers for the prospecting, etc., of mines 
in Haiti 
2. Salaries and expenses of the engineers to be borne by Haiti during preliminary investigations 
3. The Haitian Government will concede to the Government of the United States or to American 
companies approved of by the Government the exploitation for twenty years of mines 
designated by the engineers. 
4. Exploitation by a corporation, all expenses of installation, exploitation, etc… of the same to be 
borne by the concessionaire 
5. One third of the stock to be the property of the Republic of Haiti 
6. The shares of the Government of Haiti to be registered and inalienable during the life of the 
concession 
7. Assistance from the United States in obtaining for Haiti a loan, the amount to be determined, to 
enable it to consolidate its debt, meet its obligations past and future, and reform its monetary 
system 
8. In return for advantages granted by article 7, the Haitian Government will grant preference to 
the Government of the United States and citizens in commercial and industrial affairs while 
giving full protection to foreign interests in Haiti. 
a. Under equal conditions in a concession to be awarded, to give preference to the United 
States should it desire it 
b. Settlement at the earliest possible moment by arbitral commission appointed in 
accordance with commercial law of Haiti of all questions pending between the United 




Whereas the former Foreign minister, Joseph Justin, was amenable to giving 
American control of Haiti’s revenue and sovereignty, Dr. Bobo endeavored to 
preserve her independence. His counterproposal demonstrated a willingness to 
tie American interests to those of the Haitian Republic, as did other Louverturean 
elites before him. It also sought the development of the economy and industry. 
The American strategy had failed and Dr. Bobo made clear his intentions in a 
document published across the nation, 
[I]ntroduce in our nation her industries, her capital, her 
work habits, providing her with particular advantages for 
mutual benefits, is one of my most ardent and constant 
dreams. However, to deliver our customhouses and 
finances and put us under her tutelage, never! Never! 
That or the destruction of the nation, I would choose 
destruction148. 
 
 His determination to preserve Haitian sovereignty and political and economic 
autonomy, ran counter to American agenda in the Western Hemisphere thus in 
this context, once the Marines had landed and the American government opted 
                                                          
9. Good offices of the United States to Haiti to secure modification of contract between Haitian 
Government and Bank Convention to continue in force for a period of years from and after its 
ratification by the contracting parties in accordance with their respective laws.  
Blanchard also notes in the telegram that the bill for the issue of sixteen million in paper money has 
passed the chamber of deputies and has been sent to the Senate and by it referred to its finance 
committee. 
148 Public manifesto of Rosalvo Bobo published on April 15, 1915. The full text can be found in (Gaillard 
1973, 243-4). Dr. Bobo’s determination to protect Haiti ran counter to the American regional undertakings 
and Haiti’s refusal to acquiesce to American demands challenged the forceful tutelage being imposed in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.  Oppositions to the geopolitical 
aspirations of an emerging imperialist power supported by the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries and 
attempts by the United States to compel Haitian governments into a treaty by Haitian nationalists 
determined to maintain the autonomy of the nation resulted in political instability and successive 
overthrow of presidents who entertained negotiations. Dr. Bobo embodied that Nationalism resistance to 
foreign encroachments and dependency both in its historical and contemporary manifestations. 
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for occupation, he was by all account unacceptable as a candidate for the Haitian 
presidency. Having made it clear he would oppose American policy-makers’ 
quest to render Haiti subservient to their national geopolitical and economic 
interests, Dr. Bobo, along with its Northern forces, became the main target of the 
opposition and its collaborators. To many Haitians and resident foreigners Dr. 
Bobo represented a long line of skillful, well-respected and cultivated Northern 
nationalists, ideal to lead a nation in search of legitimate, stable and unifying 
government and precisely the type of government not wanted by an occupying 
force and neocolonial elites. As the British Minister in Haiti observed,  
[H]e was highly educated and refined. His sense of 
honor is well known, and he enjoys a reputation of 
uncontested integrity. During a long conversation we had 
once, (and I have no reason to doubt his sincerity) he 
expressed his sentiments of devotion to his country149 
(qted in (Gaillard 1973, 18).  
 
The observation of the British minister contrasted starkly with the portrait drawn 
by the American consul Livingston who wrote, “Dr. Bobo is a big charlatan in 
medicine. The Haitian people do not take him seriously and consider him as the 
biggest political phony in Haiti”150. Caperton, the head of the occupation 
characterized him as emotionally unstable to the State department, unfit to lead 
Haiti151 (E. L. Beach 1915, R. Gaillard 1973, Healy 1976).  Even those who 
determined to prevent his presidency conceded he was greatly beloved by his 
                                                          
149 British Minister in Haiti to foreign Office, August 6, 1915. Public Record Office. London, England, F.O. 
371/2370 
150 National archives in Washington, DC 838.00/1183 
151 Caperton to Daniels, August 13-19, 1915. Also see Lansing to Wilson, August 3, 1915, 838.00/1275B 
 224 
 
compatriots (E. L. Beach 1915). For his willingness to defend Haitian sovereignty 
against American encroachment, argues Gaillard, “Rosalvo Bobo became a 
target. Washington is advised that for the happiness offered us by the United 
States, this person, is the most firmly hostile” (Gaillard 1973, 23). Having offered 
the presidency to various prominent leaders without success, American found in 
Dartiguenave the only person willing to agree outright to American conditions 
after which “he was provided with a nine-man Marine bodyguard detachment” to 
safeguard him from the population who felt betrayed152 (Montague 1940, 214, H. 
Schmidt 1971, 73). Thus it would come to pass that despite elite collusion in the 
capital to prevent the election of Dr. Bobo, none would agree to the presidency 
unsure as they were of the permanency of the occupiers and weary of the cost to 
themselves, their legacy, and, perhaps, their nation (E. L. Beach 1915, 130-33). 
America Found its ideal candidate for the Presidency, a Southern neocolonial 
elite, one whose grandfather had fought with Rigaud against Toussaint and his 
Northern revolutionaries for the preservation of slavery and French rule (Ardouin 
1848, 390, Vol. 3). History was being re-enacted. “In the presence of 
Congressmen, Dartiguenave, the president of the senate” writes Admiral 
Caperton to the Secretary of State,  
[H]ad agreed that Haiti must and will accede gladly to 
any terms proposed by the United States. Now, they say 
they will cede outright without restrictions Mole St. 
Nicolas, granting us the right to intervene when 
                                                          
152 Beach memorandum, August 10, 1915, RG45, w4-7, Box 365.  Admiral Caperton, leader of the 
occupation testified before Congress that Dartiguenave acquiesced to American terms to secure their 
support for his Presidency. (Foreign Relations, 195, p431-437) 
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necessary, customhouse control and any other terms”153 
(A. Millspaugh 1971, 39, H. Schmidt 1971, 74).  
 
The election was at best a farce; nationalists were cleared from the chamber, 
and deputies informed the United States would not permit the election of a 
president not predisposed to acquiesce to American dictum to which 
Dartiguenave had acquiesced and Dr. Bobo rejected154. According to Millspaugh,  
[W]hile there is no proof that the members of the national 
assembly were directly coerced into voting for 
Dartiguenave. His election was eventually attributable to 
the American intervention. Had matters taken a more 
precipitate and in Haiti more natural course, Dr. Bobo 
apparently would have been elected by a Cacos-
dominated assembly” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 41) 
 
The American Secretary of the navy would later admit, Dartiguenave’s 
election “was undoubtedly not the choice of the mass of the Haitian people but 
only of those who felt that intervention by America was essential,” But essential 
for what? Did they believe as Captain Beach maintains that “the interests of Haiti 
could best be served by complete cooperation with the United States”, or were 
they “ready to imperil Haitian independence in order to gain a political advantage 
over their fellow citizens,” as Montague asserts (Montague 1940, 213, H. 
Schmidt 1971, 72-74)  
 
                                                          
153 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. Telegram – extract. File No. 838.00/12433 Also; see 
Testimony of Admiral Caperton, Congressional hearings p 315. One must assume that no nationalist 
congressional representatives were present in the meetings with Caperton as they were subsequently 
excluded in the election of Dartiguenave. Neocolonialist seemed to have finally found the alliance capable 
of securing their control over the state at a high cost to the nation. 
154 Foreign Affairs 1915, 431-7; Testimony of Admiral Caperton, Hearings, p316. It was a classic case of 
historical reoccurrence, one that rivaled the election of Pétion and would adopt his institutional 
framework to govern; this time with foreign backing. 
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Haitian Clientelism:  
Lemarchand and Legg define clientelism as a personalized ‘face-to-face’ 
relationship between actors or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, 
status, or influence, in exchange for support and conditional loyalties (Scott 1969, 
Lemarchand and Legg 1972). The power of patrons to provide protection or 
services, and their control over and access to vital resources are central to 
sustaining clients’ support (Scott 1969). These interdependent transactional 
relationships, according to Flynn, rely primary on a convergence of power and 
inequality guided by social class dynamics (Flynn 1974).  Patron-client relations, 
rooted in national inequality, resource scarcity, and dependence between political 
and economic elites and the masses, are prevalent in the Caribbean but distinct 
in Haiti.  Haitian clientelism supports the thesis of inequality but does not rely on 
party-voters transactional relations or economic Elite–party dependence. As the 
Caribbean scholars Carlene Edie, Anthony Bogues and Carl Stone argue, 
clientelist regimes and political parties derive their legitimacy from resource 
distribution, and are externally dependent and lack the resources to 
autonomously sustain their national dominance (Stone 1980, C. J. Edie 1984, 
Bogues 2002).  Their reliance on resources from national elites and/or foreign 
powers to maintain voter support limits their capacity to fully preserve the 
autonomy of the nation and interests of the citizens (C. J. Edie 1984).  
Consequently, Caribbean nations with clientelist regimes suffer from 
diminished sovereignty, internal and external dependence, and a restricted 
capacity to be responsive to the demands and aspirations of its citizens (Knight 
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1993, Roniger 2004). Clientelist regimes seek and try to maintain their legitimacy 
and popular support by garnering and redistributing limited resources. The 
clientelist regime that evolved under the American Occupation in Haiti was more 
dramatically insulated from the population than its Caribbean counterparts. It had 
no political party structures from which to manage patron-client relations. More 
importantly, it evolved in opposition to the aspiration of the population, installed 
and protected by a foreign force, and without the required resources, the 
willingness, and need to maintain a level of popular support (Bellegarde 1924, 
1929). Whereas states controlled by client regimes in the Caribbean enhanced 
their capacity to secure popular support through state control and dispensation of 
jobs and state support and services through their political party structure, Haiti’s 
client regimes during the Occupation was only interested in securing the state’s 
limited resources for its core elites but not the populace. Moreover, even in their 
preferential patron-client relations, they were hampered by their lack of control 
over state institutions firmly in the hands of American Marines and treaty officials. 
The Dartiguenave Regime and those who succeeded it during the Occupation 
was the veneer of legitimacy needed to impose American will and destroy the 
nationalist forces that had maintained Haitian independence and resisted its 
subjectivity since its independence. It did not require nor did it seek popular 
legitimacy and support.  
Edie’s dual clientelist model recognizes that Caribbean cleintelist regimes 
require foreign support for governance and derives most of their legitimacy not 
from an organic development of political responsiveness, confidence building, 
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and economic development but from internal and external economic support. 
This support enable them to facilitate internal resource redistribution through their 
political party structures in order to secure the adherence and support of 
segments of the masses (C. J. Edie 1984, 1991). The Dartiguenave clientelist 
regime did not receive economic resources from either the neocolonial elites who 
supported it nor from external actors but instead was funded, its expenses 
monitored and even the salaries of the Presidents and its ministers withheld. 
They were the employees of the Occupation’s senior officers thus subject to their 
supervision and sanctions. The regime used whatever resources it was allowed 
to circumvent the popular will and secure neocolonial elite support through 
resource redistribution, and preferential employment opportunities (Bellegarde 
1929a, Berthoumieux 1950, A. Millspaugh 1971). Instead of devising ways to 
secure popular support, Dartiguenave’s client regime lent legitimacy to American 
efforts. Despite the constraints, it was not just a puppet regime, but one with its 
own interests that facilitated, used, and collaborated with the occupying force to 
fulfill its own agenda of neocolonial elite supremacy. Driven by the need for 
political supremacy, Dartiguenave and its neocolonial supporters sought and 
acquired the support of the Marines not just for political dominance but also for 
military action to subdue an organic nationalist infrastructure that enjoyed 
widespread legitimacy in the North.  
In this context, the Haitian clientelist regime evolved distinctly from its 
Anglo-Caribbean, Dominican and African counterparts, independent of popular 
support and legitimacy but in direct opposition to the national will (Buell 1929, 
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Lindsay 1975, R. Gaillard 1981, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Pre-independence Anglo-
Caribbean states developed within an intentionally designed institutional 
structure of political and economic clientelism and dependency forced to operate 
as semi-autonomous political entities within prescribed institutional, economic 
and political frameworks (C. J. Edie 1991). Post-independence Anglo-Caribbean 
states already structured into dependency, developed into a system of dual 
clientelism and dependency as emerging political parties no longer relying on 
their opposition to British control as a source of legitimacy, faced constraints as a 
result of a national economic environment dominated by neocolonial elites and 
western interests (C. J. Edie 1984). Engaged in competitive political environment, 
political parties became dependent on these internal and external actors for 
resources to maintain their competitive advantage and secure their political 
survival (Stone 1980, Knight 1993, Gonzalez-Acosta 2008, Girvan 2015). In this 
context, a decline in the patron’s ability to offer financial and security support 
leads to a decline in legitimacy and support155.  
Similar to many countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America 
(Scott 1969, Lemarchand and Legg 1972, Flynn 1974, Stone 1980, Roniger 
2004), Haitian clientelism is both domestic and external. The state being the 
primary vehicle for wealth accumulation, national political and economic elites 
                                                          
155 African States, on the other hand, when not dominated by post-independence one-party systems 
capable of garnering support through nationalism and state control, became dependent on their former 
colonial powers found themselves constrained within a structure of international economic and 
institutional clientelism and dependency (Rodney 1974, Bienefeld 1988, Callaghy, Thomas M. and 
Ravenhill, John 1993, Walle 2007). 
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rely on foreign support to remain in control of the state in exchange for policy 
orientation, restricted sovereignty, and state subservience. Elites rely on external 
patrons for coercive support (i.e., weapons, riot control gear, military training and 
support) protection from international pressure, and economic support (i.e., 
monetary aid, food aid, loan access, and national project support). These patron-
client relations are necessary to maintain control of the state due to the lack of 
popular support and legitimacy, and their inability or unwillingness to meet the 
needs of the population through redistributive economic policies that would 
counter their particular interests and the economic interests of their capitalist 
patrons. 
The Haitian state, like its counterpart in the Caribbean, is used as a 
vehicle for clientelist patronage through state jobs, access to elite public schools 
and scholarships, inclusion into the military, and access to high-level state and 
international positions.  In the Anglophone Caribbean, this has been primarily an 
upper middle-class, and in the case of Guyana and Trinidad,ethnic-based 
transactional relations directed by neocolonial elites to maintain the allegiance of 
their groups while neglecting the largely black poor and using the state’s  
coercive capacity to control them (C. J. Edie 1984, Hintzen 1994). 
 With the advent of the neocolonial state and formal entry into the world 
system as a structurally unequal member because of the capitulation of 
neocolonial elites, the Haitian state maintained its independence because of the 
determination of Northern nationalist forces. The post-indemnity and pre-
occupation state became indebted but not dependent. It relied on no foreign 
 231 
 
power for resources and was not vulnerable to their dictates. The dependency of 
the Haitian state and its clientelist model developed through the destruction of 
nationalist infrastructure, the liquidation of its forces, and the consolidation of the 
neocolonial state under American Occupation. Its development is directly related 
to the collusion of neocolonial elites and imposition of client regimes by the 
United States. 
Neocolonial Collusion and the Consolidation of the Clientelist Regime: 
From the start, the client regime of Dartiguenave worked to supplant nationalist 
forces and collaborated with the Occupation to remove those forces and 
individuals capable of challenging its legitimacy.  Dr. Bobo was forced into exile, 
his attempts to re-enter Haiti through the Dominican Republic prevented at the 
behest of American representative to frustrate the nationalists of their political 
leader, and undermine resistance to the Occupation and challenges to 
Dartiguenave’s government156.  Allowed to travel to Cuba, and under surveillance 
and armed monitor by the Cuban client Regime157 at the request of the American 
Government, Dr. Bobo was forced to leave for France where he died158 (Gaillard 
                                                          
156 Charge D’Affaires Johnson to the Secretary of State. Santo-Domingo, August 28, 1915 – 11am.  File no. 
838.00/1277. The American had acquired undue influence in Dominican Affairs having supported the 
client regime of Jimenez and control over the nation’s Custom Houses since 1904. 
157 Having already installed and supported client regimes in Cuba since the Spanish-American War of 
1898, American influence and policies predominated.  
158 Correspondences between American representatives, the Cuban and Dominican government and the 
Secretary of State make the coordination to curtail Dr. Bobo’s movement unequivocal.  See The Secretary 
of State to Charge Johnson, Department of State. Washington, August 28, 1915 – 9pm. File No. 
888.00/1282, and Minister Gonzales to the Secretary of State, American legation. Havana, September 1, 
1915. File No. 838.00/1287.  It is precisely the disconnectedness of these American client regimes to the 
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1973). Conscious of the hostility it faced, and to bolster its legitimacy, the client 
regime included three staunch nationalists in its cabinet to supplant vocal and 
armed recriminations while simultaneously requesting the suppression of 
Northern forces by the Marines (Berthoumieux 1950).  This strategy rather than 
allaying recriminations intensified them by giving nationalists within the client 
government quasi veto power over its decisions and enabling them to subvert the 
American clientelist strategy from within. With American pressing for the adoption 
of its treaty as promised by Dartiguenave, nationalists blocking within the 
government and opposing nationally, Dartiguenave could have permanently 
resisted American encroachment and bolster the legitimacy of his regime by 
openly opposing occupation forces, but instead chose to continue to collude159.     
The Neocolonialist clientelist regime’s strategy became even clearer. Within a 
month of its establishment, Dartiguenave requested the imposition of martial law, 
and the restriction of the Freedom of the Press to prevent an uprising and 
facilitate the forfeiture of Haiti’s sovereignty by signing the treaty opposed by the 
majority of the nation to which he had already agreed as a condition for 
ascending to the presidency160 (H. Schmidt 1971, 75, Healy 1976, 135). In 
                                                          
aspirations of the masses that led to later revolutions in countries such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Philippines, and Nicaragua, and continues the patterns of instability in those societies. 
159 Resisting the American occupation would have deprived them of a client regime from which to procure 
its legitimacy. It would have created a national front against the occupation and assume common cause 
with the North. Instead, Dartiguenave’s collusion not only provided the occupation with the national 
cover needed but with the international legitimacy to consolidate the occupation and act against Haitian 
citizens by characterizing resistance forces as brigands and bandits (U. S. Congress 1929). 
160 Senate Hearings, 1922, p70. Davis to Lansing, September 3, 1915; Foreign Relations, 1915, p442. 
Dartiguenave not only requested the imposition of Martial Law to suppress popular discontent and 
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collaboration with American forces, he requested the resignation of the three 
nationalists in the cabinet, for their refusal to acquiesce to the treaty, replacing 
them by compliant neocolonial supporters.  
The most important facet of the pre-planned forced resignation was their 
replacement by, as the American Legation wrote to the Secretary of State, “men 
more in sympathy with the desires of the United States”161. Such was the level of 
collaboration between the American government and its client regime that on 
Sept. 4, the American Charge D’Affaires Davis was informed by the president of 
the impeding “resignation” of nationalist members of the cabinet, a decision, 
which he implemented on September 7, three days later. Consequently, Louis 
Borno replaced the eminent nationalist scholar Pauleus Sannon as foreign 
minister following consultations with American representatives162.  
The subservience of the client regime and its neocolonial supporters to 
American dictates set the regime squarely on a collision course with the nation. 
Borno’s collaboration not only secured the signing of the treaty, a move that 
would later facilitate his rise to the presidency of the clientelist regime, but 
worked closely with the Americans for its implementation and extension. Through 
                                                          
intimidate elected officials into signing the treaty, he even informed the charge D’Affaires American that 
“the declaration of martial law greatly strengthened his position and will facilitate speedy ratification”. 
See Charge Davis to the Secretary of State - American legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 4, 1915. File 
No. 711.38/28  
161 Charge Davis to the Secretary of State, P-au-P, Sept. 4, 1915 – 10am. File No. 711.38/36 and Charge 
Davis to the Secretary of State. American legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 4, 1915. File No. 711.38/28 




the treaty, the American government acquired complete control over Haitian 
sovereignty and decision-making and implemented it as a modus viviendi prior to 
congressional ratification163 (A. Millspaugh 1971). The most important feature of 
a clientelist regime is reliance on resources to secure support.  The Dartiguenave 
regime, strapped for cash and facing resistance in both chambers and the nation 
sought financial resources from the occupation forces, which, argued the 
American Charge D’Affaires, Davis, “will be greatly beneficial to the government 
both in securing ratification and with the public generally”164. The acquisition of 
financial resources from foreign powers for elite’s redistribution, and the 
assignment of governmental posts to secure their adherence and support is a 
distinct feature of Haitian Clientelism.  When offers of bribery failed to induce the 
members of the senate to ratify the treaty, coercion became the modus operandi. 
Using a list drawn by Dartiguenave, the Marines targeted dissenting senators 
while Admiral Caperton gave an ultimatum, “treaty or no treaty, the United States 
intended to retain control over Haiti, pacifying the country to whatever extent 
might be needed and meeting out to ‘those offering opposition’ the treatment 
                                                          
163Charge D’affaires Davis’ correspondence to the Secretary of State makes the collusion of Dartiguenave 
with the occupiers unequivocal.  “I have just returned from a conference with President and Cabinet 
which began at 3 this afternoon… Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Works refused to 
accept financial advisor... whereupon the President requested and accepted their immediate resignation.” 
Davis to the Secretary of State. Port-au-Prince, Sept. 7, 1915 – 8pm. File No. # 711.38/20.  Pauleus 
Sannon, the scholar and staunch nationalist foreign minister, Antoine Sansaric, its minister of Public 
works, and later, Emile Antoine , minister of the interior, were removed from the government. (Charge 
Davis to the Secretary of State, P-au-P, Sept. 4, 1915 – 10am. file No. 711.38/28, 29) and also see (Healy 
1976, 154) 
164 Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. Telegram – American Legation. Port=au-Prince, September 14, 
1915 – 8:00pm.  File No. 711.38/32. 
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their conduct merited” (H. Schmidt 1971, 77, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 396). To 
further strengthen and confirm its clientelist credentials, Dartiguenave and its 
new cabinet members strategized with Occupation forces to dissolve Congress if 
ratification was still not forthcoming, while the United States warned, “its 
government will not countenance efforts, either direct or indirect to overthrow 
Dartiguenave administration, to the support of which the United States purposes 
to lend all proper aid…”165. So traitorous was the client government that it 
undercut the efforts of its own ambassador to end the occupation or change the 
terms of the treaty166.  As an indication of its unpopularity and lack of legitimacy, 
Dartiguenave remained under American military protection until his replacement 
by Louis Borno (H. Schmidt 1971, 75). 
Disarmament and Pacification of the Nation:  
Even the exile of Dr. Bobo did not allay the patterns of Northern resistance 
to the occupation and resulted in the declaration of “international war against 
Dartiguenave and the American Occupation”167. From the start, the occupation 
                                                          
165 Charge Davis to the Secretary of State – American Legation.  Port-Au-Prince, September 25, 1915 -3pm 
– File No. 711.38/35.  Acting Secretary of State Polk to Charge Davis. Telegram – Department of State, 
Washington, September 27, 1915 *pm. File No. 711.38/38 
166 See correspondence between the Haitian Minister Solon Menos and the Secretary of State from Sept. 
4-6. The Haitian Minister, Solon Menos to the Secretary of State, Washington, Sept. 4, 6, 1915/ File no. 
838.00/1294 and 838.00/1295; The Secretary of State to the Haitian Minister (Solon Menos). Department 
of State, Washington, September 10, 1915; and the Secretary of State to Charge Davis. Washington, 
September 10, 1915 – 6pm, File no. 838.00/1295. It was the Secretary of State who informed Menos that 
negotiations would take place directly in Haiti and not through him, the nations’ legitimate representative 
in Washington DC. Rather than facilitate the negotiations of its representative, the Dartiguenave Regime 
had undermined the efforts of the nationalist Menos in Washington. 
167 See Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. Port-Au-Prince, August 13, 1915 in the Acting 
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State. Washington, September 11, 1915. 
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forces and their neocolonial allies recognized the need to eliminate the armed 
revolutionary threat posed by the Haitian military in Port-au-Prince and other 
cities as well as the Northern Nationalist military infrastructure.  Two marines had 
already been killed by snipers upon their landing, and with an armed population 
willing to resist American encroachment; neither an occupation nor the imposition 
of a neocolonial client regime would have been possible168 (A. Millspaugh 1971, 
U. S. State n.d.). All military personnel were disarmed, including the 1500 Cacos 
Soldiers stationed in the City, armed marines invaded military premises and 
forcefully disbanded all military personnel escorting them out of the city with the 
blessings of city elites (E. L. Beach 1915, Balch 1927, R. Gaillard 1973, 108-9, 
Nouvelliste 2005). Aided by neocolonial elites, American Marines lost no time 
asserting military control over the capital and the state by neutralizing the 
military, and executing those who refused to disband. Within a month, the 
marines had landed in the capital, received reinforcements, taken control of all 
military installations, disarmed and disbanded all military personnel, seized 
control of the Haitian navy disbanding its personnel, controlled all institutions, 
and set off to eliminate what they consider the greatest threat to their occupation 
and client regime169 (Bellegarde 1929, Auguste 1979). According to the military 
officer, Capt. Beach, in charge of implementing American policies on the ground,  
[O]n the order of Admiral Caperton marines were 
dispatched in the military installations, all military 
                                                          
168 Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. American Legation, Port-Au-Prince, July 29, 30, 31, and August 
1, 2015.  File No. 838.00/1226,  838.00/1231, 838.00/1230, and 838.00/1276 
169 (The Hoover Commission 1922, Vol I p308 & II, 1671) 
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equipment and munition in possession of the Haitian 
army were confiscated. Moreover, we have disbanded 
all military personnel and evicted them from the city. We 
informed them that any attempt to enter the city dressed 
in military uniform would result in their arrest and 
imprisonment (E. L. Beach 2002). 
 
The only remaining forces capable of challenging the Occupation were the 
Cacos in the North; the only forces historically fully committed to defend the 
nation’s sovereignty (Bellegarde 1929b, II, 5, Pavet n.d., 101-3, Montague 1940, 
212-3). Established and maintained Since Toussaint as a well-organized and 
layered guerrilla force led by local, regional, and national leaders, the Cacos had 
been dedicated to preventing neocolonial elites from taking control of the state 
and undermining its sovereignty.  Thus, “the first priority was to disband the 
Cacos” concur most scholars of Haiti (Castor and Garafola 1974, B. Plummer 
1990, 93). Caperton’s letter to the Secretary of the Navy was more specific,  
I think the time has come to resolve the Haitian question. 
In this vein, and to ensure that the solution is definitive, it 
is necessary to destroy the Cacos bands170. To render 
that occupation and its client regime secure, to create a 
Haiti permanently oriented toward American interests, it 
was necessary to clear the surrounding countryside of 
armed Cacos, and occupy their territory far in the 
northern interior171 (Montague 1940, 218).  
 
As Schmidt suggests, from the start of the Occupation, “Cacos forces 
interfered with food supplies to American-occupied coastal cities, and raided 
Marine encampments. Their efforts were directed solely toward nationalistic 
political objectives of driving the Americans into the sea.” (H. Schmidt 1971, 83). 
                                                          
170 (The Hoover Commission 1922, Vol II, p1674).  Also see  (R. Gaillard 1973, 126-7, R. Gaillard 1981) 
171 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. P-au-P, August 13, 1915 – File no. 838.00/1301 
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A few weeks into the occupation, and at the request of the client regime, armed 
with Howitzer and Gatling guns, Marines invaded Northern territories, 
encountered determined but lightly armed guerilla forces, at times armed only 
with machetes and rocks, they engaged in a killing spree that so alarmed the 
Secretary of the Navy that he requested the Marines desist172. Admiral 
Caperton’s reply to the order to desist demonstrate the level of information he 
had received as to the location of Northern nationalist military centers of power 
and the level of support for the military action he was undertaking from the client 
regime and neocolonial elites. Acknowledging receipt of the order, he wrote,  
I received Department’s radiogram 22018, in which the 
department directs that, in view of the heavy losses to 
the Haitians in recent engagements, our offensive 
operations be suspended to prevent further loss of Life. 
It is assumed that the department understands that 
patrolling in North Haiti is now underway by our forces 
and hostile with the bandits173 contact may unavoidably 
occur… The operations we have been conducting are 
purely of a defensive character for the preservation of 
law and order..., and the suppression of revolutionary 
activities against the present government… Having 
undertaken this intervention, any diminution in the 
protection and support offered the government and the 
people of Haiti by the United States will greatly harm our 
prestige. Our action in suppressing these bandits is 
approved by the Haitian government, and in the case of 
most of the members of the government, most 
enthusiastically. It is absolutely necessary that the 
present movement continue to the Southward to include 
                                                          
172 In a telegram to Admiral Caperton, the Secretary of the Navy wrote, “Department strongly impressed 
with number of Haitians killed. Department believes a proper patrol can be maintained… without further 
offensive operations” (The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to Admiral Caperton, Navy Department. 
Washington, November 20, 1915. File no. 838.00/1373.  For firsthand accounts of the Marines’ actions 
against the Cacos in the North, see Foreign Relations, 1915, p491-5 
173 American occupying forces, in their attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Northern Nationalist 
forces referred to them as bandits. Yet, despite bribe offers, and wholesale slaughter, these so-called 
bandits resisted the occupation and the client regime for five years succeeding in bringing the fight into 
the Capital, the very center of power twice (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 397-401). 
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Hinche at least… If Hinche is not occupied it will 
therefore form a base for future revolutions…174 
  
Determined to support their project, early resistance to the Occupation 
and its client regime was met with overwhelming force; “the Marines engaged in 
wholesale execution, hunting down a courageous but poorly armed group… 
killing unarmed and surrendering Cacos” hoping to destroy any threats to the 
client regime175. Colonel Waller who headed the expedition against the Cacos 
reported to the client regime,  
The Cacos will not infest these regions anymore, they 
have been almost all crushed. All the fortifications in the 
North, except the Citadelle de la Ferriere and the one in 
the city of Cap Haitian, have been razed and dynamited. 
Every important corners of that department are occupied 
by our troops.” (j. Desquiron 1996, 67)176 
 
That the Occupation forces concentrated its efforts in the North is no 
accident, that they were acting on behalf of the client regime and neocolonial 
elites reflect an important shift in the historical conflicts between neocolonial and 
nationalist elites. It was the first time since Boyer that Nationalists were on the 
losing end of the conflict. From the time of the occupation in August 1915 to 
                                                          
174 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy, Port-Au-Prince, November 19, 1915. File no. 
838.00/1373. Also, see Foreign Relations, 1915, p493-4.  Hinche was the regional headquarter of 
Cacos and the home of one of their most significant leader of Charlemagne Peralte. Hinche was well 
known since the struggle for independence to be the Center of resistance and to have fostered a 
citizen devoted to the defense of Haiti sovereignty. The eminent Historian Roger Gaillard once 
observed, “History had made, the men and women of Hinche, a population, as attached, without a 
doubt, as the others to the homeland, but more combative on this point, for they were always prepared 
to having to defend it.” (Gaillard 1981, 14) 
175 Colonel Eli K. Cole, USMC, personal letter to Capt. E. H. Durell, USN.  October 27, 1915.  NA, RG45, WA-
7, Box 633. (H. Schmidt 1971, 85), also refer to the actions of the marines in the North. 
176 Desquiron, vol. IV.  Quoted from Le Matin no. 3616 
 240 
 
1920, Northern military resistance to the occupation persisted despite wholesale 
slaughter and summary execution of surrendering peasant nationalists (Gaillard 
1981). The formation of a new Gendarmerie in February 1916 to support the 
client regime, which Caperton predicted would help resolve the Cacos question, 
gave the regime and the occupation a national force dedicated to their interests 
but did not end resistance to the occupation177. Earlier recruitment of the new 
military focused on the elite in Port-au-Prince, but resulted on recruiting middle 
class Westerners, and was later extended to elite and middle-class Southerners, 
the North having mainly ignored recruitment efforts and being engaged in 
resistance against the occupation (De Young 1959)178. With mainly Southern and 
Western soldiers as recruits, and officered by American Marines accountable 
only to the leadership of the occupation, the Gendarmerie was purely an 
extension of the occupation’s war Machine that served to offset their lack of 
                                                          
177 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy, Port-Au-Prince, August 16, 1915. Most scholars concur 
that the Marines succeeded in pacifying the North the first year of the occupation and the renewed 
fighting was simply the result of the ‘corvee’ or forced labor imposed by the marines. History may offer us 
some insight in this respect. As in the struggle for independence, segments of the Northern military 
infrastructure rushed to fight the invaders, took bribes, disarmed, or were massacred by the Marines 
while the shock troops of Northern nationalists withdrew to organize, observe and plan the next phase of 
the resistance. It was these troops, more organized, and under strict leadership that posed the real 
danger to the occupying forces and its new national constabulary.   
178 Although some scholars suggest that actual elite participation in the Gendarmerie did not materialize 
until the opening of the military school in 1928. Their reference is mainly to the officer corps, which was 
led entirely by Marines. After all the American military itself was a highly segregated force with no place 
for high-ranking blacks. What Deyoung and others make clear is that recruits were from the South and 
West of the country, and later Mulatto officers replaced whites ones, a move fully supported by 
succeeding client regimes. 
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manpower 179 (H. Schmidt 1971, 89, R. Gaillard 1982, 26). Its creation would 
serve to strengthen the client regime by equipping neocolonial elites now in 
control of the state with a centralized military force180 and exasperate the 
historically tenuous national ethnic caste181 dynamic (H. Schmidt 1971, 86, Heinl 
and Heinl 2005, 402). Widespread abuses of power by the Marines, the 
implementation of forced labor that black chained gangs in Southern America, 
the arrest of the Peralte brothers for revolutionary activities, the looting and 
ransacking of their home by the Marines, and the summary execution of the older 
brother, Saul Peralte, brought to light the ongoing Cacos insurgency182 (Gaillard 
1982, 30-9). The New gendarmerie was overwhelmed, the Marines, confident 
they had overcome the Cacos, and unable to contain the continued revolt, sought 
and received fresh reinforcements from the Deep South (J. W. Johnson 1920, 
Balch 1927, Montague 1940, Renda 2001). With the Northern population 
engaged in guerilla resistance, the Marines, now aided by the Gendarmerie 
                                                          
179 American engagement in WWI had severely reduced the manpower of the Marines. The gendarmerie 
expanded their military capacity in their quest for control of the Haitian State. 
180 According to Maingot, the pattern of US intrusion, military adventurism, and military creation was in 
accordance to the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries (Weeks 2008). Centralized military forces were 
being created or refashioned across the region and beyond - in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, the Philippines, 
and the Dominican Republic -  all nations occupied by the Marines in order to permanently secure 
governments that supported American interests (Weston 1972, Munro 1974, Greene, et al. 1984, Healy 
1988). 
181 For an in-depth expose of the caste system in Haiti, see (J. G. Leyburn 1966)  
182 The Peralte brothers, respected functionaries and former generals of the Central plateau were paraded 
in front of their citizens in chains and sent into forced labor. While Saul Peralte’s home was looted but, 
the home of the Charlemagne Peralte was looted and burned to the ground (Gaillard 1982, 38). 
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renewed their terror, “tens of thousands of Haitian peasants were massacred183, 
thousands more were placed in internment camps184, the Marines engaged in 
electrocution, torture and summary execution185.  Consequently, to escape 
oppression, peasant emigration to Cuba, and later, the Dominican Republic, 
dramatically escalated. This was a new phenomenon, for while migration of the 
landless from other countries in the region for work in the construction of the 
Panama Canal, the agro-businesses of the United Fruit Company in Latin 
America, and the tobacco and sugar industries in Cuba increased in the early 
1900’s, the Haitian peasantry had remained home, masters of their land and 
destiny. The occupation would change that paradigm resulting in a dramatic 
exodus of the Haitian peasantry. From 1,838 between 1912 and 1914 to 79,495 
between 1915 and 1921 with 30,000 leaving the country in 1920 and a 
comparable number crossing into the Dominican Republic at the height of the 
repression (Balch 1927, 77-8, Bellegarde 1929, 1929a).    
Already accustomed to target and kill Black American citizens without due 
process, Southern Marines engaged in an orgy of lynching with orders to kill 
Cacos on sight. According to Marines’ testimony, since they could not determine 
                                                          
183 (U. S. Congress 1929, 12-19). The Scholar George Anglade estimated that 50,000 Haitians were killed 
(Anglade 1974, 33). 
184 The scholar and former minister of the United States to Haiti, Raymond Leslie Buell noted that 4,000 
Haitians died in prison in the City of Cap Haitian and 5, 475 died in the prisoner camp at Chabert (Buell 
1929, Bellegarde-Smith 1985, 192).  
185 During the Senate hearings, Marines and members of the gendarmerie testified that Marines executed 
and electrocuted prisoners (U. S. Congress 1929, 1722-1842).  
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an average Haitian from a guerilla, every male adult was considered one 
increasing the arbitrary murder of the citizenry (United State Congress 1929, 13-
9, 1804-1806). An article on October 15, 1920 in the New York Times noted,  
Marines, largely made up of and officered by 
Southerners, opened fire with machine guns from 
airplanes upon defenseless Haitian villages, killing men, 
women, and children in the open market places; natives 
were slain for ‘sport’ by a hoodlum element among these 
same Southerners.186  
 
According to witnesses testimonies, the killing of women and children, the 
beating to death of Haitian citizens, summary executions, the burning alive of 
man and women in broad daylight, the execution of widows and family members 
of suspected guerilla fighters, and the burning of crops and killing of cattle and 
horses were some of the excesses of American forces against the Haitian 
Northern peasantry (Balch 1927, 125-7, Davis 1928, 224-38)187. This was not 
unlike the murders and lynchings so common in Southern and mid-Western 
America. Peasant resistance also broke out in the South and west-eastern part of 
the country following the old Louverturean guerilla lines and the first recorded 
instance of American coordinated air-ground combat took place on Haitian soil to 
suppress the resistance of the poorly armed but determined Haitian peasant 
nationalist guerillas188 (H. Schmidt 1971, 102-4). Despite the excesses of the 
                                                          
186 (NYT 1920, 17) 
187 See (McCormick 1920) and public testimony given at the (The Hoover Commission 1922). Also, see 
congressional testimonies in Inquiring into the occupation (U. S. Congress 1929). 
188 Information relation to aviation raids and bombings activities can be found in congressional 
testimonies the Marines (U. S. Congress 1929, 1734-6).  
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Marines, the client president and his cabinet decorated them with 20 medals of 
valor for their suppression of Cacos forces while he disbanded parliament twice, 
extended the occupation mandate for another 10 years until 1936189.  
To make its collusion unequivocal, the client regime collaborated with the 
Occupation forces to run a plebiscite to adopt a new constitution giving foreigners 
the right to own land in which only the yes ballots were distributed190 (Davis 
1928, 201-9, Bellegarde 1953, 259-61, R. W. Logan 1968, 133-4, Danache 
1969). As Schmidt correctly noted, the new constitution did much more than 
allowed foreigners to own land. It “served to consolidate the legal and 
constitutional position of both the occupation and the client-government. It also 
presumably laid the bases from which Haiti would henceforth proceed.” (H. 
Schmidt 1971, 100) Emboldened by what scholar Logan called the “farcical 
plebiscite”, the president and his cabinet reduced the number of deputies and 
senators from 116 to 30 and 39 to 15 respectively to limit the number and impact 
of a still vocal legislative opposition. When opposition persisted to the new 
constitution, he disbanded them appointing a 21-members council of state 
selected by his foreign minister Louis Borno with the approval of the General in 
charge of the occupation to rubber-stamp his decisions (R. W. Logan 1968, 133-
4, H. Schmidt 1971, 94). What is remarkable are the policy parallels between 
                                                          
189 Louis Borno, as minister of foreign Affairs, Education and Finance worked to facilitate the extension of 
the treaty at the height of the insurgency. 
190 See testimony given to the Senate (U. S. Congress 1929, 26-8 & 81). The American president Warren 
Harding during his electoral campaign criticized the seating government for “a constitution shoved down 
the throat of the Haitians at the end of a bayonet” (Penceny 1999, 2) 
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Pétion and Boyer’s usurpation of power and Dartiguenave and Borno’s; both 
changed the number of representatives and facilitated new legislative elections in 
the hope of securing support, and in the end, disbanded the legislature and 
handpicked a council of state to rubber-stamped their decisions. Both used the 
Council of State to give institutional legitimacy to their governments, which lacks 
the popular legitimacy to govern.  
The only distinctions between the Pétion/Boyer neocolonial regimes and 
the Dartiguenave/Borno’s were, the earlier regimes relied on Mulatto military 
leadership for support and was dependent on Black soldiers. The earlier regime 
was held in check by the reality of a military dominated by Blacks and a more 
powerful Northern competitor. The new neocolonial client regime on the other 
hand, had the full backing of the military of a foreign power, faced no internal 
armed opposition, and had a new centralized foreign-backed gendarmerie to 
impose its will on the population (Castor 1971, Delince 1979, 18-9, Y. L. Auguste 
1979). While Boyer never defeated Northern nationalist forces, the client regime 
of Dartiguenave did, with the support of occupation forces. Unlike the Pétion-
Boyer regime whose lack of legitimacy compelled it to curtail its excesses against 
the population, the new neocolonial client regime had no such reservations. Its 
dependence on a foreign military force and their defeat of Northern forces made 
it impervious to threats and internal pressures, and less careful about cultivating 
internal legitimacy with the Black citizenry. By 1920, Haiti was saddled with an 
entrenched occupation, a client regime that had no control over national 
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decision-making and having even to request and be denied funds to repatriate its 
dead ambassador from Washington, DC by the American financial advisor191.   
As Langston Hughes keenly observed during his visit to Haiti, “The Haitian 
live today under a sort of military dictatorship backed by American guns. They 
are not free.” (Hughes 1932, 157) To add insult to injury, Haiti had to suffer an 
elite and its president who, having betrayed a segment of the nation for its own 
interests, would not even be considered fit in their own country to enter the social 
clubs of these very Marines on whose support they depended for domination (H. 
Schmidt 1971, 129, Blancpain 1999, 362). Ironically, despite the collusion, 
subservience, and dependency of the Haitian president he was informed by 
Warren G. Harding, the American president in 1921, that his term would not be 
renewed because of the failure to fully cooperate with American government 
functionaries in Haiti192 (Blancpain 1999, 364). They had found a better client 
president. 
The seven years of the client regime of Dartiguenave ended with the 
consolidation of the neocolonial-American alliance, the political dominance of 
neocolonial elites, the elimination of the nationalist military and political 
infrastructure, and the creation of a central military apparatus at its service. The 
                                                          
191 Financial Advisor Addition T. Ruan in a letter responding to Louis Borno’s request for funding to 
retrieve the body of Solon Menos, the Haitian ambassador on November 13, 1918 wrote, “As you know 
financing laws stipulate no payment without the appropriate requirements and a new rule has not been 
produced to that effect nor budgetary provision accounting for such expense. In the absence of these 
indispensable legal requirements, I regret not being able to acquiesce to your request”.  The difference 




Haitian government under Dartiguenave was a government without the capacity 
to make decision about state matters; it could neither collect revenues from its 
own customs nor dispense of them for the benefit of the state and its citizens 
without the approval of the American government and its representatives (Balch 
1927, Bellegarde 1929a, Blancpain 1999, 148-53). Even the salaries of state 
functionaries had to be cleared and paid by American commissioners and were 
often denied or delayed if the functionary did not support the occupation or if their 
role were deemed unimportant.  Dartiguenave, the president of the client regime 
had his salaries withheld for disagreeing with leaders of the occupation (Danache 
1969).  
In assessing the absence of autonomy of the client-regime of 
Dartiguenave, Bellegarde-Smith notes, “At the government level, all executive 
departments of the Haitian state had been seized outright by the occupying 
forces, except for education and justice” (Bellegarde-Smith 1985, 28). The 
Ministry of Justice was irrelevant as occupying forces abrogated all laws, 
arrested, imprisoned or killed citizens at their discretion while refusing to pay the 
ministries’ staff and judges. Education was neglected and defunded and closed 
the only medical school was. American Marines did not think Haitians were 
capable of classical education, closing existing schools, favoring and funding 
only vocational and agricultural schools (Buell 1929, R. W. Logan 1930, 448-51, 
Brutus 1948, 460-8, Berthoumieux 1950, 110-13). These policies led the 
American scholar Rayford Logan to observe of General Russell, 
[T]he high commissioner appeared to consider Haitians 
primarily destined to be hewers of wood and drawers of 
water when he proclaimed a policy of making every 
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Haitian the master of a trade. Russell’s educational 
program not only implied the inability of Haitians to 
acquire professional an classical education, but it also 
run afoul of the Haitian tradition which had always 
depended on these disciplines to defend their nation and 
their race… (R. W. Logan 1968, 137, 1985, 64-7).  
 
It appeared for all intents and purposes that “racism and violent measures 
to pacify the country” were the two main features of the occupation under 
Dartiguenave’s client regime (R. W. Logan 1971, 339). Indeed, American forces 
introduced and institutionalized Jim Crow laws and practices into the Haitian 
political and social spheres. Paradoxically, neocolonial elites engaged in their 
own brand of Jim Crowism, excluding dark skinned Haitians as they complained 
of exclusion by Americans in their own nation193.  Neocolonial elites while 
decrying being barred from white clubs, hotels, and social gatherings by marines 
and American representatives in their own country engaged in wholesale 
targeting of Blacks in the North, the eclipsing of black leaders in positions of 
influence, and the preferential treatment to their Mulatto kin. As Paquin notes, 
“certain hotels, clubs, and restaurants catering to Americans became off-limits to 
Haitians” (Balch 1927, Price-Mars 1928/1983, Bellegarde 1929a, Paquin 1983, 
77)194. Another scholar notes,  
[A]mericans retained their initial distrust of the elite, 
denigrating the Mulattoes for their anti-democratic 
politics and European ways. Already American social 
standards penetrated polite society. Segregation 
flourished. The Marines had their American clubs, off 
limit to Haitians including Borno, but the Port-au-Prince 
                                                          
193  
194 Although a Mulatto apologist, Paquin argues, that before saddled with colorism and a sense of cultural 
superiority, Mulatto elites became outright racist because of the occupation, distancing themselves from 
their Black counterparts with whom they historically mingled. 
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elite had its Club Bellevue, which remained closed to 
anyone in Uniform. Upper-class Haitians suppressed 
their resentment of American racist slights (Langley 
2002, 167) 
 
Even neocolonial elites who colluded and benefited from the occupation 
by capturing control of the state were themselves loathed and discriminated 
against by the occupation forces. Yet, suppression as Langley suggests is an 
inadequate characterization, perhaps Richard Rohr observation that “Pain, if not 
transformed, is transferred,” is more appropriate in this respect. While offended 
by American racism, neocolonial Mulatto elites reproduced the same patterns of 
discrimination and Jim Crowism. They opted to recreate, with American support, 
the policies of Black marginalization of the Boyer era, and refocusing the 
historical schism by elevating and institutionalizing, once again, the aristocracy of 
the skin in all the institution of the nation. In a misreading or blatant obscuring of 
Haitian history, Paquin notes 
[T]he Mulatto upper class became color conscious and, 
reinforced by their position under the occupation; their 
social activities became more exclusive of their black 
counterparts. Social clubs tended to become limited to 
members of a particular color group (Paquin 1983, 
77)195.  
 
Trouillot is perhaps closest to the historical reality in his assessment of the 
convergence between American Jim Crowism and neocolonial racism noting,  
U.S. racism added its institutional systematism to Haitian 
colorist favoritism. The U.S. ‘advisers,’ who in fact ran 
many government services, openly showed their 
preference for light-skinned officials… The visibility of the 
                                                          
195 (Rotberg and Clague 1971), quoted by Lyonel Paquin. The Caribbean and Latin American scholar, Lester 
Langley notes, it was not infrequent to hear high level American representatives suggest, “the only hope 
of the negroes is wise guidance… it would be fatal to turn the government over to negroes, as fatal or 
worse than it was to turn the South over to negroes after the Civil war” (Langley 2002, 164). 
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mulatres grew – as did their arrogance in 
institutionalization of ‘the aristocracy of the skin’ (Trouillot 
1990, 129-30) 
 
It is not that they became color conscious, for the first time, though they held 
power as client to the occupation, they felt protected and empowered by the 
support offered by a foreign power to impose Their  governance model as they 
did under Pétion and Boyer. Moreover, that power and the type of governance it 
offered to neocolonial elites had thinned their ranks of the few non-Mulattoes 
elites. Successive neocolonial Mulatto client regimes would deepen that 
arrogance and systematization of American Jim Crow practices. The 
replacement of Dartiguenave by Louis Borno, the highest-ranking member of his 
cabinet selected by his handpicked Council of State, was supported by 
Commissioner Russell. According to consular correspondence, as Dartiguenave 
promised to acquiesce to American demands by signing the treaty if elected in 
1915, Louis Borno, constitutionally ineligible for the presidency196, promised to 
sign banking contracts to which the previous regime had objected thus 
committing “the United States government to long-term oversight of Haitian 
finances197 (H. Schmidt 1971, 132-3). Despite some objections to Borno’s 
                                                          
196 For information regarding the birth of Louis Borno and subsequent naturalization as a Haitian citizen of 
his French father, a fact that should have prevented Louis Borno from becoming president due to the 
constitutional requirement that stipulates Haitian presidents be born of Haitian fathers, see (Blancpain 
1999, 157) 
197 Although the historian Blancpain argues that Borno had no prior agreement with Russell and dismisses 
those who suggest otherwise as engaging in myths, correspondences between the American 
Commissioner, General Russell and the Division of Latin American Affairs suggest otherwise (Blancpain 
1999, 158).  A perusal of the following documents seem to upend Blancpain claim in support of the 
Haitian thesis – see Division of Latin American Affairs memorandum to Welles, November 16, 1921 No. 
838.51/1262 and Russell to Hughes, April 26, 1922. 
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election by segments of his neocolonial allies, their collaboration with him 
consolidated and centralized authority in the president and the high 
commissioner and consolidating the clientelist aspect of the occupation into what 
most scholars of Haiti (even the American financial advisor) describe as a “joint 
dictatorship” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 107). Voted by 14 out of the 21 members of 
the Council of State, and over the objections of remnants of the nationalist elites 
in Port-au-Prince, Borno’s presidency meant a consolidation of neocolonial 
control and the expansion of the clientelist relationship. It also meant leading a 
government not just dependent on American support but one where the 
American high commissioner exercised veto power over every decision of the 
Haitian government, however insignificant and the Haitian government exercising 
dictatorial power over his countrymen (Bellegarde 1929, Brutus 1948).   
The Dartiguenave regime, even when collaborating with the Occupation 
and assisting in the dismantling of northern nationalist political and military 
infrastructure and the consolidation of neocolonial power, sought a degree of 
autonomy from American control and retained some independent nationalists, 
albeit members of his ethnic group, on his cabinet. Borno, on the other hand, 
named people already known and palatable to Commissioner Russell, avoided 
conflicts by acquiescing to his policies at the detriment of the state and its 
citizens198. According to the American financial advisor at the time,  
                                                          
198 Some scholars have suggested that Borno’s cooperation with the occupation was “because he believed 
that the American program would modernize Haiti, achieve a viable economy and bring efficiency to 
governmental institutions” (M. W. Shannon 1976, 57, Blancpain 1999). 
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[G]overnment in Haiti took the form of joint dictatorship. 
There was understanding, Friendship and collaboration 
between them… The High Commissioner’s close 
relationship with President Borno made the opposition to 
Borno an anti-American movement, particularly so 
because the High Commissioner was the diplomatic 
representative of the United States (Streit 1928, A. 
Millspaugh 1971, 107-8).  
 
Under Borno’s client regime, jail became a revolving door for the 
opposition, the implementation of vocational and agricultural at the detriment of 
classical and professional studies became fully supported. More importantly, 
neocolonial elites and their progeny who were responsive only to Borno 
dominated the institutions of the state. The gendarmerie became the primary 
vehicle for buttressing the regime and quelling internal dissent against both the 
occupation and the regime. Apart from the Gendarmerie, whose training, 
personnel, and institutional capacity had been carefully expanded, the expantion 
of the capacity of state institutions, led by American advisors remained 
neglected. Such was the dependence that in some cases, even the regime’s 
attempts to deepen its clientelist network by expanding access to state 
institutions and schools were prevented. Despite the rhetoric of development and 
good governance used by the American government, given their policies and 
practices, it is fair to suggest that Borno would not have been permitted to 
develop the state’s institutional and personnel capacity necessary to support the 
development of the nation and its citizens.   
[A]merican teachers hired by the state received $3-400 
monthly to Haitians’ $15.00. Haitian schools who favored 
classical education was financed at $4.50 per capita to 
the Americans’ $50 and of the 400,000 school age 
 253 
 
children three-quarters were not in any school at all (R. 
W. Logan 1930, 440-60, 1968, 137-8)199.  
 
Re-elected again in 1926 by his personally selected Council of State, Borno 
served with mounting opposition. Despite the declaration of martial law by the 
American Commissioner, his attempt to delay legislative elections and 
orchestrate a third term using his Council of State culminated into a widespread 
civil disobedience movement and the demise of his government (Bellegarde 
1929, Anglade 1974, Y. L. Auguste 1979). The scholar Paul Douglas in 
discussing the role of the Council of State in the election noted, 
[P]rior to the election, President Borno replaced several 
members of the Council with others of whose support he was 
more certain. He was re-elected in April, receiving all of the 
twenty-one votes with the exception of one member who did not 
vote and another who cast a black ballot. These men are 
appointed by the President and hold not for any stated period of 
time but only at his pleasure. The somewhat ridiculous spectacle 
is then presented of a President appointing the very men who 
are to determine whether or not he shall be re-elected. Under 
these circumstances, it would not seem very difficult for a 
President to succeed himself if the American Occupation did not 
oppose him and if wanted another term (Douglas 1927, 255, 
258) 
 
                                                          
199 Some have argued that in many ways, Borno had managed to reproduce if not the policy of 
disenfranchisement of the Black masses implemented by Boyer, at least the same result of educational 
neglect and institutional marginalization, if not exclusion. Borno’s collaboration was based on the belief 
that Haiti needed American support for national development and political stability. The mulatrization of 
his regime is not due to racism views but the fact that he had little control over those institutions 
controlled by Americans. Moreover, both Scholars Shannon and Blancpain refute the claim that a disparity 
truly existed and argues that any disparity in education was due to Borno’s provincial ideas and emphasis 
on classic French education. They maintained that Russell was convinced that a system of vocational 
education, agriculture, and trade was necessary to create a middle class that could bridge the gap 
between the elite and the masses and letters from Russell to Borno clearly support their claim (M. W. 
Shannon 1976, 63, Blancpain 1999, 213-6). Indeed one could argue that theirs was a difference in 
philosophy of national development and not based on racism. Russell’s idea that a strong and stable 
middleclass is a source of political stability and democracy is not without foundation. However, Bobo also 
expressed similar idea, “the country needed time to organize itself so that the masses up to now 
miserably exploited can be fully liberated, through work and education, from the slavery where 
plundering politicians without heart and honor have kept them” qted in (Blancpain 1999, 248) 
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The American Occupation did not object and in fact tacitly supported his decision 
by aiding in the arrest of opposition figures and the muzzling of the press 
(Blancpain 1999, 248-53). The Bono-Russell alliance, at its peak, made the 
client-regime impervious to national pressures, but by making the alliance so 
obvious and visible, both the regime and the occupation governance 
infrastructure became vulnerable to national recriminations. 
The Borno regime, by its actions and collusion, seems to be an extension 
of the authority of the occupation. As Streit observed, it resulted in  
[I]dentifying American officials and President Borno as 
one and the same. It has put both in a position where 
each may be condemned in specific matters, for the sins 
of the other, but where neither can afford to disown the 
other. All of which constitutes a vicious cycle of 
centrifugal force, ever widening between most of the 
articulate Haitians, on the one hand, and the Haitian 
government and out intervention officials, on the other 
(Streit 1928, 626-7).  
 
This symbiosis between the client regime and the American occupation created a 
political opening for resistance national forces. For the first time, opposition 
forces were able to challenge the Occupation and its client-regime and neither 
the Occupation forces and its gendarmerie nor the client-regime had the ability to 
limit the impact of that challenge on its governance structure. The most 
remarkable aspect of this new phenomenon however, was the complete absence 
of Northern nationalist forces and their military infrastructure in this political 
transition. Nevertheless, the prevalence of their progeny, not as politico-military 
and economic elites as before, but as middleclass and working class 
professional, and political newcomers in Port-au-Prince would lead a new 
resistance, one lead by intellectual and professionals instead of military men.  
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Surviving and new intellectual elites created a new political phase, one that 
would come to challenge the neocolonial grip on the state, its institution and the 
nation (Trouillot 1990). Short of military capacity, they used the most important 
instrument Haitians have used since independence to defend their nation; their 
intellectual capacity and the power of the pen200. 
The failure of Borno and the Occupation to subdue the widespread national 
protest movement finally opened the way to renegotiating the terms of the 
occupation and a path to its end. As if to confirm the dependence and clientelist 
nature of Borno’s neocolonial regime, despite widespread protests, it was the 
State department that mandated the terms of his departure and ordered a 
process for legislative elections201 (M. W. Shannon 1976, 58).  However, the 
demise of Borno’s client regime did not end American clientelism in Haiti nor did 
it end the neocolonial supremacy it had orchestrated. Neocolonial control 
remained unimpeded and far from including remnants of the surviving nationalist 
elites, their progeny, and the emerging Black middle class, they monopolized 
state and national institutions and continued the Jim Crow policies their patrons 
used to marginalize them.   
It was precisely this racism and the Borno-Russell alliance that gave focus to 
Haitians resisting the occupation one centered on Haiti’s black identity and 
                                                          
200 This is precisely why resistance to American refusal to fund classical education was the source of so 
much conflict. Targeted by powerful nations since its inception, the nation has always relied on its 
intellectuals as a bulwark of resistance to marginalization and exclusion on the world stage. 
201 See correspondence between Stimson, the Secretary of War to the American Legation, April 11, 1929; 
Stimson to Russell, August 2, 1929, p.1; Russell to Stimson, December 24, 1929, PSCH, HHPL.  
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culture. What the Black nationalist elites and their military infrastructure were 
unable to accomplish, this intellectual cultural movement, Negritude, which 
involved both the sons of neocolonial elites who grew up under the Occupation 
and black intellectuals made possible. Negritude was Haitians’ way of reclaiming 
their history, pride, and identity as a source of resistance against the trauma of 
occupation and the violence and racism it produced. Rather than succumbing to 
American and neocolonial racism, they reclaimed their blackness, arguing that 
the nation can only be uplifted  from the degradation of occupation and 
destruction of the national psyche by acknowledging its identity and using it as a 
tool for resistance and regeneration. It was not new; it was part of the 
Louverturean discourse.  It was the ideological underpinnings that guided the 
nationalist regimes of Dessalines, Soulouque and Solomon rejected by 
neocolonialists, and partly that of the nationalist party absent the political and 
military power.   
Negritude, led by the Black Northern scholar Jean Price-Mars, with both 
blacks and Mulatto intellectual adherents directly challenged the clientelist 
framework of neocolonial’s aristocracy of the skin and American racism and 
domination. This new movement confronted both the Occupation and its client 
regime on the terms in which they had cooperated and led; racism and the 
disenfranchisement of the black population (Bellegarde Smith 1982, 171-5). It 
motivated students to take to the street nationwide to challenge the occupation 
and its client-regime and won. Borno was removed from power, a caretaker 
government chosen to organize legislative and presidential elections, which saw 
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a legislature and a president properly elected according to Haitian constitution for 
the first time since the occupation began.  
Despite the success of Negritude in providing focus for the resistance and 
influencing political change, it was ultimately the Americans who dictated the 
terms of the transition for the client state; it was they who mandated the very 
steps that would end the occupation202. The recommendations of the Forbes 
Commission sent to investigate the disturbances in Haiti is useful in 
demonstrating the success of the movement and ironic if one understands the 
constraints the Occupation imposed on the Haitian state and on the socio-
political and economic life of the nation203 (M. W. Shannon 1976, 66). The 
Commission sought to undo in six years what had been imposed after 15-years 
under Occupation with considerable violence and collusion: 
 Rapid Haitianization of the services by 1936 – but all of these institutions 
were led by White Americans and Haitians, no matter their education and 
professional experience had not been allowed important post.  Even in the 
Gendarmerie only 38% of all its Captains and Lieutenants were Haitians 
 The selection of racially unbiased employees for the Haitian service – 
even though they had already removed dark skinned Haitians and replace 
them by Mulattoes and the American society itself relied on racism for 
governance 
 Abolition of the office of High Commissioner, appointment of a non-military 
minister, and non-intervention in Haitian affairs – Though the very reason 
for the occupation was to bring Haiti and other nations in the Caribbean 
and Latin American under American political influence and economic 
control. More importantly, the alliance with post-occupation elites and the 
                                                          
 
 
203 Reports of the President’s Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti, 
March 26, 1930, PSCH, HHPL. Plan of Commission, March 21-24, 1930. 
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formation of a central military to support them created the new 
infrastructure for indirect intervention. The power of the American 
Embassy would replace the power of the Marines. 
 Gradual withdrawal of the Marines – yet the Gendarmerie was structured 
and trained as the new occupying force so the departure of the Marines 
did not mean the end of their policies and their involvement.  In the case of 
Haiti, not only did the gendarmerie placed Mulattoes at the head of the 
Gendarmerie, it was the only institution that was intentionally trained, 
organized and permitted to lead thus the most powerful post-occupation 
institution. 
 
The Occupation and its client regime had permanently re-engineered the 
political landscape and political competition and participation. The Black 
Nationalist elites and their military infrastructure that had kept neocolonial elites 
at bay from the levers of power and limited the vulnerability and dependency of 
the state had been dismantled (Bellegarde 1929, 1929a, R. W. Logan 1961). The 
success of the Negritude movement forced both a re-evaluation of black identity 
as central to the nation and a transition did not upend the new landscape, but 
simply removed the U. S. Marines from Haitian soil. Haiti’s political landscape 
had been redesigned – clientelism and dependency were now permanent 
features of the nation. 
         The removal of Borno and election of Stenio Vincent would reaffirm the 
challenges of a post-occupation dependent Haiti and the new political dynamic. 
Vincent was elected because he was a member of the Patriotic Union, a group 
founded in 1920 “to defend Haiti’s sovereignty and dignity”. He had taken part in 
resistance activities against the Occupation and the Borno regime with prominent 
Black Nationalist Pauleus Sannon and was considered impartial, free of racial 
bias, and above all an “intransigent patriot.” His program, according to Gingras, 
“reflected the unanimous views of all honest citizens; to liberate Haiti smoothly 
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from the occupation and from foreign ascendancy.” (Gingras 1967, 70) Within a 
year, the Veto powers held by the American ministers and financial advisor were 
eliminated as mandated by the Forbes Commission; The Garde was fully 
Haitianized as well as the management of important departments (Castor 1978). 
By 1934, due to Vincent’s personal relationship with the President of the United 
States, F.D. Roosevelt, the physical manifestations of the occupation were also 
finally removed. To facilitate his re-election, Vincent changed the Constitution, 
and mirroring the Occupation, used the military to arrest opposition figures, 
organized for a plebiscite for the approval of the Constitution and closed 
newspapers and imprisoned journalists who opposed him.  
While, argues Flynn, “coercion and manipulation are inseparable from the 
power relationship expressed in political clientelism,” Violence and coercion are 
by necessity the central feature to control a state in the absence of legitimacy 
and adequate resources to maintain effective populous clientelist networks 
(Flynn 1974, 135, Knight 1993, Gray 1998, Bogues 2002, Roniger 2004). Having 
little control over the resources of the state, still under American oversight, and 
having dedicated available resources to secure the support of neocolonial elites, 
Vincent had little recourse other than coercion to hold the population and 
opposition in check. His new Constitution muzzled the legislative branch by 
removing their ability to influence governmental decision from the Chamber of 
deputies, and as Gingras notes,  
This democratic constitution gave Vincent the right to 
name 10 out of the twenty one senators and to submit a 
list of the 11 others to the chamber of deputies for their 
nominal approval. A later amendment gave him the 
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power to dismiss any representative at any time.” 
(Gingras 1967, 73, Blancpain 1999, 329) 
 
Vincent had re-implemented the policies of the previous client regimes without 
the High Commissioner, created a Mulatto-dominated Senate, put his caste in 
charge of all state institutions and short of disbanding, undermined the power 
and influence of the more populous, more nationalist darker-skinned Chamber of 
deputies.  His control and Haitianization of the new military or Garde D’Haiti 
provided him with the protection to impose his will on the nation and shifted the 
Garde’s strict hierarchical and meritocratic promotion mechanism to one at the 
service of his caste. Having integrated the Garde’s leadership into his clientelist 
network “he surrounded himself with, and was protected by a group of totally 
devoted Mulatto officers, who naturally worked diligently to promote their own 
kind and kin,” notes Paquin (Paquin 1983, 80). Despite Vincent’s initial attempts 
to include prominent Black leaders in his government and some Blacks in state 
institutions to obtain broader popular support and offset Mulatto competitors, his 
election and re-election furthered the mulatrization of the neocolonial client 
regime. However, the Mulatto-dominated national political landscape and the 
state had been transformed into a new clientelist and dependency paradigm; one 
best described by Gingras,  
In the overall scheme, the Americans granted some 
concessions to the Mulattoes and even gave them some 
semblance of supremacy; but, and most importantly, 
American influence predominated ( (Gingras 1967, 78) 
 
Indeed, Americans had since the occupation decided who should be in power 
and when they should leave; their litmus test, the willingness of these regimes to 
protect of American geopolitical and economic interests. Since the Occupation, it 
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has ranged from acquiescing to a treaty that permanently tied the Haitian 
economy to American economic and geopolitical interests, to securing and 
consolidating loans that enable the monopolization of Haitian banking and 
economic decision-making (R. W. Logan 1968, 144). However, despite requiring 
the obeisance of successive Haitian governments and preservation of American 
economic interests, it was not just the Americans who were informing and 
supporting Mulatto dominance, it was the emboldened neocolonial Mulatto elites 
themselves, backed by the new Mulatto-dominated military.  
          The military-protected clientelist infrastructure of power had demonstrated 
its capacity to impose its will on the nation. The Pétionist neocolonial regime had 
resurfaced more powerful than before, and “the elite caste seemed firmly in the 
saddle…and Vincent’s amoralism had opened all the politico-social sores of 
Haiti” (Gingras 1967, 72). The 1937 massacre of 33,000 Haitians and 
Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic by the Trujillo regime 
and the absence of a robust response by the Vincent’s government became part 
of the symptom of the new post-Occupation neocolonial state. The response, 
argues the eminent Haitian historian, Dr. Suzy Castor, lead to the suppression of 
the incident and to a “complicity of silence” that was indicative of the interests of 
the oligarchy to the plight of the Haitian masses (Price-Mars 1953, Castor 1988, 
70). Given the neglect with which the Vincent government and its representative 
in Washington dealt with the genocide, it is fair to suggest, as have most 
scholars, that Vincent and those who dominated his government lack of concern 
for the lives of their citizens was demonstrated by its failure to produce an 
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adequate state response204. Thus, it is not surprising that the Haitianization of 
services he undertook as recommended by the Forbes Commission and 
mandated by the American government led to the institutionalization and 
systematization of neocolonial Mulatto dominance to the detriment of the majority 
black population.  
Having been already populated by light-skinned Haitians in the lower 
echelon due to American racism, the Gendarmerie, now christened Garde D 
’Haiti, as well as all other state institutions became under Mulatto leadership 
through Haitianization205. The centralization of power in the Capital, a 
geographical space historically dominated by neocolonial elites that had not 
experienced the violence the occupation meted on the North and its black 
population, also facilitated this mulatrization process. Having re-established 
control over the senate, Vincent also engineered the election of his chosen 
candidate Elie Lescot to continue his political platform.  As Gingras points out, 
“citizen Lescot was elected president, on April 15, 1941, without a presidential 
campaign, by a rubber-stamp parliament, with a majority of 56 voices out of 56 
voters”206 (Gingras 1967, 74). 
                                                          
204 Paquin suggests that Vincent was concerned about military conflicts between the two nations and that 
this concern mitigated the national response (Paquin 1983). What is clear though argues Delince is that 
following this debacle, he removed the highest-ranking officer of the Haitian Garde replacing him by more 
malleable Mulatto officers (Delince 1979). 
205 Haitian governments had no control over their finances until 1946 because of the treaty signed by the 
Borno regime. The occupation could have compelled an inclusive Haitianization had their national politics 
and international politics not been influence by their own racism and stereotypes (Weston 1972) . 
206 Rayford Logan argues that it was elected by 54 votes out of 56 voters (R. W. Logan 1968, 146) 
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This re-emergence of the aristocracy of the skin during the Occupation, its 
consolidation and continuity with the farcical election of Lescot207 and its control 
of and reliance on the centralized American-created national army without the 
Northern nationalist military infrastructure to challenge it, gave neocolonial elites 
unlimited national power. The Occupation had created a new political landscape, 
refashioned the state and engineered their re-emergence as holders of state 
power. Lescot presidency would become the rallying point. Lescot not only 
continued the policy of his predecessor, but demonstrating the true clientelist 
nature of his regime, he made clear his alliance with the United States in his 
inaugural address,  
Let us proclaim that our fate is deeply tied with that of 
the United States. I intend that our international policy be 
the real, candid image of the international policy of our 
generous and powerful neighbor.” (Gingras 1967, 75) 
 
The Lescot Regime, attempting to support American investments, 
dispossessed the Haitian peasantry of 200,000 acres of land, the most important 
marker of freedom for the Haitian peasantry since independence. He used the 
military to institute mass arrests of those who criticized his regime, extended his 
mandate and those of the Senate whom he had the power to nominate, 
postponed elections, established the most exclusive Mulatto regime since Boyer 
with segregationist pro-Mulatto policies to institutionalize political power (Dash 
1997, 87).  Both Borno and Vincent had tried to, at least, maintain a veneer of 
                                                          
207 With the new power to select the Senators, Vincent nominated Lescot for the Senate in absentia which 
made him eligible for the presidency. Following his selection as a Senator, he was subsequently selected 
as the president to replace Vincent. 
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racial equilibrium. However, Vincent at the end of his regime, and Lescot from 
the very start of his presidency advocated and implemented policies of 
discrimination not just against the peasant masses by targeting their religion and 
traditional practices, but against the surviving and new intellectual, political and 
economic elites by excluding them from the levers of state and national 
institutional power.  As Paquin notes, 
[T]he question of color became the paramount issue in 
Lescot’s regime… The Mulattoes had unchallenged 
political supremacy. Secured in that fortress, they 
extended their exclusivism to the social setting… The 
Lescot regime outdid itself in its blatant discrimination in 
the foreign service.” (Paquin 1983, 82-83)  
 
These practices of exclusion and Lescot targeting of the peasantry re-
invigorated the Negritude movement. Despite engineering his re-election, he was 
forced from the Presidency by popular uprising, and a military triumvirate was 
established to lead the political transition. It was the military, not politicians, that 
dictated the terms of the transition. Subsequent attempts by its Mulatto officer 
corps to forcefully shape the path, scope and nature of the post-Lescot transition 
process without success, became the staging ground for future actions (Delince 
1979, Paquin 1983, Ruffat 1991, M. S. Laguerre 1993, Renda 2001).  
Three features evolved in post-occupation Haiti, which became apparent 
in the overthrow of Lescot: first, the exclusion of the masses in the electoral 
process was necessary for neocolonial dominance of the political system and the 
state. Second, whereas before the challenge was between opposing elites, now 
the masses became the primary challengers to the client regimes. Third, the 
military the source of support for nationalist and later reorganized to support the 
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new neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, began to display its own power, 
interests and internal schisms because of the inclusion of its leadership in the 
neocolonial governance scheme.  
The fall of Lescot resulted in shifting the electoral calculus that had 
perpetuated neocolonial dominance; the senatorial election by popular suffrage 
instead of presidential nomination was instituted. This change resulted in the 
election of the most diverse chambers of Senators and Deputies since the 
occupation, and consequently, the election of Haiti’s first Black president, 
Dumarsai Estime.  The population had reasserted its power, and accordingly, a 
Black president was elected projecting future struggled between a neocolonial-
dominated state and military and a new black president with roots in the North.  
Lescot, according to Paquin, “did very well what his regime was supposed to do 
as an overseer of American interests in Haiti” but the post-occupation 
governance system and its anointed neocolonial leaders, because of their 
deficiency in popular legitimacy, lacked the ability to withstand pressure from the 
Haitian polis. Their lack of legitimacy became the primary source of vulnerability 
and instability. The military had emerged not just as a pawn but also as an arbiter 
in Haitian affairs and perhaps the most important one. The election of Estime 
however did not affect the direction of the new neocolonial state nor did it 
substantively change the role and leadership of the military. This new political 
development, the election of a true representative legislature and a Black 
President, far from indicating a shift in the orientation of the state and its military, 
created the pressure that would compel the military to play out its true nature of 
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preserving and protecting political elites capable of maintaining American and 
business interests.  
The new post-Occupation state, with its military exercising monopoly over 
the use of force, its unchecked power, and lack of reliance on the population for 
its legitimacy, became the only institution capable of maintaining neocolonial 
dominance or intervene decisively in the political process. The military forceful 
entry into the political arena to support the client regime or lead if need be to 
safeguard foreign and elites’ interests became an important post-occupation 
transition.   
Unable to retain power democratically, neocolonial elites and military 
supporters would result to coercion (J. McCrocklin 1956, Delince 1979).  The 
increase role of the military to protect their clientelist infrastructure and its 
neocolonial elites would mark it as a target by the masses and an emerging 
Black intelligentsia and middleclass Black population opposed to an elite that had 
neglected their interests (Gingras 1967, Nicholls 1979). The Garde’s cohesion 
since its creating by the Marines with its leadership dominated by Mulattoes and 
its lower echelons by Blacks began to experience internal dissent due to the 
political and ideological divergence between its officers and soldiers (Delince 
1979, Laguerre 1993). Before the vehicle for Mulatto dominance, racial and 
ideological schism within its ranks would shift the allegiance of the Garde as the 
vehicle that would drive the rise of Duvalier’s dictatorial Noirist regime, and later 
its target in Duvalier’s attempt to undo Mulatto political and institutional 




Clientelism and Dependency as Consequences of the Occupation: 
In Haiti, American occupiers found a divided nation and a weak, 
leaderless, and dysfunctional state with northern leaders competing for its control 
and orientation, and neocolonial elites for its spoils. They found a state that had 
lost its direction and ability to defend challenges to its sovereignty since the failed 
attempt of the Firminist modernist forces, which ended with the death of Leconte. 
More importantly, they found collaborators willing to sacrifice national sovereignty 
for personal and ethnic interests208. The lack of cohesion of Louverturean forces 
and intra-elite competition had lost them the control and orientation of the state to 
neocolonial elites and their foreign allies (R. Gaillard 1981, J. Desquiron 1993). 
Their failure to maintain an effective northern coalition and re-establish the 
Louverturean social contract between the state and its citizens ultimately resulted 
in their downfall. More than neocolonial elites whose economic interests had 
historically taken precedence over those of the nation, and whose betrayal was 
                                                          
208 The Scholar Philippe Girard, Edouard Depestre, and others have correctly suggested that some elites 
were genuinely concerned about the welfare of the nation and saw the continuing instability as an 
impediment to national progress (P. R. Girard 2010, 76-9). This concern is what led Charles Moravia to 
write, “We are not at war with the United States, the Americans are the enemies of a sovereign 
Despotism and occupy the country to prevent its restoration” (Nicholls 1979, 146, Montague 1940, 212). 
They saw in the United States a potential ally for both investments and support (Firmin 1905). Even the 
distinguish nationalist scholar and statesman, Jacque-Nicolas leger, as early as 1886, advocated for an 
alliance between Haiti and the United States, “If it was necessary” he wrote, “ for Haiti to form an alliance, 
it would not be, at the moment, in Europe she would seek such an alliance… many times, the United 
States have shown themselves disposed to accord us, at the very least, strong moral backing; and has 
always treated us with the utmost courtesy” (J.-N. Leger 1886, 135-6). It may be therefore useful to 
suggest that not all who collaborated with the occupation forces did that for personal and/or ethnic 
interests. The distinguished historian Roger Gaillard argues that the cooperation of certain members of 
the elite was to avert bloodshed (Gaillard 1973, 112-4). 
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predictable, Northern Louverturean elites, with unqualified military dominance, 
should ultimately be held responsible for losing the independence of the Haitian 
state so valiantly gained. Their failure to use their political and military power to 
bring national stability and cohesion cannot be ignored.  Having gained the upper 
hand over their neocolonial counterpart, shortsightedness and fratricide 
undermined their ability to find a permanent path for the state (Bellegarde 1929, 
H. Schmidt 1971). The ultimate measure of that failure was their inability to 
properly arm and train their shock troops for a confrontation they surely could 
anticipate given the patterns of American involvement in other neighboring 
nations in the Caribbean and Latin America (Nicholls 1979, Trouillot 1990). They 
had neglected the very forces upon which their political and military dominance 
depended and the very national ideological underpinnings that afforded them 
coherence and purpose. In their internal competition for control of the neocolonial 
state, they had neglected the very basis of the Louverturean project, and the 
foundation of the nation’s independence; military power for the protection of 
national sovereignty from external and internal threats, and interdependence 
between the state and the nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, A. Millspaugh 1971, 
M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Pierre-Etienne 2010). The American Marines found a 
Northern military force, the only force capable and willing to resist the occupation, 
unprepared, untrained, and poorly armed, having been used in intra-nationalist 
elite competition for power rather than national defense (R. Gaillard 1984, Dupuy 
1989). Yet, even so, they found a force and leaders, whom despite being 
outgunned, were willing to defend the sovereignty of the Republic and did so well 
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into the fifth year of the occupation (Nicolas 1927, H. Schmidt 1971, R. Gaillard 
1981). 
Despite their resistance however, they succumbed to the overwhelming 
force of a better-equipped military superpower, and lost the historical struggle to 
create an independent nation, connected to the world system but not subjugated 
by it. The Louverturean project continued through the struggle of Northern 
nationalist to maintain dominance over the neocolonial state finally ended and 
with it the sovereignty and autonomy of a nation that had fought so valiantly 
through the years. The Occupation, having defeated the nation’s nationalists and 
destroyed their political and military infrastructure, imposed on Haiti a distinct 
Clientelism; one guided by coercion and foreign military support, lacking the 
required popular legitimacy from a cross-section of the population and the 
political institutions to sustain it (Nicolas 1927, 160-5, H. Schmidt 1971, 86, 
Renda 2001). This form of military or coercion-centered clientelism established in 
Haiti that relied on foreign protection and dependency enabled its beneficiaries, 
neocolonial elites and their client regimes, to ignore the interests of the nation 
and aspiration of its citizens. 
The Occupation succeeded in four major aspects. The population, armed 
since independence, and long able to defend itself, was disarmed and pacified, 
northern elites predominance was eliminated, and their military infrastructure 
destroyed and replaced by a centralized military led by Western and Southern 
Mulatto officers. Moreover, the neocolonial state became centralized with all 
power derived from the capital. For the first time, political and military power was 
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finally concentrated into the hands of neocolonial elites. More importantly, the 
state and its client regime came under the patronage and protection of an 
external power. The policies of the Occupation, in re-structuring power in the 
neocolonial state, and the institutional, economic, and political developments 
they engendered, crafted a more stable and protected state no longer vulnerable 
to pressure from regional forces, but designed to pacify resistance to the 
governance system and its elites instead providing national protection (Delince 
1979, M. S. Laguerre 1993). For once, since the Boyerist regime, the neocolonial 
state was safe and its power uncontested and because of the policies 
implemented by the occupation, had acquired the capacity to maintain and 
defend neocolonial elite control. The state under American Occupation and 
during the post-Occupation era became less prone to contestations, and 
neocolonial elites, having acquired a new centralized military and the protection 
of a foreign power, became less interested in fostering their relationship with the 
population and strengthening legitimacy and support for themselves and the 
state. The state hitherto, weak and fragmented, became the vehicle for external 
control, and its military, before decentralized, dependent on regional forces, and 
vulnerable to armed resistance to its infringements, became the undisputed 
arbiter of power in the nation. The United States, as it did in Nicaragua, Cuba, 
the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic, eliminated resistance to elite 
domination and crafted a military-centered state to protect its interests and those 
of its client neocolonial elites. 
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From 1915 until the end of the Occupation in 1934, American forces 
engaged in a project of state centralization designed to consolidate the 
neocolonial state by pacifying and disarming the nation, and eliminating the 
nationalist northern forces that had provided a check on neocolonial elite power 
and prevented their control over the Haitian state. Powerless, and since the fall of 
Boyer, unable to acquire and maintain control of the national neocolonial state 
they themselves had crafted, these elites collaborated with Occupying forces to 
create institutions capable of strengthening, sustaining, and protecting the state 
and their dominance over it (Dupuy 1989, R. Fatton 2007).  
The post-Occupation neocolonial state, with neocolonial elites as its 
leaders, a new centralized army created by American Marines for its protection, 
and the client regimes they established, became consolidated and self-
protecting. Neocolonial elites, encouraged by their foreign supporters rather than 
allaying the prevalence of old cleavages for the sake of nation building, 
accentuated it. At a time when neocolonial elites had the capacity to unite the 
nation, their decision to forego the nation for their own interests became the 
source of national instability. Their path to national dominance intensified racial 
and mass-elite schisms ultimately resulting in the rise of Negritude and the black 
power movement that propelled and facilitated Duvalier’s centralized dictatorship 






THE POST-OCCUPATION CLIENTELIST STATE: THE RISE, 
CONSOLIDATION AND DECLINE OF DUVALIERISM 
 
          This chapter analyzes the post-Occupation period of neocolonial elite 
hegemony and the national schism that facilitated the rise and consolidation of 
the Duvalierist regime. It covers the Estime and Duvalierist periods and the 
attempts of both regimes to institutionalize a Noirist regime within the framework 
of a post-Occupation neocolonial clientelist state constrained by American 
geopolitical concerns and interests. It focuses on the reorganization and 
consolidation of the neocolonial national state into a military-centered coercive 
state apparatus and the struggle over military control between Noirist and 
neocolonial elites. The chapter offers an original analysis of the rise of 
Duvalierism and Noirist governance, within the framework of a neocolonial 
clientelist infrastructure imposed by the United States, and sheds light on the 
Noirist state-military centered politics that have dominated Haiti. 
 
The Decline and Demise of Neocolonial Elite Dominance: Mulatto Hegemony 
and the Rise of Noirism: 
The destruction of the Northern military infrastructure, forceful removal of 
Blacks from positions of power, imposition and perpetuation of Mulatto 
domination, and marginalization of Black citizens, left them with little options but 
to challenge neocolonial elites and the post-Occupation military-centered 
neocolonial clientelist state. Baridon and Philoctete argue, “The Racist, 
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humiliating, and insolent occupation provoked in Haitians an enlightened 
awareness of their own racial, spiritual, and moral worth” (Baridon 1978, 14). The 
Occupation, the defeat of Northern Nationalists, and the Mulatto domination it 
facilitated, created a new cadre of Haitian leaders, not military generals, but 
intellectuals committed to re-centering the Black presence and re-asserting Black 
leadership as the source of national identity and state legitimacy. In the absence 
of a military option to the Occupation, a cultural ideology based on Haitian Black 
identity became central to nationalist resistance. New leaders emerged to 
challenge the neocolonial adoption and implementation of the racial system 
imposed by American Occupation forces, and the forced displacement of the 
Black majority from every aspect of the state and national institutions it 
engendered. Such a displacement “permitted the traditional Mulatto elite to hold 
onto political center stage” as spoils for their collusion with the U.S. Marines in 
their defeat of Northern nationalist forces (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 150). Intellectual 
resistance to this displacement produced a cultural revival – Indigenism209 - that 
sought to reassert an African cultural identity in opposition to white supremacy 
                                                          
209 The Indigenist movement emphasized the Haitian African majority as central to national identity and 
culture, thus necessary as a vehicle for national liberation. For Haitian scholars, it was precisely the 
disregard for Haiti’s African identity and culture that allowed neocolonial elites to adopt and implement 
American racist ideology as a feature of the Haitian state and institutions. An affirmation of that African 
identity and culture, they argue, would serve as a counter weight to American and neocolonial elites’ 
racial imposition and rekindle national pride. Indigenism would later be transformed into the international 
Negritude movement adopted by many Latin American, Caribbean, and African anti-colonial scholars 
(LHerisson, et al. 1956). To use the description of Rene Depestre, one of its most famous proponents, 
“Negritude was an awareness of Blacks’ historical circumstances as a means of decolonization and the 
realization of the necessity to destroy the myths and stereotypical images of people of color... It 
compelled Haitians to accept its African origins in order to make common cause with the masses and 
restore the collective conscience in order to create a spirit of national solidarity and  cohesion” against 
the occupation (Price-Mars 1928, Nadeau 1978, 14,18) 
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and colonial racial impositions. Thus, Indigenism, as a reaction to the Occupation 
and white and neocolonial dominance was purely a cultural movement whose 
goal was the valuation of Black culture and the end of white dominance. 
“Not only did Africa come into view as the wellspring of much that was Haitian,” 
remarked Leyburn, “but Haiti’s status as an occupied though once –sovereign 
power dramatized the need for a social and political philosophy” (Leyburn 1966, 
xii). C.L.R. James argues that the trauma of the Occupation and the 
transformation it spurned in Haiti meant, “Haiti had to find a rallying-point. They 
look for it where it can only be found at home, or more precisely, in their own 
backyard” (James 1963, 394). Indigenism was the answer. 
In spite of the success of the Indigenist movement in engendering cultural 
and intellectual resistance to the Occupation, and contesting its anti-Black 
manifestations, it could not control the actions and offset the power of 
Occupation forces, their neocolonial elites’ collaborators, and new neocolonial 
infrastructure. Indigenism as an intellectual cultural form of resistance proved 
inadequate in addressing Black marginalization.  
From 1915 to 1946, American forces had maneuvered Mulattoes into 
economic, political, and institutional power to sustain the clientelist regime and 
preserve their interests at the detriment of the Black majority. Charles 
Dartiguenave, Louis Borno, Stenio Vincent, and Elie Lescot, were all Mulattoes 
brought to and sustained in the Presidency to continue and deepen their 
institutional control and supremacy over the neocolonial clientelist state.  
American Occupation forces were not simply the cause of cultural 
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marginalization of the majority Black population, they had imposed a structural 
marginalization and the solution required a re-structuring of the society and its 
centers of power. Their segregationist politics and policies exacerbated racial 
tension and though it affected remnants of the small and fragile Black 
bourgeoisie, it disproportionately affected the Black middle and working class, 
leaving them out of the institutions and direction of their own state. It was the 
Black middle-class and working class,210 left out of the primary vehicle for social 
mobility, that reacted most strongly to the segregationist policies. Their 
dependence on the state and public institutions was not just based on cultural 
and historical expectations, but also on political and economic survival in this 
new dependent neocolonial clientelist state (Labelle 1976, 133, 1987). This 
institutionalization of color prejudice, imposed by Occupation forces and 
continued by neocolonial Mulatto elites, according to Jean-Luc,  
[H]ad direct consequences on their economic wellbeing. 
This racist ideology allowed the Mulatto middle-class to 
have access to political and professional positions and 
propelled them to economically advantageous positions 
at the detriment of their more competent Black 
counterparts” (Jean-Luc 1968, 11-12)211 
 
Etienne Charlier, a Marxist Mulatto elite observed, “ we have seen dumb 
Mulattoes with no training chosen to represent the nation in the most important 
international institutions while Blacks with credentials are systematically kept out 
                                                          
210 If the American occupation did anything, it was that it facilitated the emergence of a middle class in 
Haiti as General Russell saw the presence of a middle class as necessary for national development, and a 
vehicle to offset the insurmountable disparity between elite peasantry (Logan 1930, 1968). 
211 Qted in (Labelle 1987, Labelle 1976, 133, Blancpain 1999). 
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of diplomatic posts” (Bonhomme 1946, 64)212. The eminent Noirist scholar Roger 
Dorsinville noted,  
All the ministers, all the important administrative posts, 
all the embassies were in the hands of Mulâtres, the 
administrative offices of subcontracting companies were 
full of light-skinned girls. They ran the country as they 
would have run a plantation... In this context, whoever 
was not a noiriste would have been scum… They forced 
upon us a culture of contempt. To this culture of 
contempt, we opposed our resistance and our hate 
(Dorsinville 1972, 130-1, 1985, 21)213 
 
As this pattern of neocolonial elites’ domination of the neocolonial clientelist state 
and segregationist policies persisted, the radicalization of Black middle and 
working class seeking to upend Mulatto dominance, and assert their own power 
and control over the state, intensified. Indigenism214, a socio-cultural intellectual 
movement advocating for an African national identity, would morph into Noirism, 
a socio-political movement seeking to unseat neocolonial Mulatto elites from 
state power (Baridon 1978). Noirism, as an ideology, advocated for Black 
leadership as the only legitimate leadership for the Haitian state much as 
Louverturean nationalists did before them. Noirism thus, as a political movement, 
                                                          
212 Also qted in (Labelle 1976, 135) 
213 Qted in (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 134) 
214 As was the case with Dr. Firmin and Dr. Bobo, it was the convergence of the Black middle-class and 
young neocolonial elite intellectuals who sought to provide an answer to the neocolonialist infrastructure. 
Unable to contest militarily, they opted for an ideological struggle against both the occupation and the 
new neocolonial state and its elites asserting a Black identity for the Haitian state. Although various 
scholars have credited Black elites for the movement, it is important to note those who were in its 
leadership were mostly not economic elites but the intellectuals and professionals class. Lorimer Denis, 
Francois Duvalier, Arthur Bonhomme, J.C. Dorsinville, Catts Pressoir, Jacques Roumain, Henri Terlonge, 
Philippe Thoby-Marcelin, Jacques Alexis, Anthony Phelps, Carl Brourd, Louis Diaquoi, Rene Depestre, 
Roussain Camille, almost all poets, physicians, sociologists, ethnologists, anthropologists lead by the 
former senator and scholar Dr. Jean-Price-Mars. Their movement was a “call to conscience for the 
exploited and humiliated blacks, but also something deeper that sought to counter all the forces which 
prevented them from breaking the chains of poverty, suffering, injustice, oppression, and moral misery” 
(Nadeau 1978, 17)  
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provided the answer to Blacks’ quest to re-assert their control over the state and 
contest their marginalization. In sum, Noirism married the class struggle between 
middle class Blacks and Mulattoes elites, and a political struggle seeking to wrest 
control of the state from Mulattoes who had dominated it since the Occupation. 
As Trouillot correctly noted,  
Noirism was perceived as the only viable political 
alternative by the vast majority of the middle classes. 
The very terms of urban political debate would not allow 
the question of color to be set aside (M.-R. Trouillot 
1990, 134) 
 
Their first success was the overthrowing of two successive Mulatto governments 
through peaceful protests215; the second was the election of Dumarsais 
Estimé,216the first Black president since the Occupation. The demands of the 
Black population that led to the election of Estimé therefore have to be 
understood within the context of that Noirist struggle for state power. The 
destruction of the Louverturean elites and their military infrastructure provided the 
space for the emergence of a new model, one not led by the historical military, 
economic, and political Louverturean elites but by the Black urban middle class in 
alliance with its working class and peasantry (Labelle 1976, 130-1, Nicholls 1979, 
189-90). The Occupation, and the dependent Neocolonial Clientelist state it 
imposed on the nation, had created new forces and a new dynamic of resistance; 
                                                          
215 These two governments led by Stenio Vincent and Elie Lescot  as I have demonstrated were the most 
egregious and blatant in their implementation of the aristocracy of the skin which further alienated and 
radicalized the Black elites and middle class (Simpson 1941, 640-1) 
216 A lawyer and professor, Estime was dismissed for Sedition by Louis Borno and joined the nationalist 
movement in 1930 becoming a staunch opponent of the American occupation. Having married into the 
neocolonial elite class, he was one of the few Blacks who served in the government of Stenio Vincent as 
minister of Education (Georges-Pierre 2010, M. Smith 2009). Estime, in this context was seen not as a 
threat, but as a good alternatives to more radical black voices by neocolonial elites  
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no longer dependent on elites, but on the Black urban middle and working class 
alliance with their peasant counterpart (P. Pierre 1987, Dupuy 1989). 
 
Dumarsais Estimé: Noirism and the Struggle for State Control: 
From 1920 to 1946 Blacks contested Mulatto dominance of the 
neocolonial clientelist state with  neither a clear understanding of the nature of 
the state itself for which they fought, nor a formulation of the state they sought to 
create. Their success in forcing the overthrow of the Lescot regime through a 
military coup represented an attempt by neocolonial elites to stem the 
radicalization of the Noirist movement and retain control of the neocolonial 
clientelist state by orchestrating the election of Estimé. The perceived success of 
the Noirists according to Leslie Pean was simply a strategy for ceding state 
leadership without state control and state power (Pean 2016). Voltaire argues 
that the military coup that facilitated the rise of Estimé was no fluke. The coup, he 
asserts, 
constituted the first stage in liquidating the revolutionary 
situation by the Haitian army. However, the military 
leaders, fearing losing complete control over the 
situation could not overtly nor covertly oppose the urban 
masses’ movement and the radicalized black middle 
class. So it opted to divide the contesting forces (Voltaire 
1988, 208). 
 
Estimé not only understood the manipulation of the army, he used his popularity 
and their attempt not to further radicalize the contesting Noirist movement as a 
counterbalance to maintain their neutrality. In Estimé, Haiti saw the re-
emergence, if not of the Louverturean model, at least its politics, some of its 
ideology, and policies. Louverturean elites, unlike their neocolonial counterparts, 
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included Mulattoes in high positions and as representatives of the state both 
nationally and internationally. Theirs was a politics of nationalist ideology, not 
color, but even those not in agreement with their politics could be part of the 
Louverturean state, not as tokenism but as full participants in state affairs (P. 
Sannon 1905, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). The basis for the legitimacy of the 
Louverturean state was strong enough not to be concerned with the beliefs and 
actions of any one man. Despite the fact that the racial exclusion imposed by 
Occupation forces, which was continued and expanded by neocolonial elites, 
changed the political landscape and consequently radicalized the Black urban 
middle class, Estimé’s government was the most culturally and “racially”, and 
ideologically inclusive. His cabinet consisted of Daniel Fignolé, the radical 
advocate for the working class, as Secretary of Education; George Rigaud, 
descendant of General Rigaud, the nemesis of Toussaint, as Secretary of 
Commerce; the Indigenist scholar and public health expert, Dr. Francois Duvalier 
as Minister of Health and Public Works; and he sent young Black and Mulatto 
middle and working class students abroad to study  (Nicholls 1979, 189-92, 
Georges-Pierre 2010). This strategy helped to broaden its bases of support, and 
offset the divide and conquer manipulations of the army and neocolonial elites. 
More importantly, Estimé’s policies sought to re-establish, if not a social contract, 
at least an orientation of the government toward the majority of its population. 
The policies of the first Black government since 1915 sought to elevate the 
marginalized and neglected population and create a government to manage the 
interests of all groups. Its orientation was not unlike those of previous 
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Louverturean regimes, but its goal was to offset the prevalence of Mulatto office 
holders. Unable to formulate an ideology of state crafting beyond Noirist 
discourse of state power, Estimé’s quest for a path to equity meant that the state 
and public institutions became the site of contestation. 
Under the Estimé government, the interests of the masses were protected. 
Black professionals, instead of just members of the light-skinned population, also 
got access to government jobs, including cabinet positions, for the first time in 
thirty years (Leyburn 1966, xxi, M. Smith 2009, 108-9). Congruent with 
Louverturean policies and the emphasis of Louverturean leaders, Estimé 
expanded access to schools, particularly rural and urban schools, and increased 
the number of trained teachers, which resulted in a 45% increase in primary 
school enrollment217 (Magloire 1950, L. Dubois 2004, M. Smith 2009, 117-21). In 
line with the Louverturean social contract of supporting rural development, 
Estimé encouraged rural cooperatives to facilitate peasant autonomy and control 
over their resources and production, and more than doubled the minimum 
wage218 (Bonhomme 1957, Heinl and Heinl 2005). He raised the salaries of civil 
servants, and ensured the representation of middle and lower class Blacks in the 
state and national institutions (Dupuy 1989, 143, M. Smith 2009, 108-135, 
Georges-Pierre 2010). Estimé enacted the country’s first income tax, fostered the 
growth of labor unions, and began the process of Haitianizing the clergy. In a nod 
                                                          
217 This was not unlike the policies of Christophe and later Soulouque and Salomon who expanded 
educational opportunities to Blacks and increase the middle classes in the urban areas and the capital 
(Bonhomme 1946). 
218 Estime increased the minimum wage from 30 to 70 cents (Diederich and Burt 1969, 55-7). 
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to Indigenists and Haiti’s rural masses, he suggested that voodoo, their African-
derived religion, targeted and maligned since the Occupation, and persecuted 
under the neocolonial clientelist regimes of Vincent and Lescot, be considered as 
a religion equivalent to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism (Magloire 1950, L. 
F. Manigat 1964, 30-7, M. Smith 2009, 16-7).  
If the policies above were not indication enough of Estimé’s Louverturean 
orientation, his attempts to strengthen the state, establish more sustainable and 
interdependent state-society relations, counterbalance American influence, and 
reduce the nation’s commercial and economic dependency cannot be 
equivocated. He sought to remove the chokehold of debt imposed by the United 
States on Haiti by seeking to have the debt cancelled and, when that failed, 
engaged in renegotiations219. He increased the state’s power and revenues by 
expanding its regulatory capacity in the import/export market, implementing 
taxation and a new income tax, requiring workers to invest between 10 and 15 
percent of their salaries in national-defense bonds (Manigat 1964, 35-7, 
Diederich and Burt 1969, 56-8). To extend the reach and services of the state, he 
invested in infrastructural development across the nation, including the building 
                                                          
219 See “Efforts to Ease the Burden of Haiti’s Foreign Debts while protecting the Interests of American 
Bondholders.” File# 838.00/1-546. Memorandum prepared in the Department of State. Washington, 
January 5, 1946. The Estime’s government also sought a moratorium on Debt payment to allow the nation 
to re-structure its economic outlook. The request was denied by the American government. See 
memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the ambassador in Haiti (Tittman). P-au-P, September 
27, 1946 – 6pm. File #: 838.52 Cooperation program /9-2646 telegram. What is noteworthy is that every 
renegotiation of loans from independent lending institutions was done with the American government 
and not those institutions. The Convergence of interests between the American government and those 
financial institutions cannot be overlooked. Indeed, these financial institutions were the vehicle through 




of a dam to increase the production of electricity and foster agricultural 
development220 (Nicholls 1979, M. Smith 2009, 118-99). The new Haitian 
Constitution reversed the constitutional changes imposed through American 
occupation by limiting investment in agricultural enterprises, restricting the 
amount of land holdings, and forbidding the conduct of retail business by 
foreigners221. Most importantly, he sought to remove the economic dependence 
of the neocolonial clientelist state by encouraging and increasing trade with other 
nations such as England and France. He also doubled the national budget from 
$12 to $21 million, and freed the National Bank from American control by paying 
off the national debt222 (L. F. Manigat 1964, 36-7, R. W. Logan 1968, 149, Pierre-
Charles 1973, 34). Yet, even in so doing, asserts the Acting American Secretary 
of State in his letter to the American Ambassador in Haiti, other loans remain 
unpaid tied to military and Coast Guard equipment directly related to the 
neocolonial infrastructure organized by occupation forces223. Ironically, the 
                                                          
220 This was not without wrangling and conflict with the American government and its banking 
institutions. Consular correspondences reflect the level of dependence and constraints face by the Estime 
regime and the neocolonial clientelist state due to indebtedness (see Foreign Relations p 591-598). 
221 See Ambassador to Haiti (Wilson) to the Secretary of State – P-au-P, August 18, 1946. File # 711.38/8-
1846 – Confidential No. 1638. In this memorandum to the Secretary of state, Ambassador Wilson 
informed him that he had raised the concerned of the American government to President Estime 
regarding injuries these constitutional articles might cause to American capital. Given that this was the 
first meeting with the elected President, the American government seemed quite focused on protecting 
American investment even at the detriment of the nation’s wellbeing. 
222 The government also sought to reverse the 120 hectares concession by the previous clientelist 
government to United Fruit Company by breaking the monopoly of the company in the production and 
importation of agricultural products. However, his decision destroyed a lucrative industry that had grown 
from $.5 million in 1934 to $7.3 million as the second income earner in the economy (R. W. Logan 1968, 
149, Rotberg and Clague 1971, 173-5, Pierre-Charles 1973, 125) 
223 Acting Secretary of State to the American embassy in Haiti. Washington, April 16, 1948. Foreign 
Relations 1948 Vol IX, 594. File #: 838.24/3-2448 – Confidential No. 44 
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Haitian state was paying loans to support the structures that secured the 
subservience of the nation.  
Therefore, despite the efforts of Estimé’s Noirist government, it could not 
pull the nation out of the web of debts and dependence imposed on it. 
Nevertheless, so improved was state-society relations, and the legitimacy of the 
state and Estimé’s government, that the population, as well as elected officials, 
supported his efforts by contributing a portion of their salary such that 2/3 of the 
loan that gave the American government veto power over Haiti’s financial 
decisions was paid off. This popular action and the rise of nationalism and anti-
American sentiments it aroused compelled the United States to cancel the 
remainder of the loan (R. W. Logan 1968, Hector, Moise and Olivier 1976, 145, 
Paquin 1983, 92-105). According to Lyonel Paquin, an anti-Noirist and anti-
Duvalierist author who would later become deeply involved in the opposition’s 
planning to overthrow the Duvalierist regime, 
[T]he Mulattoes would accept no consolations to make 
up for their loss of power… Despite all of the money they 
were making in the post-war black-market, along with 
the fabulous public works contracts that Estimé had 
passed on to them, they were not satisfied… Under 
Estimé, the Mulattoes were given all the economic 
advantages without giving anything in return, not even 
gratitude. The Mulattoes were furious for being out of 
government… The more Estimé tried to appease them, 
the more arrogant and self-assured they became 
(Paquin 1983, 96-7, M. Smith 2009, 135-151, Georges-
Pierre 2010). 
 
Despite economic concessions to neocolonial elites and attempts to ally them to 
the government, he failed to garner their support (Pierre-Charles 1973, 146, 
Nicholls 1979). For the first time since the Occupation, neocolonial Mulatto elites 
did not control the levers of government. Lacking direct influence in Haitian 
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affairs, and compelled to pay taxes and be accountable to the state, they 
resorted to clandestine lobbying among the Mulatto –dominated officer corps. 
Moreover, Estimé’s policies of counterbalancing American power, his populous 
policies, his protection of trade unions and workers’ rights, his economic 
independence, and the presence of pro-communist intellectuals in his 
government made him suspicious to American policy makers concerned with the 
threat of communism in the region (Gingras 1967, 81-2, Dupuy 1989, L. Dubois 
2004, Georges-Pierre 2010).  
The very first year of his government, President Estimé challenged 
American involvement in undermining his government. Constrained to deal with 
American financial institutions and seeking to create international competition 
and assert the independence of the Haitian state, he sought loans from France 
for state expansion and infrastructure and agricultural developments, but a weak 
post world war II France, itself dependent on American largesse, was in no 
position to help contravene American interests. To reaffirm the dependent status 
of the new neocolonial state within which the Noirist regime had to operate, 
Estime’s government was forced to rely entirely on American financial 
institutions. He requested $4 million in loans for infrastructural development via 
the American government and the bank dictates were clear. It was  
[N]ot prepared to consider applications for credits for 
improvement of water supply systems in Port-au-Prince 
and Cape Haitian or to undertake the low-cost Housing 
in Port-au-Prince until plans for the Artibonite valley 
project have been completed and a decision has been 
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reached with regard to export-Import bank assistance in 
the financing of that project224.   
 
The Haitian state, its revenues tied up in servicing loans acquired through 
the Occupation was at the mercy of the State Department’s supported Export-
Import Bank. The Bank decided which projects were necessary or viable for the 
Haitian government and dictated the terms under which it could borrow or 
build.”225 Not only did the Bank have the power to dictate the terms, but its 
coordination with the American government was even more apparent when the 
Bank president requested that their representatives and the State department 
send an economic mission to Haiti to “help the Haitian government decide which 
projects should be undertaken”226. The Haitian Ambassador to Washington D.C. 
himself protested to his American counterpart that, “U.S. policies towards Haiti is 
to do just enough for Haiti to keep the country’s head above water”227. The 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, William Mc Martin 
not only agreed with the Ambassador Armour, but argues that the American 
government had a “moral responsibility toward Haiti, which distinguished Haiti 
from the other American Republics”228. His feelings did not prevent him from 
refusing to support the Estimé government request for loans necessary for Haiti’s 
                                                          
224 The Secretary of state to the Embassy of Haiti, Washington, July 1, 1948. File 838.51/8-248 Airgram – 
Also found in Foreign Relations 1948, 597 
225 See (Foreign Relations 1948, Vol IX, 597) 
226 Mr. Maffry, Export-Import bank and Mr. Lucien Hibbert- Director of the University of Haiti and former 
Finance minister.  (Foreign Relations vol VIII, 728-9). Memorandum of Conversation by Charles C. Hauch of 
the Division of Caribbean Affairs. Washington, September 17, 1947. File# 838.51/9-1747 
227 See (Foreign Relations 1947, Vol VIII, 733). Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Charles C. Hauch of 
the Division of Caribbean Affairs. Washington, October 10, 1947. File# 838.51/10-1047 
228 Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol IX, 596 
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improvement. Thus, under Estimé, loans for development projects were routinely 
denied while military equipment and vessels for rent and sale were readily 
available229.  
The neocolonial clientelist infrastructure was such that despite Estimé’s 
efforts for a more independent and legitimate state, the nation was tied to 
American interests through a system of indebtedness and dependence. Sidney 
Mintz correctly observed that despite the advances made by darker-skinned 
Haitians in employment in state and public institutions, “the Estimé regime did not 
produce changes in the economic structure of Haitian society of importance 
proportionate to the national cultural renascence”230. In fact, he was forced to 
deepen the structure of dependence and foreign clientelism by accumulating new 
debts from American financial institutions. Estimé had managed to balance out 
the power and dominance of neocolonial elites and created a more independent 
state and government, but the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the 
institution designed to protect it remained intact, and on May 10, 1950, it acted, 
deposing the president and forcing him to leave the country. The military that had 
assumed power after the fall of Vincent and Lescot, to avert more radical 
politicians from gaining power, re-asserted its role supported by both neocolonial 
elites and the American government. It was not lack of popular support that 
facilitated the overthrow of Estimé; it was in spite of it. As a witness to the events 
preceding the overthrow of Estimé notes, while the threat of Noirist consolidation 
                                                          
229 See file #838.24/5-1848 
230 See Sydney Mintz introduction of Leyburn’s The Haitian People ( (Leyburn 1966, xxi) 
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of power, and the permanent eclipsing of Mulatto dominance compelled the 
neocolonial infrastructure into action, the threat to the Noirist Regime also sent 
the population to the street, 
[T]he masses felt instinctively the danger; aroused by 
their leader, they began to demonstrate hysterically their 
attachment to the president. The civil servants, the new 
class of Black bureaucrats joined in a parade of cars, 
honking their horns, raising their fits in threatening 
gestures. The Iron Market, the massive hub of peasant-
merchants, came to a standstill. That was an awesome 
sight… (Paquin 1983, 105) 
 
In the end, the popular support enjoyed by the Noirist regime of Estimé could not 
allay the threat; the same Junta that led the transition from Lescot to Estimé now 
presided over Estimé’s overthrow and another transition to avert the challenge he 
posed to the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure231. Clearly. Estime’s efforts were 
constrained by the very structure within which he was operating, one that limited 
both the scope and nature of changes possible. The dependent neocolonial 
clientelist state was crafted to be military and coercion-centered and self-
protecting. However, it cannot be discounted that the inability of Estimé to 
manage the competing interests and demands of neocolonial elites and their 
neocolonial infrastructure against those of the rest of the population, and his 
failure to assert control over the military ultimately resulted in his overthrow. 
However, Rodman suggests that it is precisely Estimé’s attempt to manage those 
                                                          
231 By asserting a role in the political process to secure the interests of neocolonial elites by removing the 
first Noirist president from power, the officer corps stood in opposition to the popular will. They sowed 
the seeds for schism within the military. By making themselves accomplices of the neocolonial elites, they 
also made themselves targets of national political actors seeking to upend neocolonial dominance of the 
state and society. 
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interests and demands, and his willingness to change the orientation and 
ideology of the state that led to his demise.   
Late in 1949 it was becoming apparent that Estimé 
intended to go much further than public works in 
changing the face of Haiti. Unions, with political as well 
as economic programs, were being encouraged to 
organize and demand a share in the larger industrial 
companies. Political parties, with frankly socialist 
programs, were starting to win converts in the cities. 
Spontaneous demonstrations were taking place 
denouncing not only the bourgeoisie but the Mulatto 
bourgeoisie.” (Rodman 1954, 30) 
 
It is clear that Estimé from the start sought to create a unity government capable 
of addressing the competing needs of Haitian citizens.  Ultimately, he did not 
have control of the neocolonial clientelist state and as he sought to acquire it by 
shifting its policies and orientation and extending his government, the neocolonial 
military, its elites, and foreign backers acted, forcefully removing him from office 
despite his popularity232. Unlike Louverturean elites who enjoyed control of the 
                                                          
232232 The scholar Jacques Barros argues that Estimé’s hesitation to address neocolonial elites’ opposition 
and interference was that, himself elite, he found common cause with some of their recriminations. 
Under Estimé, The problem face by the Haitian society, he suggests became clear; it was class not color, 
and many Noirists came to understand that colorism or not, the social question was a proletarian, 
deserting to Marxism (Barros 1984, 705-14). The father of the Indigenist movement, Dr. Price-Mars, 
challenged the Noirist assertion that color rather than class has been the primary contradiction, asserting 
that From Independence onward, both Black and Mulatto elites had exploited the majority for their own 
benefits (Price-Mars 1967, 33-45).  Thus, many Noirists, seeking systemic change and a solution beyond 
state control and color-based competition for state power turned to Marxism as an ideology more 
congruent with their goals. They saw in Marxism an ideology capable of transforming existing power 
relations and creating a new and more egalitarian social contract to unite all citizens regardless of class or 
color. For them, Estimé represented the perpetuation of social and economic inequality, not its reversal 
(Bonhomme 1946, 1957, 327-31). Nichols argues, “The military coup of 1950 was made possible by a 
number of factors. Estimé had not only failed to gain support from the powerful bourgeois class, but he 
had alienated much Black support. In addition to this, world economic situation was not particularly 
favorable to the country… The action of the army in overthrowing the Estimé government was thus 
welcomed by many black politicians, like Fignolé and Saint Lot, as well as by big business, by the Roman 
Catholic Church and by the Mulatto Marxists…” (Nicholls 1979, 192). Estimé faced opposition and 
criticisms from Noirist adherents for not targeting neocolonial elites, from segment of labor union, which 
he had championed, due to the bonds requirement, and from the left for his lack of support for a Marxist 
solution to the Haitian problem, but none of these forces had accumulated enough power to undermine 
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state, its centralized coercive power, and popular legitimacy, the Noirist 
government of Estimé secured the legitimacy without acquiring control and power 
of the state to sustain it, which would have allowed him the ability to counter 
neocolonial elites’ and American’s power and influence. Moreover, despite 
Estimé’s attempt to implement a Noirist agenda, he believed or rather understood 
that the nation was 
[D]ependent upon the good will of the United States and 
upon some degree of cooperation from the business 
community, which was dominated by Mulattoes, was 
fearful of a slowdown and adopted a somewhat timid 
ineffectual approach to the problem of Mulatto 
hegemony (Nicholls 1979, 191) 
 
Estimé did not think the nation was capable of being governed autonomously and 
understood the dependent and clientelist relationship that existed between Haiti 
and the United States. As the American Ambassador to Haiti wrote to the 
Secretary of State, relating his first meeting with the elected Haitian President,  
[T]he President told me that he realized perfectly well 
that American-Haitian relations must be close, as 
American economic and commercial assistance to Haiti 
was absolutely indispensable to the latter’s existence233 
 
                                                          
his popular Noirist government. They needed the military. Indeed, they quickly became target of the 
military and neocolonial resurgent forces after his overthrow. An alternative but doubtful view is 
presented by Gingras who argued that the coup was a consequence of Estime’s left leaning politics  
(Gingras 1967, 84). The reality was that Estimé sought a balance between competing forces in a volatile 
political and social environment in transition, a declining economy. The refusal of Americans to offer 
support through loans and grants eliminated the only option he had at maintain support and a modicum 
of leverage on key constituents. His nationalism, however mild, his unwillingness to target a growing 
Marxist movement meant that he received little economic support to maintain governance of the 
neocolonial clientelist state. Governance of the Dependent clientelist infrastructure required foreign 
support and Estimé’s inability to garner that support has to be accounted as a factor in its weakness and 
ultimate overthrow. 
233 Ambassador to Haiti (Wilson) to the Secretary of State. Port-Au-Prince, August 18, 1946. Received 
August 22. File # 711.38/8-1846 – Confidential No. 1638 
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Ironically, as the first Noirist President, he not only understood the dependency of 
the Haitian state, he conceded that it was indispensable not just to the new 
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, but also to the nation’s very existence. 
However, by the time he was in his second year in office, his decisions and 
political maneuvers would suggest that he sought an alternative to absolute 
dependency on the United States.  Although Dupuy (1989, 143-154) and Dubois 
(2004) are right to suggest that Estimé’s mistake was his failure to restructure the 
military to ensure his control over it and their adherence to his Noirist political 
agenda, the fact that he tried is an indication of the search for that alternative. His 
attempt to reshape the identity, orientation, and politics of the American-created 
army by rechristening it Armée d’Haïti, and promoting Black officers to positions 
of leadership to create a more representative force and undermine the 
supremacy of the Mulatto officer corps, fell short. Nevertheless, he recognized 
the military as the primary tool of that domination and sought its re-structuring 
and control. However, Estimé could not undo in four years without bloodshed 
what it took the Americans thirty years to build. Neocolonial elites had opposed 
his government from the start and their backlash was just a matter of time.  
          Unable to control the ballot box by garnering the support of the population 
they had willfully neglected and marginalized, they sought the support of the 
military to reassert their dominance over the neocolonial clientelist state 
(Magloire 1950, Delince 1979, Dupuy 1989, 153, M. Laguerre 1993, Georges-
Pierre 2010). Had Estimé succeeded in gaining control over the military, perhaps 
the reorientation of the Haitian state might have been possible, but his failure 
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accelerated neocolonial elites’ actions against him and his government 
(Bonhomme 1957, 39).   
The coup that removed Estimé from power brought neocolonial elites back 
closer to the levers, if not of power and control of the state, at least influence over 
it (Barros 1984). As in post-1843, in a transformed political landscape where 
direct neocolonial control, whether civilian or military, to replace the Noirist 
government was impossible without repercussion, neocolonial elites reverted to 
their old formula by choosing a popular Mulatto sympathizer, Colonel Paul-
Eugene Magloire, for their politics of understudy. “Magloire’s regime was a 
classic case of government by understudy – the last of its type for sure,” asserts 
Trouillot (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 205). As in the post-Boyer period, neocolonial 
elites sought a Black army colonel to sustain their politics of understudy. Unable 
to win by the ballot box, as was constitutionally mandated, or retain power 
through the Mulatto-dominated officer corps, they saw in Magloire someone 
capable of garnering popular support through universal suffrage and in so doing 
sowed the seeds for their own destruction and permanent removal from state 
power (Bonhomme 1957, 38-40, Rotberg and Clague 1971, M. Smith 2009, 135-
151).  
The overthrow of Estimé and Magloire’s election came at a time when 
American concerns about the spread of communism had compelled them to use 
the militaries in the client states they had established and supported throughout 
Latin America and the Caribbean to secure those nations and safeguard their 
interests (Rodman 1954). Whether in the Dominican Republic with Trujillo, Cuba 
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with Batista, Nicaragua with Somoza or Haiti with Magloire, “Washington was 
willing to support military dictatorships” so long as they secured its interests 
(Dubois 2012, M. Smith 2009, 81-94). The policy statement prepared by the 
State Department makes this preference unequivocal as it pertains to Haiti. It 
states,  
[T]he Haitian armed forces have proved to be a deciding 
factor in domestic political upheavals and they would be 
essential to the maintenance of stability in the event of 
an internal communist attempt to create a diversionary 
disturbance or gain a strategic foothold234. 
 
The actions of the Haitian military in removing Estimé from power and 
exiling him cannot be viewed outside of this American stated policy preference. 
As discussed earlier, the U. S. did not support the Estimé government in its 
efforts to acquire a $4 million loan for some major projects, which would have 
deepen its support amongst the population and enhanced its legitimacy. 
However, it supported a loan of $14 million for the Magloire’s government for the 
same project, and provided the regime with an additional $12 million in aid235. 
While the degree of American influence in the overthrow of Estimé is not clear, 
we know that the military would not have acted without their acquiescence. 
Furthermore, when one compares their behavior toward Estimé and Magloire, 
American preference becomes quite clear. Besides financially supporting the 
                                                          
234 “Political and Economic Relations of the United States and Haiti” File #: 611.38/4-1651. Policy 
Statement Prepared in the Department if the Secretary of State. Washington, April 16, 1951. Foreign 
Relations, 1951, Vol II 
235 See (Foreign Relations 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 954) and Memorandum from the Asst. Secretary of State for 
the Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Acting Secretary.  Washington, Oct. 29, 1955for details of the 
support garnered by the Government of Colonel Magloire.  
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clientelist regime led by Magloire, the American government invited him to the 
United States for a state visit, gave him a ticker tape parade in New York, and 
allowed him to address Congress as an ultimate demonstration of their 
support.236 That these honorific treatments were reserved for an officer-President 
dedicated to safeguarding the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure was by no 
means coincidental. 
The overthrow of Estimé and his replacement could not have been by any 
other than a representative of the Black majority and this fact escaped neither 
neocolonial elites nor the American government seeking the stability of the 
neocolonial infrastructure (Nicholls 1979, 220).  In an environment where color 
was politically salient and where popular suffrage is the guiding electoral 
principle, Magloire’s color afforded him a degree of support from the majority, 
which facilitated his election. However, he offered nothing new; Magloire merely 
continued many of Estimé’s policies without the neocolonial antagonism, and 
obtained the support of most sectors of society except the hard-core of Estimé’s 
Noirist supporters who rightly saw him as the vehicle for neocolonial control. 
Dietrich observes,  
[T]he black colonel began from an excellent position. 
The elite, the army, the Church, and the United States 
supported him and he had a measure of genuine 
popularity… Magloire established a surface balance of 
color and classes, though in fact he favored the old elite 
(Diederich and Burt 1969, 60, 62).  
 
                                                          
236 Congressional Record, January 27, 1955 p667. Also, See (Foreign Relations 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 932). 
Memorandum from the Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Acting 
Secretary of State. Washington, October 29, 1955 
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As Nicholls bluntly puts it, “the regime of Magloire represented the last successful 
attempt by the old elite to reassert its political pre-eminence behind the mask of 
the Black Colonel” (Nicholls 1979, 191). Consequently, neocolonial elites enjoyed 
a resurgence in state affairs. Those who resisted the regime faced violence, 
imprisonment, intimidation, and even death. For the first time since the 
Occupation, state actors used violence to secure power. Yet, despite the 
violence perpetrated and intimidation by Magloire and the military to re-assert 
neocolonial control, the genie was out of the box. The re-emergence of 
neocolonial control led to greater and more acrimonious ethnic schism. The 
murders, imprisonments and closing of newspapers reproduced the old patterns 
of neocolonial control and as such undermined cohesion within the officer corps, 
as well as between members of the officer corps and rank and file soldiers 
adherent to Noirist agenda. The military–led government of Magloire’s was not 
new, it was the culmination of the military-centered neocolonial clientelist state 
model. By making the military the most organized institution of the clientelist 
state, the American government had structured its defense in times of threats237.  
Latin American and Caribbean states from Cuba to Nicaragua had to 
contend with pressures from segments of the population determined to 
restructure the neocolonial clientelist state to be responsive to their needs, and 
compel neocolonial elites to be accountable to the nation (Fauriol 1984, Hartlyn 
1998, B. Diederich 2000). The rise of military dictatorships across the region 
                                                          
237 Foreign Relation 1950 Vol II, 628-9.  File 611.20/11.850. Draft paper by the Regional Planning adviser of 
the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Halle). Washington, November 9, 1950.  
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cannot be interpreted as an accident or failure of the American state model. The 
military was designed to protect the established order that re-oriented financial 
control and political influence toward the U. S.  Therefore, to take over the 
leadership and protection of the neocolonial clientelist state in the face of internal 
challenges to its orientation and functions is congruent with the fulfillment of the 
roles they were designed to play (Langley 2002, Weeks 2008). 
 Using the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries as justifications and the 
Marines as a tool, the U. S. imposed a system structured against national 
interests, without popular legitimacy and strong state-society relations238. It 
supported elites, concerned not about the national welfare or the responsiveness 
and accountability of the state to the majority of its citizens but determined to 
collude with foreign interests to expropriate and exploit the nation, which 
ultimately started by force and could not be sustained without it (R. W. Logan 
1968, Langley 2002). Military officers in consultations with their American 
backers were using their institutions to do exactly what they were designed to do: 
avert the collapse of neocolonial clientelist states. In the end, the involvement of 
the military to maintain neocolonial dominance and the clientelist state meant that 
both elites and the military infrastructure became targets of the forces of 
contestations. In Haiti, with its history of resistance and Noirist ideology, without 
                                                          
238 See (Weeks 2008). The Monroe Doctrine is often argued to be a re-orientation of political influence. 
What is often not studied enough if the systemic approach of the American government to re-structure 
economic dependence from Europe to America by negotiating with European powers, at times, without 
representatives of those Latin American and Caribbean states, and transferring the debts to American 
banks without their acquiescence.  
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popular legitimacy, such a regime could not be sustained without direct military 
intervention. However, the entry of the military into the political arena created 
competition and schism within its own ranks and triggered an institutional 
response from an officer corps concerned with the internal conflicts and threat to 
the institution. Having an officer-President, any attack on him or the neocolonial 
infrastructure was an attack on the military. Direct military control succeeded in 
limiting the scope of mass mobilization, but also brought to the surface the 
internal contradictions within the corps, furthering its fragmentation and 
vulnerability.  
Magloire’s association with and protection of neocolonial elites and his 
removal of the popular Noirist regime to safeguard their interests exacerbated the 
infighting (Delince 1979, Dupuy 1989, Georges-Pierre 2010). Factional fighting, 
graduating-class rivalry, racial and class conflicts became as much part of the 
military as it was of the society – the most coherent institution of the neocolonial 
infrastructure was in crisis (Laguerre 1993). The crisis took center stage resulting 
in open, armed conflicts between Noirist adherents and the more conservative 
and established neocolonial officer corps. Internal schism resulting from the very 
structure of the military organized by Occupation forces and accentuated under 
neocolonial leadership in the post-Occupation period became the source of 
national instability. Magloire would be deposed by Noirist army officers resentful 
of his collusion with neocolonial elites and determine to upend post-Occupation 
neocolonial Mulatto dominance of the institution, and most importantly by the 
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masses who felt betrayed and took to the streets in the thousands to reclaim their 
revolution.  
The overthrow of Estimé had intensified the disunity based on color, class, 
and ideology within all levels of the military, especially the officer corps, which the 
leadership was unable to address. The crises in civil society had affected the 
institution and its increasingly diversified body of interests, thus, the mostly 
Mulatto officer Corps, although supportive of Magloire, was unable to maintain 
support for him in the face of internal dissent and widespread popular 
dissatisfaction. In order to save the institution from further disintegration, they 
had no choice but to escort Magloire out of the Presidency and into exile. The 
neocolonial clientelist regime established by Occupation forces, not designed to 
be a representative force at the service of the nation, faced with ideological 
divergences and saddled with competing allegiances that undermined its 
coherence, was in crisis again.  
Neocolonial elites, despite various maneuvers to retain control of the 
neocolonial infrastructure, were unable to wield state power through the force 
designed to facilitate it. Already exposed to recriminations, their failure would 
make them, the state, and its military target for Noirist control. Segregationist 
policies implemented by Occupation forces, and the continuation of those 
policies by neocolonial elites had colored all institutions and state actions. The 
Occupation’s unwillingness and failure to include members of the majority within 
the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure became the basis for its contestation. 
Yet, Magloire’s final act catalyzed the clientelist nature of the Haitian state he had 
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presided over; it was the American Ambassador he informed of his plans to 
resign the Presidency239. 
 
Francois Duvalier and the Institutionalization of Noirism: 
The overthrow of Estimé led to a wave of violence directed by the military 
against the left, the popular sector, and its middle and working class supporters 
forced Francois Duvalier into hiding (Diederich and Burt 1969, 67). As the 
Minister of Public Works and Health, François Duvalier saw in Estimé’s ouster 
and the regime of Magloire that the military could not be trusted to support the 
Black Nationalist movement it was created to counter, and which it helped to 
suppress during the occupation. A student of nationalist history, he recognized 
the historical lessons of Dessalines and Soulouque’s and other Louverturean 
elites; a neocolonial Mulatto dominated military in the West ran counter to Black 
Nationalist interests (Bonhomme 1957). It was precisely this ethnic-based 
national dynamics that led to Dessalines’ assassination, and the successful 
attempt to unseat Soulouque’s nationalist regime. Duvalier was well aware of the 
historical roots of the formation of the Zinglins, the paramilitary group created by 
Soulouque to counterbalance the power and influence the post-Boyer Mulatto –
dominated officer corps and this realization, and knowledge would shape his 
policies toward that force240 (Duvalier 1966).  
                                                          
239 Foreign Relations, 1955-1957- Vol. VI, 346. Dept. of State, Central File# 738.00/12.656 
240Duvalier was not only aware of the history of conflict and completion but had written about it 
extensively. See (Duvalier 1967), Oeuvres Essentielles Premier Volume.  
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The election of Duvalier with the support of the Noirist segment of the 
army represented a new development in post-Occupation Haiti. Duvalier’s 
Presidency was a revival of Estimé’s Black middle, working class and peasantry 
alliance that emerged to offset Mulatto dominance (Denis and Duvalier 1958, 
Leyburn 1966, XV, Diederich and Burt 1969). Indeed, as Trouillot correctly 
asserts, 
[D]uvalier inherited a political mantle and an apparatus 
that had solid support among lower level army officers 
and intellectuals. Above all, he inherited a vision of 
Haitian society, which, vague and poorly defined as it 
was, presupposed continuity in change, the desire to 
complete an unfinished revolution (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 
135). 
 
This alliance, the backing of segments of the military241, and his loyalty to Estimé 
provided Duvalier with broad support amongst the population and the legitimacy 
he needed to engage in systemic institutional change (L. F. Manigat 1964, 45-7, 
Rotberg and Clague 1971, 194-5). Nicholls suggests, 
[T]he fierceness of the election campaign of 1956 -7 was 
due largely to a realization on the part of both sides that 
a victory for Duvalier would entail a final collapse of the 
Mulatto hegemony in the political field and some feared 
the economic arena as well (Nicholls 1979, 191). 
 
                                                          
241 Heinl suggests that the support of the military was due to their belief that the American government 
supported Duvalier. While this may well be partially true for the Officer Corps, since an important feature 
of the new Neocolonial clientelist state is the role of kingmaker played by the American government in 
countries where those states were imposed, and the deference of the economic and military elites to 
their will. By the time of the elections, Noirist officers were directly in charge of the army and leading the 
Junta that oversaw the elections (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 196). Therefore, it is not farfetched to suggest 
that the Noirist segment of the military that supported Duvalier cannot be counted as supporters of the 
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure given the fact that Noirism was a rejection of that reality. However, 
the fact that they were indeed part of that infrastructure demonstrates the very nature of the new system 
of dominance imposed on Haiti. 
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The election of the President by popular suffrage sapped the last 
mechanism of neocolonial Mulatto hegemony leaving them with their only 
remaining option, the military, and that option itself was no longer as reliable. 
Duvalier found a state, crippled by debt, dependent on foreign tutelage and 
oriented toward its interests (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 200-1). According to 
Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, “The Haitian government is 
virtually without financial resources and cannot borrow further from the national 
Bank to cover its operating expenses” as the Magloire regime had left the country 
with a $30 million debt242. Even by American account, Duvalier found a country 
heavily indebted by supporting the Presidency of Magloire and extending loans to 
it they had refused to the more nationalist Estimé regime, the American 
government had succeeded in rolling back the reduction of economic 
dependence achieved under Estimé243.  
Neocolonial elites’ re-assertion of state power through Magloire had 
increased the dependency of the state, and strengthened its clientelist structure, 
which had been targeted under Estimé, by deepening the nation’s reliance on 
American grants and loans.  Worse, little of those resources had gone to national 
development, institutional expansion and to meeting the needs of the population. 
Duvalier also faced a military that, having entered into the political fray, facing 
internal disintegration and seeking to protect its institutional coherence, was 
                                                          
242 Foreign Relations 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 933-4 & 953-4. 
243 Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to 
the Secretary of State (Herter). Washington, May 15, 1957 
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viewed with suspicion by neocolonial elites, middle class, and the masses alike, 
the latter having suffered from its excesses. Moreover, as if to complicate the 
political and economic environment, Francois Duvalier had to reckon with a 
burgeoning Marxist movement seeking solutions to Haiti’s historical challenges 
as well as United States’ concerns about the rise of communism in the region 
and his Estimist credentials (L. F. Manigat 1964, Pierre-Charles 1973, 192-4, 
Nicholls 1979, Delince 1979).  
Despite having a clear mandate to govern, the Presidency of Duvalier had 
to contend with an unpredictability and chaotic political and economic 
environment, a suspicious and powerful national patron with the ability to 
undermine his government, and an influential but divided military. Critiquing the 
rise of Duvalier for emerging from feelings of marginalization rather than driven 
by an ideology that could inform institutional reforms, the Haitian scholar Leslie 
Pean argues,  
[T]his search for political power by these middle classes 
involved no vision of structural reforms, just a factional 
struggle for a share of political power and access to the 
riches historically reserve for others (Pean 2016, 3) 
 
However, while it may be true that Estimé may have begun without a clear vision, 
the implementation of some of his policies, the legitimacy and enthusiasm his 
Noirist regime enjoyed, and the bitterness the military coup elicited from those, 
like Duvalier, committed to Noirism, had at least taught them what mistakes not 
to make. Moreover, Duvalier had witnessed the hesitation of Estimé to deal with 
the military and neocolonial elites, and experienced the frustration of seeing a 
resurgence of Mulatto hegemony through Magloire, and had thus been given 
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time to reflect on his experience and think about his own vision and plans to 
complete the Noirist program. As Nichols noted, 
Duvalier came to power with certain ideals; he was 
genuinely concerned to forward and complete the work, 
which Estimé had begun. …His general aim, then, was 
to translate into practical policy that ideology which he 
had helped to develop since the time of the American 
occupation (Nicholls 1979, 212) 
 
From the onset, Duvalier set out to institutionalize the Noirist regime, to 
finish what Estimé could not, and saw himself as the embodiment of “La 
Revolution au Pouvoir – The Revolution in Power”. Thus, permanently 
eliminating obstacles to the implementation of the Noirist Doctrine faced by the 
first Noirist government of Estimé became his primary focus (Duvalier 1967). He 
saw the need for intellectual rigor to address this societal challenge of re-
establishing the historical link between citizens and state. “Prolonging this 
revolution” he cryptically argues, “requires an internal discipline, ‘that which 
govern the laws of the mind in decomposing it’, and of an external discipline, ‘that 
which re-establish the link between subject and the object’” (Ulysse 1965, 73-4). 
If we take Francois Duvalier at his words, he makes clear that he understood the 
historicity of Blacks’ struggle for state control and the connection and 
interdependence between the Black majority and the Haitian state. Stating in a 
speech in 1964, 
[M]y dear friends, with you I have retained the pact. It is 
with the masses revolutions are made. It is with the 
masses that Toussaint took the directions of his nation 
for life. It is with the masses that Jean-Jacques Accau, 
according to the scholar Louis Joseph Janvier, made the 
revolution. It is with the masses that Jean-Jacques 
Dessalines, of whom I am a student, took the Crete-a-
Pierrot, Vertiere and proclaim the nation free and 
independent. The interests of the individual and those of 
society are interrelated and call to each other; the 
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individual, the state and society retain their 
affinity…instead of insisting on the contradictions or the 
antagonisms that stand as obstacles to progress. By 
reconciling the nation with itself, I have sought to 
establish this interdependence between the individual 
and the state. And if it has not fully materialized, should 
we stop to search for the right conditions and to favor its 
realization? There are common expectations for the 
state and the individual, and the state must fulfill its 
responsibilities toward the collective as well as the 
collective must uphold its duties toward the state 
(Duvalier 1967, 199-202) 
 
He believed the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the 
US/neocolonial alliance to be the source of these obstacles and set out to 
dismantle its pillars of dependence and power. Pean, however is correct when he 
argues, the Duvalierist project worked to “impose a dramatic social de-
structuration. In its first manifestation, he attacked five key sectors of the society: 
The Elites, the army, the church, the intellectual elites, and the peasantry.” (Pean 
2016, 3-4) Clearly, Pean cannot have it both ways, Duvalier, as a Noirist, either 
had a vision or he did not, and without a vision, how does one engage in de-
structuring key societal institutions? Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that 
Estimé was new to Noirism whereas Duvalier had been a leader in both the 
Indigenist and Noirist movements, thus more than Estimé, he was prepared to 
carry the mantle. Insisting, “What has become essential is the possibility for the 
masses to find adequate nutrition, decent housing, permanent work, and 
appropriate medical care,”244 he argued for the establishment of a responsive 
state capable of securing those goods and eliminating those in opposition to his 
                                                          
244 Speech of Francois Duvalier to the General Assembly on May 22, 1961 (Duvalier 1967, 269). 
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project. More importantly, it is not necessary to conjecture on Duvalier’s vision 
and motivation.  His speech on May 22, 1961 in front of the National Assembly 
mirrors the Louverturean project. 
My responsibility is to move my nation toward peace, 
toward prosperity and greatness according to its 
historical roots. My responsibility is to reconcile the 
nation with itself; to reconcile you with the truth of your 
history (Duvalier 1967, 269) 
 
 Pean’s dismissal of the notion of a Duvalierist vision and a project reflect 
the symptoms of a broader challenge facing Haitian scholars, one that must 
move beyond anti-Duvalierist reflexes to provide us with a clear-eyed 
understanding of the Duvalierist period245. The pervasive polemical study of the 
Duvalierist period cannot explain why Francois Duvalier, despite the violence, 
enjoyed a high degree of popular support, and that under his regime, despite the 
constraints of the neocolonial clientelist state within which he operated, access 
for middle and working class social mobility increased and so did Duvalierist 
support and legitimacy (Pean 2016, 4). 
 
The Military and the Rise of the Duvalierist Regime: 
Even prior to Francois Duvalier taking office, the Noirist faction of the army 
had already taken up arms against their comrades, killing two officers and 
forcefully retiring others (Delince 1979, M. S. Laguerre 1993). Three months 
before the election of Duvalier, three of the highest-ranking Mulatto officers were 
                                                          




retired and the Noirist faction re-structured the corps by creating new posts and 
making appointments to assert and consolidate their control. Twelve days prior to 
the elections, they reorganized the army’s retirement system to facilitate the 
additional retirement of twenty-one senior officers (Laguerre 1993, 97). The 
increasing pre-eminence of the Noirist faction and the consolidation of their 
power started a destabilizing trend that Duvalier, although the beneficiary of their 
growing power and influence would go to great lengths to exploit. By the time of 
the election, the army, once a coherent and united institution, was the site of 
many factions and inter-group conflicts. Laguerre notes, 
[T]he ideological alignment of soldiers was a source of 
Schism. Some officers who felt discriminated against 
because they were black or because of their peasant 
background, constituted their cliques. Other cliques 
emerged because of their anti-American and pro-
socialist leanings. Still, others functioned because they 
were pro-Mulatto and pro-bourgeoisie. The army was, 
politically speaking, a divided institution and was truly a 
reflection of civil society. Each one of these cliques 
aligned itself with a segment of civil society… (Laguerre 
1993, 89) 
 
These factions within the coercive neocolonial infrastructure impeded its function 
and ability to fulfill its role of protecting the neocolonial clientelist state (Voltaire 
1988). However, these factions should not be interpreted as an indication that the 
army had undergone an overall change in institutional orientation away from the 
neocolonial infrastructure and its foreign backers. Moreover, despite the 
dominance of the Noirist faction, the Army remained dependent on American 
tutelage and oriented toward preserving its interests. Their involvement in 
manipulating the electoral process by imprisoning, arresting, or exiling those 
thought too radical, too leftist or destabilizing, and too much of a threat to the 
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neocolonial infrastructure to participate in elections were proof that despite its 
leadership change, as the most coherent institution in the neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure, it intended to protect it from collapsing (Gingras 1967, Paquin 
1983). Indeed, as Voltaire keenly observes, 
[I]n depriving the forces that it judged undesirable from 
the political process and in imposing to the nation the 
sector that harbor its sympathy, the Haitian army clearly 
proved that it was the “structure-cles” of the dictatorial, 
reactionary political regime (Voltaire 1988, 212). 
 
Duvalier had witnessed the demise of Estimé by the military, gone 
underground to avoid being harmed by it, and understood he could not rely on 
the schism between the Noirist and neocolonial factions, that left the situation 
unstable, to govern. He could neither fully trust those who facilitated his election 
due to their alignment with the United States, nor forego their support, knowing 
the unpredictability of their allegiance. He had seen military officers swearing 
their support to Estimé, to, within a few months, overthrowing him (Georges-
Pierre 2010). As Lawless points out, also “Mindful that Dessalines and other 
rulers of Haiti had succumbed to plots hatched by a traditionally Mulatto –
dominated elite, Duvalier was determined to break the hold of the elite” (Lawless 
1992). Wary of the military’s coercive capacity and determined to undermine its 
ability to intervene in politics in support of foreign and neocolonial elites, no 
sooner was he elected, that he sought to capitalize on the instability in order to 
control and reform it. Could a military, organized to assist an invading force to 
suppress nationalist forces, be put to the service of those same forces and the 
nation against which it fought? How does one reform a military controlled by a 
foreign power without upsetting its usefulness to that foreign power? Duvalier 
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sought an interdependence between the army and the people; a marriage which 
he coined “Armée-Peuple / Peuple-Armée”.246 Duvalier understood the role the 
army had been structured to play and made clear his intention to align the 
military to the nation and ensure its adherence to the popular will. 
[I] have removed from the army its role of arbiter and 
balancer of national life, a role that made it oscillate from 
one end to the other to its own interests. I have applied 
myself to amputate it of its ability to act independently, 
by putting it at the service of the people. I want to make 
it a popular army, convinced of the legitimacy of the 
revolution (Duvalier 1967, 221) 
 
To achieve this goal, he created a parallel force, first known as the Cagoulars 
because of their masks, engagement in night time arrests, murders, and 
disappearances, then formally known as VSN (volontaires de la Sécurité 
Nationale) and popularly known as the Tontons Macoutes, to keep the military in 
check. Samuel Huntington’s assertion that “A totalitarian system cannot tolerate 
a military institution that controls substantial power but does not adhere to the 
political ideology of the regime” though true, contradicts Duvalier’s action. It was 
not so much that the newly re-organized force did not adhere to the Noirist 
political ideology, but rather given its institutional foundation, original design, 
dependence, and its institutional interests, could not be counted upon to maintain 
its adherence and allegiance indefinitely.  
Duvalier was concerned that, in the end, personal and institutional 
interests, and American influence would supersede inclinations toward Noirist 
                                                          
246 See Duvalier’s inaugural speech during his second election by popular suffrage (Duvalier 1967, 267). 
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ideology. Indeed, Duvalier had correctly assessed the situation247. As Dumas 
points out, “The systematic cleaning operated by Francois Duvalier in the army to 
neutralize its interventionary capacity have decisively re-enforced the foundations 
of his government” (Dumas 1994, 20). Had Duvalier not acted, he would have 
been deposed. Upon assuming the presidency, he eliminated potential threats to 
his government and promoted his supporters in their stead. He accelerated the 
process of dismantling the army began by the Noirist faction by dismissing two 
generals, ten colonels, and forty lieutenant colonels (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 
21, Laguerre 1993, 108). The progression of the percentage of officers 
originating from the popular and middle classes was an important aspect of 
Duvalier’s Noirist politics,” argues Dumas (Dumas 1994, 20). Instead of rising 
through the ranks, low-level officers were promoted and by so doing, he secured 
the allegiance of these new officers to his government paralyzing the army’s 
ability to overthrow his government. He re-assigned officers out of the country or 
in different regions to reduce the potential for collective actions, dismissed and 
retired officers he thought hostile to his regime, and sought to integrate his militia, 
already more powerful, into its ranks (Gingras 1967, Paquin 1983, P. Pierre 
1987, 138-48, M. S. Laguerre 1993). Duvalier’s strategic re-structuring of the 
                                                          
247 According to declassified documents, the CIA involvement in funding, advising, and organizing coups 
against the Duvalier regime was frequent. Members of the military from every level were involved in the 
plotting, not to mention the multiple direct invasions by armed groups to overthrow the Regime.  The 
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 4/30/63. Eyes only - Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 
Special Assistant to the President. Subject: Anti Duvalier Activity and Projected Plan of Action by Louis 
Dejoie. Memorandum, March 3, 1963 “Operation Liberation” – Declassified, July 7, 2014. Both 
memoranda involved the American government providing direct as well as indirect military support for 
the overthrow of Duvalier while on friendly relations with the latter. 
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armed forces to reduce its power and American influence over its officers led the 
American Ambassador to observe,  
Duvalier is determined to neutralize and preferably 
eliminate, the regular armed forces. His deliberate and 
systematic efforts to downgrade the armed forces and 
build up the civil militia have succeeded despite the 
presence and activities of our military missions and 
repeated remonstraces to him with respect to the 
militia… Duvalier is determined to prevent our missions 
from exercising any further influence on the armed 
forces… If this continues….., the prospects of these 
missions exercising any influence on the armed forces 
will be remote and the question will sharply arise 
whether their continued presence in Haiti will serve U.S. 
interests248 
 
These actions were a departure from Estimé who did not challenge the military 
and favored meritocratic and well-structured institutional military hierarchy. Within 
two years in office, he had reduced American influence on the military, which had 
facilitated the removal of Estime and governments before him, and sought the 
transformation of all branches of the neocolonial military to bring about its 
‘domestication’: 
 Decree of December 17, 1959, created the presidential guard to provide 
protection to Duvalier against any possible military coups. The force 
became the best paid within the military outranking even the military high 
command. 
 Decree of January 9, 1959 re-structured the military by decentralizing its 
leadership. The same decree called for an increase in the number of 
officers in the navy and appointed new commanders and lieutenant-
commanders 
 Decree of January 17, 1959 re-structured the medical services and the 
aviation corps. For the first time females were added to the force, two as 
second-lieutenant and four as sergeant majors 
 Decree of January 30, March 30, and September 24, 1959 decentralized 
the army’s bureaucracy and gave each force autonomy 
 
                                                          
248 Outgoing “secret” telegram from the American State Department to Ambassador Thurston, October 
19, 1962. “Plan of Action of Action from period form Present to May 1963, p3 & 6. 
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Through these decrees, the Departments of Health, Navy, Aviation, the 
Engineering Corps, Military Academy, Camp d’Application, 
Communication/Intelligence gathering, the Presidential Guard, and the Judiciary, 
all former branches of the army under unified command became autonomous 
and disconnected, receiving orders directly from Duvalier (Delince 1979, M. S. 
Laguerre 1993, 107-110). The final death knell to United States’ influence over 
the armed forces, was the systematic elimination of important members of the 
corps both retired and active: 
Table 1: Duvalierist impact on the military 






Colonels, Lt-Colonels 6 12 
Majors 9 11 
Captains 28 15 
Source: (Delince, Armee et Politique en Haiti 1979, 222-225) 
 
Following the implementation of the American “Plan of Action” in 1963, resulting 
in an attempt to overthrow him, “Duvalier dismissed sixty-nine officers , roughly  
one third of the officer corps.  Virtually all of them, as well as the plotters, had 
received American training” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 572). Another 19 officers 
were executed in June 1967 (Delince 1979, 222-224)249.  
Duvalier succeeded in wresting the military out of the neocolonial 
infrastructure and American control and manipulations. His actions, the 
                                                          
249 Even General Antonio “Thompson” Kebreau, a cousin of the author, and the officer who facilitated his 
rise in office was forced into exile (Diederich and Burt 1969). Beside the officers, neocolonial families 
became targets of murders, imprisonments, and tortures.  
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resentment of the officers, and the armed attacks and invasions of young 
neocolonial elites, former military officers, and middle class Marxists on his 
government allowed him a modicum of international cover from an American 
government concerned about the expansion of communism but no longer in 
control of the officer corps. Even while planning to overthrow him, concerns 
about communism caused a level of hesitation and the lack of viable options due 
to Duvalier’s dismantling of the occupation-imposed structure of control through 
the military, led the Unites States to support the Duvalierist regime. Trouillot 
notes, “Washington’s double-standard, which evaluated a Third World regime in 
terms of degrees of Soviet influence, gave Duvalier ballast in spite of Kennedy’s 
recriminations” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 61). However, unclassified documents 
show that the Kennedy administration monitored, supported opposition forces 
and invasions, and cooperated with the Duvalierist regime when it became clear 
the regime’s control of the military and the national sphere made its overthrow 
without direct American intervention impossible250. Duvalier’s government faced 
consistent armed attacks from a diversified opposition in and out of the country 
and used his newly organized military and paramilitary forces to defend the state. 
As Morse points out, 
[He] ruthlessly bent his efforts to consolidate a then 
precarious base. Threatened by invasions and coups, he 
nearly fled the country twice. He systematically 
suppressed all sources of opposition (Morse n.d.). 
                                                          
250 Central Intelligence Agency, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 28, 1962. Papers of John F. 
Kennedy, Presidential Recording, Dictabelts 19A. Conversation #1: President Kennedy with Dean Rust, 
May 16, 1963 – 10am. In the recording, President Kennedy wanted to organize a force a la Bay of Pigs to 





Haitian nationalists who saw in Duvalier the continuation of the neocolonial 
infrastructure, communists seeking the formation of new social arrangements, 
neocolonial Mulatto elites wanting their state back, and former and active military 
officers opposed to the disintegration of the armed forces, its domestication, and 
seeking to avenge the murders of their comrades, all tried unsuccessfully to 
remove him from office. These attempts to overthrow the Duvalierist regime often 
took place with tacit American support, and at great lost in their ranks (Gingras 
1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Heinl and Heinl 2005). More than five times the 
Duvalier regime was on the verge of being overthrown but his devoted followers 
folded every attempt. Duvalier accomplished what the Estimé Regime could not, 
due to its ability to control the coercive infrastructure of the neocolonial clientelist 
state.  
The patron-client relationship between the Haitian government and the 
United States did not wane, but the ability of the Noirist Duvalierist regime to 
control the coercive forces of the nation and secure the support of the citizenry 
reduced American leverage to the economic sphere. He never sought to change 
the economic neocolonial infrastructure that rendered the nation dependent since 
the occupation, just to engineer national control for regime survival and 
legitimacy. As such, Duvalierism was no threat to American imposed economic 
clientelist system of dependence for so complete was the economic dependence 
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that he sent a 7-point request for funding detailing its annual budget and 
governmental goals to President Kennedy for his approval and support251.  
After 1963, he made communism a crime to allay American fear and 
increase their support for his regime (Trouillot and Pascal-Trouillot 1978, 446-7). 
His ability to control and expand the state enabled him to create a new power 
base, a coalition of middle and working class urban Blacks and rural landowners 
and peasants whose interests depended on the survival and expansion of his 
regime while the regime depended on foreign economic and military support 
(Pierre-Charles 1973, 57-64). As Ulysse, one of his ideologists, and disciples 
correctly noted, 
[T]he awakening of social conscience provoked by the 
doctrine of Duvalier, constitute a major event. New social 
forces coming out of the masses, the peasant, and the 
middle class have benefited from promotions from which 
it will now be impossible to remove them (Ulysse 1965, 
33). 
 
Nicholls also noted, 
[P]erhaps the most significant result of Duvalier’s 
‘revolution’ will turn out to be the sense which was given 
to the mass of the peasants that they were really citizens 
and that what they did was important. The actual power 
which they possessed to influence the course of events 
was negligible, but the rhetoric of populism, the mass 
rallies and the countrywide organization of the VSN may 
have led to a new consciousness on the part of the 
masses. If the people are told often enough that they are 
important, they may begin to believe it (Nicholls 1979, 
237) 
 
                                                          
251 Letter from Francois Duvalier to John F. Kennedy, July 11, 1961. 
http://archive1.jfklibrary.org/JFKPOF/118/JFKPOF-118-013/JFKPOF-118-013-p0012.jpg (p0002.jpg--




This consciousness was not just based on rhetorical manipulations, it was their 
participation in the affairs of the state, from popular suffrage to their role in 
conveying legitimacy to state actors. Long neglected by state elites and further 
distanced by the Occupation and their neocolonial allies, it was their presence in 
the very confine of the state itself, the Presidency’s reliance on them, Duvalier’s 
affirmation of their culture and their importance in the national project that 
secured their allegiance and its legitimacy. The consciousness rested on solid 
ground.  
Ulysse’s assertion that Duvalierist power and legitimacy rested on the 
masses, the peasants, and the middle-class and that unlike previous post-
Occupation government, he relied on them to protect his government is not 
without merit. However, the line between the peasantry, masses, and middle-
class had so thinned since the Occupation. Consequently, it was the peasants 
who defended his government when the insurgents landed in the south and 
north252. It was under his government that the Black middle class would be 
expanded through state employment and access to education. Under the 
Duvalierist regime, the Catholic Church and every major state and public 
institution was brought under Haitian control and Black leadership. Duvalier 
effectively used the dependence on American economic support to improve the 
conditions of Blacks in the state as well as their position in Haitian society 
                                                          
252 My mother, a witness would often recount stories of when Cubans and Haitians landed to overthrow 
the government were captured and summarily executed for all to see by average citizens and Duvalier’s 
paramilitary. Also see (Heinl and Heinl 2005, Diederich and Burt 1969) 
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(Pierre-Charles 1973, 60). Despite the coercive nature of the regime, this 
success in expanding access to the state and enhancing the position of Blacks in 
the society resulted in increased popular legitimacy and support.  
The neocolonial state, having absorbed a cross-section of the black 
populace, consolidated its legitimacy supported by a black majority who saw its 
interests tightly woven with the new Black dominated neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure. The responsiveness of the Duvalierist regime to segments of the 
population, and its ability and willingness to create paths of entry into the state 
structure was important for both the regime and the neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure. Participation instead of alienation, responsiveness instead of 
marginalization, absorption instead of exclusion from institutions capable of 
supporting social mobility, and status upgrade appear to have a direct correlation 
to improvement in legitimacy in the Haitian state under Duvalier.  
Duvalier’s dictatorial regime reflected a characteristic distinct from 
clientelism in the newly independent democratic Anglophone Caribbean states; 
there were no parties to support, no neocolonial Mulatto or foreign-descended 
elites for those political parties to rely on for resources to dole out. It was a new 
model of ideology driven, state-directed, and foreign supported clientelism; less 
flexible, more coercive, and internationally dependent. In Haiti’s neocolonial 
clientelist infrastructure, entry into the state structure, institutional absorption, and 




State Expansion and National Autonomy: 
From the outset, Duvalier’s made his project of institution-building and 
expansion clear. “I wanted to set on Haitian soil,” he said, “by creating institutions 
that could be either instruments of execution or monuments of codification in the 
perspective of the new Haiti that we have sworn to leave to future generations” 
(Duvalier 1967, 224)253. In his zeal to secure the institutions necessary to 
consolidate the politico-economic gains of the Black majority, and assure their 
continuity and Black leadership, Duvalier accelerated Estimé’s policy of Black 
employment and absorption by the state and public institutions. He enlarged the 
middle class by expanding the state bureaucracy to absorb them, promoted 
Blacks and demoted Mulattoes in the military and other institutions, and replace 
the foreign clergy with a Haitian one (Gingras 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005). 
Duvalier’s success is such that few contemporary Black middle class and elites 
can claim their position without referencing their entry, at some point and on 
some level, in the Duvalierist infrastructure. Yet, it was not without major 
deficiencies that would undermine the nation. 
The Church and the Duvalierist State: 
Duvalier challenged the legitimacy of Catholic Church, which was still 
dominated by neocolonial elites and a foreign clergy, who, as Pierre-Charles and 
Nicholls noted, displayed ferocious animosity and open scorn for the national 
                                                          
253 Speech of Francois Duvalier, June 22, 1964 
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culture and religion, and had fully supported both the Occupation and neocolonial 
elites domination (Pierre-Charles 1973, 75-77, Nicholls 1979). The Church’s 
refusal to select Haitian clergy for its leadership, and their clandestine support of 
the neocolonial elites opposition, led them into direct confrontation with the 
Duvalierist regime. He asserted the sovereignty of the nation by expelling three 
bishops, the Jesuit order, the Order of the Holy Ghost Fathers, including leaders 
of the Baptist and Episcopal Churches, and eliminated two religious orders, 
which resulted in his excommunication by the Pope Paul VI (Heinl and Heinl 
2005, 560-1). The failure of the Church hierarchy in Rome to intimidate the 
Duvalierist Noirist regime, and the refusal of Duvalier to allow white dominance of 
the church, forced the Vatican to send its Secretary of State to the negotiating 
table with the Haitian State (Gingras 1967, 110-11). As Pierre-Charles noted 
rather grudgingly, 
[A] special mission of the Vatican, led by Monseigneur 
Antonio Samaro, Secretary of State of the sacred 
Congregation, arrived in Haiti to negotiate a treaty 
between the Holy See and the Duvalierist regime to 
normalize relations and establish, and re-establish an 
official position for the Church in Haiti. A new Catholic 
hierarchy, nominated by Duvalier, within the ranks of the 
Haitian clergy, guaranteed cordial relations between the 
church and the Haitian state (Pierre-Charles 1973, 77). 
 
Many Haitians, even some in the opposition, felt pride that the rights of the Black 
nation were respected and that, since the Occupation, a government finally cared 
enough to demand it. In his dealing with the Church, observed a priest, Duvalier 
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had brought 1804 up-to-date254 (Duvalier 1969, 314-19, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 
561). The determination of the Duvalierist regime to open the Church’s hierarchy 
to Black Haitians compelled Pope Paul VI to Haitianize the Church by 
acquiescing to five Noirist adherents as bishops to replace the white foreigners, 
thereby expanding the priesthood to the lower middle classes. Indeed, Nicholls’ 
assertion that “Duvalier’s vigorous policy towards the Roman Catholic Church 
ended foreign domination of the hierarchy” is a gross understatement. For the 
first time in Haitian history, the Archbishop of Haiti, leader of the Catholic Church 
in Haiti, was Black (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 160). Duvalier also Haitianized the 
Catholic sisters, expanding access to Black women as leaders of the sisterhood. 
Sister Monique St Louis became the first Haitian woman to lead an all-Haitian 
convent, and two Black priests led the Department of Education, Father George 
and later Father Papailler. Duvalierism was not only creating opportunities in 
state and public institutions, it was expanding access even in the halls of the 
“sacred” to both the urban and rural Black populations (Gingras 1967, Duvalier 
1969, Pierre-Charles 1973, Paquin 1983). The underside however is that it 
destroyed the lives of all who stood against it, from the most important 
intellectuals to the least important country dweller, from the old grandparents to 
the newborn. Its terror was not particularized; it was oppressively universal, 
impinging in every aspect and in every corner of Haitian society. At the end, 
                                                          
254 While the author’s assertion of this event as an important one in Haitian history is true, it may be 
considered an exaggeration as Emperor Soulouque had also compelled the Holly Sea to negotiate its 
return to Haiti.  
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Duvalierism was in many ways transformative because it made the unthinkable 
normal. 
The Business Sector and the Duvalierist Regime: 
By expanding the middle class, creating access and entry points for the 
urban and rural population in all areas of the society, and asserting the rights of 
the Haitian state, Duvalier broadened the support for and legitimacy of his 
regime. He reorganized the business sector by expanding state control over 
transactions between exporters and farmers ensuring a long lost role for the state 
in the collection of taxes and the protection of farmers (Diederich and Burt 1969, 
Heinl and Heinl 2005). He compelled neocolonial elite merchants, who 
dominated the import black-market and import sectors and engaged in 
speculation, to adhere to fair practices, an area, which Estimé had left untouched 
to the detriment of the urban poor. Duvalier stopped the manufacturing shortages 
that served to increase food prices in the cities by sending state inspectors to 
check storehouses to verify claim shortages and penalized those who violated 
fair practices (Bonhomme 1957, Denis and Duvalier 1958, Paquin 1983, 103-5). 
He eliminated finally, the threat of strike utilized judiciously by merchants and 
their allies to create political instability and overthrow government. Under 
Duvalier’s Noirist regime, the state having not asserted its control of commerce 
since the demise of the Louverturean state except in the context of agricultural 
export, regained its regulatory role and power. The Duvalierist regime levied 
taxes on import, export, car inspections were required and taxed, businesses had 
to pay taxes, and neocolonial elites, who control the economic sector and were 
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accustomed to fleecing the nation, found themselves constrained to contribute to 
the expansion of the state and its services to the population (Rotberg and Clague 
1971, 238-41). As Gingras notes,  
Duvalier frequently stated, “I consider it a duty to free the 
Haitian citizen politically, economically, and spiritually, by 
setting up an economic democracy, the only way for a 
fair dealing of the national wealth to all classes” (Gingras 
1967, 99).  
 
Duvalier strengthened the state and created new state-society and state-
elites relations by expanding state control to limit the monopoly of neocolonial 
elites, and curtailing their ability to arbitrarily raise the price of goods, or threaten 
the government with strikes to gain concessions. The state was no longer at the 
mercy of neocolonial elites. In implementing new regulatory measures and 
collecting taxes historically avoided by neocolonial elites, Duvalier boosted the 
resources of the state in order to enhance its capacity to balance the interests of 
neocolonial elites and those of the peasantry, as well as those of the urban 
middle and working class populations. As Duvalier himself puts it, 
[I] have succeeded in establishing the authority of the 
state to serve the interests of the dispossessed masses 
and middle classes that cannot protect their economic 
interests, as well as to safeguard the interests of the 
privileged classes, such that the state has revealed itself 
a guide and a protector. As a result, you have all 
decided to join the state… (Duvalier 1967, 266) 
 
Duvalier’s determination to render the state strong and autonomous 
enough to be able to protect the interests of all major cleavages mirror a 
particular historical trajectory that should not be obscured. His attempts, perhaps, 
reflected the new manifestation of Louverturean statecraft, but one constrained 
by a nation that had been forced into economic dependency. Nevertheless and 
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despite the nation’s economic dependency, Duvalier endeavored its political 
independence. He effectively exercised the autonomy of the nation by 
negotiating with communist countries, arresting foreign nationals for their 
involvement in destabilizing the political environment, and expulsing the 
American and British ambassadors for violating the nation’s sovereignty. This 
was a first since the Louverturean state under King Henry Christophe and 
Emperor Soulouque (R. D. Heinl 1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Paquin 1983, 
Heinl and Heinl 2005). He made clear that he intended to assert and defend 
Haitian sovereignty and self-determination, 
[A]lthough despised by all the major foreign powers – 
they are beginning to understand… every nation should 
have the right to manage its own Affairs. Why can’t the 
Haitian people do as they please … Why? Well, let each 
country develop according to its customs and traditions 
(Duvalier 1967, 199-2000) 
 
However, Duvalier’s insistence that the Haitian people and state should do as 
they please was clouded by a reality of clientelism upon which he depended to 
govern and upon which the state depended to function. Despite his claim and 
assertion of national autonomy, Haiti depended on a foreign power for both its 
international protection and economic survival. Between 1957 and 1960, the 
Duvalierist regime had received “$40 million from the American government – 
40% of all American aid to Haiti since 1945” (R. D. Heinl 1967, 15). The 
Duvalierist regime relied on American subsidy to make its annual budget. 
Although the Occupation had ended, and the regime was able to exercise some 
national autonomy by controlling the armed forces, the clientelist infrastructure 
remained and one might add was strengthened as the Duvalierist regime 
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became even more dependent on American support than any other previous 
regimes for its survival. 
 
Duvalierism and the Consolidation of Popular Support and Legitimacy: 
Under Duvalier, as under Trujillo, Batista, and Somoza, a new neocolonial 
clientelist state emerged without the veneers of democracy, entirely based on 
dictatorship, state expansion and absorption, coercion, and foreign dependence. 
Previous neocolonial regimes, already lacking legitimacy, could not use violence 
against the majority as a tool for control. However, the black–dominated 
Duvalierist regime allowed it the political space, if not legitimacy, to use a level of 
violence for its support and continuity never before possible or witnessed in the 
nation by Haitian leaders on Haitians (Pierre-Charles 1973, 51-6, Chassagne 
1977, P. Pierre 1987, 139-48). As if in revenge for their collusion with Occupation 
forces and their implementation of color-based politics to usurp and maintain 
power, the Duvalierist regime meted out on neocolonial elites the same treatment 
American Marines meted out in the North. Duvalierism, argues Trouillot, was 
something unprecedented. The regime broke through the acceptable, culturally 
specific limits of authoritarianism by its level of violence. Its use of violence in the 
society can only be compared to arbitrary violence committed by Occupation 
forces in Northern Haiti, documented earlier. The Duvalierist regime used force 
against large numbers of individuals beyond the socially accepted range for 
victims of state violence: whole families were massacred for alleged or real 
actions committed by one individual; entire neighborhoods were punished for the 
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dissent of one family; tortures and summary executions spared neither mothers 
nor children; in sum state-directed violence was institutionalized and normalized 
(Diederich and Burt 1969, Rotberg and Clague 1971, Chassagne 1977, M.-R. 
Trouillot 1990, 165-8). The Duvalierist regime engaged in, and normalized 
behaviors and practices explicitly rejected in Haitian culture, violating the basic 
tenets of a culture that believes as Trouillot so aptly notes, “moun pa fè moun sa 
– There are things a human being does not do to another”. By destroying the 
nationalist military infrastructure in the north and centralizing the military under a 
unified command in Port-au-Prince, the occupation had removed a structure that 
kept political and economic power, and coercive structures and excesses in 
check. Since the demise of the Louverturean state, no leader could have used 
overwhelming violence to remain in power. Moreover, societal and cultural norms 
made wholesale violence against the population to maintain power unacceptable. 
Duvalier, in his quest to consolidate his power and institutionalize his regime was 
willing and able to transgress the basic tenets of Haitian society against not only 
neocolonial elites but all who opposed him. 
Yet, despite the unprecedented violence to consolidate his power and offset 
American institutional influence, Duvalier’s legitimacy increased, and his support 
within the population, even in the face of disagreement with his tactics, remained 
strong. To maintain this level of support and legitimacy, the Duvalierist regime 
 Broadened the Noirist discourse within a nationalist framework going as 
far as changing the flag to its original Louverturean form (black and red). 
He expulsed ambassadors who disrespected the nation, its president, or 
its people, which culturally enhanced his prestige and the perception that 
he cared for the nation 
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 Identified the chief of state with the nation – “I am the state,” he exclaimed! 
Thus, attacking Duvalier is the same as attacking the Haitian state. The 
Black majority saw the portrayal of Duvalierist power as equal with that of 
the state a source of pride 
 Expanded the role of the state as a mechanism of redistribution, which 
extended to all levels and institutions… To be a Duvalierist was to have 
access and anyone could be one. More importantly, his policies allowed 
for a rise in the middle class Black population mostly through state 
employment 
 Used the civil militia as a vehicle for inclusion and redistribution (anyone 
could be a Macoute or benefit from the nation – all that was required was 
to stay out of politics and keep your criticisms private Moreover, being a 
Macoute or accepting access became a sign of political adherence and 
consent255 
 Included the Haitian peasantry by explicitly interacting with and supporting 
their traditions and religion and having regular listening sessions with them 
at the Presidential palace. Given that, this segment forms the majority of 
the population and their historical neglect along with his willingness to 
elevate them and bring them into the state structure, played a major role in 
strengthening his regime. Even those who regarded the peasantry as 
backward regarded his interactions with and treatment of them as 
praiseworthy.  
 
In many ways, Duvalier demonstrated that the legitimacy of a regime or state 
was not dependent on the elimination of the neocolonialist clientelist 
infrastructure, but on its effective management to maintain or include the 
interests of the population. American interests had shifted from establishing its 
commercial and banking to protecting them by supporting anti-communist 
government and forces, and ensuring that new politico-social and military 
developments in the neocolonial clientelist state in Haiti did not run counter to 
already established and entrenched interests. Thus, their support of the 
                                                          
255 Scholars like Fatton, Pierre-Charles, and Gingras argue that one cannot consider the Duvalierist regime 
as one that require or elicited consent.  For them, the regime was terror, and this violence and terrorism 
required and elicited silence, not consent. While their argument should not be ignored, arguing that the 
regime did not enjoy a degree of legitimacy that enabled it to persist politically would be misguided 
(Gingras 1967, Pierre-Charles 1973, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). 
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Duvalierist regime rested on the fact that it did not change the orientation of the 
dependency and clientelism of the neocolonial infrastructure. The centralization 
of power and the military-centered state the occupation imposed were precisely 
what was needed to protect the neocolonial clientelist states imposed in Cuba, 
Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and others in the region. Duvalier had 
merely shifted the paradigm and mechanism already in place by engineering a 
civilian-directed military-centered dictatorial regime instead of those directed by 
military officers supported by the United States throughout the region. The genius 
of Duvalierism was its control of the military infrastructure that previously enabled 
the United State to dispose of governments that challenged its interests. 
The orientation of the new Haitian regime toward dictatorship followed 
already established regional patterns and enhanced its ability to fight the 
communist onslaught with American support due to the convergence of the 
interests between those regimes and the United States (L. F. Manigat 1964, 
Pierre-Charles 1973, Ducan 1978). Indeed with grants, interest-free loans, 
military training and advisors, and direct military support to fend off 
Marxist/communist attacks, American support for the regime demonstrated the 
continuity of the Neocolonial Clientelist rather than the Noirist model, which it had 
previously opposed and overthrew (Diederich and Burt 1969, 134-146). 
Moreover, after the 1959 Cuban debacle, the American government acted more 
forcefully to preserve neocolonial states throughout the region and protect its 
geopolitical and economic interests (R. W. Logan 1968, Paquin 1983, Nicholls 
1985, Bob 1988, Winn 2010). It had become clear that Duvalier posed no threat 
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to the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Sure it had reorganized the state 
making the military impervious to American influence and eliminated the military 
and political leverage imposed by the United States, but the dependency and 
clientelist aspects of the neocolonial infrastructure persisted and maintained a 
chokehold on the Duvalierist state.  
Despite his success in maintaining the five Haitian Gourdes at par with the 
one American dollar, Haiti was still economically dependent and financial at the 
mercy of American lending institutions. Duvalier appears to have understood that 
no matter how centralized and how much control he exercised over the state, he 
could not change its orientation and imposed infrastructure. For his regime to 
survive, foreign support was necessary but more importantly, a commitment to 
maintain the neocolonial infrastructure and respect American national and 
regional interests were necessary.  He sought a balance between asserting 
national sovereignty and the right to engage with other nations as he saw fit while 
safeguarding American interests and its enforced structure of domination and 
dependence. He makes this clear when he says, 
[W]e will rise with all our energy against the pretentions 
of foreign government to impose their dictates on us, to 
intervene in our internal affairs, or to treat us as children, 
weak and incapable. Let it be understood once and for 
all, whatever the cost, that our revolution will not 
compromise our national independence and we claim to 
have the right to address our internal problems with the 
full accord of the Haitian people, and with the greatest 
respect of the political doctrine of this hemisphere 
(Duvalier 1967, 230). 
 
The Duvalierist regime not only understood American hegemony, the 
implications of the Monroe Doctrine, and the nation’s subservience to American 
dictates, he went to great lengths to make it clear that he respected and would 
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not challenge the regional infrastructure that permanently structured Haiti into a 
clientelist network now based on its political and economic dependence. Despite 
this dependent clientelist infrastructure, he defended fiercely Haiti’s national 
independence. Duvalier’s acquiescence to American domination cannot be 
equivocated, 
[W]e are aware that we belong to a sphere of influence. 
We have neither the intention, nor the ill-reasoned desire 
to resist it. To the contrary, we would like to collaborate 
with the great American nation in its position of 
leadership (Duvalier 1967, 230). 
 
While he sought control of the state and it neocolonial infrastructure, he accepted 
American dominance and sought to use his acceptance to garner American 
support and offset the possibility they might openly support his overthrow (R. D. 
Heinl 1967). Duvalier’s survival was dependent on convincing the American 
government that his regime was not a threat, so despite the nationalist discourse 
Duvalierism was constrained by the American-imposed regional and national 
political infrastructure that undermined Haitian sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
Duvalier sought to use diplomacy to leverage against American dominance by 
using emerging states and the non-aligned movement to lessen Haiti’s political 
dependence and use it as a tool to protect whatever national interests he could. 
As Diederich notes, 
Duvalier brought in new Communist influence to badger 
the United States… he welcomed a three-man 
Czechoslovakian commercial mission which had come 
to study the potential for trade exchanges between the 
two countries. A polish diplomatic and trade mission had 




He withheld votes against Cuba sought by the United States, hosted emerging 
African leaders, and used the communist threat, and American support at the UN 
and OAS to influence American action and negotiate better terms for Haiti256. He 
made his multipolar strategy quite explicit in his speech at the National Assembly 
in 1964, 
[W]e propose to open Haitian diplomacy to the recent 
currents of countries on the path to development, and to 
the new Europe on the path to reconstruction. Almost 
everywhere in the world new entities are being formed 
either political organizations or economic systems… It is 
necessary that our country familiarise itself with its 
strengths in the international political arena and take 
advantage of the various centers of interests arising in 
the international sphere (Duvalier 1967, 231)257 
 
Duvalier had formulated the basis and contour of Haitian multipolar strategy and 
advocated that it be leveraged in the international arena to secure national 
interests and power, however limited they were. Nevertheless, despite this claim 
and efforts to offset American power and dictates, and Duvalier’s so-called 
control of the national sphere, the Haitian state was not only dependent on “the 
political doctrine of this hemisphere” but also on the economic infrastructure all 
the way to the negotiations and renegotiations of national loans. Duvalierism, 
even if it wanted to secure a degree of national autonomy could not achieve the 
changes that were possible under previous Louverturean regimes. His, was a 
neocolonial clientelist regime dependent on the political and economic 
                                                          
256 See Ambassador Thurston letter to the Secretary of state regarding his meeting with Duvalier on 
September 15, 1962. It is clear that Duvalier understood that the Haitian state advantage was minimal 
and he was determined to use whatever it could muster to secure influence American political and 
economic decisions vis-à-vis his regime. 
257 Speech of Dr. Francois Duvalier in front of Congress (the National Assembly), after being sworn as 
President-for-Life on June 22, 1964. 
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infrastructure within which it emerged with little possibility to wrest the nation from 
it. The dependency of the neocolonial clientelist state and the Duvalierist regime 
is even clearer when one reads Duvalier’s letter to U.S. President John F. 
Kennedy requesting budgetary support, grants, loans, infrastructural 
development grants, and debt payment moratoriums.  
Any attempt to reduce the financial resources of the 
government through the payment of amortization or 
interest, or both at the same time, on the heavy 
obligations owed the export-import bank would cause 
the Haitian economic and financial crisis, which my 
government is combatting, to become explosive. I take 
the liberty of requesting your good offices and those of 
your entire government to the end that a twenty-year 
moratorium may be granted the Haitian State on its 
debts to the Export-Import Bank, as in the case of other 
countries such as Brazil, that enjoy more advantages but 
are faced with problems of the same sort as those 
confronting Haiti and its people258 
 
Owing loans to an Export-Import Bank controlled by the American government, 
the limited internal autonomy the Duvalierist regime enjoyed could not spare Haiti 
from American control over its national destiny. Duvalier was faced with the very 
reality of the neocolonial clientelist mechanism that facilitated American control. 
Yet, the implementation of American control, and the imposition of its neocolonial 
clientelist infrastructure, was not uniform nor did it treat all states the same way. 
Despite giving a moratorium to Brazil, the U.S. government refused to do the 
same for Haiti, a nation it had impoverished after more than 19 years of 
occupation. Doing so would have allowed Haiti to regain its financial footing and 
                                                          
258 Department of State, Division of Language Services,  - translation – No: 20-598-B   - Letters from the 
President of the Republique – Palais National, Port-au-Prince, July 12, 1960, July 7, 1961 and July 3, 1962. 
Declassified E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5(b).  
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undo the primary and most important structure of dependence and control under 
the American clientelist system. Duvalier’s loan request was no different from 
that of the Estimé regime, which was also denied.  
The imposition of economic dependence through indebtedness imposed 
on Haiti, not only impoverished the nation, but also left every government at the 
mercy of American financial institutions. For another nation to rely on a foreign 
government to negotiate loans with financial institutions that it created, owns or 
controls is perhaps the biggest irony, but such was, and is, the nature of the new 
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The Duvalierist regime, despite its perceived 
independence nationally, operated within a particular system of control and 
dependence and was, for all intent and purposes, if not controlled, at the very 
least constrained and subdued by it. However, although Duvalier’s request for 
loans for structural development was denied, military aid to bolster his anti-
communist struggle and to sustain his regime increased.  Despite constraints, the 
Duvalierist regime successfully secured more than $116 million in grants, loans, 
and other types of foreign assistance mostly from the United States (Diederich 
and Burt 1969, 182) 
Such was the nature of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure that 
escaped those advocating for a leftist revolution in Haiti or who blamed Duvalier 
for the lack of economic development and national progress. Nevertheless, the 
threat they represented to the American government has to be understood and 
analyzed in that context. American governments had more to fear from young 
communists who sought to upend existing state structures and power relations 
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for new ones, than from the Duvalierist regime whose survival depended on 
those loans and grants to sustain its systems of state expansion, absorption, and 
regime legitimacy.  
Young intellectuals throughout the region, including Haiti, enamored with 
Marxist and communist ideologies, and concerned with the social power relations 
and unequal distribution of resources and power in their nations sought the 
reorganization of the neocolonial state for what they foresaw as a more 
responsible and accountable distribution of national resources. Their goal was to 
counter the monopolization of power by national elites and international capital, 
which resulted in the disenfranchisement of the majority (Pierre-Charles 1973, O. 
E. Wright 1979, Greene, et al. 1984, T. Wright 2001). Although driven by a 
different ideology, their objectives were not far from the Louverturean model, 
which sought a more equitable distribution of resources and protection of rights 
(Diederich and Burt 1969, E. Paul 1976, Paquin 1983). As was the case 
throughout the region, the military-centered neocolonial infrastructures imposed 
by the United States became effective vehicles for resisting communism and this 
time, dictatorship rather than good governance and democracy became the more 
predictable option (Time Magazine 1973, Munro 1974, Harris and Nef 2008, 
Wiarda and Kline 2011).  
In Haiti, the centralization of power imposed by the American occupation 
enabled Duvalierism to flourish nationally, uncontested and impervious to 
challenges, but constrained internationally through a system of indebtedness and 
threat of intervention. The claim of Duvalierism as an independent nationalist 
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regime is illusory at best, and those who study the Duvalierist period without 
considering the US-directed neocolonial clientelist infrastructure miss the true 
nature of the regime. Duvalierism was an internationally dependent regime that 
found the means to assert a modicum of national autonomy through control of 
the military apparatus, but it was a permitted dictatorship given its reliance on 
American military and economic support to survive.  
  The attempt by Estimé to orient the neocolonial state toward the 
Louverturean model was continued by Duvalier in rhetoric only. Duvalier, from 
the start, deviated from Estimé’s Louverturean attempt by relying on foreign 
support and the use of force rather than managing internal cleavages and 
interests, and securing the political and economic rights of the majority for its 
survival. Although he counterbalanced American power with the threat of 
communism, he did so to garner resources to support his regime, avert military 
intervention and support for the neocolonial opposition forces, not to enhance the 
power and reduce the dependency of the Haitian state. His government became 
more dependent on American economic and military support, not less, and the 
state became more dependent on the clientelist infrastructure for its daily 
functioning, not less. American marines began training the Macoutes and new 
military, American loans and grants funded state services, the neocolonial 
clientelist model was being consolidated under a new dictatorial governance 
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infrastructure259. The Noirist had managed to create a new coercive infrastructure 
and its orientation was toward securing the power of the Duvalierist regime, and 
maintaining American interests and the continuity of the neocolonial clientelist 
state.  
Far from the Louverturean model and the interdependent state-society 
relationship it fostered, a predatory Noirist regime emerged, dependent 
economically and militarily on foreign support for its survival and this time, with 
the capacity to dominate national cleavages, or more precisely to eliminate them 
without repercussion. Although Duvalier successfully subordinated the military to 
his regime, rather than orienting its power to restore the sovereignty of the nation 
and continue the Noirist expansion, it became his personal army, acting to 
expand his control, and terrorize the nation rather than securing it. He used the 
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the centralization of power facilitated by 
the American occupation to make Haiti his uncontested fiefdom – ensuring him 
the presidency for life.  
Duvalier succeeded in removing neocolonial elites from the all aspects of 
governance and state and public institutions by capitalizing on the political and 
color-based polarization instituted by them. However, besides the cost to those 
involved directly and indirectly in the political arena, the economic position of 
neocolonial Mulatto elites who supported the regime solidified, protected by the 
                                                          
259 A grant of $ 6 million was received from the American government for direct budget support. See 
declassified document – The Secretary of State –Washington, August 3, 1961 – Memorandum for the 
President – subject: Suggested Reply to letters to You From the President of Haiti, by Dean Rusk. 
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neocolonial economic infrastructure imposed during the occupation and the 
convergence of their interest with those of foreign capital (Rotberg and Clague 
1971, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 206). It facilitated the rise of competing foreign-born 
Syrian elites, willing to support the regime to consolidate their own position in the 
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure (Dupuy 1989, L. Dubois 2012, Pean 2016, 3). 
More importantly, the Duvalierist regime’s reliance on taxation, customhouse 
dues, and economic stability for state revenue and expansion could not afford to 
impose the same level of control on the economy it did on political life; 
Dependent on state expansion and absorption, it needed economic continuity 
and growth for its survival. As such,  
Duvalier had no objection to the merchants prospering; 
he did not even mind if they maintained their domination 
over the economy. But he insisted on the right to dictate 
the economic and social price that the merchants would 
pay for this domination, and he saw to it that the state’s 
share of the spoils increased as to fit current political 
realities.” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 206) 
 
The Duvalierist regime was independent of neocolonial elites, curtailing their 
power while coercing them into compliance or murdering them. However, it was 
dependent of the American-imposed clientelist infrastructure; it was imbedded 
and subservient to it, taking attention not to challenge American economic 
interests, by keeping those interests beyond the reach of his Noirist state. This 
distinct model of national autonomy and external dependency would become a 
major feature of the post-colonial African states markedly different from the dual 
clientelist model of Anglophone Caribbean states (Bienefeld 1988, Edie 1991). 
Although Duvalier lowered the economic control of neocolonial elites on the state 
by creating a new state-directed and foreign supported infrastructure of 
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exploitation and expropriation controlled by emergent Black Duvalierist elite and 
its foreign-born Levantine elites as competitors, both dependent on the regime 
for their survival, he did not undermine the American-imposed neocolonial 
clientelist infrastructure. His government, argues Trouillot, has “always given the 
United States the most tangible sign of its submission; unconditional support for 
U.S. capital” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 202). As elaborated previously, constrained by 
the imposition of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, his commitment to 
political and military control of the state did not extend to the control of the 
economic infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the Louverturean 
state model. Duvalier was only as strong as his American financial and military 
support allowed him to be. The scholar Leslie Pean is right, in the end,  
Papa Doc did not commit crimes in a vacuum. The terror 
exercised was somewhat consistent with the new 
regional260 politico-economic order that had to be 
imposed through fire and steel (Pean 2016, 4).  
 
It represented the advent of dictatorial regimes supported by the United States to 
sustain its dependent clientelist infrastructures and safeguard American against 
the communism. The very nature of neocolonial domination and its exclusionary 
practices that gave rise to noirist politics meant that the Duvalierist regime, 
despite its coercive and dictatorial manifestation did not alienate the nation but 
enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy due to its Noirist credentials 261. Duvalierism 
                                                          
260 Emphasis mine 
261 Both Neree and Diederich argue that Duvalier’s support was based on coercion and not voluntary.  
While the Duvalierist regime was, by all account, coercive, he had also secured the support of a segment 
of the population.  They were willing to defend his regime against attacks from internal and external 
forces. Due to their absorption in the state apparatus and the access given to the children of many of the 
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was much more than a coercive dictatorial regime for the majority of Haitians; it 
was the vehicle for middle class formation, social mobility, and national pride. 
If as Robert Dahl maintains middle class expansion is conducive to 
democratization, Duvalierism turned this notion on its head by facilitating a state 
and regime-dependent middle class fully committed to the support of the Noirist 
dictatorial regime as long as it offered opportunities, stability, and national pride 
centered on Noirism (Dahl 1971, Krouse Spring 1982, Huntington 1993). Within a 
new neocolonial framework of external dependence, hyper-urbanization, 
austerity, state contraction, and free market imposition, the regime could not 
sustain the absorption of its Black citizens and expand opportunities for their 
children as it did in years past. Nevertheless, as long as stability persisted and 
the regime commitment to protecting their interests remained unshakable, the 
Duvalierist elites and its middle and working class supporters, and even the rural 
majority, were more than willing to support and defend it no matter its excesses. 
More than its failure to deliver leading to its demise, it was the change from 
Duvalier’s Norist politics after his death in 1971 to Jean-Claudism and its focus 
on the Mulatto elites that became the death nail of the regime’s social control and 
legitimacy.  
 
                                                          
Black population to education, employment and upward mobility, they saw in the regime the 
embodiment of their aspirations (C. J. Edie 1991, Neree 1988). 
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Jean-Claudism: Continuity, Legitimacy, and the Decline of the Duvalierist State: 
As early as 1969, Henry Kissinger was contemplating a post-Duvalier 
transition and engaging in cost-benefit analysis regarding the continuity of the 
regime262. The death of Duvalier in 1971, rather than end his regime, continued it 
with the passage of power to his 19-year old son – Baby Doc; an indication that it 
was the new Duvalierist elites rather than the young impressionable boy who 
held the power (M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Despite Jean Claude’s claim of having 
gained experience under the tutelage of his father, his ability to replace his father 
as President-for-life could not have taken place without American blessings. The 
legitimacy of the regime persisted because of its absorption and expansion of 
segments of the Black population into the state infrastructure, but would face a 
crisis beginning in 1980. Having consolidated the Duvalierist regime, the 
neocolonial clientelist dictatorial infrastructure continued, albeit with less terror. 
“The only difference”, argues Trouillot, “between the two regimes lay in the 
deepening of relations between the state and holders of capital at home and 
abroad, and in the increased support of the U.S. government.” (Diederich and 
Burt 1969, Neree 1988, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 200)  
Jean-Claudism reflected a marked departure from his Norist roots, the re-
emergence of the military, and re-entry of neocolonial Mulatto elites into the 
governance structure of the nation. The assertion of power by Jean-Claude faced 
                                                          




a new orientation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure spawned by a 
newfound interest by American capital and American manufacturing 
entrepreneurs, and reformulation of American interests and expectation of its 
clientelist regimes brought about by the election of Jimmy Carter (Vestring, et al. 
2005 ). The flight of American manufacturing in search of cheap labor in 
developing countries required a new governance structure, one more stable and 
predictable, with more legitimate governments and a stronger coercive capacity 
to manage labor demands and facilitate commerce – less dictatorship, more Law 
and Order and political liberalization. Less threatened by communism and more 
confident in its ability to overcome communist encroachments, American 
interests had formulated a new model under the presidency of Jimmy Carter; one 
less dependent on dictatorship and based on human rights protection, and 
political liberalization to fit a new emerging neoliberal agenda. This shift in 
American policy and the orientation of the young Duvalier opened the national 
political arena for contestations. Haiti saw the re-emergence, long suppressed, of 
political actors, to contest the regime whose dependence on the American 
clientelist network limited its capacity to engage in suppression and human rights 
violations. The regime engaged in local elections, allowing greater freedom of the 
press, gradually emboldening the forces the new American neocolonial 
reformulation had made possible.   
It was a new era, what Baby Doc referred to as Jean-Claudism—an  
alliance between Mulatto and Duvalierist elites; one fraught with competition 
between old entrenched Duvalierist and technocratic elites within the regime, and 
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between those regime elites and emerging Mulatto competitors. The entry of light 
manufacturing following the death of Duvalier marked the beginning of a new 
neocolonial reality for Haiti and the Jean Claude regime. 150 U.S. firms operated 
in Haiti in 1972, which doubled by 1977, manufacturing grew by more than 10 
percent a year from 1970 to 1980, and assembly industry exports, which 
represented 1/3 of all exports, grew by 30 percent a year (Dupuy 1989, M.-R. 
Trouillot 1990, 200-2, Dupuy 2007, 48-51). Besides the inclusion of neocolonial 
elites in national politics, and the growth of manufacturing, under Jean-Claude, 
the economic advantages of neocolonial Mulatto elites also increased, facilitated 
by the regime and American capital. As Trouillot and Dupuy argue,  
[T]he light industry solution offered those neocolonial 
Mulatto elites the possibility of diversifying their 
investments and increasing their income without 
increasing its risks. (Dupuy 1989, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 
207, 2007, 43-52).  
 
Jean-Claudism, neglected the regulatory capacity of the state developed 
by his father as demanded by the United States under the new neoliberal free 
market impositions of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The state relaxed 
the collection of taxes and facilitated inefficiency and corruption and 
consequently state revenue declined. Tax evasion grew, revenue declined due to 
neocolonial elites no longer fearful of crossing the Duvalierist state, and national 
production decreased because of urbanization and cheaper food from abroad 
(Pierre 1971). The Haitian Goudes, pegged to American currency as equal 
exchange lost its footing to inflation (R. D. Heinl 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005). The 
adoption of new American neocolonial dictates undermined the agricultural 
sector in order to provide a market to dump American surplus rice and corn on 
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the Haitian market. As a result, the incentive for agricultural production and 
peasant livelihood was undermined. One of the most damaging Jean-Claudist 
policies to the peasantry was the destruction of its important sources of 
investment and revenue – the Creole Pig (Clammer 2012, 24).  
The decline of Haitian agricultural production due to government collusion 
with American capital, and the facilitation of American food dumping schemes led 
to the rise of imported foodstuffs. The once self-sufficient and export-oriented 
agricultural sector was so destabilized by the flooding of the Haitian market with 
cheap food that it was no longer profitable for farmers to farm thereby 
impoverishing what was, until then, the most economically well off and stable 
peasantry in the hemisphere. These imported foodstuffs increased from $10.7 
million in 1970 to $62.1 million in 1976 and continued to increase thereafter. To 
make matters worse, the price of all foodstuffs double between 1975-1985 and 
the trade deficit also grew from $12.4 million in 1970 to 68.4 million in 1975, and 
183 million in 1980 (Graham and Edwards 1984, 75, IHSI 1985, Hooper 1987b, 
33)263.   
Whereas Duvalierism distanced itself from what remained of the Mulatto 
bourgeoisie, choosing an economic arrangement backed by a coercive state 
rather than an alliance, Jean-Claudism sought an alliance without the constraints 
established by Duvalierism that protected the interests of the urban poor against 
speculations and hyper-exploitation. Jean-Claudism allowed the re-emergence of 
                                                          
263 The figures are also quoted in (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 210-12, Dupuy 2007, 48-51) 
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new and visible neocolonial Mulatto economic elite, increasingly more influential 
in the nation’s socio-economic arena, but less responsive and accountable to the 
regulatory capacity imposed by Duvalier. The marriage of Jean-Claude Duvalier 
to Michelle Bennet, one of the few Mulatto families who had supported the 
election of his father, and her subsequent influence in engineering a resurgence 
of Mulattoes in state affairs, alienated entrenched Duvalierist elites and the Black 
urban middle and working class population upon which the regime legitimacy 
depended264.  
While Duvalierism took great care to embrace Noirism and maintain its 
connection with the Black population in terms of ideology and political discourse, 
policies, and state absorption, Jean-Claudism distanced itself from Noirism and 
facilitated, nay, feted, the visible absence of Noirism as a governing ideology. 
American insistence under Ronald Regan on compliance and adoption of the 
light manufacturing export-oriented neoliberal model eliminated the last vestiges 
of the Duvalierist state regulatory capacity and accelerated the weakening of the 
state, the decline of its revenue, its capacity for expansion and ultimately its 
legitimacy. As Trouillot argues correctly, “the light manufacturing industry 
strategy never brought the returns expected by those who stubbornly imposed it 
on the Haitian people and the surviving Duvalierist state” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 
209). Instead, it exacerbated the disparities between social classes by facilitating 
                                                          
264 Jean-Claudism had relaxed the collection and regulatory capacity of the state – tax evasion grew, state 




a hyper-urbanization because of the placement of those light manufacturing 
plants exclusively in Port-au-Prince. The influx of factory workers created 
imbalance between the well-to-do and the working poor in the capital with the 
state unable to service an exploding expansion of slums in the outskirts of the 
capital. The influx of the rural poor in search of manufacturing work, rising 
inflation, the decline in food production, and rise in food prices, coupled with the 
visible opulence of the Black and Mulatto elites, brought to the surface the 
contradictions of color discourse and the coercive nature of the dictatorial regime 
of Duvalier had until then kept hidden.  
Moreover, the propagation of technology, once unavailable, made evident 
the disparities between the struggling majority and its elites. Even the established 
Black middle class population felt the impact of economic disparities by seeing 
the state that was once an important source of employment contract. Structural 
adjustment programs forced on the Duvalierist state within the context of the 
neocolonial clientelist infrastructure limited its capacity for absorption, 
undermining one of the most important pillars of Duvalierist legitimacy amongst 
middle and working class urbanites (Dupuis 1997). More dramatically, even the 
revenue collected by Jean-Claude’s regime was not re-invested in the state to 
allow it to, at the very least, maintain the level of support it had established for 
those it had absorbed. Dupuy noted,  
[T]he public revenues appropriated by the Duvalier 
regime were not returned to civil society in the form of 
increased infrastructural investments in the urban or 
rural sectors; as health, education, employment, 
technical, and financial services; or as subsidies 
designed to promote economic growth and the welfare of 




Whether the erosion of the Duvalierist state was caused by Jean-Claudism, or 
whether it reflects a new state of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, or 
whether Jean-Claudist politico-economic choices accelerated the impact of this 
new phase of Neocolonial economic imposition on the Duvalierist state is not 
clear. What is unequivocal is that the economic excesses of Duvalierist elites and 
their neocolonial allies in the face of mass deprivation frayed the support and 
legitimacy enjoyed by Duvalier, the father, and his regime. Most importantly, 
Jean-Claude’s willingness to facilitate the re- ascension of neocolonial Mulatto 
elites into the neocolonial clientelist state infrastructure demonstrated a betrayal 
of the basic tenets of Duvalierism. Jean-Claudism marked a resurgence of 
Mulatrism infused with all its pervasive colorism and arrogance of yesteryears; 
the son had turned the Duvalierist Noirist infrastructure on its head, and forced it 
on its knees having undermined both its coercive capacity, its absorptive 
capacity, and the sources of legitimacy (Paquin 1983, Neree 1988, M.-R. 
Trouillot 1990, 140).  
Under the Jean-Claudist regime, the military regained its power, relegating 
the Macoutes to less important positions and roles in the regime and society 
(Neree 1988, 185-6). Jean-Claude’s inability to sustain and broaden the centers 
of legitimacy established by the Duvalierist regime or to create new ones capable 
of addressing the dynamics of hyper-urbanization and privation capable of 
meeting the needs of the population would ultimately result in its demise. Most 
suggest that Duvalierism was overthrown, but the more accurate analysis is that 
Jean-Claudism was overthrown, not by the military, but by a population tired of 
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exploitation and continued marginalization by the state and its Black and 
neocolonial elites. It was the masses clamoring in the streets, risking limbs and 
lives who forced the 30-year dictatorial regime and its leader, Jean-Claude 
Duvalier to go into exile leaving military officers, Duvalierist elites, and resurgent 






DEMOCRATIC TTRANSITION: A SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
          This chapter advances the argument that the refusal of the population to 
participate in manipulated elections fits the pattern of their historical struggle to 
secure a responsive and accountable state and regimes. Whereas nationalist 
elites supported their aspirations for a responsive and accountable state 
historically, the advent of democracy has place the orientation of the state in their 
hands. Their refusal to participate delegitimizes regimes that are structured into 
the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure whose dominance of Haitian 
politics have little to do with the popular will and to the type of democratic 
accountability and state they have historically sought. The absence of a 
legitimate democratic regime is directly related to their historical struggle for 
accountability. The basis for legitimate democratic governance and democratic 
consolidation in Haiti should rest on a model of state crafting incongruent with the 
current dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, one centered on 
nationalist/noirist politics and Louverturean statecraft. Such a project would 
strengthen and address the challenges of legitimacy, democratic participation, 
and state-society relations or the historical État-Peuple / Peuple-État 
interdependence advocated for by Louverturean, Noirist, and Duvalierist state 
crafters. Unlike its counterpart in the Caribbean, Haitian democratic continuity will 
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continue to lack the pre-requisite legitimacy unless it is based on a more 
responsive and accountable state. 
 
Authoritarian Crisis and Democratic Opening: Political Instability, Elite 
Competition, and the Demands for Democratic Governance  (1984-1990): 
In our haste to counter thirty year of 
dictatorship and its structures of terror in 
support of democracy, we end up destroying 
the state and the institutions we needed for 
democratic governance. It was a mistake from 
which we have not yet recovered- Dr. Susy 
Castor (2013)265  
 
The birth and growth of the Haitian democratic movement was facilitated by the 
breakdown of consensus within governing Duvalierists and Jean-Claudist elites 
characterized by growing conflicting interests amongst their core sectors. Jean-
Claude’s alliance with neocolonial elites his father had removed from state 
control, his support for the re-emergence of the Army by sidelining his father’s 
shock troop, the Macoutes, and the creation of new military regiments led to 
competition for power and leverage between these two institutional branches of 
the state (Rebu 1994, Avril 1997, Pierre-Etienne 1999). Moreover, many 
Duvalierist elites saw the emphasis of certain features of Jean-Claudism, 
especially its efforts at consolidating a neocolonial alliance as an affront to 
                                                          
265 Interview and conversation between the author and Dr. Castor at CRESFED – (The Center for Economic 
Research and Formation for Development) in Port-au-Prince, Canape Vert. Dr. Castor is a historian, 
political activist, and leader in the anti-Duvalierist and democratic movement. She is the Director of 
CRESFED, and wife of Gerard Pierre-Charles, the late Director General of OPL (Organization Politique 




Duvalierist Noirist ideology and Jean-Claudist neoliberal policies as signs of 
declining Noirist state power (Rebu 1995). As Chamberlain notes, 
The Macoutes came to despise the young Duvalier as a 
traitor, and their brooding hostility exacerbated existing 
divisions, contributing ultimately to the dictatorship 
collapse (Chamberlain 1995, 15). 
 
Jean-Claude consolidated his alliance with a segment of the neocolonial elites in 
an attempt to form an alliance between black political elites in control of the state 
and neocolonial elites in control of the national economy. This sort of alliance has 
been characterized by Caribbean scholars as a dominant feature of Anglophone 
Caribbean politics - an alliance between Black political elites in control of the 
state and entrepreneurial minority ethnic elites in control of the national economy 
(Reid 1977, Stone 1980, C. J. Edie 1991). However, the re-emergence of 
neocolonial elites in political affairs and their prominence as decision-makers in 
the Jean-Claudist regime was an affront to Duvalierists adherents, which resulted 
in open conflicts between Duvalierist elites and neocolonial elites vying for state 
control (Dupuy 1989, Casimir and Dubois 2010). Although, these new 
neocolonial elites that now dominated Jean-Claude’s regime were distinct from 
the oligarchs mostly killed or exiled by the Duvalierist regime, they represented 
the new foreign-neocolonial alliance; the new dependent neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure. Jean-Claude’s policies had provided the U.S. an entry into the 
Duvalierist national infrastructure, which had escaped them. Their support of 
sectors of the economic, military, and manufacturing elites to dismantle the 
Duvalierist infrastructure and re-establish control over the national sphere proved 
successful. These American-supported elites posed a direct challenge not only to 
 348 
 
the Duvalierist military and nationalist infrastructure and its surviving oligarchs 
who had become subservient to the regime, but to the Duvalierist political and 
economic elites who had acquired some control over the national economy. The 
growing prominence, and clout of these new technocratic and manufacturing 
foreign-backed elites in Jean-Claude’s regime accentuated the internal 
incoherence and dysfunction of the ruling class266 (Slavin 1995, Pierre-Etienne 
1999, 75-9). These intra-elites conflicts also materialized in other areas, between 
the policy-makers vying for state power, technocrats and oligarch competing for 
control over policies, power, and influence. The conservative Catholic Church, 
long a central component in the Duvalierist power infrastructure, saw the 
emergence of Liberation Theologists within its rank challenging church leaders 
and their political alliance. The importance of the poor and the Church’s policy of 
non-political participation were at odds with the role of the Church leadership as 
active supporter of the regime267. The decline of Duvalierist power and the open 
conflicts and competition between Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist forces that 
ensued validate O’Donnell and Schmitter’s claim,  
[T]here is no transition whose beginning is not the 
consequence…of important divisions within the 
                                                          
266 Many Haitian scholars suggest that Jean-Claude’s marriage to the Bennet family gave the latter a level 
of power and decision-making in both the political and economic arena that upended the status quo. 
Their greed, and aggregation of power elevated the friction within the regime which Jean-Claude proved 
impotent to address. 
267 The Haitian Catholic Church, having emerged as an indigenous church under the Duvalierist Noirist 
regime as we noted earlier, was, by definition, an arm of the regime (Duvalier 1969).  Thus, it is not 
surprising that it too faced internal challenges both within its upper leadership, some of whom rejected 
the Jean-Claudist approach, and within the institution itself, by members who saw the alliance with the 
regime and its elites as antithetical to the values of the church and its connection with the 
disenfranchised (Chamberlain 1988, Florival 2011).  
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authoritarian regime itself, principally along the 
fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19). 
 
From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, Haiti’s political, economic, military and 
religious cleavages undermined the stability of the state. These internal divisions 
within the Haitian ruling class, more complex and extensive than suggested by 
O’Donnell and Schmitter, provided the space for the emergence of the popular 
democratic movement and the development of a viable opposition to confront the 
entrenched elites.268 The tension and fault lines created between state and 
economic elites undermined the Jean-Claude regime’s coercive capacity, and 
limited its ability to withstand the pressure from democratic forces until it was too 
late to undermine their popularity and aggregated power (Abbot 1988, Dupuy 
2007). The populace, watching the opulence of the elites in the midst of 
economic decline and deprivation and seeing itself no longer central to the 
discourse of state crafting, became increasingly disenchanted and restless 
(Rotberg and Clague 1971). Its treatment by the new regime as seemingly 
irrelevant to the legitimacy of the state and its leaders, and the inability of the 
state system to absorb them, as it did under the Duvalierist Noirist regime, led 
                                                          
268 O’Donnell and Schmitter suggest that the fall of authoritarianism is often preceded by economic 
expansion and internal conflicts between governing elites with soft-liners seeking to expand rights to 
larger segments of the population. These factors, they argue facilitate the rise of a viable opposition 
capable of effectuating a political transition (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In the case of Haiti, neither 
economic expansion nor soft-liners advocacy for rights preceded the fall of the regime, the intra-elite 
conflicts and the distractions it created merely provided a moment for the population to assert itself, 
which once done, has been, historically, almost impossible to counter without extreme and sustained 
violence. The context of state-society relations as a result of history has always depended on a degree of 
legitimacy and popular support. 
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the masses to seek political alternatives. Theirs was a politics of bread and 
representation and their solution was a responsive state and an accountable 
democratic government. Thus coercive actions only served to embolden them269 
(Dalvius 1987, Dumas 1994, Avril 1997). 
The inability of Jean-Claude’s regime to sustain the strong state-society 
relations or more specifically, the État-Peuple/ Peuple- État interdependence 
established by his father, and his failure to maintain the national autonomy and 
political independence of the Duvalierist Noirist regime ultimately undermined the 
legitimacy and stability of the Haitian state270. Its alliance with neocolonial elites 
who had lost their power under the previous regime undercut the foundational 
basis of the Duvalierist regime’s Noirist orientation (Baguidy 1986, Bob 1988). 
This new Jean-Claudist Alliance reintroduced the very dependent clientelist 
infrastructure with its military-dominated system that was used so effectively by 
neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters, and which his father had 
thoroughly destroyed (Duvalier 1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Delince 1979).  
 Jean-Claudism resulted in the re-emergence and re-assertion of the 
neocolonial-dominated, American-imposed clientelist infrastructure rejected and 
undermined by Duvalierism. The fall of Jean-Claude’s regime thus ended a 29- 
year attempt to permanently re-orient the Haitian state through a centralized, 
                                                          
269 It is not by coincidence that the North was the first to rise to challenge the regime and give the 
impetus to the rest of the nation.  
270 Some have argued that the contracting of the state which limited its strength and capacity to absorb 
segment of the population are directly related to the new Clientelist infrastructure based on a free market 
and IMF mandates for privatization and the elimination of the regulatory state (Dupuy 1989). 
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military-centered approach. It marked a new development in Haitian politics with 
a large segment of the population no longer interested in alliances along racial 
lines but seeking a responsive democratic state. The fight for democracy thus ran 
counter to the interest of all segments of the elites – Old Duvalierists and their 
Macoutes, Jean-Claudists and its military, as well as the neocolonial elites who 
saw popular democracy as the new vehicle for their disempowerment, and 
American policy-makers who saw it as counter to American regional political and 
interests.  
As had taken place decades earlier in Latin America in the struggle 
against authoritarian forces, Liberation theologians led this surge toward 
democratization (Peeler 2009).  In Haiti, as in Latin America, the triangulation of 
elites, the Catholic Church, and the military as cohesive centers of power in 
control of the state made them target as defenders of the status quo by any 
forces seeking a change in the orientation of the state (Black 2011, Nef 2011).  
Popular democratic forces therefore found themselves competing with forces that 
sometimes allied to defeat them, and other times competed against each other 
for control of the emerging democratic state. Author and journalist Amy Wilentz 
best echoed the analysis of most scholars of Haiti. She captured the Haitian 
context, the liberation theologian at the center of the movement toward 
democracy, and the forces that both supported and opposed it.  Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, the firebrand liberation theologian, despised by regime elites and loved 
by the masses, “had all the right enemies”, she observed, 
[T]he army hated him, because he mentioned colonels 
and sergeants and lieutenants by name in his sermons, 
and excoriated them for the abuses they committed 
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against the people… The American Embassy hated him 
because he held the United States and its economic 
system responsible for much of Haiti’s economic woe, 
and thus for the misery of her people, his congregation. 
The Church hierarchy feared him because he did not 
often miss a chance to include them in his list of 
enemies of the people, and they were jealous of him, 
too, for the loyal following he had attracted, and for the 
attention he received from foreign journalists. The very 
wealthy few in Haiti despised him also, because he 
accused them of betraying their countrymen and stated 
baldly that the system by which they enriched 
themselves was corrupt and criminal, and an offense 
against their fellow Haitians. He frightened them all with 
the violent honesty of his sermons (Wilentz 1994, 77-
78).  
 
Thus, the democratic movement, its leaders, and popular mobilization that 
brought it into existence faced ab initio widespread resistance from all 
major institutions and entrenched national and foreign interests groups. 
The period of democratization it gave rise to and that persists today pitted 
the masses and segments of the middle and lower middle class against 
national and international forces. This has resulted in countless coups, 
destabilization attempts, and when those failed, ultimately invasion led by 
the United States under the cover of the United Nations to recapture 
control of the client state (Shacochis 1999, 133-37).  
It was the successful resistance of the masses to attempts to re-
impose control over them, rescind their capture of and attempt to re-orient 
the state, and their sidelining of the military, which led to American 
usurpation of Haitian sovereignty lost by its client elites during the 
transition. With neocolonial elites and the American government unable to 
use the military to maintain their dominance over the nation and its people, 
and protect the clientelist infrastructure, another invasion became the only 
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option. Thus, the resulting invasion by United States-sponsored U.N. 
military forces was an act of last resort to re-impose the dependent  
          clientelist infrastructure. 
            
The Military: 
After more than two decades of subordination and dominance by 
Duvalierist para-military forces, Jean-Claude’s preference for the military enabled 
it to regain its power and control over the state’s coercive apparatus. By early 
1980, military officers, emboldened by Jean-Claude’s favoritism, and motivated 
by institutional memory, pride, and revenge sought a permanent end to 
Macoutism. Senior officers forcefully re-asserted the army’s institutional role as 
the only coercive power-broker of the state. More educated and better trained 
than their para-military counterpart as a result of Jean-Claude’s purposeful 
neglect, the military sought the destruction of their rival having not forgotten the 
Macoutes’ role as executioners of their officer corps. The Macoutes themselves, 
still powerful and embedded within the Duvalierist state, resisted the military’s 
growing power and infringements into a state system they had dominated.  This 
conflict made the Jean-Claude’s regime vulnerable and unable to respond to 
popular democratic forces clamoring for a political transition271. Its attempt to use 
                                                          
271 Beginning with the mass arrests in November 1980 and deportation of twenty dissidents, the following 
events help demonstrate the masses determination and the regimes’ failing attempts to control them and 
well as manage its internal conflicts: 
 In May 1984, slum dwellers looted care food warehouses in Gonaives and Cap-Haitian and attacked a 
prison and police station. This was an act of defiance against the regime from the North; the very 
center of Nationalist resistance. 
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the long-neglected and disaffected Duvalierist forces to quell the mass protests 
resulted in a half-hearted response, which led to military action against them. 
This not only enhanced the profile of the military in the eyes of anti-regime 
democratic forces, it also undermined what little support was enjoyed by the 
regime and its forces. As Cedelle and Gautheret note, 
[I]n 1985, the terror of the «tontons macoutes» was not 
enough to suppress the revolts that broke out in many 
cities and Duvalier lost control of the situation. In 
January 1986, Washington, which had supported him 
under the banner of its struggle against communism for 
some time, counseled him to resign. On February, 7, 
1986, he ceded power back to the military and flee in an 
US Air Force (Cedelle and Gautheret 2014). 
 
It cannot be considered coincidental that it was the Americans who decided it 
was time for Jean-Claude to leave, negotiated his departure, and relegated the 
rein of power to the military as occurred in the pre-Duvalierist era. After all, it was 
the military, the primary institution of the American dependent clientelist 
infrastructure that facilitated the elimination of Jean-Claude’s regime and 
                                                          
 Beginning 1985, a series of demonstrations against hunger and in favor of social justice and 
democracy took place throughout the country. 
 The regime’s plan to legalize political parties on its own terms failed due to popular protest and 
rejection by opposition forces. 
 In 1985. Dealing a blow to Duvalierist forces, a high level minister and a staunch Duvalierist was 
sacked by the Jean-Claudist regime, further undermining its ability to withstand pressure from anti-
regime forces. At a time when uniting its forces was necessary and reliance on the military was 
tentative, the regime incited more division. 
 In 1985, the macoutes, in an attempt to suppress opposition and assist the Jean-Claudist regime 
attacked a series of demonstrations killing many unarmed civilians. 
 The killing continued even after the fall of the regime with churches attacked in broad 
daylight…According to various reports, more than 50 were killed and 80 wounded (Chamberlain 1995, 
15-7, Times 1988). 
 At least 11 attempt to assassinate the most popular leader of the opposition, the Salesian priest, and 
liberation theologian, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 




remnants of the Duvalierist infrastructure.  The General and former President 
Prosper Avril also acknowledged that the army intentionally precipitated the fall of 
Jean-Claude’s regime by refusing to use its coercive power against anti-regime 
forces. As General Avril wrote,  
[The military] had participated by its silence and 
complicitous inaction to the concretization of this result 
for it too wished for change.  No repression of the 
protestors, voluntary absence where its intervention was 
sought, etc. It so fulfilled its role that it was called, when 
came the fateful moment, to hold the leadership of the 
nation in crisis to the satisfaction and complete 
approbation of all political classes, the population, and 
the international community. The protesters, during their 
manifestations against the regime, weren’t they chanting 
everywhere “Vive L’armee”, “Hail to the Military”! 
Everywhere, military personnel were considered heroes 
of the day. The crowds were expressing their gratitude 
with enthusiasm (Avril 1997, 176-77)! 
 
To consolidate their power, in the months following the fall of the regime, the 
military disarmed most of the Macoutes, allowed low ranking members to be 
targeted for revenge killings, and arrested some of its leaders. It regained its 
original role as the only coercive force and institutional power-broker in the 
nation272 (Dalvius 1987). Having undermined the regime’s capacity to suppress 
the masses, and destroyed its defensive capacity, the military came to be seen, 
albeit erroneously, as a supporter of the emergent popular democratic 
movement. It is important to note that many of the senior officers were already 
paid CIA agents and as such their refusal to protect the regime may have also 
                                                          
272 Some have argued that the presence of the police force defies the assertion of the army as the only 




been, if not mandated, at the very least supported by the American government 
(Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 222).  
By focusing on Duvalierist forces and specific individuals within the 
military, the popular democratic movement and the military found common 
cause. The support garnered by the military permitted it the space to eliminate 
Duvalierist forces capable of suppressing it and undermining its dominance. Its 
attempt to re-stablish order, and protect the economic and political status quo ran 
counter to the interests of pro-democracy forces. Thus, it increasingly acted 
against their demonstrations and demands (Chamberlain 1988). Various 
attempts by ruling elites and the military to stabilize and re-assert control over the 
orientation of the state and the nation failed273. The failure of ruling elites to form 
an effective governing coalition allowed popular democratic forces unfettered 
control of the political arena. Therefore, it was predictable that the reliance of 
anti-regime forces on the military as a source of support would be short-lived. 
                                                          
273 To following help illustrate the unsuccessful but persistent attempts of the ruling elites and the military 
to re-assert  themselves: 
 Duvalierists’ efforts to form a party failed amid political protest, foreign involvement, and other 
competing elites. Instead, a law preventing their political participation for a determined period was 
passed 
 Reactionary forces coalesced long enough to remove a liberal but that coalition did not last past his 
removal 
 Two elections ended in bloodshed when elite elements realized the chosen candidate would not win 
 The military, in an attempt to limit conflict and dissent within its rank increased the number of 
general from two to nine. As a Result, 7 officers were elevated to the ranks of general. 
 The military imposed a ban on demonstrations followed by widespread crackdowns against 
democratic forces, the media, and political organizations 
 Despite its control over the political space and state, and its expansion of professional access to its 
members, the military could not sustain the institutional coherence to effective manage the nation. 
Infighting and factionalism within the military resulted in five military coups, each removing one 
officer for another, the latest being to compel democratic expansion. 
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Once its assertion of institutional supremacy was successful, it unleashed its fury 
on the popular democratic movement trying to shape political outcomes. 
Between 1987 and 1991, attempting to restrain pro-democracy forces, the 
military engaged in widespread violence, targeting them in their homes, 
churches, as well as polling stations in sensational acts of brutality. None of 
these acts deterred the population in its demands for fair elections and 
democratic accountability. However, according to General Avril, these coercive 
actions taken by the military to counter the masses’ democratic demands ended 
the honeymoon between civil society and the military.  
The image of an army close to the people as it was 
perceived at the Dawn of February 7, 1986, began to 
progressively fade to give way to a sentiment of rejection 
toward the institution (Avril 1997, 184). 
 
Not only did the direct involvement of the military in the political affairs of the 
state undermine its standing amongst the population, it also created friction 
within the institutions itself. Much as it did, in the years following the decline of 
neocolonial mulatto control of the state, the military fell prey to divergent centers 
of influences, losing it institutional coherence and succumbing to internal 
competition (M. S. Laguerre 1993, Avril 1997). Factionalism stemming from 
personality conflicts, ideological differences between senior officers, and 
antagonism between branches that competed for power under Jean-Claude’s 
regime, led to violent internal schisms (M. S. Laguerre 1993, Dumas 1994, 
Hallward 2007).  
From the fall of Jean-Claude’s regime in 1986 to the election of a 
democratic government in 1990, internal dissent and competition for power and 
 358 
 
control of the state undermined military cohesion and popular support. Military 
officers, symptomatic of the pre-Duvalierist era, undermined the popular will, and 
alternated each other in the presidential palace over the corpses of the 
population seeking democracy, further destabilizing the nation. In 1988, the 
Duvalierist wing of the military removed the elected president, Leslie Manigat, 
and replaced it with the staunch Duvalierist, General Henry Namphy. Three 
months later, left wing and democratic-leaning military officers and lower rank 
soldiers arrested their high ranking Duvalierist officers and overturned the army 
leadership sending General Namphy into exile and replacing him with Jean-
Claudist General Prosper Avril who appeared to support the Democratic 
movement (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 266, Dupuis 1997). These tensions 
mirrored the environment that saw the rise of the Duvalierist Noirist regime. As 
Bellegarde-Smith notes, 
[A] collective of about thirty non-commissioned officers 
was ostensibly in charge, and their demands for a 
transition to democracy resonated favorably with the 
citizenry. That generals, colonels, majors, and some 
‘Tonton Macoutes’ were removed from high office, gave 
credibility to sergeant Joseph Heubreux and his cohort. 
These men were members of Haiti’s urban and rural 
lower classes, using the army to raise their social 
capital... (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 226-7) 
 
As in 1957, Progressive officers and lower ranking soldiers from working class 
background sought an inclusive, more progressive politics and an accountable 
system of representation. Their betrayal by General Avril and their imprisonment, 
and exile of some of the higher ranking participating officers for violating the 
military code, undermined their attempt to influence the formation of a responsive 
government. General Avril, himself a member of the Jean-Claudist elites tied to 
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the neocolonial coalition, with the support of the American embassy suppressed 
the popular democratic movement and progressive forces within the military that 
had brought him to power. The U.S. government demanded the elimination of the 
Duvalierists still present in state institutions and most importantly in the military; 
individuals who had prevented it from acquiring full control over the internal 
affairs of the nation. Consequently Avril “restored the suspended Constitution of 
1987, which includes a provision that bars former top supporters of the Duvalier 
dictatorships from holding public office”274. It was the embassy that dictated the 
members of Avril’s government and had veto power over even its military chief of 
staff. As Robert Pear reported,  
[T]he military chief of staff,was ruled out by the United 
States Ambassador, Brunson McKinley, when General 
Avril telephoned the diplomat in the hours after the coup, 
as decisions were being made about who would hold the 
major positions in a new government…(Pear 1988).  
 
Congruent to its imposed clientelist infrastructure, the United States had already 
re-imposed its influence over Haitian internal affairs. Thus it was not surprising 
that it was they, who since the fall of the regime, demanded the prosecution of 
Duvalierist elements, encouraged the overzealous anti-Duvalierist forces to 
enshrine their demise in the Constitution, set the terms to prevent the re-
                                                          
274See “Haiti Says 'Certain Officers' Tried To Topple the Avril Government” The Associated Press, April 
3, 1989.  Also the Organization of American State report “ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN 






emergence of the “macoutes”, and insisted on the protection of the 
manufacturing infrastructure as conditions for the resumption of $70 million in aid 
(Pear 1988, Rebu 1995, 63, Pierre-Etienne 1999, 124-8). Emboldened by 
American support and seeking the resumption of American economic support, 
General Avril, as did Magloire before him, engaged in arbitrary and excessive 
use of force and imprisonments, and threatened to disrupt the military with 
intimidation, threats, exiles, and assassinations275 (Rebu 1995). After a failed 
attempt, which angered the American government276, in 1989, two of the best 
trained military battalions and remnants of the officers who had participated in the 
overthrow of Namphy, with the support of the population revolted. Their revolt 
sent General Prosper Avril, the head of the American-supported military 
government, into exile replacing him with the moderate Colonel Herard Abraham 
to prepare the path for democratic elections with a civilian government led by 
Ertha Pascal Trouillot (Rebu 1995, Avril 1997).  
                                                          
275 The Organization of American State report “ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1988-1989, 8 September 1989” September 8, 1989. Under his leadership, the mayor 
of the capital, a democratic activist was arrested and tortured while the former mayor and Macoutes 
leader Frank Romain was allowed to leave the country.  
 
276 The first attempt led by Himmler Rebu, Commandant of the anti-guerilla force, the Leopards, failed 
which led him to take refuge in the Dominican Republic. He was extradited against his will to the United 
States where he was detained for three months to prevent him from overthrowing their client 
government.  Given the coordination between the Dominican Republic and the United States and the fact 
that they were waiting for him at the airport, one can only concur that his proximity to Haiti made him 
such a danger to their client regime that the United states government was willing to intervene to protect 
the regime. Nevertheless, the Leopards would strike again, this time successfully overthrowing Avril, The 
General president (Rebu 1995, 150-161, Avril 1997). This attempt to overthrow Gen. Avril by the 
progressive members of the military who had brought him to power, reflect the widespread disillusion 
that he had betrayed their demand for a democratic government. A feeling shared by the majority of the 
population (Dumas 1994, Dupuy 1997). 
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This election, the most democratic ever and since, would lead to the 
election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a priest, and the main leader of the popular 
democratic movement. Although the infighting weakened the military, the 
institution and its officer corps had re-asserted their place as the most organized 
and powerful institution and group in Haitian society, and the American embassy 
had, at the same time regained its pre-Duvalier role as its primary manager with 
many paid CIA assets within its highest echelon (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 
222).  
 
Democratic Transition and the Search for a Responsive State: 
Divisions within the ruling elites had given the mass democratic movement 
full control of the political landscape. This domination of the national sphere 
facilitated, not only the creation of a democratic coalition, but accelerated elite 
conflict and infighting, which enabled the popular democratic movement to 
capture the Presidency in the internationally monitored election in 1990 (R. J. 
Fatton 2002). The Haitian democratic movement evolved and intensified in 
opposition to the ruling elites and the military. It was populist as all major political 
movements seeking systemic change had been since the American Occupation, 
and the orchestrated violence it endured from both Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist 
forces rendered it diametrically opposed to their interests.  
As Kim Ives notes, the first democratic coalition was a loosely organized 
platform under the banner of FNCD-(National Front for Democracy and Change) 
consisting of Konakom (National Congress of Democratic Movements), PNDPH 
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(Haitian National Democratic and Progressive Party, OP-17 (Popular 
Organizations of September 17), MOP (Peasant Workers Party), Lavalas, a small 
nationalist sector of the bourgeoisie, and the left-wing and reformist sector of the 
military that placed general Abraham in power277 (Ives 1995).   
In the Haitian historical context, the masses have shown flexibility toward 
any regime when they believe or perceive that their core interests are being 
served. No regime has acted unconstrained without popular support, unless 
supported by coercive foreign powers. Authoritarian regimes, no matter their 
coercive capacity, have been overthrown by the masses when their excesses 
outweighed their safeguarding of the common good. Thus, the contention that, 
“ultimately, the rhetoric of popular movements is in tension with the practical facts 
that authoritarian regimes are almost never liable to defeat by frontal assaults” 
displays unwarranted confidence in the ability of authoritarian regimes to 
withstand popular pressure in Haiti, especially while experiencing internal 
conflicts. Gillespie’s assertion that in political transitions, 
                                                          
277 It is important to note that had the coalition not convinced Jean Bertrand Aristide, the popular 
firebrand priest venerated by the masses, to run for President, The preferred American candidate and 
neo-liberal and former World Bank economist, Marc Bazin, would have won the election. Thus the 
democratic alliance and its success at the elections was a blow to American and neocolonial elites. 
Historian Susie Castor, and wife of the leader of the OPL (Organization du Peuple en Lutte) argues that 
besides the main political parties, the success of the democratic movement rested on women 
organizations. Organizations such as Ligue Feminine d’Action Sociale, Movement Feminin Haitien, 
Association des Femmes de Carriere Liberal et Commerciale, kay Fanm, Fanm D’haiti, Solidarite Fanm 
Ayisyen (SOFA), Rassemblement Femmes Populaires (RFP), Fanm je Klere (FAJEK), Konbit Liberasyon Fanm 
(KOLFA), Comite Feminin Contre la Torture, ASOL, FASMA, Ligue Haitienne de Defense des Droits de la 
Femme Rural (LIDEFER), Syndicat du Personnel Infirmier (SPI), and neighborhood  groups such as Fanm 
Sen Maten, Machan Mache Salomon played a central role in both the struggle against the Jean-Claudist 
Regime, subsequent military governments, and most importantly in the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 
It is these organizations that he most favored and counted upon for political support (Castor 1994). 
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[T]he organized masses…must glare fiercely at the 
repressive apparatuses of the authoritarian regime, and 
if necessary, flex their muscles with the occasional 
general strike or pot-banging protests, but then must sit 
in the back seat… while political elites demobilize them 
and adopt a strategy of negotiation with the authoritarian 
regime, consociation amongst themselves and even 
concertation with the representative of capital (Gillespsie 
1991, 58). 
 
runs counter to the Haitian experience and Haiti’s democratic transition. Unlike its 
Latin American and Caribbean counterparts, the Haitian masses have always 
played a central role in constraining elites, authoritarian institutions, and state 
actors. While the Duvalierist regime won their allegiance by catering to their 
aspirations, the betrayal of Jean-Claude’s regime had brought them out to 
refashion a state responsive to their interests. Successful popular resistance and 
intervention against unresponsive regimes is consistent with Haitian history, 
argues Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, 
Popular dissatisfaction with the status quo, lead social 
groups to insert themselves into the body politic to 
create ostensibly a more democratic state with equitable 
access to societal resources and access to political 
power (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 231). 
 
This was true in the struggle for independence, challenges to the Boyer regime, 
true in the periods of waning Northern nationalist power, the anti-Occupation and 
anti-neocolonial movement that brought Noirist and the Duvalierist regime to 
power, and true still in the struggle for democracy in the post- Jean-Claudist era 
(Denis and Duvalier 1958, Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, Hallward 2007). 
As argued in earlier chapters, the historical path to Haitian independence and 
Louverturean state crafting had made the survival of any regime dependent on 
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popular allegiance, and no authoritarian regime, no matter how coercive, could 
survive indefinitely without this pre-requisite legitimacy.  
          In 1990, with a determined population having survived countless acts of 
terror and intimidation, unafraid to exercise its power, 90% of qualified voters 
registered to vote, the result clearly proved that the Haitian masses were doing a 
lot more than banging pots. They gave Aristide a landslide victory, embarrassing 
the American government by soundly rejecting its preferred candidate (Castor 
1994, 57).  
Table 2: 1990 Presidential Election Results 
Candidate’s Name Political Party Affiliations Percentage of vote 
received out of 90% 
eligible voter 
participation278 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide FNCD 67.48% 
Marc Bazin ANDP 14.21% 
Louis Dejoie PAIN 4.88% 
Hubert de Ronceray MDN 3.34% 
Sylvio Claude PDCH 3% 
Six additional parties 
garnered less than 5% of 
the vote 
MRN, PNT, MKN, MODEH, 
Paradis, INDEP 
4.26% 
Source: The 1990 Elections in Haiti: Report of the International Election Observer Delegation 
(National Republican Institute for International Affairs, 1991) 
 
American collusion with authoritarian forces to curtail the popular sector through 
coercion could not forestall the exercise of their will, nor could it prevent its 
capture of the state and the presidency in a free, unhindered, democratic election 
                                                          
278 Political Database of the Americas (1999) Haiti: 1990 Presidential Election Results / Résultats de 
l'élection présidentielle de 1990. [Internet]. Georgetown University and the Organization of American 
States. In: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Haiti/90pres.html. 24 June 2000. Also see the source of 
the information for greater details: "OAS Report of the Secretary General on the Organization's Support 
for the Electoral Process in Haiti," 29 April 1991, p.13 
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(OAS 13 December 2000, 1, Erikson 2005, Nohlen 2005, 381). As Roussiere, 
Rocher, and Danroc note, “the Americans wanted a certain type of democracy, 
easily controllable, that would not slide toward a truly popular awakening” 
(Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, 241). Their plans were contrary to the 
popular will. 
After overthrowing a dictator and enduring the violence of regime elites, 
the election gave the Haitian citizenry the opportunity to re-assert their control 
over the orientation of the state, and secure a representative and responsive 
government. Aristide’s election discredited Marc Bazin, the American client 
candidate, traditional politicians, and political organizations. It demonstrated the 
weakness of the officer corps in the face of external and internal pressure, and 
situated the popular sector instead of the military as a primary national 
powerbroker279. The first democratic transition, populist by history and 
circumstance was anti-establishment, suspicious of state institutions and the 
Church with their roots in the previous regime, and anti-American as all three had 
attempted to frustrate their attempt to re-orient the state to secure their interests. 
Faced with an elite alarmed by their loss of power, a fractured military unable to 
fulfill its original role or maintain law and order, and politicians trying to secure 
                                                          
279 By providing military equipment and training to the Haitian military despite their documented human 
rights violations, the American government proved its complicity in the violent suppression of the popular 
sector. Paul Farmer took notice of these weapon transactions as a way to help the military maintain 
control over the popular movement (Farmer 1994). Ridgeway notes the two-faced American involvement 




their personal interests, the popularly elected government of Aristide’s reliance 
on grassroots popular organizations for support exacerbated existing tension.  
          By re-orienting politics toward popular grassroots organizations, 
encouraging mass participation and orchestrating a devolution of power toward 
mass civil society instead of foreign-funded and supported political organizations, 
Aristide’s decision, whether conscious or not, became congruent with Haitian 
political history. It was a deliberate attempt to rupture Haiti from its corrupt and 
dependent post-Duvalierist political class to re-orient the state toward the nation 
and secure his government’s popular legitimacy. As J.P. Slavin notes, mass 
support and popular legitimacy were indeed his only option. 
All the country’s major institutions were ill-disposed 
toward Aristide: the army, because they feared for the 
privileges and power they had built since the Duvalier 
family collapsed in 1986; the Catholic church, because 
Aristide had denounced its bishops as heartless 
enemies of the people; parliament, because of Aristide’s 
fragile majority; and the traditional political parties, 
because he scorned their emptiness (Chamberlain 1995, 
Slavin 1995, 59). 
 
While his efforts at state re-orientation cannot be divorced from the hostility of 
former regime elites toward his government, his mistrust of them, and his 
unwillingness to rely on the clientelist structure for security, albeit reasonable, 
also increased foreign opposition to his regime. Moreover, his actions 
undermined the possibility for coalition-building, a smooth democratic transition, 
and collaboration with former regime elites by accelerating the rate of structural 
changes and triggering crisis responses. The following illustrates the point, 
 On the very day of his inauguration, he retired six of the seven military 
generals and gave their successors provisional appointments.  
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 He forbade 160 senior level civil servants and administrators from leaving 
the country under accusations of fraud  
 He named a cabinet composed of personal allies, rejecting members of 
the coalition of the parties that facilitated his election rather than relying on 
the coalition to govern.  
 In an attempt to further undermine the depleted military high command, he 
had frequent meetings with the rank-and-file soldiers and to secure their 
allegiance, allotted $6 million to improve their working conditions.  
 He created two independent presidential guards to secure the presidency 
and reduce the possibility of a military coup, which was seen as a 
counterbalance of the military thus a threat 
 In accordance to the constitution, he attempted to separate the police 
force from the military, established since the occupation and to place it 
under civilian control 
 Short of a legislative majority, in an ill-conceived attempt to consolidate his 
power and control, he formed his own coalition party280, depriving his 
former coalition party elites a position to secure their party and personal 
interests  
 Last, but not least, he raised the minimum wage from $2.00 to $3.50 a 
day, angering the Jean-Claudist manufacturing elites and their foreign 
allies backers281 
 
Aristide’s overreliance on the popular sector for security and protection rather 
than existing institutions, and his attempt to monopolize the political process 
reflect the fault line in popularly driven democratic transitions. His use of the 
Duvalierist strategy constrained by the democratic environment represented a 
type of presidential democratic model one finds in countries with unreliable or 
                                                          
280 Aristide’s new coalition composed of APN – National Popular Assembly, MPP – Movement Paysan 
Papaye, and Lavalas. The shift from coalition politics to political monopolization reflected a tendency 
toward presidentialism prevalent in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. According to democracy 
scholar Shin Do, presidential democracies seem to fare better in those regions even though a 
parliamentary and multi-party systems are more conducive to democracy (Shin 1994). 
281 The National Republican Institute for International Affairs. The 1990 Elections in Haiti. Report of the 
International Election Observer Delegation. 1991, 54-5. Also see (Slavin 1995) for details on Aristide’s 
governance strategy and Elites reactions. 
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weak institutions and an entrenched elite capable of upending the democratic 
transition (O'Donnel 1996). Unlike Duvalier who mastered control of the coercive 
apparatus of the state to pursue political and social change and shift the 
orientation of the state, Aristide erroneously relied on mass intimidation and 
protests to effect the orientation of the state and offset the power of authoritarian 
forces. His was a presidentialism of the weak, best characterized by Stepan and 
Skach (1993, 20) as “Presidential Democracy”.  
According to these scholars, presidential democracies emerge when 
democratically-elected Presidents feel they have a personal mandate but lack a 
legislative majority to fulfill that mandate and attack key parts of political society 
and state institutions capable of subverting their mandates (legislatures, parties, 
elites, and military). Faced with an unsecure environment, they increasingly rely 
on “state-people” or state-society political discourse that tends to marginalize 
organized groups in political and civil society and within the state itself (G. 
O'Donnell 1991, Stepan and Skach 1993, 20). Determined to fulfill his mandate, 
legislative obstructionists were met with threats from the popular sector rather 
than negotiations and compromise. In a democratic transition where political 
coalition with remnants of regime forces could have helped reduce conflicts and 
instability, Aristide’s presidentialism, and his reliance on the popular sector, 
enthusiastic but weak, undermined the possibility for democratic coalition-
building with moderate elite Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist forces. Instead, he 
provided the rationale for competing elite forces to coalesce against his 
government by increasing the threat factor.  
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Aristide’s maximalist tendencies were symptomatic of a popularly elected 
democratic regime trying to do too much too early in a post-authoritarian 
institution-light environment. Even his attempt to act according to constitutional 
mandates ran counter to elites’ interests, pitting it against the authoritarian 
institutional norms of the previous regimes, and entrenched corporate elite 
interests. The Constitutional requirement that the police force be independent of 
the army, and the democratic government’s attempt to fulfill it went against 
military interests. Given that the police had been its primary intelligence force, the 
military high command, already targeted, saw the creation of an independent 
police force, which it had controlled for more than 50 years as another attempt to 
deprive it of much needed resources and undermine its power and influence (M. 
S. Laguerre 1993, Avril 1997). 
Aristide’s monopolization of the political space, his outward attacks on 
state institutions - remnants of Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist regimes- and his 
reliance on the popular sector have been criticized by scholars as the re-
imposition of authoritarianism. However, his actions can be better understood as 
an attempt to re-establish the state-society (or as was coined by Duvalier “État-
peuple / Peuple- État”) interdependence so central to the Louverturean model 
that had been diluted by Jean-Claudism. His drive to create a new state-people 
relations more accountable and responsive to the need of the majority, as well as 
to expand the ‘distributional coalitions’ was designed to refashion the state itself 
and re-orient it toward the population.  
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The suggestion by scholars that democratic transition and consolidation in 
a post-authoritarian environment requires the development of a new kind of State 
and the establishment of a new distributional coalition to prevent regression 
toward authoritarianism is very important in analyzing Aristide’s action during his 
eight months in office (Flisfisch 1991, 9-20). Haitian elites and the U.S. 
government’s reaction to his regime were directly related to his attempt to create 
the conditions for a more accountable and responsive state. In this vein, James 
Morrell puts it best, 
[H]e took over a state administration that served chiefly 
as a device for enrichment of the top families. When he 
moved to trim ghost workers from the payroll, enforce 
customs collection, and end monopolies, the families 
staged their coup (Morrell September 1993, 1).  
 
Thus the overthrow of the first democratic government nine months after Aristide 
was elected to office is the direct result of his efforts to re-orient the state and a 
response to the threat those efforts posed to former regime elites. The argument 
that,  
[T]he planners and perpetrators of the 1991 coup were 
clearly Haiti’s old-guard elite: the oligarchic families and 
their allies in the brass, who were terrified of the masses 
of poor to whom Aristide and his Lavalas movement 
gave voice and vote (NACLA – Haiti: Dangerous 
Crossroads 1995) 
 
may not tell the whole story. What they feared most was the capture and re-
orientation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure toward those black majority 
masses by popular democratic forces. The first post-Duvalierist and post-Jean-
Claudist democratic transitions were successful because of a coalition which it 
failed to maintain, and it was overthrown because of another more powerful 
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coalition by entrenched elites. The failure of the first democratic government to 
maintain its coalition and prevent regime forces from reasserting their power is 
characteristic of the inability of popular democracies whose overconfidence of the 
power of popular forces leave them unprepared to withstand pressures and 
counter-measures from more entrenched elite groups.  It demonstrates the 
internal organizational challenges faced by those loosely held coalitions that 
bring popular democratic governments to power. 
The success of procedural democracy marked by a 90% electoral 
participation and overwhelming popular support lacked the foundation for a 
sustainable approach to meeting popular demands and expectations. The 
government that emerged, despite its legitimacy, lacked the institutional capacity 
necessary to support its goals, and the unity, discipline, and flexibility necessary 
in a hostile post-dictatorship environment to address its own internal problems as 
well as prevent the coalescing of reactionary forces (Ethier 1986, Blais and Dion 
1990). Its frontal attack on the military and failure to form alliances with moderate 
sectors of Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist elites undermined its stability.  
Aristide’s determination to fulfill the popular mandate and alleviate the 
deprivation of his supporters, his respect for their rights and actions to undermine 
structures that have disenfranchised them, although an asset to the democratic 
government in securing its legitimacy, ultimately failed because his government 
lacked the power and institutional depth to implement it. While some analysts 
correctly argue that it was impossible to bridge the gap with an opposition that 
was bent on destroying the democratic process, and that the first democratic 
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government was on the defensive even before the presidential inauguration, the 
failure to formulate an adequate response to the political environment cannot be 
overlooked (Dupuy 1989, Yves 1995, R. J. Fatton 2002). Aristide could neither 
keep its more radical members away from the decision-making process and 
center of power, nor integrate the more moderate segment of regime forces into 
its coalition. Thus, the first democratically elected government lacked the 
constitutive elements necessary for a stable democratic transition and 
governance in a nation emerging from more than thirty years of authoritarian 
governments to facilitate its own survival. At its core, the post-Jean-Claudist 
movement that resulted in the democratically-elected Aristide was anti-American, 
just as was the Noirist movement that brought Francois Duvalier to power, and 
naturally, nationalist and populist it sought to disrupt the clientelist arrangements 
imposed on the Haitian state. Thus the U.S. government was happy to facilitate 
and bless the military coup that upended the popular democratic movement. Yet, 
it would be disingenuous to contend that the failure of the first elected 
government was solely the result of foreign meddling and authoritarian elites.  
The conditions for the persistence of the democratic regime were far from ideal. 
 
The Roots of the Haitian Post-Duvalierist Democratic Experience: 
Some scholars are quick to fault more than thirty years of dictatorship, and 
the culture of authoritarianism it imposed on the population as barriers to 
democracy (Huntington 1984, Huntington 1993, R. Fatton 1999, R. J. Fatton 
2002). Others have focused on the foundation of the Haitian state as the primary 
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obstacle to nation-building and democracy (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Ruffat 1991). As 
I have documented, the population has historically not only insisted on the 
establishment of government accountable and responsive to their needs, but 
more importantly, sought governments whose legitimacy is based on a strong 
state-people interdependence. While the analysis of Haitians and the Haitian 
state as obstacle may not be without merit, it is not the people and Haitian state 
in its original crafting that should be the focus of critical analyses, but the 
imposition of a dependent neocolonial clientelist state, historically in opposition to 
the popular will (P. R. Girard 2010, Gros 2012). From the outset, the Haitian 
democratic movement faced structural challenges. It sought to re-establish state-
society relations divergent from the type of unresponsive democracy possible 
with the neocolonial clientelist model (Gros 1997). It sought a nationally oriented 
state while an externally oriented and directed one existed. It demanded an 
economically responsive state while the neocolonial and neoliberal model 
imposed a coercive but institutionally weak state devoid of economic 
independence and the institutional capacity to manage its economic affairs and 
deliver socio-economic benefits to the majority classes.  
Whereas the Duvalierist state had the capacity to meet the popular 
democratic demands but did not, the dependent neocolonial clientelist state was 
never crafted to serve the population282. It not only lacked the ability to expand to 
                                                          
282 It is important to note that the Duvalierist regime was constrained by the constant military attack on 
his regimes and the neocolonial state within which it emerged and operated but had subdued enough 




meet the demands of the population but its outward orientation runs counter to 
the national welfare. At the time of Haiti’s transition, the regulatory Duvalierist 
state had given way to the laissez-faire outwardly directed orientation demanded 
by its neoliberal patrons. It had contracted, been privatized, and had been 
dispossessing the population and the nation of its last resources (Dupuy 1989). It 
was in opposition to this coercion and dispossession that the democratic 
movement emerged. Thus, the national context within which Haitian democracy 
began and flourished posed some challenges to democratic transition and 
consolidation theorists (Bazin 1995, Pierre-Etienne 1999). Those challenges 
must be understood within the context of the dependent neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure and the lack of political legitimacy, institutional accountability, and 
economic deprivation it created. What is clear however, is that despite those 
challenges, the cultural and historical inclination of the population toward 
democracy and democratic accountability and their historical struggle for a 
legitimate and responsive state were the driving forces behind Haitian democracy 
(Danrock and Roussiere 1995, Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, Hallward 
2007). Unlike democratic transitions in Latin America, it was not the middle class 
or the elites that demanded democracy and state accountability; it was the 
masses.  It was not that the Haitians masses were not democratic, but perhaps 




Democratic Transition: Requisites, Pre-requisites, and Assumptions: 
There is consensus amongst many democratization theorists that the 
existence of certain political and institutional conditions within a nation is 
indicative of its potential for democratic governance (Lipset 1960, Dahl 1971, 
Huntington 1996). It continues to be widely understood that the real possibility for 
change in government through electoral competition, cogent political participation 
and stable constitutional and institutional frameworks formed the key pre-
requisites for democratization (Ethier 1986, Flisfisch 1991, 13, Lipset 1993, 
Lawson 1993). These pre-requisites, they advance, “constitute the lasting, 
universal, necessary conditions of any democracy” (Legters, Burke and 
DiQuattro 1994, 132, Tirado 1998). The consensus that free and fair elections, 
inclusive suffrage, eligibility for all public office, enforced rights to freedom of 
expression, free access to alternative sources of information for all, and the right 
to form and join organizations unimpeded directly contradicted Haitian reality. 
Much like they orchestrated the Haitian revolution and independence, at the cost 
of life and limb, the Haitian polis orchestrated a democratic transition with sheer 
determination. More remarkably, the absence of a significant middle-class, a 
debilitating economic decline and monetary devaluation, and a comparably low 
literacy rate, all of which conditions that are contrary to democratic transitions 
from authoritarian rule, did not deter the Haitian populace from pushing their 
nation toward accountable democratic governance (O'Donnell and Schmitter 
1986, Huntington 1996, Dupuis 1997, Tirado 1998, Guo 1999).  
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The characterization of democratic transitions as struggles of middle and 
upper classes against authoritarian regimes for an expansion of political and 
human rights and for a share in the economic decision-making and institutional 
control is not reflective of the Haitian experience (G. Pierre 1971, Saint-Gerard 
1988, Shin 1994, R. Fatton 1999). The explicit stipulations for democratic 
transitions advanced by democratization theorists show that, 
1. A strong and institutionally dense state exists to facilitate the transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy. “no state no democracy” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, 14-5) 
2. National institutions as stable and strong enough to withstand the shock 
of democratic transition, and are able to adapt to reforms, a new state-
society relations and political environment 
3. At the time of the transition, “democracy was the only game in town”, 
leaving political leaders with little options but to engage in the democratic 
process (Dahl 1971). In other words, authoritarian elites no longer felt 
their interests threatened by a loss of political power and control over the 
state 
4. Demands for democratic governance encapsulated a shift from 
authoritarian to democratic culture by the polis and authoritarian elites 
5. Institutions are strong, respected and able to impose constraints on 
participants in the democratic process, and are capable of preserving 
their autonomy while serving as arbiter and rule enforcer 
6. Core state institutions and state elites have the capacity to identify and 
safeguard the interests of the state and the nation. They are able to adapt 
to transition from maintaining the status quo of the authoritarian regime to 
a new role of balancing interests and maintaining stability. More pointedly, 
scholars foresaw 
a. A competent military capable of securing the nation’s sovereignty 
and borders 
b. A reliable civilian controlled Police force with the ability to sustain 
law and order 
c. An independent  judiciary able to dispense justice to all citizens 
equally regardless of positions 
d. Competent and experienced parliamentarians able to engage in 
constructive debates and prescriptions 
e. Core state professionals primarily concerned about preserving the 
integrity of state institutions and supporting the common good 
7. In sum, scholars stipulated a state with the institutional, regulatory, and 
personnel capacity to both manage transition and adapt to the 
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transformations it engenders (Huntington 1984, 212, Sangmpam 1996, 
Gros 1997). 
 
As we have demonstrated, none of the conditions for democratization, as 
stipulated by democracy scholars, existed in Haiti. Democracy was the demand 
of a population, culturally and organically democratic who by both history and 
national culture had always been at the forefront of reforms and re-establishing 
the legitimacy of the state by re-structuring state-society relations. Haitian 
democratization began with a declining economy, contracting state, and 
weakening institutions, thus a lower capacity for redistribution and state 
absorption. Given these realities, the democracy demanded by the population, 
and that advocated by scholars, diverged.  The population did not simply seek a 
procedural democracy and the preservation of existing authoritarian institutions 
that supported their marginalization. They sought to transform institutions to not 
only secure grassroots democratic governance but more importantly, they 
endeavored to refashion a new state capable of meeting their distributional 
demands and addressing their continued deprivation and dispossession 
intensified by Jean-Claudism. With a failing economy, an inadequate educational 
system that neglected the majority of the population, a judiciary that had long 
ceased to protect it from authoritarian excesses and was no longer relied upon to 
dispense justice, and a political system that had found itself disconnected from 
them, the Haitian masses demanded a re-adjustment. In this context, they 
challenged all those who benefited from the established order and wished to 
maintain it. It has been and continues to be the Haitian masses that pressure the 
society toward democratic governance and accountability at great costs.  
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The orchestrated coup that brought down the democratic government 
therefore was no accident. The exile of Aristide and the systematic targeting of 
democracy activists, rather than deterring democratic activism and protests, 
accelerated them. According to Hampton, during the week following the toppling 
of Aristide, 1,500 democracy activists had been killed (Rampton 1994). As 
Stephen Engelberg points out, the coup and subsequent violence cannot be 
divorced from the patron of the clientelist infrastructure, 
[T]he leader of one of Haiti's most infamous paramilitary 
groups was a paid informer of the Central Intelligence 
Agency for two years and was receiving money from the 
United States while his associates committed political 
murders and other acts of repression, Government 
officials said today. Emmanuel (Toto) Constant, the head 
of the organization known as Fraph, was still on the 
C.I.A.'s payroll in October 1993 (Engelberg 1994). 
 
This was confirmed by Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), member of the House 
Intelligence and Foreign Affairs Committee, who asserted that "It should not be a 
surprise to anyone that the assets of the United States include people in 
sensitive positions in the current situation in Haiti" (Weiner 1993, Bernstein and 
Levine 1993, Gale 1995). Haitians, and most importantly, democratic activists, 
experienced widespread oppression and violence by the military aided by Front 
Pour L’Avancement et Le Progress Haitien (FRAPH), the newly organized, CIA-
financed paramilitary group283 (Chan 2007, Mechanic 2009, Grann 2001). The 
summary executions, torture, rapes, imprisonments and death squads, the 
                                                          
283 The leader of The Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), Emmanuel Toto Constant, 
and the group were paid monthly for their services. See HaitiInsight vol. 6, No. 6, Aug/Sept 1996. Also see 
the Press release of the Center for Constitutional Rights on October 25, 2008. 
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alliance between the CIA, military, elites and FRAPH, while it decimated the 
ranks of democracy activists did not succeed in undermining their resolve. It 
proved historically consistent, that the Haitian populace once determined, could 
not be deterred by violence and coercion. 
 
The Post-Coup Era: The Survival of Accountable Democratic Politics:  
Attempts by the democratic government of Aristide to return from exile and 
assume its legitimate leadership of the state were frustrated by the Bush and 
later Clinton administrations while their representatives met regularly with, 
coached, organized the opposition284 and funded the military and paramilitary’s 
attacks on democratic activists (Grann 2001, Dupuy 2007). Aristide’s insistence 
on returning to Haiti to continue his term made him vulnerable to international 
demands and influences. He was compelled to:  
 Agree to consider the time in exile as time served  
 Negotiate an amnesty that would leave military leaders who orchestrated 
the coup in their post  
 Modernize the armed forces, thus enhancing the primary tools for foreign 
and elite interventions  
 Nominate a new Prime minister from the opposition, one that would be 
supported by the economic elites who overthrew him  
                                                          
284 The author witnessed weekly meetings between the American embassy and high level members of the 
opposition. Leaders of OPL and their emerging leadership cohorts, though they cannot be accused of 
collaborating with FRAPH, certainly did so with their organizers and funders, namely the American 
government through its embassy. The Bush administration undermined its own embassy who sought to 
return Aristide to power (Morrell September 1993, 3). On May 17, 1994, it was reported that the 
American Ambassador to Haiti Lawrence A. Pezzullo collusion with the coup leaders had hampered 
Clinton policy implementation. More damming was the leaked embassy memo that demonstrated the 
involvement of the American government in supporting the coup plotters and undermining the 
legitimately elected government (Ridgeway 1994, 104-7).  
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 Reorganized the police force, which he had tried to do prior to the coup as 
mandated by the constitution  
 
The Governors Island Accords Agreement organized by the U.S., which Aristide 
signed, left him without the power and leverage to effect change and be 
responsive to the needs and demands of the population285. Moreover, by obliging 
Aristide’s democratic government to grant amnesty and collaborate with the 
forces that massacred more than five thousand democratic activists, the U.S.  
sought to undermine its legitimacy while maintaining authoritarian control of the 
state and of the democratic process.  
As the primary sponsors of the agreement, the U.S. government sought to 
contain Aristide, and redirect the democratic transition from its populist roots into 
the framework of the neocolonial infrastructure (Bazin 1995, Hallward 2007, 
Dupuy 2007). The most important aspect of that redirection and the conditions 
that facilitated his return however, was the World Bank structural adjustment 
agreement of August 1994. As a condition for re-establishing democratic 
governance, he agreed to implement the neoliberal policies he had railed against 
by privatizing the nine state-owned industries, the primary vehicle for 
employment and state revenue established by the Duvalierist regime to absorb 
                                                          
285 Despite the Governor’s Accord agreement, the military and elite refused to allow for a resumption of 
democratic politics and the return of Aristide, which resulted in the imposition of an embargo by the 
American government… See Federal Register Presidential Documents, Vol. 59, No. 113, Tuesday, June 14, 
1994. Title 3— 




the middle and working class population into the state system in which they 
previously had no part (Dupuis 1997, Wah 1997-1998). This push by France, the 
U.S and Canada to privatize these state-owned industries and deprive the state 
of important sources of revenue and employment for the population, sought to 
finally do to the Duvalierist/Noirist state what Jean-Claudism could not fully 
achieve: undermine the last vestiges of the Duvalierist state’s political legitimacy 
and independence. Aristide’s seeming capitulation, his promise to implement the 
neoliberal policies so maligned by him previously, and the mandate that he 
himself sell the privatization concept to the populace facilitated his return and the 
show of force exercised by the U. S. to reurn him to power accompanied by the 
Marines (Wah 1997-1998).   
It is well documented that the U. S, France, and Canada endeavored to 
delay and undermine Aristide’s government, thus their collaboration for his return 
after he agreed to their demands cannot be interpreted outside of the imposed 
neoliberal policies and privatization286 (Ridgeway 1994, 104-7, Rother 1995, 
Hallward 2007). They sought to privatize the nation’s two banks, its primary 
source of electricity, its flour company, which provided a major resource for 
consumption and employment, its cement company that not only produced 
cement for the nation but exported some abroad, its lucrative telephone 
company, and the airport, the only hub of international transportation and an 
                                                          
286 Why did the French and American government change their position from advocating that Aristide 
should permanently step aside because he was mentally ill, and responsible for the military coup and the 
crisis to agreeing to his return and forcefully returning him to Haiti?  
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important source of revenue. Tatiana Wah, hired to facilitate the privatization 
process, argues that those state entities were dysfunctional, inefficient and 
produced little revenue and services to the population (Wah 1997-1998, 16). Yet, 
she also maintains that the less lucrative animal feed company was ignored, and 
international bids and investors poured in, suggesting therefore that the 
companies slated for privatization were desirable entities that were sought after 
by those seeking economic benefits.  Privatization, as imposed on Aristide and 
Haiti, was simply state dispossession, good for western profiteers but bad for the 
nation and its citizenry. By demanding that Aristide personally advocate for the 
privatization of state-owned companies, the U.S., France and Canada sought to 
undercut his popularity and legitimacy and reorient him and his democratic 
regime away from its populist supporters already openly wondering whether he 
had betrayed them while in exile.  More importantly, these so called “friends of 
Haiti” sought to undermine the capacity of the state and the surviving Duvalierist 
politics of national independence through dispossession and by re-establishing 
the military-centered neocolonial clientelist infrastructure Duvalier had so 
thoroughly demolished. 
Aristide’s return also marked a turning point in Haitian history, in that for 
the first time since the American invasion and Occupation, U.S. troops had 
landed on Haitian soil seemingly to reinstitute democratic governance and more 
importantly to curtail and constrain the brand of democratic populism required for 
a responsive and accountable government. The soft-landing of U.S. forces was 
not altruistic nor reflected a belief in democracy, it was instead the 
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implementation of a new paradigm of dominance centered on democracy, state 
weakness, and neoliberal dispossession. Whereas military-centered dictatorship 
was needed to maintain U.S. interests earlier, the calculus had changed. 
Democracy became the new vehicle to facilitate American neoliberal policies 
within the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The miscalculations of 
the military high command in preventing the return of Aristide following the 
signing of the Governors Island Accords undermined the position of the institution 
and ultimately resulted in their exile. They assumed wrongly that American 
interests necessitated their presence, as negotiated, and did not foresee the 
economic agreements and the landing of American armed forces. Having 
negotiated the privatization agreement, Aristide recognized the strength of his 
position and pressured the U.S. government through his associates, to disarm 
the Haitian military. As Ira Kurzban, Aristide’s general counsel forcefully argued, 
‘[T]o have true democracy in Haiti, you must disarm 
those people whom the President of the United States 
has called thugs and murderers,’ “If you don't disarm the 
Haitian Army and the paramilitary organizations, not only 
could you not have democracy, but you're putting 
American soldiers in harm's way.’ (Greenhouse 1994) 
 
He had counted on the convergence of interests to influence the process and 
reshape the national socio-political landscape. It seems clear, that while 
negotiating his return and making concessions, Aristide had no intentions of 
making good on his privatization agreements but hoped, once in Haiti, to 
refashion the political landscape. Much as neocolonial elites did at the eve of the 
1915 American invasion, Aristide capitalized on the historic vulnerability of the 
Haitian military. Neither the Clinton Administration, nor the military, recognized 
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Aristide’s manipulation in convincing them to disband the very vehicle of their 
control. While it may well have been true that a military-centered regime was no 
longer necessary, the threat of military intervention and coercion was still useful. 
Without the military as a political arbiter and foreign interests’ protector, the 
constraints that could be imposed on a democratic regime were purely economic 
without the threat of force or regime overthrow. Landing in Haiti a month prior to 
Aristide’s return, and with the high command gone and the military in transition, 
the American forces occupied Haitian military barracks, confiscated their heavy 
weaponry, and disarmed most of the military personnel to prevent hostile actions 
from rogue members of the military (Risen 1994). Whereas Duvalier offset the 
power of the outward-directed military by using the Tontons Macoutes and 
sustained violence, Aristide use the American government to undermine the very 
institution it had depended on to secure its interest. By confiscating their 
weapons and placing them in a subordinate and ineffective role, The American 
government unwittingly provided the perfect opportunity for Aristide to shape the 
political terrain by becoming impervious to armed threats from within and 
unmitigated foreign pressure (B. Graham 1994).  
Once in Haiti, the temporary alliance with the international community 
would be strained by the military question287.  Although tamed and temporarily 
constrained by his commitment to the international community, and the presence 
                                                          
287 It was widely discussed in national news that the meeting between Oscar Arias, the former President 




of foreign military forces, Aristide wasted no time to deal a death blow to the 
Haitian military, retiring the remaining senior officers and reducing the force from 
seven thousands to fifteen hundred. He would later disband the entire force, 
leaving the police as the only coercive state institution under civilian 
leadership288. Aristide had managed to out-fox the fox and forced it to help 
dismantle its primary vehicle for protecting the neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure it had imposed on the nation, and which it had been re-fashioning 
since the fall of the Duvalierist regime. The elimination of the military removed 
the structure of coercion capable of influencing the orientation of the state 
threatening the international order. The vacuum and threat to the dependent 
neocolonial infrastructure led to the imposition of a U. N. military presence under 
the guise of providing security to the population. However, besides those 
embedded in the management of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure or 
benefiting from it, most Haitians saw the presence of U.N. forces as an 
unwarranted occupation. The demise of the military also delegitimized most of 
the political parties whose leaders, in various ways, collaborated with post-coup 
governments giving Aristide even greater political leverage than the 
                                                          
288 According to the White House Press Secretary, “U.S. troops and their civilian and international military 
counterparts have given the people of Haiti the chance to restore their democracy and work toward a 
more secure and prosperous future.  Specifically, they have: Confiscated or bought-back more than 
30,000 firearms and individual explosive devices; Maintained a secure and stable environment as the 
brutal FAd'H (Force Armee d’Haiti -Haiti's former military) was disbanded; Provided security, technical 
expertise and logistical support for democratic elections nationwide; and Supported the development of 
the new, civilian police force to assume security and law enforcement responsibilities throughout Haiti.” 
(See THE WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Haiti.  The Road from Dictatorship to 
Democracy, March 21, 1996) 
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manufactured opposition289. With the military out of the way, he reneged on his 
privatization agreements, forced the opposition-supported Prime Minister, a 
staunch proponent of privatization, to resign, and negotiated with former political 
allies now turned competitors due to foreign influence290.  
The loose coalition that propelled him to the Presidency had coalesced 
into a potent party, the “Organization du Peuple en Lutte – OPL (Organization of 
the People in Struggle)”, led by Dr. Gerard Pierre-Charles. Its leaders sought to 
curtail Aristide’s power by moving from a personalized Aristide-centered politics 
to an institutional framework of party-centered decision-making. This newly 
formed party whose leaders met regularly with the American embassy officials to 
strategize, was, rightfully, viewed with suspicions by Aristide’s entourage as they 
sought to dictate the terms under which decisions were permissible. Rather than 
collaborating with Aristide to form a stable and responsive government, OPL 
sought to control every aspect of decision-making and all key ministerial posts to 
curtail Aristide’s power and influence. Having not acquired the popular legitimacy 
enjoyed by Aristide, and having been coached and funded by the American 
                                                          
289 A candidate for Congress express the political dynamics right when he said, “We cannot win competing 
with Aristide. Our only chance is to hope that the Americans undermine his leadership and popularity. We 
just cannot beat him in a free and fair competition.”  It was the involvement of political parties and 
leaders in the murderous military government that discredited them in the eyes of the population 
hindering their political and electoral viability. Alix Cineas and his FREN, Marc Bazin and National Alliance 
for Democracy and Progress (ANDP), Jean-Jacques Honorat and L’Union National des Forces 
Democratiques (UNFD), Serges Gilles and PANPRA, all these parties and their leaders has discredited 
themselves through their participation in the military regime. OPL, played a less complicit role, 
collaborating directly with the American embassy and was thus less vulnerable.  
290 The author was well aware of some of the negotiations. As members of OPL who were privy to them 




embassy, OPL sought to highjack its way to power through him. Their political 
maneuvering and diktats led to a schism between Aristide, his entourage, and 
members of OPL. These schisms also brought to light the two main tendencies 
within the party.  
According to senior members of OPL, Aristide’s anti-institutionalism had to 
be kept in check for democracy to survive, and this attempt to move the party 
from personalization to institutionalization was resisted by the President and his 
supporters. OPL strategy to block Aristide from forming his own cabinet 
independent of the party he barely knew, their insistence that he conform to party 
politics, and their unwillingness to support the recuperation of the three years 
spent in exile, led Aristide to distance himself from the party. His capitulation to 
the prime ministerial position, and his acquiescence to their demands did not 
translate into his support for them. Thus, Aristide undermined his own cabinet as 
he was unable to trust them to follow his mandate. This forced Prime Minister 
Smack Michel, who had been thrusted upon him to pursue privatization, to resign 
due to his lack of collaboration with him. Haiti was being pressured to implement 
neoliberal policies and the U. S. government asserted, perhaps with too much 
confidence,  
[T]he Haitian government has moved to implement the 
program of economic liberalization which it discussed at 
the August 1994 Paris meeting of the Consultative 
Group. This liberalization of its economy will provide a 
freer, more competitive atmosphere for business 
development. Haitian government actions to lower tariffs, 
sign the Uruguay Round, reach an understanding with 
the IMF on economic policy goals and consider moves 
toward privatization of state enterprises provide grounds 
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for confidence in the future course of the Haitian 
economy291. 
 
Aristide had not implemented the program of liberalization as suggested by the 
White House Press Secretary. He saw the pressures toward economic 
liberalization as an attempt to divest the state of both its resources and 
independence and protected the state by disavowing the privatization 
agreements. His refusal to implement policies he thought detrimental to the state 
and the nation ran counter to his party and foreign mandates. As Wah confirms, 
“the Fickleness on the privatization issue”, and “the lack of governmental 
commitment” led to investor malaise and flight. Aristide’s public condemnation of 
the agreements he had signed, which created tension between him and the 
Prime Minister and fostered animus between the Prime Minister and popular 
organizations was not without consequence. Wah, whose job was to facilitate the 
implementation of neoliberal policies and the national privatization scheme, 
observed, 
[O]n October 13, 1995, the prime minister who 
vigorously supported privatization resigned, privatization 
disputes being central to that decision… The 
capriciousness of the Haitian government and its leaders 
vis-à-vis the privatization program and the antagonistic 
attitude it had toward the foreign sponsored privatization 
unit scuttled the program292 (Wah 1997-1998, 17-8). 
 
                                                          
291 THE WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO 
HAITI, Release March 2, 1995. 
292 Although the author alluded to as much, the emphasis in italics .is mine 
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However, there was nothing capricious about the decisions of the Haitian 
government. Aristide had successfully blocked the privatization process by 
undermining the foreign-impose Prime Minister and other cabinet members who 
supported the program to forestall the fleecing of the state (Rother 1995). The 
subsequent two Prime Ministers, Claudette Werleigh and Rosny Smart, showed 
little interest in pursuing the privatization mandate, ignoring existing bids for 
those companies and allowing them to expire. His strategy angered American, 
French, and Canadian policy-makers and members of OPL, but was congruent 
with the Louverturean and Duvalierist strong state model. As a result of Aristide’s 
strategy of frustrating privatization efforts, Tatiana Wah, hired to supervise the 
privatization process argues, “Haiti may have lost all credibility vis-à-vis private 
sector participants, particularly in the international community” (Wah 1997-1998, 
18).  
By the end of his term, Aristide had, despite the pressure, accomplished 
two major goals in less than two years: 1) the disbanding of the military - the 
bulwark of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, and 2) 
preservation of state-owned industries, therefore lessening the economic 
dependence of the state and maintaining a degree of political independence and 
the ability to meet popular demands. Contrary to Gros’ assertions that divergent 
political tendencies within parties, lack of cohesive leadership, and internal 
competition for power, undermined political stability and democratic governance, 
Aristide’s leadership and vision even in such an environment, managed to create 
the political space for a new social contract between the state, its political and 
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economic elites, and the nation (Gros 1997). Without a military to enforce its will 
and protect its interests, refashioning a state responsive to some of the 
redistributive and political demands of the population became a reality. In this 
context, the prevailing narrative that he accomplished little during the remainder 
of his first presidency would need re-evaluating. The failure was the inability of 
neocolonial, Duvalierist, and Jean-Claudist elites to renounce their zero-sum 
clientelist politics for a more nationally-oriented coalition politics centered on the 
common good.  
This failure created tension between the popular President and opposing 
elites and OPL that persisted until the end of his term. The party’s nomination of 
his friend and first Prime Minister, René Préval, as the candidate for the 
Presidency, to acquire his blessings proved unconvincing. Continued conflict 
between OPL loyalists and Aristide’s supporters undermined coherence in 
parliamentary elections and parliamentary decision-making293. The conflict 
between Aristide and OPL leadership was both a political and ideological 
struggle for control and orientation of the state; Aristide for a more populist and 
nationally oriented agenda, and OPL for a more centrist, institutionalized state, 
and internationally oriented politics of national development through investment 
and state divestment. Thus, the political disconnect can be understood within the 
                                                          
293 The author were present during multiple political meetings as observer in 1995 and 1996 throughout 
the country where voters openly discussed their frustrations and confusion with the current political 
dynamics. Voters who had traveled from various region in the North for a meeting at Trou-Du-Nord 
complained of not knowing which politician represented their interests given the conflict between 
Aristide and OPL.  
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historical tension over state formation and orientation. It was not therefore 
unpredictable that Aristide would refuse to support the OPL candidate. 
Conscious of his popular support and ability to influence electoral outcome, 
Aristide’s refusal to openly support his close associate and former Prime Minister 
due to the behaviors of OPL leaderships, and only publicly supporting his 
candidacy two days before the elections, was both a show of force and harbinger 
for greater conflicts in the horizon. Consequently, voter turnout was at its lowest. 
Out of 3,668,049 eligible electors, 1,140,523 or 31.09 % participated instead of 
the 90% registered voter participation in the election of Aristide  (Nohlen 2005, 
392). However late, the highly sought endorsement by Aristide, enabled OPL to 
dominate the elections winning 17 out of 18 seats in the Senate, and 68 out of 83 
in the Chamber of Deputies as well as the presidency294.  
 
                Table 3: 1995 Presidential Election Results 
Candidate/Party % of votes cast out of 31.09% of 
eligible voter participation    
René García Préval (OPL) 87.9 
Léon Jeune (Independent) 2.5 
Victor Benoît (KONAKOM) 2.3 
TOTAL (incl. others) 100.0 
 
Source: D. Nohlen (2005) Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook, Volume 1 (New York: 
Oxford University Press) p. 392. 
 
Although Aristide’s last minute endorsement had secured an overwhelming 
victory, it either came too late to motivate most of the population to participate in 
                                                          
294 See 1995 Inter-Parliamentary Union,  Historical Archive page of parliamentary election results for HAITI  
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the election or they too understood the power of their vote and participation, 
deciding that the outcome would preserve their interests. Although Preval 
garnered 87.9% of the vote, the total dominance of parliamentary elections by 
OPL was in name only as it elected mostly Aristide’s supporters. The 
parliamentarians were divided between Aristide’s supporters and OPL supporters 
who would become the opposition. The elections and political jockeying that 
surrounded them also made two things clear to national actors as well as foreign 
governments with a stake in Haitian national political outcomes:  
1) Aristide had the overwhelmingly support of the Haitian population and had the 
capacity to influence the orientation of the nation and state  
2) He could not be defeated in any free and fair electoral competition 
 
The Preval government enjoyed neither the confidence of OPL, because of 
his relationship with Aristide, nor the full support of Aristide who saw it as an 
attempt to impose the U.S. agenda. With limited support from Aristide, saddled 
with a Constitution that sapped the Presidency of all powers, and a deeply 
divided parliament undermining its decisions, it became mired in gridlock (Gros 
1997, R. J. Fatton 2002, Dupuy 2007). Vulnerable to foreign pressure and 
without adequate national support, the government of Rene Preval felt compelled 
to implement some of the liberalization and privatization policies Aristide had 
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reneged on amidst popular resistance295. As the American diplomatic cable296 
makes clear, the Preval government under the leadership of OPL wasted no time 
implementing the neoliberal agenda:  
 It established legislation on the privatization of public enterprises, which 
allows foreign firms to invest in the management and/or ownership of 
Haitian state-owned enterprises.  
 It created the Commission for the Modernization of Public Enterprises 
(CMEP) in 1996 to facilitate the privatization process by creating 
strategies to privatize Haitian state enterprises.   
 It privatized two Haitian state-owned enterprises; the flour company 
(minoterie) now Moulins d’Haiti, and the lucrative Cement factory that 
produces cement for national and international consumption.   
 It allowed private sector investment in electricity generation to compensate 
for the state electricity company's (Electricite d'Haiti - EDH) inability to 
supply sufficient power.   
 
The Preval government also sought to privatize the state telecommunications 
company (TELECO), the Port-au-Prince airport, and the important national 
seaports. This push to privatize, however forced by foreign powers, resulted in 
widespread resistance from the masses, and some of the most popular and 
reputable democratic organizations. For example, the Haitian Women Solidarity 
(SOFA) wrote, 
[M]any people want to make believe that we have no 
other choice [but to privatize] because we have a big 
budget deficit. But what measures has the state ever 
taken to sustain and control those [public] enterprises? 
We believe that privatization does not mean profitability 
nor better service. On the contrary, privatization will 
                                                          
295 Haiti Progès, “Haiti polarizing around privatization,” This Week in Haiti, Vol. 14, no. 6, 1-7 May 1996. It 
cannot be denied that Aristide, having been forced to negotiate privatization by France and the United 
States and fully aware of their attempt to undermining his legitimacy, left the implementation to his 
opponents, thus escaping and setting his own trap.  
296 2009 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – HAITI, American Embassy Diplomatic Cable - Sanderson, 




weaken the state even more, a state which has never 
taken up its responsibilities to the people. Privatization 
will eliminate the possibility for the people to get 
services... The state should look for ways to meet the 
people's needs. We don't need a servant state, nor a 
puppet state, but rather a state which is able to build a 
participatory democracy where people can live in dignity, 
where there is justice, and where everybody lives 
equally. 
 
The National Popular Assembly (APN) on the other hand argued, 
 
Preval talks about promoting national production while at 
the same time saying that he has to privatize all the state 
enterprises. We say to Preval that national production 
and the neo-liberal plan are irreconcilable [let ak sitron]. 
They are 2 things which can't go together [pa domi nan 
menm kabann]. It is precisely because of the neo-liberal 
plan that the big imperialist countries, headed by the 
U.S., encouraged Jean-Claude Duvalier to open up the 
country to allow imported rice from Miami to freely flood 
the country and destroy rice production in the Artibonite 
Valley. Under this same plan, the U.S. ordered Duvalier 
to kill the Creole pigs of the peasants [in 1981-82] and 
made [former Finance Minister and present Central Bank 
head Leslie] Delatour close [the state-run sugar refinery] 
Darbonne, [the state-run essential oils plant] ENAOL, 
[the state-run sugar refinery] Welch, etc. 
 
More importantly, APN challenged the notion of unproductive and inefficient 
state-owned industries, blaming the state and its leaders for mismanagement. 
“Preval says the state industries don't give good service. If Preval has a short 
memory,” they argue,  
[W]e must remind him that during the 7 months of his 
government [in 1991], it was he himself who praised the 
revenues that the public enterprises brought the Haitian 
state in only 2 to 3 months. Thus, his talk today that 
privatization will give better services does not mean 
services for the masses but rather for big foreign 
companies so they can make more money faster off the 
backs of the Haitian people, while they pay peasants 
and workers 36 gourdes [about $2] a day, which is not 
even enough to buy food, let alone to send a child to 




Some suggested a re-evaluation of the logic of privatization. The Haitian Platform 
for an Alternative Development (PAPDA) suggested that Haiti did not fit the 
profile for privatization, because according to the World Bank,  
……..[T]he process of privatization only has a chance of 
success in high revenue countries which have solid state 
structures capable of regulating the private agents 
enjoying a monopoly position. It is pointless to stress 
that this is not the case in our country.... 
 
Others, like the Committee to Defend the National Interests (KODENA) did not 
mince words, 
[T]he neo-liberal economic project that [Preval's] 
American boss has given him to implement in the 
country has these objectives: to sell the country, a high 
cost of living, more unemployment, [and] to tie up the 
sovereignty of the country to the foot of the table of the 
big imperialist countries. If this death plan really takes 
root in this society, the corrupt state will abandon more 
than ever its responsibilities to the peasants and poor 
who don't have the means to live as they should. Only a 
policy based on the sovereignty of the country can bring 
a correct solution to the country's problems.  
 
The Collective for Mobilization against the IMF and the World Bank argued for 
enhancing the regulatory capacity of the state, better management of national 
resources, and greater protection against unfair competition.297 Scholar and 
leader of OPL and its former Presidential candidate, Sauveur Pierre-Etienne, 
blamed Aristide for the opposition to privatization and the inability of Preval’s 
government to “honor its engagements with the International Community” (Pierre-
Etienne 1999, 227). While partially true, he disregards the diversity of the 
                                                          
297 For more on the positions taken by these popular organization, see Haiti Progrès, “Privatization: 
Popular organizations respond”. This Week in Haiti, Vol. 14, no. 3, 10-16 April 1996 
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organizations involved, and minimizes the role of the overwhelming majority of 
the citizenry who opposed the privatization project imposed on the nation by the 
“International Community” (i.e., the United States, France, and Canada both 
directly and through the World Bank and IMF) and his own party, OPL.  
The position of civil society organizations, and the popular democratic 
sector was clear, privatization as was being imposed on Haiti was contrary to the 
popular will and aspirations. They colluded to oppose it and undermine any 
government that would support the dismantling of state industries necessary for 
national autonomy, revenues and employment. These state companies and 
industries represented the custom houses of 1915, whose control the American 
government coveted and acquired, permanently structuring Haiti into the 
dependent neoliberal clientelist infrastructure.  
Their creation by the Duvalierist regime undermined this infrastructure, 
thus their privatization would once and for all re-integrate Haiti fully into the 
dependent clientelist infrastructure and complete the dependency of the Haitian 
state. Even the U.S. government recognized the power of popular democratic 
forces and their opposition to privatization, a formidable obstacle for the Haitian 
government in implement the American neoliberal scheme. It sought to alleviate 
the pressure by changing its own policy linking aid with privatization for the risks 
it posed to overall American interests in Haiti. As the Clinton administration 
argued in Congress, 
[T]he Administration has strongly encouraged economic 
and public sector reform in Haiti. However, the 
Administration opposes new restrictions on assistance, 
which condition its provision on privatization of three 
public enterprises. Such an approach puts at risk 
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American interests in Haiti by conditioning assistance on 
a process that neither the Haitian Government nor the 
U.S. entirely control.298 
 
The Preval government also recognized the strength of the opposition to its 
privatization efforts and maneuvered to maintain a modicum of state autonomy to 
placate the resistance of popular democratic forces. Preval began emphasizing 
the creation of state partnerships, instead of outright privatization, by advocating 
partial instead of complete sale of these industries to outmaneuver popular 
democratic forces. For example, he sold 70% of the State’s Flour Mill retaining a 
30% share for the state. However, this approach did not allay the opposition to 
privatization who saw any move to privatize those industries as the fleecing of 
the state and foreign theft of national resources299. Unlike other nations whose 
population holds little leverage on the state, the Haitian polis could sway the 
direction of the state in the absence of a military to intimidate them into silence. 
This gave their position great leverage and a veto power. Aristide’s formation of 
his own political party, Fanmi Lavalas, and its subsequent electoral domination in 
the parliamentary elections consolidated that power300. Popular protests and 
orchestrated parliamentary resistance from elected Aristide loyalists and 
                                                          
298 HR 2159 -- 07/15/97 - EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503. Statement of administration policy. (This statement has been coordinated by 
OMB with the concerned agencies.) July 15, 1997 - H.R. 2159 – Foreign Relations, export financing, and 
related operations appropriations bill, FY 1998.  
299 Haiti Progrès, “Privatization: Popular organizations respond”. This Week in Haiti, Vol. 14, no. 3, 10-16 
April 1996. 
300 Fanmi Lavalas won 80% of the vote with a ratio of 10/1 proving that the Aristide’s popularity was 
transferable to his party and making him impossible to beat in free electoral competitions. 
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members of Fanmi Lavalas undermined the government’s ability to proceed. 
Parliamentarians frustrated the World Bank and American policy-makers by 
refusing to vote for a new prime minister, rejecting three nominations, following 
the resignation of the first after 17 months in office thereby undermining the 
ability of the Preval government to act legitimately. Without a prime minister,  
[T]he long standoff slowed or blocked many national 
programs including privatization and held up hundreds of 
millions of dollars in badly needed international aid. An 
agreement to sell Haiti's cement company has been 
stalled for eight months because there has been no 
prime minister to sign the deal, and privatization of 
seven other enterprises-- the telephone company, 
electric utility, seaports, airport, the two national banks 
and the cooking oil factory-- also are on hold301.  
 
Giving that the disbursement of funds by the World Bank, IMF and Foreign 
governments was conditional on implementing the liberalization program and 
privatizing those state-owned industries, the Preval government found itself 
constrained by lack of resources. Unable to privatize, with no funds in state 
coffers, he could neither use state patronage to attain parliamentary and mass 
support or institute programs to increase his popularity. He was forced to retreat 
and his capitulation caused international donors to withhold their funds.   
  The departure of American forces and the elimination of the military, for 
the first time since the American occupation, gave the Haitian polis the power to 
preserve their interests and hold the state, and the political and economic elites 
accountable. Unable to be subdued by the police, the only remaining coercive 
                                                          
301 Reuters, “Government Crisis Stalls Privatization,” 18 November 1998 
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arm of the state, they were able to stall the liberalization project and the 
consolidation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The time was indeed 
propitious for a new social contract and for the real implementation of the État-
peuple /Peuple-État interdependence stipulated by Duvalier but undermined by 
the dictatorial nature of his regime.  
With the formation of Fanmi Lavalas by Aristide in 1996, in an 
environment already overpopulated by political parties, the coalition project 
abated for a more virulent and zero-sum game party competition. Despite the 
bravado of members of the OPL, in asserting that while Aristide and his cohort 
were in exile they were engaged with the population, the reality was that they 
could not compete with Aristide and his party without the support of the U. S., 
France, and Canada. Even with such support, they were unable to offer much 
competition for they lacked the legitimacy and popular support.  
The assertion by democratization scholars like Dahl (1971), O’Donnell 
(1986, 1996), and (Huntington (1996) that electoral competition and inter and 
intra-party contestation are necessary for democratic transition does not account 
for an institutionally weak state incapable of managing conflicts and competition 
between political actors and institutions. They also assume a strong multiparty 
system, and fail to consider single party dominance as an ideal outcome of 
electoral competition as also reflecting a particular pattern of democratization 
(Ethier 1990). A one-party dominated transition is not anathema to, but may be 
indispensable for democratic stability and consolidation (Arian and Barnes 1974, 
Dunleavy 2014). Although Huntington acknowledges overpoliticization of 
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particular institutions such as the armed forces as an impediment to democratic 
transitions, all three scholars ignore the politicization and dependence of the 
state itself and the impact of institutional capacity in undermining its ability to 
manage political competition and competing claims for its control (Sangmpam 
1996, Gros 1997).  
The notion that electoral competition rather than political participation, 
stability, and state accountability and responsiveness are indispensable for 
democratization seems contrary to Haitian development and trends in 
postcolonial states. In fact, it is the imposition of this paradigm by national and 
foreign actors that have impeded democratic stability and consolidation. By 
making the state the target of democratic contestation, and overburdening its 
already limited capacity, the democratizatiobn process itself may be 
delegitimized. Indeed, in states with weak institutional capacity, strong civil 
society and mass political involvement, a one-party dominated transition and 
state responsiveness to the population may be the best and perhaps only viable 
path to democratic consolidation302.  
Haitian democracy, as being imposed, is a vehicle for implementing 
neoliberal economic policies not one to safeguard a new social contract that 
affords greater leverage to the population and demand greater accountability 
from the state, state actors, and neocolonial elites. Haitian democracy, as being 
impose, therefore was diametrically opposed to the type of democracy being 
                                                          
302 One-party dominance could indicate a weakness of the democratic process but may create a level of 
stability and enough time to allow growth in state capacity and thus consolidation. 
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demanded by the overwhelming majority. As a popular newspaper astutely puts 
it, “U.S. capitalists seek profits; Haitian people seek justice”303. 
The ability of the popular sector to prevent the privatization and fleecing of 
state resources, as they interpreted it, further discredited the other political 
parties that supported privatization, making Aristide the only viable Presidential 
candidate, and the success of his party in the subsequent parliamentary 
elections inevitable. The dominance of his party, Fanmi Lavalas (FL), and his 
subsequent win led the International Coalition of Independent Observers along 
with most international observers to characterize the 2000 elections as an 
“election without fear and intimidation”304 (Dupuis 1997, OAS 13 December 2000, 
1, Carey 2000, MiLes and Feeney February 2001, Hallward 2007). This 
assessment was supported by the Organization of American States’ observation,  
[T]he day was a great success for the Haitian population, 
which turned out in large and orderly numbers to choose 
both their local and national governments, and for the 
Haitian National Police, whose capacity had been 
questioned by the political parties, by the Government 
and by the press, but who had been able to keep order 
quietly and effectively. Election Day proceedings on May 
                                                          
303 Haiti progres. “U.S. capitalists seek profits; Haitian people seek justice”, Vol. 15, no. 39, 17-23 
December 1997 
304Miles, Melinda and Feeney, Moira, “Elections 2000: Participatory Democracy in Haiti” February 2001. In 
this Post Election Report by International Coalition of Independent Observers” the authors wrote, “It is 
our observation that voters were able to participate without fear in almost all locations we visited. At 
each of the sites we visited we met with observers from other organizations. Political party 
representatives, or mandataires, from the Espace de Concertation, OPL (Organization de Peuple en Lutte) 
and Fanmi Lavalas were present at as many as 95% of the bureaus we visited. The presence of these 
mandataires was documented in each location we visited, as well as representatives from other parties 
(including: MOCHRENHA, RDNP, APPA, RCP, Tet Ansamn, PLB, and independent). In nearly 100% of the 
bureaus we also documented national observers from the National Council of Observers (CNO/KNO). The 
preliminary conclusion of the International Coalition of Independent Observers is that the Haitian people 
have mobilized in large numbers to express their political will through participation in the local and 
legislative elections of May 21, 2000.”  
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21 represented the high point of the electoral process. 
An estimated 60 percent of registered voters went to the 
polls. Very few incidents of violence were reported. 
While voters had to wait in long lines, especially at the 
beginning of the day, they were eventually able to cast 
their ballots free of pressure and intimidation. Most 
voters were able to find their polling stations with relative 
ease.  305. 
 
Aristide’s party, Fanmi Lavalas (FL) devastated the competition in May 2000 by 
winning “89 of 115 mayoral positions, 72 of 83 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies306 and 18 of the 19 Senate seats contested” due to the loss of 
legitimacy of the other parties307 (Hallward 2004, 8, Nohlen 2005, 380-1). The 
sweeping victory is not coincidental, given the electoral dominance his support 
for the previous government created. Even the margins of Fanmi Lavalas’ win 
could have been predicted. Although OPL, his former party, and most of the 
other parties boycotted the Presidential elections claiming it was in protest of the 
parliamentary election results, it is clear that they understood and they were not 
competitive and would be embarrassed by the results. Theirs was a maneuver to 
protect their lack of legitimacy and a strategy supported by the U.S., Canada, 
and France to cast doubts on the elections (R. J. Fatton 2002, Dupuy 2007). 
Aristide himself went on to win the Presidential election by an overwhelming 
                                                          
305 OAS Mission in Haiti, Final report, 13 December 2000, p. 2 
306 The 1987 constitution established an 83-seat lower chamber (now 119) or chamber of deputies and a 
27-seat upper chamber or senate (now 30).  
307 See (Dupuis 1997, 170-72, R. J. Fatton 2002). Both authors argue that the collaboration of many of the 
parties with the coup leaders and later opposition to Aristide has discredited and delegitimized them in 
the eyes of the population. As I suggested earlier, party leaders, especially the leaders of OPL recognized 
their lack of popularity and expressed openly that unless the American government forcefully intervened, 
they would not win any elections in Haiti. 
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majority of the vote; out of 2,871,602 or 67.6% registered voters, 2,632,534 or 
91.67% voted to elect him as President (OAS 13 December 2000, 1, Erikson 
2005, Nohlen 2005, 381). The lack of voter participation in the 1995 elections 
that led the International Republican Institute (IRI) to note, “The massive 
abstention and lopsided vote raise deeply disturbing questions concerning the 
future of democratic institutions, processes, and culture in Haiti,” reflected a 
deeply flawed understanding of Haitian democracy. Had Aristide fully supported 
Preval in 1995, as I suggested earlier, the turnout would have been great and his 
win more lopsided308.  
It was not Haitian democratic institutions, processes, and culture that were 
in peril, it was the American-imposed neocolonial clientelist system and the 
manufactured opposition. Indeed, one could argue that IRI’s problem was not the 
lopsided win but the fact that none of the right-leaning parties proved legitimate 
and viable enough to command more than 2% of the vote. The Haitian population 
was conscious of its interests, as it has been historically, and sought a 
democracy where the government and state were responsive to their needs and 
accountable to them. They exercised their democratic rights to elect candidates 
they felt more represented their aspirations. In Aristide and Fanmi Lavalas, they 
saw a leader and a party that not only advocated for, but also fought to secure 
their interests, and their vote reflected both their confidence in Fanmi Lavalas, 
and rejection of the opposition parties. The phenomena of voter concentration 
                                                          
308 See IRI – Haiti – Election Observation Report – Dec. 17, 1995. 
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and party monopoly are not unique to the Haitian democratic transition (Arian 
and Barnes 1974, Ethier 1990, Caplan 2008, Tisdall 2010). It reflects a trend in 
highly unequal emerging democracies where one-party rule offers legitimacy, 
accountability, stability, and the possibility for institution-building and political 
coherence309.  Lipset is right when he notes, 
[N]ew democracies must be institutionalized, 
consolidated, and become legitimate. They face many 
problem, among which are creating a growing and more 
equalitarian economy; reducing the tensions with, and 
perhaps replacing, the old civil and military elites” (Lipset 
1993, 7) 
 
The fear of a new distributional scheme posed by Aristide’s party’s dominance of 
the electoral process is precisely the context for understanding the national and 
foreign opposition to his regime. With a population long awaiting the opportunity 
to re-capture and re-orient the neocolonial clientelist state, using a one-party 
dominated system and without a military to uphold and protect the status quo, it 
was more than an ideal outcome for the Haitian populous, though a dreaded one 
for both patrons and clients of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. If as 
Lipset contends, “political legitimacy in a democratic system relies heavily on 
legitimacy and explicit or implicit support from the citizenry,” then the “free and 
fair” electoral victory was a good indication of popular support and the legitimacy 
                                                          
309 The overemphasis on multi-party systems as necessary for Democracy obscure the pattern of one-
party dominated democracies. Countries such as Mexico, Uruguay, Singapore, Costa Rica, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Ghana,  and even Brazil and Argentina, experience one-party-dominated democracies, which 
have provided stability and a path to democratic consolidation. In post-colonial countries who gained 
their independence through armed struggle, a one-party dominated system with roots in the military 
struggle retain a high level of legitimacy allowing them to dominate the electoral process.  See Challenges 
to Democracy by One-Party Dominance: A Comparative Assessment - 10 October 2005 - KONRAD-
ADENAUER-STIFTUNG • SEMINAR REPORT • NO 17 • JOHANNESBURG • Published on OCTOBER 2006 
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enjoyed by Aristide and his party. The turnout of the population is also an 
indication that Haitian citizens believed in democracy as a vehicle for addressing 
economic inequality and supporting their aspirations. They were determined to 
challenge the neo-liberal policies associated with the American-sponsored 
democratization model. The observation that “the combination of democracy, low 
income economy, and substantial inequities tend to politicize all forms of societal 
cleavages,” is not without foundation. However, it is the “accumulation of 
distributive claims” on the state, and the inability or refusal of those in control of 
the state to address those claims, that are at the roots of democratic instability 
and lack of legitimacy (Tirado 1998, R. Fatton 1999, Dupuy 2003, Dupuy 2007). 
Kohli is right to argue,  
[G]iven the scarcity of poor economy, the competitive 
energies of many individuals and groups seeking 
economic improvements tend to get focused on the 
state. Thus competition over state resources often 
results in intense conflicts (Kohli 1993, 677)  
 
In the case of Haiti, it is not just national actors but also international actors who 
are competing over state resources. In the end, it is the convergence of national 
elites and foreign governments against popular democratic forces in control of 
the state, which proved fatal to both the state and Haitian democratic stability.      
Unable to win elections and impose their neoliberal privatization schemes 
designed to fleece the state, the opposition and its foreign supporters decided to 
undermine the democratic process by refusing to accept the electoral victory of 
popular democratic forces.  They did so by challenging two Senate seats on a 
technicality.  As Peter Hallward explains, both the OAS, who had recognized the 
actual voting as free and fair, and the U.S. State Department, contested the 
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parliamentary vote due to a technical vote counting model that gave the 
candidates with the most votes an outright win. Instead of going into a second 
round, the two candidates with 32,969 and 30,736 to their rival’s less than 16,000 
votes were declared winners due to the differences in votes, which the CEP 
deemed hard to overcome. This was argued to be flawed by the opposition, 
OAS, and the United States as an excuse to undermine the democratically-
elected government. Although the CEP maintained that this was congruent with 
past practice (Hallward 2004, 9,17).310 Despite various efforts by the elected 
government to resolve the situation, including offers to redo the elections for the 
contested seats, the opposition refused,311 with the backing of the U. S., France, 
and Canada, leaving the nation in crisis. Their strategy was to find an excuse to 
delegitimize the entire election since they could not win. To escalate the crisis, 
and undermine the government’s credibility and popularity, the U. S. blocked 
every avenue for the elected government to acquire funds to address the needs 
of the population. As Street and Hallward point out,  
[T]he Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), under 
pressure from the US, halted a package of loans 
amounting to US$148 million for education, roads, 
reform of the public health system and for water 
supplies. On the back of this decision by the IADB a 
further US$470 million in loans due to be disbursed in 
the up-coming years was also frozen. Few governments 
could survive such sustained financial assault. The 
combined effect of these measures was to overwhelm 
an already shattered economy. Gross domestic product 
                                                          
310 Also see Haïti Progrès, 28 June 2000; and Morrell, James, ‘Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory’, 
Centre for International Policy, August 2000. 
311 The opposition, Convergence Democratic and the group of 184 organized and supported by from the 
International Republican Institute lack the legitimacy and support to compete in open elections. 
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has declined from US$4,089 million in 1999 to US$2,983 
million in 2003. Foreign exchange reserves now stand at 
a mere US$72.7 million compared to US$264 million 
before the crisis of 2000 (EIU 2003a, EIU 2003b, Street 
2004, 4-7, Hallward 2004, 9). 
 
These pressures compelled Fanmi Lavalas to seek reimbursement from France 
for the indemnity forced upon Haiti at the eve of its independence in 1804 
(Farmer 2004, Dupuy 2007). “Twenty One” became a popular chant to 
emphasize the assessed $21 billion owed Haiti by France, a position that had 
legal merit and supported by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the 
African Union, which elicited much irritation from France. More importantly, 
however, the deleterious economic impact orchestrated by France and the U. S. 
forced the democratically-elected government of Aristide to make concessions to 
a discredited opposition, unable to compete in open elections with little following 
and legitimacy, despite the foreign funding to create and maintain party-based 
clientelism312. He agreed to accept a Prime Minister from the opposition, to redo 
the elections where the calculations were in contention, and requested 
international security support to maintain national stability and security for all 
sectors of the population. However, asserts Fatton, the U.S. was not amenable to 
those concessions:  
Formulated by two ultra-conservatives, Roger Noriega 
and Otto Reich, Washington’s policies empowered 
Aristide’s adversaries. The US encouraged and financed 
the development of the opposition regrouped in 
Convergence Democratique and the Groups des 184. 
                                                          
312 According to Paul Farmer, Senator Christopher urged an investigation of US training sessions for six 
hundred ‘rebels’ in the Dominican Republic, and wanted to find out ‘how the IRI spent $1.2 million of 
taxpayers’ money’ in Haiti (Farmer 2004). 
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Even though Aristide agreed to the terms of a 
compromise engineered by Caribbean Community of 
Common Market, CARICOM, which would have 
weakened Aristide’s powers and generated a 
government of National Unity, instead of compelling the 
opposition to accept it, Washington supported its 
rejection, calling into question Aristide’s fitness to govern 
(Fatton 2006, 20). 
 
Emboldened by American political and financial support, the opposition 
demanded the departure of the elected President, disregarding his willingness to 
create a unity government thereby escalating the conflicts313. External efforts to 
destabilize and discredit the government persisted as well as assassination and 
coup attempts, one of which resulted in the murder of Aristide’s cousin 
(Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, Chomsky, Farmer and Goodman 2004, Podur 
2012). As Blumenthal makes clear, neither Convergence nor the Group of 184 
could have materialized and sustained their opposition politics without outside 
funding, institutional support and the knowledge that U.S. support would allow 
them to withstand the popular support enjoyed by Aristide and his party. They 
could neither acquire the funding on their own, nor the support of the population 
whose interests they opposed. It was an opposition in name only given their 
trouncing in the election. Under the guise of ‘promoting the practice of democracy 
abroad’, 
[T]he International Republican Institute conducted a $3 
million party-building program in Haiti, training Aristide’s 
political opponents, uniting them into a single bloc and, 
according to a former U.S. ambassador there, 
encouraging them to reject internationally sanctioned 
                                                          
313 It was in this context that popular democratic supporters ransacked the house of OPL leader Gerard 
Pierre-Charles and set fire to CRESFED, the Center for Economic Research and Formation for 
Development, from which he operated. 
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power-sharing agreements in order to heighten Haiti’s 
political crisis (Blumenthal 2004, 2).  
 
It is can be argued that Aristide’s approach to governance facilitated the 
strategies that led to his overthrow, and his willingness to depend on popular 
support alone as the basis for his legitimacy and protection left him with few 
collaborators. Nevertheless, and more importantly, the opportunistic nature of 
those who opposed him, their reliance on foreign powers instead of popular 
legitimacy, and their inability to formulate a national vision capable of garnering 
the support of the population were by any measure, the most destabilizing 
aspects of Haiti’s democratic transition (R. Fatton 2006, 18-21, Dupuy 2007). 
Nevertheless, the pressures experienced by Aristide and his government did not 
discourage him from seeking options favorable to strengthening the Haitian state 
and facilitate national development.  
          He instituted policies to facilitate foreign investments capable of enhancing 
state capacity, human capital, and improve the economic outlook and 
independence of the nation314.  According to the American Embassy Climate 
Investment Report, hoping to garner foreign support Aristide established an 
Investment Code, expanded the state’s regulatory capacity, secured natural 
resources as the property of the state, worked with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), encouraged investments and provided tax incentives and exemption.315 
                                                          
314 In many way, Aristide’s program can be compared to Dr. Bobo’s proposition as foreign minister before 
the American invasion of 1915 discussed in chapter four. 
315 2009 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – HAITI, American Embassy Diplomatic Cable - Sanderson, 
2009 Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 14:22 
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While Aristide’s government both created some advantages for foreign 
investment and facilitated national capacity building, he resisted privatization and 
cooptation, which accelerated efforts to destabilize it. His attempt to spur the 
expansion of the institutional and regulatory capacity of the state and national 
development without depriving the state of core resources necessary for 
revenues and services, defied the neoliberal agenda and U.S impositions.  
Indeed, Aristide’s attempt to secure foreign investment and a strong role 
for the state can be compared to Dr. Bobo’s proposal at the eve of the American 
Occupation. Gros’ assertion that “the challenge for Haiti is to find a sustainable 
democratic alternative” begs an important question; Sustainable to whom? 
Haitian democracy would indeed be sustainable without the imposition of 
external forces and the ability of opportunistic political leaders to rely on foreign 
governments to ascend to power instead of relying on their ability to garner 
popular support (Gros 1997, 106-7). The challenge has not been the inability to 
find a sustainable democracy but the refusal to accept the type of accountable 
popular democracy demanded by the Haitian majority classes that afford a 
stronger role for the state and state-society relations based on interdependence. 
Haitian democratic transition, unlike most of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, 
Asia, and Eastern Europe provides us with an alternative framework where 
democracy emerged due to elite weaknesses, defeats, and capitulations316. The 
                                                          
 
316 See (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). These scholars offer some great insight on the kind of democracy 
from below  on 
 411 
 
weakness of the Haitian elite makes democratic reversal only possible through 
foreign intervention. The challenges faced by democratic transition in Haiti are 
due to attempts by national elites and their foreign backers to repress democratic 
forces and allay their demands on the state long the turf of resource competition 
between elites and the target of neoliberal policies and privatization. Haitian 
democracy purports to upend the clientelist infrastructure for a more accountable 
and independent state thus it is not coincidental that there have been efforts to 
replace it with a more predictable elite-dominated democratization that protects 
foreign and elite interests rather than those of the populous (Wurfel 1990, 111). 
Democracy Under Attack: The Second Overthrow of Aristide and the 
Consolidation of the Dependent Neocolonial Clientelist Infrastructure:  
With mounting pressures, escalating protests, armed assaults, the murder 
of the President’s cousin, and internationally orchestrated destabilizing activities, 
supporters of the government resulted to authoritarian tactics and violent 
beatings of student protestors and professors who supported the opposition (R. 
J. Fatton 2002, 184-207). This response, in reaction to escalating belligerence 
and violence from a paid opposition, was used to paint the Lavalas regime as 
lawless and undemocratic, which gave greater legitimacy to its local and 
international enemies (Dupuy 2007, Podur 2012). A coordinated national and 
international propaganda campaign ensued to undermine the national and 
international legitimacy enjoyed by the democratically-elected government 
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preceding its overthrow (Vastel 2003, Cooper and Rowlands 2006, 211-215)317. 
The accusation of widespread killings levied against the government, if it had not 
resulted in the destruction of the Haitian state, its occupation and loss of 
sovereignty, and the murder of thousands of pro-democracy activists, would be 
ironic. Even our intellectuals collaborated with anti-democratic forces and 
supported the destabilization campaign and destruction of Haitian democracy, 
fickle as they have been in the defense of the nation and its interests. Even the 
intellectual and Haitian ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Guy Alexandre, 
supported the destabilization campaign by resigning his posts and supporting 
France’s position that Haiti should not be repaid the indemnity.318 Amnesty 
International went to great length to portray the besieged democratic government 
as a continuity of the patterns of state-sponsored violence.  However, the fallacy 
                                                          
317 Coordinated efforts by France, the United States and Canada to undermine and overthrow the regime 
was widely reported and documented. As Engler wrote, “On Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 2003, Jean Chrétien’s 
Liberal government organized the “Ottawa Initiative on Haiti” to discuss that country’s future. No Haitian 
officials were invited to this assembly where high-level US, Canadian and French officials decided that 
Haiti’s elected president “must go”, the dreaded army should be recreated and that the country would be 
put under a Kosovo-like UN trusteeship. 
Thirteen months after the Ottawa Initiative meeting President Aristide and most other elected officials 
were pushed out and a quasi UN trusteeship had begun. Since that time the Haitian National Police has 
been heavily militarized and steps have been taken towards recreating the military. 
Present at the Ottawa Initiative discussion were Canadian Health (and later foreign) Minister Pierre 
Pettigrew, US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Otto Reich, another State 
Department official, Mary Ellen Gilroy, Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American 
States, Luigi Einaudi, El Salvador’s Foreign Minister, Maria de Avila and France’s Minister of Security and 
Conflict Prevention Pierre-André Wiltzer. They were all invited to the government’s Meech Lake 
conference centre in Gatineau, Québec by Secretary of State for Latin America and Minister for La 
Francophonie Dennis Paradis” (Engler 2014). 
318 The author was present with Dr. Guy Alexandre when he defended France’s position and supported 
the Debray report that refuted the well-established and legally supported government claim that Haiti is 
entitled to repayment by France for the indemnity. 
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of this comparison is unequivocal for any scholar or lay observer of Haitian 
politics and history. The death tolls themselves disprove the claim of widespread 
violence by Aristide’s government: From over 50,000 killed by the Marines during 
the American occupation, and at least half a million displaced319, to an estimated 
50,000 murdered by both Duvaliers with thousands of exiles, to 700-1000 during 
the military-led transitional period following the fall of Jean-Claudism, to over 
4,000 killed following the first coup against the democratically-elected 
government of Aristide, and at minimum, 3,000 killed during the Amerian-
imposed regime of Latortue following the second coup. Thus, no matter Aristide’s 
faults, and his supporters’ violent acts, accusing him or his government of 
widespread murder and comparing his government to previous violent regimes 
cannot be taken seriously by any measure (AmnestyRprt2004 2004, Hallward 
2007, 155, Dupuy 2007, Podur 2012, 27). As Hallward notes, 
… [N]either Amnesty International nor any human rights 
organization has yet risked an estimate of the total 
numbers of people killed under Aristide – then from 2001 
to 2004 perhaps thirty political killings can be attributed 
to the PNH (Haitian National Police whose political 
affiliation was often anti-government) or to groups with 
(often tenuous) links to FL (Fanmy Lavalas) (Hallward 
2007, 155). 
 
 According to Hallward, even the virulently anti-Aristide crusader Michael Deibert 
in his 454-page assessment of Aristide’s 2001-2004 government attributed only 
44 politically-motivated killings to Aristide’s supporters out of the 212 murders 
                                                          
319 See (Bellegarde 1929a, 1923, 1924, 1937) 
 414 
 
that took place during that period against his supporters and state agents 
(Deibert 2005, Hallward 2007, 155, 376). 
The overthrow of the popular democratic regime therefore has to be 
assessed by scholars as an attempt to prevent the democratic restructuring of 
the state that could have produced a lasting social contract based on the 
interdependence between state and society long sought after by the Haitian 
populace and crafters of the Louverturean state and its adherents. Unable to 
dislodge the elected government by democratic means or by protests and 
violence, the model of funded invasion defeated by Duvalier’s Noirist regime was 
re-introduced (Blumenthal 2004, Blum 2014, Engler 2014). A well-trained and 
well-equipped group of former military officers, in training in the Dominican 
Republic for a year, invaded the country to overthrow the popularly supported 
and democratically-elected government (Williams 2004, Farmer 2004, Goodman 
and Barrios 2004, Podur 2012, 48-50).  As documented by members of the U. S. 
Congressional Black Caucus and many scholars and journalists, most of the 
guns used by the invaders were recently sent to the Dominican Republic by the 
U. S. government (McKinney 2004). The paramilitaries who invaded the country 
had been in training, led by U.S. Marines, for almost a year in the Dominican 
Republic as part of the United States ‘Operation Jaded Task’ (Buss and Gardner 
2008, Podur 2012, 49). These well-armed and well-trained mercenaries were 
unable to enter the capital due to the popularity of the democratic regime, and 
the willingness of the population to defend their government. Their bravery forced 
the U.S., Canada, and France to forcefully remove the elected government from 
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power, transporting him against his will to the Central African Republic, thus 
insulting not just Aristide but the proud Black Haitian nation320 (Farmer 2004, 
Chomsky, Farmer and Goodman 2004, 97-130, Dupuy 2007, Hallward 2007, 
Davies 2014 ).  
The Marines landed again, and this time, under the cover of the U. N. to 
impose a clientelist government and re-assert control over their neocolonial 
clientelist infrastructure. As had taken place following the first overthrow, 
wholesale suppression of the population and mass arrests, intimidation and 
murders followed, but this time not by the military as it had been disbanded, but 
by United States Marines and United Nations troops (Blum 2014, Doleac 2015). 
The elimination of the military by Aristide now required a new model to support 
the imposed neocolonial infrastructure, one with limited democratic participation, 
a state deprived of its ability to absorb its working population, and a national 
environment controlled by non-governmental organizations usurping the role of 
the state and compromising state-society relations. The result was the removal of 
the population from democratic participation. 
                                                          
320 In a classic case of American racism a la Deep South, the former assistant of the virulently racist 
senator Jesse Helm, Roger Noriega who orchestrated the military coup against Aristide, brought him back 
to Africa and in one act played out the “Go back to Africa” one often hears in America. Most Haitians, 
whether supporters or opponent of Aristide did not miss the point that this happened at the bicentennial 
anniversary of Haitian independence in an action supported by France. It was the actualization of what 
was proposed by the King of France to Petion, at the eve of Haitian independence, to rid the Island of 
black revolutionaries and give limited rights to the same neocolonial elites who now contributed to the 
deposition and exile of the democratically elected popular Black president. 
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Democracy without Participation: Privatization, NGOs, and the Decline of the 
Haitian State and Democratic Politics: 
The overthrow and exile of the democratically-elected President and the 
imposition of Gerard Latortue, the former U.N. consultant and a former Prime 
Minister, allowed the United States and neocolonial elites to succeed in 
preventing the state from being permanently captured by popular democratic 
forces. With its client regime in place, the American government transferred 
some 2,600 handguns and 21 long guns to the ‘puppet’ Haitian government to be 
issued to the police. It also allowed American companies to sell $1.9 million 
worth of arms, including 3,000 .38-caliber revolvers, 500 9mm pistols, 500 12-
gauge shotguns, 200 Mini-14 rifles, and 100 M4 carbines to the interim Haitian 
government (Taft-Morales and Seelke 2008, 26). While it prevented the 
democratically-elected government of Aristide from receiving weapons and riot 
gear from South Africa under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, it was quick to 
supply its clientelist government with weapons to suppress the population.  
Thus, armed and protected by international forces, the Latortue interim 
government secured the support of General Abraham, retired by Aristide during 
his first presidency, as Minister of the Interior, and members of Convergence and 
Group of 184 as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Justice. It arrested 
members of Aristide’s party, and allowed the targeting and widespread 
“disappearance” and killings of democracy activists and the re-assertion of power 
by members of the military and FRAPH, with the acquiescence, if not support, of 
United Nation’s forces (Amnesty_Int'l 2005, 11-20, Podur 2012, 58-65). As 
Gunenwardena and Schuller suggest,  
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[L]atortue was widely regarded as a puppet of the 
International Community.  The prime minister and 
President do not speak a day with saying the 
‘international Community’. You are left with the 
impression that the country cannot exist, do not exist 
without speaking about the ‘international community’. 
The interim government obliged to the international 
community for securing its position was especially eager 
to please international organizations (Gunenwardena 
and Schuller 2008, 193). 
 
Faced with the refusal of the previous government to privatize state-owned 
industries and liberalize the economy, the U. S., France and Canada now found 
in Latortue a willing participant in the dismantling of the lasting pillars of the 
Duvalierist state. Popular organizations that before resisted privatization were 
violently repressed by a U.S.-directed a U. N. force that protected the regime 
from its opponents. Before, fearful of the Haitian masses and without a military to 
protect it, the neocolonial elite could not implement its neoliberal agenda. Now, 
with the U.S.-sponsored forces to protect them, neocolonial elites and the 
imposed clientelist regime of Latortue felt no need to adhere to the demands of 
the population or to protect the interests of the nation. They were no longer 
beholden to the population as their power was not derived from a foreign army 
more than willing to kill and maim those who resisted the new clientelist regime 
and internationally imposed order. According to Podur, within weeks, funds 
illegally withheld from the democratically-elected government of Aristide were 
released to its interim replacement and additional funding to support occupying 
forces and their pacification projects were disbursed with Canada pledging a total 
of $19 million and the United States $66 million (Podur 2012, 62). Taft-Morales, 
the Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade 
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noted the magnitude of funds pledged, which contrary to her assertion went not 
to secure the state and enhance its capacity, but primarily to support U.N. forces, 
NGOs and the divestment and destruction of the Haitian state. 
International organizations and governments had 
pledged $1.085 billion over the next two years to help 
Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and 
improve basic services. The United States committed to 
provide $230 million for FY2004-FY2005 (Taft-Morales 
2005, 6).  
 
The Latortue client regime facilitated what had been rejected by both the Haitian 
people and its popular democratically-elected government by assessing the 
viability of the state industries in order to prepare them for privatization. Amongst 
the companies assessed were the National Port Authority, TELECO, and 
Electricity d’ État D’ Haiti.321 He undermined state capacity and the stability of the 
middle class population to be absorbed by the Duvalierist Noirist regime by 
sacking 12,000 state employees and an additional 2,000 employees from 
TELECO, the phone company and one of the most lucrative state enterprises 322 
(Podur 2012, 62).  
          Under the internationally-imposed regime, state decisions were relegated 
to the ‘international community’, security of the nation transferred from the state 
to foreign forces, and the state, itself weakened, became supplanted by non-
                                                          
321 See the 2009 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – HAITI’s openness to Foreign Investment - American 
Embassy Diplomatic Cable from Haiti to the United States Department of Commerce, Department of the 
Treasury, Dominican Republic, Secretary of state- Sanderson, 2009 Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 14:22 
322 See Jeb Sprague, ‘Failed Solidarity: The ICFTU, AFL-CIO, ILO, and ORT in Haiti.’ Labor Notes. Sept. 28, 
2006 – htpp://labornotes.org/node/230 and Isabel MacDonald. ‘DDR in Haiti: The UN’s cleansing of Bel 




governmental organizations. It is under these conditions and the targeting of 
popular democratic organizations and their leaders, as well as widespread 
killings of Aristide’s supporters that preparations for elections took place. With 
Aristide exiled, and Fanmi Lavalas, the most popular and only legitimate political 
party prevented from participating in elections, the former president Renee 
Preval was convinced to compete in the elections due to his relationships with 
Aristide and his reputation with the population. The results made clear that 
although suppressed, the Haitian populace could demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction with the opposition by their electoral participation. Of the 
3,533,430 registered voters 2.093.947 participated (59.26%) and Preval was 
elected by 51.21% with the next runner up only earning 12.4% of the vote. Given 
the absence of Aristide and the banning of the party, the failure of the opposition 
to muster votes from significant segments of the population revealed their 
precarious manufactured existence and their actual relevance to the population 
















% of votes cast 
out of 59.26% of 
eligible voter 
participation    
Rene Preval  LESPWA  992,766  51.21%  
Leslie Francois Manigat  RDNP  240,306  12.40% 
Charles Henry Baker  RESPE  159,683  8.24%  
Jean Chavannes Jeune  UNION  108,283  5.59%  
Luc Mesadieu  MOCHRENAH  64,850  3.35% 
Serge Gilles  FUSION  50,796  2.62% 
Paul Denis  OPL  50,751  2.62%  
Evans Paul  ALYANS  48,232  2.49%  
Guy Philippe 323 FRN  37,303  1.92% 
26 additional candidates Other 189,661 9.76% 
Total  1,942,641 100% 
 Source: Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Committee (Port-au-Prince, 2006). 
 
 
Some scholars suggested that Preval’s connection with Aristide garnered him 
some popular votes since many believed he would support the latter’s return 
from exile. Almost half of the masses, discouraged and suppressed, remained 
home rather than provide him with the unquestionable plurality they had provided 
their preferred candidate (Dupuy 2007). Out of an extraordinary 35 candidates 
and parties competing for the Presidency, Senate, and Congress, Preval’s newly 
formed party LESPWA (Hope) also gained 13 out of 30 Senate seats and 23 out 
of 99 congressional seats leaving him with little possibility of governing 
effectively324.  
                                                          
323 Guy Philippe, the leader of the military invasion the American government claimed enjoyed 
widespread support only received 1.92% of the vote. Altogether, the eight candidates who ran from the 
opposition garnered a total of 23.43%. The dismal showing by both the OPL candidate, Paul Denis, and the 
leader of RÉSPÈ, Charles Baker, demonstrates the bankruptcy of the foreign manufactured opposition. 
324 See the Interparliamentary union website report on HAITI Chambre des Députés (Chamber of 
Deputies): http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2137_arc.htm and Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections for 
data and other information regarding Haiti’s elections. Copyright © 1996-2008 Inter-Parliamentary Union 
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Despite the privatization of its main industries, the clientelist state still 
remained the primary vehicle for wealth extraction, and competition for its control 
had reverted to focusing on its meager resources rather than its orientation. Little 
was therefore accomplished by the Preval government, now protected by foreign 
forces, besides the furthering of privatization and the dismantling of the state, 
both accelerated by his willingness to cede the role of the state to non-state and 
non-national actors and allow its erosion and replacement by non-governmental 
organizations (Buss and Gardner 2008).  
Already weak and saddled with an ineffective government controlled by an 
American-supported U.N occupation force, the January 2010 massive 
earthquake of 7.0 magnitude devastated what little remained of the Haitian state 
infrastructure and personnel. All state institutions, and the middle-class 
population that supported them disappeared in 38 seconds. It destroyed what 
little semblance of the state that had survived privatization, and resources 
destined to strengthening the capacity of the Haitian state were diverted to 
NGOs. If the supplanting of the state by foreign and foreign-funded NGOs was 
incomplete, the earthquake became its death knell. The Haitian population, 
without any strong institutions and government, found itself with over 350,000 
deaths mostly in the capital, and the rest sleeping under the sky in the capital at 
the mercy of NGOs and foreigners (with little expertise and understanding  
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of Haiti) serving as experts, and running roughshod over surviving government 
officials325.  What little remained of the declining Duvalierist state and Duvalierism 
adherents embedded in state institutions, evaporated, leaving little more than 
rubbles and corpses.  The ouster of Aristide led to foreign occupation, the 
consolidation of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, and 
imposition of a clientelist regime.  
          A new model of clientelist infrastructure emerged, one based on managed 
democratic elections. In post-earthquake Haiti, It was foreign governments and 
NGOs that decided national policies, dictated government decisions, and 
threatened to remove its President from office when he showed signs of 
independence. Neocolonial elites’ participation was useful, but not required. The 
veneer of legitimacy of any regime could be secured through a managed 
democratic process and economic and military dependence on foreign support, 
and those who refused to acquiesce to national subservience could be 
threatened and summarily dismissed. The relationship between the Haitian state 
and civil society further eroded state-society relations or the Etat-Peuple/Peuple-
Etat undermining the legitimacy of its government and democracy.   
In a remarkably revealing interview with Dan Beeton from the Center for 
Economic and Policy Research, the Special Representative of the Organization 
of American States’ (OAS) to Haiti, Ricardo Seintenfus reported that Edmond 
                                                          
325 This number was provided by the Haitian government but others estimated the number of deaths to 
be about 250,000 deaths. 
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Mulet, the then-head of the U.N. Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the American 
ambassador Kenneth Merten threatened to remove Préval from office. They 
would have done so without his objection and that of the Brazilian representative 
(Beeton 2014). It is therefore not unreasonable to understand that given the 
occupation by U.N. forces under the leadership of France, the U. S. and Canada, 
and the impact of the earthquake on the nation with more than 350,000 deaths 
and total destruction of the already weak infrastructure, the President had little 
power to make important policy decisions for his own country. He was viewed 
with contempt by the average citizen for his inability to stand up to foreign powers 
to protect the interests of the nation326. His only success, for which he received 
considerable support from the population, was his facilitation of the return of 
Aristide from exile327. 
The manipulation of the democratic process and subservience of the state 
and its leaders were not lost on the population, and subsequent elections 
reflected their rejection of the new national reality. Having historically prevented 
                                                          
326 While Preval was indeed constrained, it is perhaps unfair to accuse him of selling the nation. According 
to one of his advisors, he resisted the impositions of foreign powers to the degree that he could. Indeed 
his facilitation of the return of Aristide against the expressed wishes of the United States reflects his 
refusal to be be intimidated and his willingness to brave reprisal to maintain a degree of autonomy. 
327 Even after overthrowing Aristide, the United States was concerned about his popularity and possible 
return to Haiti and fear a post-Latortue government led by Preval would facilitate his return.  In a 
telegram from the American Embassy “Latortue’s Plan for Haiti’s Future, Thoughts on Preval and Aristide”, 
cable 06PORTAUPRINCE299_a, dated and timed Friday, February 10, 2006 at 18:25, American policy 
makers inquired of their imposed prime minister, whether “the message from the U.S. and international 
channels on Aristide being a man of the past was being heard in Haiti both among the poor and elite” to 
which he responded, “we must repeat, repeat, repeat this message,” indicating Aristide’s continued 
support. The French and American governments also tried to prevent his return, demanding that the 
South African government prevent him from traveling out of the country, which was declined. 
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Haiti from succumbing to neocolonial elites and their foreign allies, post-
earthquake Haiti left the masses with few avenues to exert pressure on the state 
and neocolonial elites. Their ability to secure their aspirations and interests 
through competitive and fair elections, which they initially supported by voting in 
high numbers, proved useless. Consequently, from 2006 to the post-earthquake 
elections, despite continuous electoral competitions, and the overwhelming 
popular support for democratic governance, democratic participation dramatically 
declined, a phenomenon unexplained by democratization and democratic 
consolidation theorists (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Huntington 1996). Given 
the frustrated efforts of the Haitian masses to use democracy as a vehicle to 
secure their socio-economic interests and political power, and their refusal to 
continue to participate in managed elections, can Haitian democracy survive 
without mass participation?  
The case of Haiti makes clear that the question is not whether consecutive 
electoral competitions are indicators of democratic governance and 
consolidation, but whether these “competitions” are relevant to the population 
and the result of popular participation. In post-colonial states with weak state-
society relations, electoral competitions are not indications of democratic 
continuity or consolidation. It is the ability of democratic competitors to meet the 
needs, demands, and aspirations of democratic participants, and the latter’s 
belief that democratic participation will have a direct impact on their lives that 
leads to democratic consolidation. The failure of democracy to address the needs 
and aspirations of the population, and inability of elected officials to be 
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accountable to them, as is the case for contemporary Haitian democracy, has 
resulted in democracy without popular participation and support. It leaves little 
hope that confidence in democratic institutions and governance will grow and 
facilitate its consolidation.  
The following results of the 2010 and 2015 elections reflect a dangerous 
trend of decline in popular participation. The election of 2010 saw a turnout from 
59.26% in 2006 to 22.79%, and out of 4,712,693 eligible voters, only 1,074,056 
participated, down from 1,942,641. 
                            Table 5: 2010 Presidential Election Results 
Candidate  Party  Votes  Percentage 
Mirlande Manigat RDNP 336,878 31.37% 
Jusde Celestin INITE 241,462 22.48% 
Michael Joseph 
Martelly 
REPONS PEYIZAN 234,617 21.84% 
Jean Henry Ceant RENMEN AYITI 87,834 8.18% 














Blank votes 12,869 1.20% 
Total votes (turnout: 22.79%1st 
round/22.52%2nd round) 
1,074,056 100.00 
Registered voters 4,712,693   
Source: Republic of Haiti Electoral Results. 2010.  
See http://pdba.government.edu/Elecdata/Haiti/o6pres.html.  
Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, Political Database of the Americas. 
 
 
Nevertheless, even with the low turnout, foreign manipulation of the elections 
was needed to influence the outcome. As Le Monde’s Editorial Board observed, 
the Haitian Electoral Commission had informed the population, 
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[T]he popular singer Michel Martelly, least educated and 
qualified amongst the top candidates, who had received 
21 % of the votes and consequently, did not qualify for 
the runoff. However, technical considerations found in 
the report of OAS experts will be considered so the run-
off elections can be organized (LeMonde, 2011). 
 
 
According to Ricardo Seintenfus, the Organization of American States’ (OAS) 
Special Representative to Haiti, who oversaw the work of election experts from 
the United States, France, and Canada, 
[I]t was necessary to change the result of the first round. 
The only possibility was to annul the results in certain 
ballot boxes that favored Célestin. That way, he would 
fall back to third place at the same time that the 
candidate anointed by the international community would 
go on to participate in the second round, along with 
Mirlande Manigat (Beeton 2014). 
 
As if Ricardo Seintenfus testimony was not enough, Fritz Scheuren, the head of 
the OAS statistical team, also noted, “In all his years, he had never otherwise 
seen an example of an election outcome being reversed without a recount”. The 
statement by the then Haitian Prime Minister, Jean-Max Bellerive’s was even 
clearer, “Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, traveled to Haiti 
to push for overturning the first round election. ‘We tried to resist and did, until 
the visit of Hillary Clinton,’ it becomes clear that Haitian democracy was not just 
constrained by foreign involvement but undermined in order to find the candidate 
more apt to cater to their interests at the detriment of the nation (Johnston 2015, 
2015)328.  
                                                          
328 According to Hillary Clinton’s emails revealed to the public and associated emails from manufacturing 
magnet, Reginal Boulos, the collusion of neocolonial elites with foreign powers were evident as reflected 
in communications between Boulos and State Department officials. See “Scrape #28882 (wikileaks): 
PLEASE CONVEY MY THANKS TO SECRETARY CLINTON FOR THE VISIT 
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While the top three candidates received 31.37%, 22.48%, 21.84% 
respectively, it was the “international community”- namely the U. S., Canada and 
France that decided who would compete in the run-off. They pressured the 
candidate in second place, Jude Celestin, to withdraw his candidacy thereby 
sending its chosen and least qualified candidate instead of the first two top 
candidates329 (Weisbrot 2011, LeMonde 2011). Consequently, less voters 
                                                          
 
From: Cheryl Mills 
To: Hillary Clinton 
Date: 2011-01-30 18:00 
Subject: PLEASE CONVEY MY THANKS TO SECRETARY CLINTON FOR THE VISIT 
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779147 Date: 09/30/2015 
RELEASE IN PART 
B6UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779147 Date: 09/30/2015. 
According to this document, “Boulos and 7 other prominent business people met with President Preval to 
compel him to accept the false OAS report and recommendations. Preval has been pushing for 
cancellation of the presidential elections, a move opposed by the United 
States, the U.N. peacekeeping mission, Brazil and others."  
Cheryl went on in her email to Secretary Clinton, “We believe that our "behind the doors actions" have 
been so far more effective than the usual public statements of the past. The business community has 
played a major role in helping to get the November 28 elections back on track, by convincing President 
Preval to request the OAS mission, by publicly denouncing the results of the 1st round, and as late as 
yesterday morning (3 hours meeting with Preval) by convincing him to drop the idea of annulment of the 
elections.” 
329 Haitian Election officials announced that no candidates met the threshold for an outright win but 
Mirlande Manigat and Jude Celestin had qualified for the run-off. However, objections from the 
‘international community”, specifically, the United States through OAS forced the acceptance of Michel 
Martelly instead of the second candidate with the highest vote to participate in the second round. 
According to the Haitian Chamber of Deputies’ report, 
The OAS submitted a report concluding that Mr. Martelly had 
won the second highest number of votes in the presidential 
elections after Ms. Manigat. However, Mr. Célestin refused to 
withdraw. Mr. Alain Le Roy, Chief of the MINUSTAH 
subsequently urged the Election Commission to respect the 
OAS' conclusion, warning that Haiti could face a 
constitutional crisis with the possibility of "considerable 
unrest and insecurity". Inité as well as President Préval urged 
Mr. Célestin to withdraw his candidacy. The following month, 
the Election Commission announced that it had removed Mr. 
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participated in the second round; leaving little doubt about the lack of legitimacy 
of the elections and the confidence of the population that 1) their voices will be 
respected, and 2) the government would, when elected, represent their interests. 
While Martelly won 67.57% to Manigat’s 31.75%, largely due to his popularity as 
a musician and Manigat’s husband’s collusion with the military regime after the 
first overthrow of Aristide, only 22.52 % voted nationally, and in some location 
less than 6% participated, according to the Interparliamentary Union (Johnston 
2015). The involvement of foreign governments and neocolonial elites in 
manipulating the elections and dictating its results meant that 77.48% of the 
voting population refused to participate in an election they deemed undemocratic. 
Thus foreign and neocolonial elite’s electoral manipulations undermined Haitian 
democratic transition by discouraging participation and creating a confidence 
deficit in the democratic process itself. This was clearly a disruption on the path 
to democratic consolidation.  
                                                          
Célestin's candidacy in favor of Mr. Martelly. 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2137_10.htm 
According to Le Monde, succumbing to pressure, Inite, the party of Jude Celestin wrote, "Even if we are 
certain that Jude Célestin received the necessary vote and as such is qualified to go to the second round, 
Inite agree to remove him as a candidate for the presidency” 
http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2011/01/26/haiti-le-parti-au-pouvoir-annonce-le-retrait-de-
son-candidat-a-la-residentielle_1471036_3222.html#PmHSIrHsRbrpX4zy.99 
This foreign intervention to circumvent Haitians’ exercise of their democratic rights in order to secure the 
Clientelist infrastructure undermined the trust of Haitian citizens in the democratic process. 
 To date, no proof has been provided that contradict the preliminary results, which disqualified Michel 
Martelly. By all accounts, the same OAS that challenged Aristide’s and his party’s overwhelming electoral 
win succeeded in imposing a fraudulent candidate at the expense of the Nation, and democratic 
legitimacy and consolidation. Even the electoral council made clear it would not change the results of the 




More importantly, besides these overt interferences, the true nature of the 
U.S clientelist infrastructure was not just manifested in the manipulation of 
elections and imposition of candidates. The fact that the political party of their 
candidate itself was manufactured and funded by USAID, according to document 
released by the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act 
(Johnston 2015) was extraordinary. 
The Presidency of Martelly continued the pattern, even increasing 
collaboration with Haiti’s foreign tormentors, by signing mining contracts with 
their companies and allowing NGOs to continue to dominate the state. With little 
institutional capacity to regulate the exploitation of its mining resources estimated 
at over $21 billion330 in gold deposits alone, the clientelist Martelly government 
awarded multiple concessions to U.S., French and Canadian companies. It 
adopted mining laws written by the World Bank, itself facing a conflict of 
interests, with $10.3 million invested in Haitian mining operations over the 
objections of civil society and the population331 (Johnston 2015). To make 
matters worse, “policies and procedures applicable to design, appraisal and 
                                                          
330 See (Schuller 2015, 4). It has been estimated, after exploratory assessment, that Haiti’s goal deposits 
are over 21 billion. 
331 See World Bank report on investments in Haitian Mining at 
https://disclosures.ifc.org/#/projectDetail/ESRS/27409 a letter from multiple civil society organizations 
sent to the World Bank on January 7, 2015 requesting an evaluation of the World Bank violation of its own 
institutional policies and practices in regards to Haitian mining, 
http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/100-Request%20for%20Inspection.pdf . The Haitian 
Senate, a divided institution also saw it necessary to unite and pass a law to suspend mining permits; 





implementation of a project, including the safeguard policies, were not applied to 
the Haiti mining laws”332. The clientelist regime allowed the World Bank and 
companies involved in the mining of Haitian gold to dictate the terms under which 
mining would take place, therefore, actively undermining the institutional and 
regulatory capacity of the state. The Center for Global Research notes, 
Martelly became quite rich from signing off on every US 
decision. By the time he was forced out of office in 
February 2016 by popular protests, Haiti’s agricultural 
exports had dropped to a mere $29 million per year, and 
its agricultural trade deficit had grown to nearly $1 billion 
per year. Of the roughly 1,500 elected officials who had 
populated the parliament, city halls, and local courts, 
only 10 remained: a group of senators without a quorum 
(Chery 2016). 
 
          The clientelist regime of Martelly undermined rather than enhanced the 
regulatory capacity of the state, and disregarded its institutions. Nationalist and 
opposition lawmakers who sought to block its contracts, policies and actions 
were intimidated, and rather than organize elections at the end of their term, their 
seats were left vacant, thus allowing the government to act by decree. It was a 
democracy by decree, no different than one-man rule of the post-Occupation and 
pre-Duvalierist clientelist governments that dominated the Haitian state (Doleac 
2015). Indeed, Martelly’s government so represented the re-assertion of 
                                                          
332 The following articles give some insight on the mining activities and attempts by Haitian civil society to 
do what their government has be unwilling to,; namely, regulate the activities of mining companies.   
Evens Sanon & Danica Coto, Haiti Awards Gold, Copper Mining Permits, Associated Press (Dec. 21, 2012), 
available at http://news.yahoo.com/haiti-awards-gold-copper-mining-232709627.html; and  Jane Reagan, 
Haitian Senate  Calls for Halt to Mining Activities, Inter Press Service (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/haitian-senatecalls-for-halt-to-mining-activities/. However, despite the 
efforts of the Haitian Senate to protect the interests of the Haitian state, and restrict the wholesale theft 
of national resources, their moratorium did not supersede the mining agreements between the Haitian 
government and mining companies. 
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neocolonial elite power that it was a common complaint heard amongst the 
majority black masses, the black middle class and even Haiti’s elites. It is in this 
context that the clientelist regime and its supporters tried to engineer the next 
election to facilitate the victory of its candidate in 2015. Its collusion with the U.S. 
to manipulate the presidential elections and secure power for its candidate, 
Jovenel Moise, resulted in widespread discontent and country-wide popular 
protest333.  
          The 2015 Presidential Election results, as reported, did little to show the 
fraudulent nature of the elections, or reflect the wide-spread national protest that 








                                                          
333 The United States spent $33 million to fund the 2015 Haitian elections, much of which has gone into 
the pockets of American NGO staff in Washington DC and American organizations. The primary 
beneficiaries were the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Organization of American 
States (OAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), United Nations Development program (UNDP), and 
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), totaling $30.5 million of the $33 million (Johnston 
2016). Also See USASpending.gov  
Whereas before, the Haitian masses and Civil Society organizations would have compelled the 
government to be more cautious about its decisions, the presence of foreign forces in place to suppress 
them allowed the government to act unchecked. 
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Jovenèl Moise Parti Ayisyen Tèt Kalé (PHTK)  508,761 32.81 
Jude Célestin 
Ligue Alternative Pour le Progrès et 
l’Émancipation Haïtienne 
392,782 25.27 
Jean-Charles Moise Platform Pitit Desalin 222,109 14.27 
Maryse Narcisse Fanmi Lavalas 108,844 7.05 
17 additonal parties 
participated and 
garnered less than 
20% of the vote 
Movement Action Socialiste, Renmen Ayiti, Organization 
du people en Lutte, Konviksyon, Réseau Bouclier 
National, Mouvement Patriotique Populaire Dessalinien,  
Canaan, Rassemblement des Nationaux Democrates 
Volontaires pour l'Unité Salvatrice, Union Nationale pour 
l'Intégrité et la Réconciliation, Konbit Travaye Peyizan 
pou Libere Haiti, Independent, Fusion des Démocrates 
Sociales Haïtienne, Front Uni Pour la Renaissance 
d'Haiti, Nouvelle Haiti, Concorde Nationale,  
Cohésion Nationale des Partis Politiques Haïtiens, 
Mouvement Chrétienne pour une Nouvelle Haiti, Parti 
Fédéraliste, Retabli Ayiti, Respect, Plan d'Action 
Citoyenne, Pati Kreyol Nouye, Parti Socialiste Unifie 
Haitien, Plateforme Politique Palmis, Mouvman 
Revolisyone Ayisyen, Parti pour l'Evolution Nationale 
Haitienne, Plateforme Politique G18, Konbit Liberasyon 
Ekonomik, Konsyans Patriyotik, Konbit pou Ayiti, Parti 
Alternative pour le Developpement d'Haiti, Coalition pour 
la Convention de la Reconstruction de la Réconciliation 
des Citoyens Haitiens, Mouvement pour l'Instauration de 
la Démocratie en Haiti, Fwon Revolisyone pou 
Entegrasyon Mas Yo, Parti pour la Rénovation d'Haiti, 
Plateforme Jistis, Action Democratique pour Batir Haiti, 
Mouveman pou Endepandans Kiltirel Sosyal Ekonomik ak 
Politik an Ayiti, Delivrans, Rassemblement des Patriotes 
Haitiens, Mouvement d'Union Republicaine, Parti Unité 
Nationale, Parti Démocrate Institutionnaliste, Plateforme 
Politique Entrenou, Régénération Economique et Sociale 
dans l'Unité et la Liberté Totale d'Action pour Tous, 
Mopanou, Independent, Olahh Baton Jenes La, 
Regroupement Patriotique pour le Renouveau National, 
Mobilisation pour le Progrès d'Haiti 
298291 19.32 
Against all 22,161 1.42 
Invalid/blank votes 120,066 – 
Total 1,553,131 100 




Despite verifiable widespread electoral fraud orchestrated by Martelly’s 
clientelist regime, Jovenel Moise was selected as one of the two top candidates 
to continue to the second round. This forced the Haitian masses to use the only 
avenue left, braving violence from U.N forces by risking their lives in the streets 
 433 
 
to demand fair and impartial democratic elections334. Consequently, Martelly was 
forced to leave office without a transfer of power to his patrons’ preferred 
candidate. The nationalist Northerner, and former Minister of the Interior under 
Aristide’s second government, and a senator, Jocelerme Privert, was named as 
Interim president. A tax expert, author, and experienced administrator and 
politician, he had suffered arrest and 26 months in prison for being a member of 
the democratically-elected government of Aristide335. His rise to the Presidency, 
however limited in scope, surprised many observers, and worried neocolonial 
elites who viewed him with suspicion.  He responded to the widespread claims of 
fraud by establishing an Independent Commission of Electoral Evaluation and 
Verification (CIEVE), against the objections of the U.S, France and Canada that 
advocated for a run-off without verification. Privert sought to secure whatever 
autonomy remained for the state and the Presidency, by addressing the 
concerns of the majority of the population who took to the street to demand free 
and fair elections without fraud and foreign interference. In a clear departure from 
the subservience of previous clientelist regimes, he accepted the 
recommendations of CIEVE for a re-run of the elections over the objections of 
foreign powers and neocolonial elites. The “Friends of Haiti” sought to validate 
                                                          




335 He was falsely accused of participating in political killings, accusations the majority of Haitian 




the results despite the report published by CIEVE demonstrating that “the 
electoral process was marred by serious irregularities, grave inconsistencies, and 
massive fraud. Only 9% of the votes were found to be valid” (Ives 2016). 
CIEVE found that,  
[T]he proportion of votes that could not be traced (29%) 
applied to the total of valid votes (1,560 631) which 
means the voting registration offices authorized 448,000 
citizens to vote without filling out the required paperwork 
as stipulated by the associated electoral decrees. The 
second critical element is the proportion of valid National 
ID cards compared to signatures and/or fingerprints. The 
percentage of national ID Cards found to be false is 
16.2%.  For the 1,112,600 votes that could be verified, 
(valid votes with ID cards, minus those written by hand) 
180,250 were associated with fake national ID cards for 
a total of 628,250 fraudulent votes. 
The number of fraudulent votes 628,250 or 40% is more 
than the number of votes received by the candidate 
place as the first and more than the combined votes 
received by both candidates placed in second and third 
place and much higher than the difference between the 
candidate who came first and fifth. When we apply the 
criteria of the CIEVE based of existing electoral decrees, 
the situation becomes graver as the percentage of valid 
votes is reduced to only 9% of the total vote (Benoit, et 
al. 2016, 6). 
 
The most alarming concern stipulated by CIEVE was that the majority of the 
fraudulent votes favored the candidate that garnered the highest votes to qualify 
for the run-off. According to CIEVE, with a 2% margin of error, only 9% of the 
population legally voted compared to the 26.45% recorded  (Benoit, et al. 2016, 
6, 49, Chery 2016). According to the Center for Research on Globalization, on 
average, on each tabulation sheet, the total number of votes was fraudulently 
multiplied by a factor of slightly more than two. The difference between this 
multiplied total and the real total was added to Jovenel Moise’s tabulation sheets, 
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of usually zero to a few votes, to achieve an edge of more than 50 percent over 
the other candidates (Chery 2016).  
          The following examples presented by both CIEVE and elaborated by 
Chery (2016) reflect the overall verifiable vote-tabulation frauds that marred the 
process and left little choice for the commission except the cancellation of the 
elections: 
 Vote-tabulation sheet from the city of Jérémie’s Lycée des Jeunes Filles. 
had Jude Célestin and Moise Jean Charles tied with 14 votes each, 
Maryse Narcisse and Jovenel Moise trailing them with 4 and 0 votes, 
respectively, but votes were changed from 0 to 107 in support of Jovenel 
Moise. 
 Another tabulation from the École Nationale de Savanette had Jude 
Célestin with 46 votes, Maryse Narcisse 18 votes, Moise Jean Charles 8 
votes, and Jovenel Moise’s 0 vote. The votes were changed from 0 to 067 
to support Jovenel Moise. 
 In yet another tabulation sheet from École Nationale Calbassier, 22 votes 
were registered for Jude Célestin, 6 for Maryse Narcisse, 5 for Moise Jean 
Charles, and 000 for Jovenel Moise’. The tabulation was changed from 0 
to 088 in favor of Jovenel Moise. 
 
By all indication, the refusal of the population to accept the election results and a 
second round with Jovenel Moise as the top candidate should have been 
supported by all democracy advocates336. However, it was the U.S, France, and 
Canada – “The Friends of Haiti”, along with the OAS that first objected to the 
creation of CIEVE and later to its findings and decision to re-do the elections. 
                                                          
336 Amongst those who insisted that no fraud occurred was the Haiti Democracy project, an NGO funded 
by USAID and other foreign sources. – See “Leaky as a CIEVE: The Commission does not find fraud”. Jun 6, 
2016 - http://haitipolicy.org/2016/06/evaluation-verification-commission-report. Even the EU insisted 
that no fraud took place, disregarding both the date and published voter-tabulation sheets that clearly 
showed the changes written in by hand and the fake national IDs.  
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Despite the documented fraud, Kenneth Merten, former American ambassador to 
Haiti, and the special coordinator of the elections made clear the intentions of the 
United States when he said, “we hope the CIEVE findings does not change the 
results of the election” (McFadden 2016). It was the same Merten who had 
threatened to remove an elected president from office unless it allowed the 
American preferred candidate to qualify for the second round contrary to the 
results. 
Even if one disputes the fraudulent nature of the 2015 elections, which 
would be incredulous, its low turnout was enough to elicit concerns about voter 
confidence in the democratic process for anyone interested in democratic 
legitimacy, stability, and consolidation. Out of 5,871,450 registered voters, 
26.45% or 1,553,131 were reported to have participated, and 9% were found to 
have done so legally (Benoit, et al. 2016, 49).  Yet, despite the acknowledgement 
of fraud by reputable international337 and national338 institutions, and calls for re-
organizing the elections, the clientelist regime, neocolonial elites, and their 
                                                          
337 Kolbe, Athena R.; Cesnales, Nicole I.; Puccio, Marie N.; Muggah, Robert. “Impact of Perceived Electoral 
Fraud on Haitian Voter’s Beliefs about Democracy”, IGARAPE Institute – A Think and Do Tank - STRATEGIC 
NOTE. NOVEMBER 20, 2015. This Brazilian institute demonstrated the impact of the fraud on voters’ 
confidence, suggesting an adverse impact on democratic legitimacy. 
338 The Commission for Electoral Evaluation and Verification (CIEVE), composed of some of the most 
respected and reputable members of the Haitian Community had the full confidence of the population 
and the commitment by the president to respect and implement their decisions.  Their goal, to impartially 
assess the elections and provide the government with both their findings and recommendations was, for 
many, the only way to avert a full-fledged rebellion by the populace unwilling to let foreign government 
and their client regimes undermine the nation and its path to democracy. It was in many ways, a response 
to American, French, and Canadian interference in their national affairs. This is the true character and 
genius of the Haitian nation, the people, not its elites sought fair elections.  it is the average Haitian who 
advocates for fair elections and it is to undermine their right to and call for accountable governance and a 
responsive state that the clientelist infrastructure was imposed 
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foreign supporters demanded the election proceed to the run-off between the two 
top candidates.  
Only the overwhelming show of force by the population forced the 
cancellation of the elections and the departure of the client President without an 
elected replacement. While the U.S. government expressed its interest in 
democratic elections openly, it worked to undermine the process with financial 
support for opposition forces, inviting opposition politicians to Washington for 
strategy sessions, and “meetings with Congressional staff and US government 
representatives” who opposed a re-run of the fraudulent elections (Johnston 
2016). Thus, the American government engaged in both covert actions to 
sabotage popular leaders with the ability to garner popular support, and outright 
manipulations and coercive tactics by threatening financial duress to undermine 
support for Privet’s government339 (Yves 2014).  
It is clear from foreign involvement and neocolonial elite collusion that the 
goals have not been to support a stable democratic regime, accountable 
government, and democratic consolidation, but rather to ensure the election of 
weak clientelist regimes that rely on foreign support for their survival instead of 
securing their legitimacy and national support based on democratic accountability 
                                                          
339 Chief amongst those working to subvert free and fair elections was Kenneth H. Merten  
Special Coordinator for Haiti and Deputy Assistant Secretary, who also represented Canadian interests.  
See “On-the-Record ‘TalkHaiti’ Teleconference with Haitian Americans for Progress Hosted by Dr. 
Cassandra Theramène 




and governance. In this context, the claim that a nationalist or popularly 
supported democratic regime would threaten the neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure is not without foundation. Despite the refusal of the “Friends of 
Haiti” to support the cancellation and re-organizing of the election and its 
attempts to use financial constraints to force compliance, the nationalist interim 
government re-organized its budget to fund the democratic elections demanded 
by the populace. The re-organization of the election, in the aftermath of a 
devastating hurricane ultimately resulted in the voting of the preferred clientelist 
candidate as President with the majority of the population abstaining and only 
18% of the population participating. Privert’s refusal to forego the democratic 
process due to external pressures, and his unwillingness to disregard the 
demands of the masses for a free and fair election was highly regarded by the 
















                         Table 7: 2016 Presidential Election Results 
Candidate Party   Votes % 
Jovenel Moïse Haitian Tèt Kale Party  590,927 55.60 
Jude Célestin Alternative League for Haitian Progress and 
Empowerment 
207,988 19.57 
Jean-Charles Moïse Platfom Pitit Desalin 117,349 11.04 
Maryse Narcisse Fanmi Lavalas 95,765 9.01 
The following 23 
additional parties 
garnered a small 
number of votes 
Renmen Ayiti, Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats, 
Randevou, Front Uni pour la Renaissance d’Haïti, Parti 
pour l’Evolution Nationale Haïtienne, Konbit Pour Ayiti, 
Plan d'Action Citoyenne, Unir-Ayiti-Ini, Cohésion 
Nationale des Partis Politiques Haïtiens, Parti Alternative 
pour le Développement d'Haïti, MOPANOU, Mouvement 
d'Union République, Rassemblement des Patriotes 
Haïtiens, Parti Unité Nationale, Résultat, Konbit 
Liberasyon Ekonomik,  CANAAN, Retabli Ayiti, Parti 
Démocrate Institutionnaliste, Mouveman pou 
Endepandans Kiltirel Sosyal Ekonomik ak Politik an 
Ayiti, Independent, Mobilisation pour Haïti, Olah Baton 
jenès la     
43,607 3.99 
None of the above 7,203 0.68 
Invalid/blank votes 57,824 0.05 
Total 1,120,663 100 
Registered voters/turnout 6,189,253 18.11% 




Consequently, while it is a good sign a President was elected through electoral 
competition, he lacks both the legitimacy and popular support required to 
effectively govern, “with less than 10 percent of registered voters ― only about 
600,000 votes — supporting him out of over 6 million registered voters. Jovenel 
Moise won 55.6% or 9.6% of the 17.3% of registered voters who participated in 
the elections. The drastic drop of voter participation was captured in the table 








           Table 8: 2015 & 2016 Presidential Election results 
Year                                             2016                     2015 
Registered Voters                                   6,189,253                                5,835,295 
Candidate Votes Percent of 
Registered 
Voters 
Votes Percent of 
Registered 
Voters 
Jovenel Moise 595,430 9.6% 508,761 8.7% 
Jude Celestin 208,837 3.4% 392,782 6.7% 
Jean-Charles 
Moise 
118,142 1.9% 222,109 3.8% 
Maryse Narcisse 96,121 1.6% 108,844 1.9% 
Valid Votes 1,069,646 17.3% 1,553,131 26.6% 
Source: CEPR -The Center for Economic and policy Research – Haiti’s Relief and 
Reconstruction. Johnston, Jake December 6, 2016, “Breakdown of Preliminary Election Results 
in Haiti”.   
           
The persistent manipulation of the democratic process has resulted in the 
refusal of the population to participate in an electoral process they know to be 
rigged. Over 89% of Haitians surveyed believed the elections were rigged and 
75% said they would participate if the elections were fair (Kolbe, et al. 2015, 14, 
McFadden 2016). With foreign powers determined to undermine the democratic 
process in pursuit of their interests, neocolonial elites with little interest in the 
autonomy of the state and the welfare of its citizens, weak institutional capacity 
from years of neglect and attacks, what little remained of the legitimacy of the 
Haitian state has disappeared. A new form of dependent neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure based on weak democratic participation is being established in 
which the masses have neither voice nor power, and given their historical 
corrective role, it is not coincidental that they have refused to participate. 
However, Haitians wholesale rejection of the electoral process is not a rejection 
of democracy but reflects their desire for a fair democratic process capable of 
producing a responsive and accountable state.   
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The Louverturean state model with its emphasis on a strong accountable 
and responsive state and interdependent state-society relations reflects the 
aspirations of most Haitian citizens, who seek to establish this model through 
democratic means – the absence of which they deplore. Their rejection of the 
dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and its client regimes, and their 
insistence on an accountable and responsive state has not yet factored into any 
analyses of the decline of democratic participation and the failure of democratic 
transition and consolidation in Haiti. The imposition of this dependent 
neocolonialist clientelist infrastructure was not designed to create and maintain 
the political legitimacy capable of fostering the emergence of a strong 
accountable state and sustainable representative democracy. Such legitimacy, 
based on democratic governance, necessitates a social contract to maintain the 
interdependence between the state and the nation… the historical l’État-Peuple – 
















That democratic participation declined is not coincidental but the result of 
unwarranted and unparalleled outside interference. The deleterious 
consequences of this interference were clear to the Lawyers’ Guild when they 
observed, 
[F]ollowing the 2004 coup d’état against President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, participation began to decline; the 
November 20, 2016 turnout represented the lowest in 
Haiti’s history. After the high hopes of the post-Duvalier 
years, electoral violence, vote-rigging, 
disenfranchisement, and repeated foreign interventions 
have bred a deep disillusionment with democracy. 
Paradoxically, falling participation rates have occurred 
alongside massive investments by the international 
community in Haiti’s electoral apparatus. The millions 
spent by the U.S. and other Core Group countries on 
democracy promotion programs in the post-Aristide era 
have produced an electoral system that is weaker, less 
trusted and more exclusionary than what came before 
(IJDH 2017, 2). 
 
For Haitian scholar Jean-Germain Gros, however, though the country has been 
the target of imperialist meddling, Haiti’s problem is historical. Any analysis of 
contemporary Haitian politics must account for both historical internal dynamics 
and foreign involvement: 
State failure has been a recurring feature of Haitian 
political life for much of the country’s history, and this 
inability of the Haitians to craft a viable political order is 
at the heart of Haitian poverty or underdevelopment. 
However, to understand the Haitian failed state, 
imperialism must be brought “back in,” even while the 
failings of Haiti’s rulers and institutions also take center 
stage” (Gros 2012, xiv, 2). 
 
While Gros’ assessment is not without foundation, missed by this often repeated 
assertion of historical instability and state failure is a nuanced analysis of Haitian 
state formation and crafting that does not solely overemphasize historical 
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failures, poverty, and underdevelopment. Any serious analysis of the Haitian 
state has to be centered on neocolonial elites’ capture and transformation of the 
Haitian state, and the impact of the post-Occupation clientelist infrastructure in 
curtailing Haitians’ potential for self-determination by undermining state capacity, 
political legitimacy, national stability, and democratic accountability.  
The consequence of the post-Occupation imposition of the clientelist 
infrastructure resulted in constant instability characterized by the struggle of the 
Haitian masses to re-claim control of the state. The emergence of Noirism and 
Duvalierism and their successes in refashioning the nationalist state as a 
counterweight to imposed dependency and clientelism was part of the historical 
struggle for self-determination and state autonomy. The advent of Jean-Claudism 
and its collusion with foreign interests accelerated the disenfranchisement of the 
population.  
The rise of a popular democratic movement in the post-Jean-Claudist era 
represented the new vehicle in the historical struggle for self-determination and 
state control. The popular democratic movement became, “the new catalyst for 
self-determination to bring about the advancement of human rights and the 
improvement of the general welfare”  (Fan 2008, 195). For Haitians, democracy 
meant much more than securing human rights and the general welfare, it was the 
vehicle to recapture and reorient the state away from the dependent clientelist 
infrastructure.  Consequently, the resistance to the popular democratic project 
that emerged from neocolonial elites’ and foreign powers and their manipulation 
of the democratic transition and electoral process has to be viewed in the context 
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of securing the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Their failure to 
curtail the masses’ democratic self-determination through manipulation and 
coercion has led to a second foreign occupation, and the establishment of a 
democracy without participation. Such democracy has resulted in a loss of 
legitimacy by political actors who could not secure the support of the majority of 
the Haitian polis.  
This new development of the dependent clientelist infrastructure – a 
democracy without participation, though similar to Caribbean clientelism, in that it 
maintains foreign financial and coercive support needed by clientelist states, is 
distinct from its Anglophone Caribbean clientelist structure (Edie 1991, Gros 
2012). It lacked the internal elite-mass party-based clientelism, and the state-
society relations which support political legitimacy and national stability (Stone 
1980, C. J. Edie 1991, Roniger 2004). The dependent neocolonial clientelist 
infrastructure’s survival in Haiti required the weakening of electoral and political 
participation as a vehicle to democratic accountability and in so doing, has 
undermined what little remained of the Haitian state, the legitimacy of state 
actors and Haitian democracy itself. Whereas for the Haitian masses, state 
control was necessary for democratic accountability, for those in opposition to 
their struggle for self-determination, weakening the state and replacing its 
institutions with NGOS was necessary in the face of Haiti’s successful popular 
democratic struggles.  
The destruction of the Haitian state was preferable to its capture by 
democratic forces. Neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters have 
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supplanted the state with foreign-funded or foreign-based non-governmental 
organizations to prevent its capture, thus further eroding state-society relations 
and the État-Nation, Nation-État interdependence sought by Louverturean 
crafters and their nationalist adherents. The World Bank notes,  
[M]ost basic services that in other developing countries 
are carried out by the government are performed in Haiti 
by NGOs, grass roots organizations, private enterprise 
or missionaries – or, as is often the case in reality, 
simply do not exist. According to a World Bank study 
there are some 10-20,000 NGOs operating in Haiti at the 
community level. Eighty per cent of schools in the 
country are run either by NGOs or private for-profit 
institutions (Street 2004, 18). 
 
It is important to remember that such reality is not accidental. The inability of the 
democratic system to meet the needs and aspirations of the nation, the lack of 
state capacity and sidelining of the state by NGOs, worsened by the loss of 
legitimacy of state actors have been the consequences of anti-democratic 
manipulations by neocolonial elites and their foreign allies to sustain the 
dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure.  
As observed in the preceding chapter, outside interference in the 
democratic process can be directly correlated to a decline in confidence in state 
actors, state institutions, and democratic participation.  As research from 
Gélineau and Zechmeister suggests, between 2006 and 2014 confidence in 
elections declined from 35.5% to 29.8% ; confidence in the national electoral 
institutions declined from 37.7% to 31.4% and confidence in the national 
legislature declined from 47.2% to 42.6% (Gélineau and Zechmeister 2015, 39). 
Electoral participation, as I have noted, had dramatically declined from 90% in 
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1990 to 18.11% in 2016340 (Orenstein 2000, IJDH 2017). McFadden argues that 
this lack of confidence and refusal to participate in a democratic process they 
view as rigged is not a rejection of democracy, and that “most Haitians would 
vote if they saw elections as fair” (Kolbe, et al. 2015, McFadden 2016, 12)  
          Indeed, a recent unpublished survey on institutional trust and confidence in 
political leaders and the democratic process demonstrate an even more dramatic 
loss of confidence of the Haitian populace341. Their lack of confidence in national 
institutions, elected officials, political and economic elites, and in the political 
process itself, undermines the possibility for legitimate democratic governance 
and democratic consolidation. Despite continuous electoral competition, their 
refusal to participate in an electoral process they think illegitimate, managed by 
institutions they do not trust, that elects people in whom they have little 
confidence, counters the claims of democratization and democratic consolidation 
scholars. The unwillingness of the majority of the population to participate in a 
democratic process that elects governments whose accountability cannot be 
assured should be viewed as their rejection of the anti-democratic manipulations 
that robs them of their rights to self-determination and not of democracy itself. As 
the National Lawyers Guild suggests, “Recurrent instances of external meddling 
have made many Haitians suspect that the outcome of the 2015 and 2016 
                                                          
340 http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Haiti/Squeeze_Vote.html 
341 See appendix for results of the unpublished survey. 
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elections would be decided by foreign powers rather than votes,” compels them 
to refrain from participating (IJDH 2017, 14). This was not only true of the 2015 
and 2016 elections but reflect a pattern of disassociation. This loss of confidence 
in the democratic process, institutions and state actors, impedes Haiti’s chance 
for a successful democratic transition and consolidation. The unwillingness of the 
majority of Haitians to lend the legitimacy necessary to the democratic process 
that now shapes national politics. As Power and Cyr observed,  
 
[L]egitimacy is both absent and pervasive at the same 
time. Legitimacy seems absent because so few analysts 
address the topic head-on, yet it also seems ubiquitous 
because it appears under so many alternative guises. 
Political support, institutional trust, regime consolidation 
and mass consent are only several of the fragmentary 
concepts through which elements of legitimacy – itself a 
multidimensional concept – are routinely invoked” 
(Power and Cyr 2010, 1). 
 
 This problem of legitimacy has regional characteristics due to the patterns 
of state formation and state crafting and is not just a result of democratic 
manipulation. Post-colonial Latin American and Caribbean states, argue Malloy 
and Seligson, have historically suffered from such a deficiency in legitimacy that . 
neither authoritarian nor democratic regimes are able to overcome. They 
therefore vacillate from authoritarianism to democracy in search of accountability, 
stability, and legitimacy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Seligson 1987, Malloy 
and Seligson 1988, 236). While their assessment is correct, the point however, is 
not the constant shifts, but what those shifts represent that should be explored.  
The inability of populations to secure their interests through these 
governance models can lead to vacillations in search of solutions and, except in 
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nations where politics are managed through clientelist networks, patterns of 
authoritarianism and democracy can become permanent features of political 
arrangements. In a clientelist infrastructure, analysis of legitimacy is relegated to 
transactional relations between patrons and clients. Citizens participate in the 
political system to secure resources; the more resource-scarce the politicians, 
their parties and states are, the less support they garner, and the less adherence 
there is to the governance model. The reliance on national elites and foreign 
powers for resources to support transactional relations is a primary feature that 
maintains the veneer of liberal democracy (C. J. Edie 1991, Stone 1980). These 
patron-client relations offer scant possibilities for the masses to orient the state 
toward their interests for their politics is confined to bread and access (Edie 
1994). Such a system is based on the historical relationship between the state 
and its citizens. For these states, citizenship has meant political participation. 
The immediate post-independence relationship between the Haitian masses and 
the state had been historically based on interdependence instead of clientelism. 
Haitian clientelism is anti-national, serving as a vehicle for popular 
disenfranchisement rather than a tool for political participation and integration. 
The assertion that democracy is possible when all national political and economic 
players see democracy as the only game in town contradicts Haiti’s path to 
democracy (Dahl 1973). In Haiti, it is the Haitian masses not the elites who seek  




The Search for Solutions: Can the Dependent Clientelist Infrastructure Foster the 
Legitimacy of the Haitian State?: 
Haitians’ quest toward democratic self-determination, and their struggle to 
establish representative democracy and state control as a counterweight to the 
dependent clientelist infrastructure, is precisely the cause for democratic 
instability (Dupuy 2003).  Their quest for accountable democratic governance 
runs counter to the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Far from a 
lack of belief in democracy, it is the Haitian masses’ faith in democracy that has 
left them disillusioned. Haitians’ insistence on a strong, regulatory, accountable, 
and centralized democratic state is antithetical to the weak, liberal decentralized 
state dominated by non-govermental organizations that is in existence today. 
 A non-participating voter put it bluntly,  
[W]hen there will be a serious leader, a leader who is 
really thinking of changing the country, a leader who will 
not be the puppet of the international community and its 
neoliberal policies of selling off public enterprises piece 
by piece, then I will go vote (IJDH 2017, 14). 
 
Their conception of state is congruent with the Louverturean model; strong, 
regulatory, and democratic - an arbiter of interests and a protector of its citizens, 
national sovereignty342. They seek a strong Ètat-Peuple / Peuple-Ètat with the 
state interdependent with the nation but not dominated by it, in direct opposition 
to the constraints imposed by the dependent clientelist infrastructure.  
                                                          
342 See tables appendices J & K 
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Despite the commitment of the masses to democracy and various 
attempts to orient the Haitian state towards democratic accountable 
governments, neocolonial elites and foreign powers have succeeded in 
undermining their participation in and enthusiasm for the democratic process by 
imposing a democracy incongruent with the popular will and aspirations. Haitian 
democracy, as it has been imposed, runs counter to the wishes of the majority of 
the Haitian polis. Their continued insistence on a social contract that maintains 
the Ètat-Peuple / Peuple-Ètat interdependence, supports an evaluation of 
Louverturean statecraft as a model for democratic accountability and 
consolidation. In the end, it is not Haitians we should be concerned about, but 
neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters who are all too willing to thwart the 
quest for a responsive state and an accountable democracy. The persistence 
and consolidation of democracy in Haiti require crafting a new state; one not 
based on clientelism, but on legitimacy and the interdependence between state 
and nation.  
The historical struggle to craft a responsive state has been central to 
understanding Haitian contemporary politics, the causes of instability, and 
addressing the needs and demands of the Haitian masses. To solve the nation’s 
endemic instability and address the dramatic decline in democratic participation 
without understanding their foundation would continue to lead to a futile search 
for solutions ungrounded in Haitian historical and socio-political realities and, 
therefore, doomed to deepen the national crisis faced by the Haitian people and 
the state itself. In the end, Fatton is right to suggest that solving the Haitian 
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problem “requires a credible and legitimate government that can speak in the 
name of the population…, and include the marginalized in the making of a new 
and responsible Haitian state” (R. J. Fatton 2010, 1-2). The marginalized, 
however, is the majority, the very population whose insistence for a legitimate, 
responsive and accountable democratic state has been systematically rejected. 
The central question is what type of statecraft and state would have the 
legitimacy to speak in the name of the population and be responsive to its 
citizens?  If the research is any indication, the population’s criteria for the type of 
state they want seems clear343. 
The type of state required for political, economic, and social stability in 
Haiti was obvious to the Haitian founding fathers and state crafters and demands 
a more sophisticated understanding by scholars and political elites alike in order 
to re-examine its usefulness in addressing the nation’s present condition. This 
work asserts that, to date, Louverturean statecraft offers the most compelling and 
historically-based model for addressing and solving Haiti’s challenges and for 
establishing authentic and viable democratic governance.  
This study offers Louverturean statecraft as a framework for analyzing 
Haiti’s lack of state responsiveness and accountability, and conflict-ridden state-
society relations face by the Haitian state in particular, and postcolonial states in 
general. It explores the nature of Haiti as a neocolonial state and the role of 
                                                          
343 See Appendices H through K for results of the unpublished qualititative survey. 
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statecraft in addressing their state-society challenges and state responsiveness 
in congruence with the aspirations of its population. The undermining of the 
Louverturean state and its État-Peuple / Peuple-État interdependence has led to 
historical instability and lack of state responsiveness and accountability. Future 
research and scholarship need to deepen the analysis of the Louverturean state, 
explore its relevance and application of its key features in the contemporary 
national and international space in which Haiti operates. The role of state 
institutions and institutional reforms in building confidence and democratic 
accountability without diluting the power of the state remains elusive344. More 
importantly, given the lack of responsiveness of the Haitian state and the refusal 
of the population to participate in the electoral competition, Haitian scholars 
would have to study the role of the state in building the confidence necessary for 
democratic participation.  
  
                                                          
344 See Appendices B through F for Haitians Views on the state and national institutions. 
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APPENDIX A  
SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE 
This research was executed through Surveymonkey and was followed by field 
interviews, which encompassed a cross-section of the population reflected in the Survey 
as well as a cross-section of those who may not have had access to computers or the 
internet. 
Objectives: The goal of this survey was to collect the responders’ assessment of the 
Haitian state, its institutions, elected officials, and government.  It also probed 
responders’ views on the legitimacy of the Haitian state.  The targeted population include 
Haitians living in Haiti and abroad, and Haitian-Americans who travel regularly to Haiti 
and maintain family connections there, NGOs working in Haiti, specifically, those who 
have worked with Haitian institutions or Haitian political and economic elites.  
Directions given to Survey participants:  This survey is part of a research project from 
a Haitian Scholar seeking answers to Haiti’s past and contemporary challenges.  Your 
participation will be helpful in that endeavor.  Please read the questions carefully before 
answering.  I appreciate your frank response.   (Moise St. Louis) 
Demographic information: 
Age   Gender    Profession  
What is the highest educational level you have attained? 
No formal education  Incomplete primary school Complete primary school 
Incomplete secondary school  Complete secondary school Some university 
Degree from university 
 
What language do you speak at home? 
French   Creole  Spanish  English  Other 
 
Please choose from the following list 
Are you currently? 




Do you have any Children? 
No children  One Child  Two Children  Three Children 
Four Children  Five Children  Six Children  Eight or more children 
 
If you were describing your social class, what would you say? 
Upper class Upper middle class Middle class  Lower middle class 
Working class  Lower class   Poor 
  
Are you:   
Haitian living in Haiti Haitian-born Living Abroad  Haitian Americans with relatives in Haiti 
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Representing an NGO in Haiti  None of the above 
 
Ethnic Background: 
White  Black Mulatto  Middle Eastern  Latino    Asian      Haitian 
Do you currently work with? 
Haitian Government Haitian institutions (explain)  Private sector (explain)    Haitian 
NGO  
Self-employed  Non-religious International NGO Religious NGOs  Not working 
Private sector (US)  Public sector (US)   other  
  
Social Dynamics 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree  
There are no differences between elites and average Haitians except access to resources. 
Class is not a factor in Haitian society. 
There are no links between color and class in Haiti. 
Colorism does not exist in Haiti. 
Color is not a factor in Haitian politics. 
Color is not a factor in Haitian economy. 
There are no racial differences between Haitians. 
There are no differences between elites. 
There are no racial animosities within the elites. 
There is only one group of elites in Haiti. 
There are multiple racial groups within the elites. 
There is no political tension between the Haitian majority and the elites. 
There is no racial tension between the Haitian majority and the elites. 
Elites cannot be placed in one group. 
Middle-class Haitians identify the same way. 
There are not tensions between middle-class Haitians. 
There are no racial tensions between middle-class Haitians. 
Elites control the politics of the country. 
The Haitian masses control the politics of the country. 
Different groups of elites compete against each other for power. 
There is only one ethnic group in Haiti. 
Haitians see themselves as belonging to one race. 
Foreigners see Haitians as belonging to one race. 
Haitians do not see a link between color and class in Haiti. 
 
Economic Confidence and effectiveness 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
I am satisfied with the direction of the country. 
The government responds to the needs and demands of the population. 
I am satisfied with the pace of economic development in Haiti. 
Fighting rising prices is important 
With the right policies, Haiti can be economically stable. 
With the right policies, Haiti can become economically self-sufficient. 
With the right policies, Haiti can produce enough food to meet the demands of the population 
I am satisfied with the amount of employment available to people in Haiti. 
The government has done a great job fighting rising prices 





For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
It is important to me for Haiti to be governed democratically. 
The country is being governed democratically today. 
Giving people more say in important government decisions is important. 
Civil society is strong in Haiti. 
Civil society can impact national policies. 
Protecting freedom of speech is important 
I voted in Haiti in the recent presidential election. 
I am affiliated with a political party. 
People have a say in important government decisions. 
The government protects freedom of speech.  
Haitians respect human rights. 
 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
I am confident in: 
The electoral system The fairness of the presidential elections  
The Electoral system is not being influenced by other countries 
 
The best way for me to voice my discontent is through: 
Protests / Demonstrations  Elections Revolutions Coup d’état Civil 
disobedience 
 
In my experience it is more effective to effect change in Haiti through: 
Protests   Violent demonstrations  Civil disobedience
 Elections 
Writing letters  There is no way to effect change  None of the above 
(explain) 
 
Assessment of Haitian Institutions 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
The Haitian State maintains a balance between interests of the masses and the interests of the 
elites. 
The Haitian State maintains a balance between interests of the country and the interests of 
foreign powers. 
Maintaining order in the nation is the most important 
State institutions maintain a balance between the masses’ interests and the interests of the elites. 
State institutions maintain a balance between the country interests and the interests of foreign 
powers. 
The Haitian government acts in the best interests of the nation. 
The Haitian government acts in the best interests of its people. 
Members of the Haitian Parliament act in the best interests of Haiti. 
Members of Parliament act in the best interests of Haitian citizens. 
I am satisfied with the effectiveness of the government to provide services. 
I trust government officials. 
The government is independent. 
The government is dependent on NGOs to function. 
The government has done a great job maintaining order 
If the government had resources, it would use them to the benefit of average Haitians. 
I am confident in the Haitian government’s ability to protect the interest of the nation 




For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
The Haitian government is:    
Very corrupt     Not corrupt Mildly corrupt No more corrupt than governments in other countries 
  
The Haitian state serves the interests of: 
The people The nation  The elites  Foreign powers The leaders in 
power 
 
Trust and Confidence in Officials and institutions 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
Elected officials care about the future of the Haiti. 
The president makes good decision as a leader. 
I have confidence in the competence of the president. 
I have confidence in the competence of the prime minister. 
I have confidence in the competence of elected officials in parliament. 
I am satisfied with the conditions of the roads where I live and travel. 
I am confident in the judicial system and courts. 
I am confident in the government financial institutions 
I am confident in the private financial institutions. 
Corruption widespread in business practices in Haiti. 
I am confident in the services I received in the hospitals and clinics. 
I have confidence in the educational system. 
The education I receive in Haiti prepares me for the future. 
I have confidence in Haitian state institutions. 
The United Nations Security force is doing a good job in Haiti. 
Health services and hospitals are available 
Equal justice is available to anyone regardless of economic status. 
 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
I would entrust my family and my security to:  
The Police Neighborhood groups UN forces Private security None of the above 
 
I have confidence in the following organizations in Haiti  
The churches The armed forces  The press Television Labor unions
 The police  The courts The government in Port-Au-Prince 
 Political parties 
Parliament Major companies  Non-Governmental Organizations – NGOs  
The United Nations Environmental organizations Women’s organizations  The 
MINUSTA 
 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
If I have to go to court in Haiti, I would be treated:  
Very fairly  Fairly  Somewhat fairly  Not fairly  Not sure 
 
Elected officials look after:  
Personal/self  Haiti/the nation  Family  Party  Constituencies 
   
The groups most likely to protect my interests are my:  
Church  Neighborhood  Political party/leaders The Country’s Intellectuals  




Haitian institutions are: 
Weak Non-existent Ineffective Effective  Improving  Control by 
Haitian elites Controlled by foreign NGOs 
 
Haitian institutions: 
Not sure Work for all Haitians  Only work for Politicians and Elites     
Work well if you have money to bribe employees  
 
The following state institutions serve the population well: 
Health  Public Works  Contribution  Commerce Custom  
Justice  Security   Postal   Education Media 
 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
The following departments are very useful: 
Health  Public Works Contribution  Commerce Customs  
 Justice 
Security  Postal  Education  Media 
 
Security and Community 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
The police force is competent. The police are able to provide security for the nation. 
The police can be trusted to assist a citizen when requested.  
If bandits threatened me or my family, I would you go to the police. 
 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
If I felt threatened by people while on the street, I would rely on: 
The police   Passerby   No one  Myself 
 
If my wallet was stolen in Haiti and someone found it, it would be returned to me if it were 
found by: 
The police Your neighbor  A stranger     Would not be returned by anyone 
 
If my house was being burglarized, I would you seek help from: 
The police Family member  Friends  A stranger 
 
For my security I rely on the: 
Haitian police MINUSTAH  Family members and friends    Myself  
  
If I had an accident, I would you expect to be assisted by: 
The police A stranger  Family member  Neighbors Friends 
 
National outlook 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
I am proud of Haiti. 
Haiti is the best country in the world. 
I am worried about the future of Haiti. 
I am proud to be Haitian 
Haiti is a failed nation. 
The earthquake brought Haitians closer together. 
A stronger leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections are best for Haiti 
Haiti will recover and become a stronger nation. 
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Haitians are capable of solving Haiti’s problems. 
Haiti should have experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country 
It is very important to live in a democratic country 
A stronger state is necessary to solve Haiti’s problems. 
The military should be recreated. 
Democracy is the best political system for Haiti 
NGOs are good for Haiti. 
NGOs undermine the State in Haiti 
Haiti is being governed democratically 
A strong parliament to limit presidential power is best for Haiti 
NGOs should be controlled by the Haitian State. 
NGOS should only work in areas decided by the state 
NGOs should have a say in the future development of Haiti. 
NGOs undermine economic development in Haiti. 
 
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you: 
Strongly agree   Agree  Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
Haiti’s problems are the result of: 
Culture      History         Religious beliefs Elites  Masses       Politicians Foreign countries  
 
Those responsible for the problems in Haiti are: 
Current Leaders  The masses  The elites  Past leaders Unites States      France        
UN  
Not sure  No one 
 
Open-ended Questions 
What are your thoughts on the Haitian State? 
Does Haiti need a new social contract? 
















APPENDIX B  
CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES IN HAITI 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
Elected Representatives act in the best 
interests of Haitian citizens 
3.04% 9.13% 36.88% 50.95% 342 
I am satisfied with the efficiency of the 
government to provide services 
1.94% 14.73% 33.72% 49.61%  342 
I trust the government officials.  2.77% 11.46% 37.15% 48.62% 342 
The government is independent.  2.38% 10.32% 29.76% 57.54% 342 
The Haitian government is dependent 
on international non-governmental 
Organizations to function and subsist. 
25.20% 42.52% 25.20% 7.09% 342 
If the government had resources, it 
would use it to benefit the 
marginalized population. 
7.51% 21.74% 40.71% 30.04% 342 
I have confidence in the capacity of 
the Haitian government to protect the 
interests of the nation.  
7.87% 13.78% 42.13% 36.22% 342 
I have confidence in the capacity of 
the Haitian government to protect the 
interests of all Haitians 





APPENDIX C  
CONFIDENCE IN STATE INSTITUTIONS 




Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
A. Personal interests of state elites 31.10% 44.09% 16.93% 7.87% 342 
B. The interest of the nation 6.53% 13.88% 43.67% 35.92% 342 
C. The interests of the elites 26.34% 49.79% 15.64% 8.23% 342 
D. The interests of foreign powers 34.60% 45.99% 13.92% 5.49% 342 





APPENDIX D  




Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
I have trust in the judicial system 
and the tribunals.  
4.71% 8.24% 43.14% 43.92% 342 
I trust the Public Financial 
Institutions.  
3.23% 11.69% 47.58% 37.50% 342 
I trust the Private Financial 
Institutions. 
4.13% 30.58% 40.50% 24.79% 342 
There is widespread corruption in 
business in Haiti. 
36.44% 36.44% 17.00% 10.12% 342 
I trust the services I receive in the 
hospitals and clinics. 
1.20% 18.80% 46.00% 34.00% 342 






APPENDIX E  




Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
I trust the government in Port-au-
Prince 
3.25% 15.04% 50.41% 31.30% 342 
I trust the political parties 0.00% 6.48% 57.09% 36.44% 342 
I trust the parliament 0.81% 9.72% 53.85% 35.63% 342 
I trust the private commercial 
companies 
2.02% 30.36% 43.72% 23.89% 342 
I trust the ONGs 3.24% 19.03% 42.51% 35.22% 342 
I trust the environmental 
organizations 
7.08% 25.83% 44.17% 22.92% 342 
I trust women’s rights organizations 11.84% 33.88% 33.88% 20.41% 342 
I trust the United Nations 2.05% 17.21% 36.89% 43.85% 342 
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Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
Culture 9.21% 24.69% 40.17% 25.94% 342 
History 12.81% 26.86% 38.02% 22.31% 342 
Religious beliefs 12.92% 22.50% 40.42% 24.17% 342 
The elites 29.22% 44.03% 20.16% 6.58% 342 
The masses 13.75% 21.67% 41.25% 23.33% 342 
The politicians 49.80% 36.55% 5.62% 8.03% 342 
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Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
Personal business 50.61% 37.65% 6.07% 5.67% 342 
The Nation’s business 7.88% 12.03% 47.72% 32.37% 342 
Their family’s business 43.15% 47.30% 6.64% 2.90% 342 
The business of their political parties 21.94% 56.12% 18.14% 3.80% 342 










Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
Haitian institutions work for all 
Haitians 
10.74% 21.07% 47.52% 20.66% 342 
Haitian institutions functions only for 
the politicians and national elites 
17.43% 37.76% 32.78% 12.03% 342 
Haitian institutions function well if 
you have the money to bribe 
employees 
27.85% 50.21% 13.50% 8.44% 342 
Haitian institutions are ameliorating 6.69% 27.20% 50.21% 15.90% 342 
Haitian institutions are controlled by 
foreign NGOs 
15.81% 44.02% 30.77% 9.40% 342 
Haitians institutions are controlled by 
Haitian elites 











Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
The Haitian state maintains a 
balance between the interests of 
the masses and those of the elites 
4.45% 10.53% 42.91% 42.11% 342 
The Haitian state maintains a 
balance between national interests 
and the interests of foreign powers  
3.02% 14.66% 47.84% 34.48% 342 
State institutions maintain a 
balance between the interests of 
the masses and those of the elites 
4.64% 10.55% 48.95% 35.86% 342 
State institutions maintains a 
balance between national interests 
and the interests of foreign powers 
4.31% 18.97% 45.26% 31.47% 342 
The Haitian government acts in the 
best interests of the nation  
3.81% 9.32% 41.53% 45.34% 342 
The Haitian government acts in the 
best interests of its people 
3.39% 10.59% 41.95% 44.07% 342 
Members of parliament act in the 
best interest of Haiti 
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Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
I am worried about the future of 
Haiti  
37.08% 45.00% 13.33% 4.58% 342 
Haiti is a failed nation  6.03% 24.14% 50.00% 19.83% 342 
Haiti will be reborn and become 
a strong nation  
24.45% 49.78% 20.09% 5.68% 342 
Haitians are able to resolve the 
problems faced by Haiti  
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Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total # of 
participants 
A strong state is necessary to 
resolve the problems faced by Haiti  
37.02% 37.02% 14.47% 11.49% 342 
The Haitian armed forces must be 
recreated or reconstituted 
30.90% 46.78% 11.59% 10.73% 342 
Non-governmental organizations 
are good for Haiti 
5.15% 21.89% 36.48% 36.48% 342 
The NGOs weaken the Haitian state 36.68% 31.00% 20.52% 11.79% 342 
The NGOs ought to be controlled 
by the Haitian state  
49.56% 39.47% 7.89% 3.07% 342 
The NGOs ought to work only in the 
areas decided by the state  
49.35% 35.93% 8.66% 6.06% 342 
Les ONG devraient avoir leur mot à 
dire dans le développement futur 
d'Haïti. 
9.96% 40.26% 28.14% 21.65% 342 
The NGOs undermine the economic 
development of Haiti  
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